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LONG

THE DECLINE
OF
THE ROMAN REPUBLIC.

BY
GEORGE LONG.

VOL. V.

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OF
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PREFACE.

THIS volume contains the history of the Roman Republic from Caesar's invasion of Italy to the close of the Civil War and the destruction of the old constitution, which was followed by other civil wars after Caesar's death, and the establishment of the Imperial system under Caesar Augustus. It is chiefly a history of military events, in which Caesar's great talents and his generous character are conspicuous. The civil administration is only a small part, for Caesar did not live long enough to do more than attempt to confirm order in the State, and to secure the power which he had acquired. I have said (p. 376), "Nothing could be worse than the condition of Rome when Caesar had completed his usurpation, and a radical reform seems to us impossible; even if Caesar had the will and the capacity to make such a reform, we cannot see how it could have been effected." Speculations about the great things which Caesar might have done, if he had lived longer, seem to me very foolish. We know what happened after his death, and what was done under the administration of Augustus, who was a man of large capacity, and after he became master of the Empire was anxious to secure peace within his extensive dominions and the prosperity of Rome and of the provinces. But it is not in the power of any man to change a state of affairs which is the result of the slow growth of centuries, or to avert the fate which awaits all political institutions. I have

endeavoured in these volumes to trace the history of Rome from the reforms of the Gracchi through a turbulent period of nearly one hundred years, a period of oligarchal tyranny and factious quarrels, to the inevitable end, the establishment of a monarchy in fact, but not in name. In this way, says Appian in the Introduction to his Civil Wars, "the Roman State was restored to tranquillity, and the Government became a monarchy." He adds, "and how this came about I have explained and have brought together the events, which are well worth the study of those who wish to be acquainted with ambition of men unbounded, love of power excessive, endurance unwearied, and forms of suffering infinite." The rise and decay of modern political systems are not exactly the same in modern States and in the great military and conquering Republic; but human passions and human folly, and even human wisdom and foresight are ever the same, and under different circumstances they work out like results. I therefore maintain what I said in the beginning of this work (vol. i. p. 2), that "all political systems contain within them the principles of their own death; and political progress, as we call it, is only the slower road to that end, to which all human institutions, so far as we have yet had experience, must come at last." "Time," says Bacon (*Essays, Of Innovations*), "is the greatest innovator; and if time of course alter things to the worse, and wisdom and counsel shall not alter them to the better, what shall be the end?"

The events contained within this volume relate principally to one man, the greatest of all the Romans in military and civil capacity; but there is another man whose relation to Caesar from the year B.C. 59 to his death makes him conspicuous in this history. I have said (vol. v. p. 466) that I have told the truth about Caesar, as far as we know the truth, and have told it with perfect impartiality. I have treated Cicero in the same way, though I do not expect that all persons will think that I have; but if they shall think

otherwise, I reply that they are either deficient in the power of forming an impartial judgment, or they have not taken pains to examine the evidence. I have observed in the Preface to the Third Volume, that "We learn Cicero's character best from his own letters, which are the strongest evidence that we have against him." I mean the strongest evidence against him as a public man. It is his own evidence that condemns him, not the evidence of his enemies, who were many. His letters also, while they often show him in a favourable light as a friend, a just provincial governor, a lover of letters, and a man of taste, also prove that he was vain, querulous, spiteful, and often ungenerous. His private character was not noble, or elevated.

A good Life of Cicero is still wanted; and when it shall be written, we shall see whether the writer has the capacity of rightly estimating Cicero's political character, and particularly his behaviour towards Caesar in the few years which preceded the Dictator's death, and whether the writer has also the power of forming a just judgment on Cicero's great talents and his literary merits. Some persons would allow him even small merit as a writer, but here I think that they are much mistaken. Cicero was both a great actor in the public events of his time and an important witness; and his life proves that, like many other men of ability, he had his weaknesses, and even his vices, and that no intellectual greatness is a security against such failings. Caesar Augustus, who knew Cicero well during the last year of his life, is reported to have found one of his own grandsons reading one of Cicero's writings, and to have taken the book from him and read a good part of it while he was standing. At last he returned the book to his grandson and said, "A wise man, my boy; a wise man and a lover of his country" (Plutarch, Cicero, c. 49). Perhaps Augustus allowed too much credit for wisdom to Cicero, whom he had himself so easily deceived; but he did him justice when he said that Cicero was a lover of his country.

I have now finished a work which has employed me more than twelve years, a work of great labour, for which I have examined all the ancient authorities, and I have used them as well as I could, and with perfect integrity and singleness of purpose. No man can know the defects of my work better than I do. Those who know what such labour is, how insufficient many of the ancient authorities are, and the difficulty of combining and using them, will be the fairest judges of what I have attempted to do.

The Index to the five volumes has been made by a young friend, Mr. Ernest Bell, to save an old man a tiresome task. If the Index had been larger, it might have contained references to more of the varied matter which is in these volumes. But it will still be useful. I have examined it with great care, and I believe that few errors will be discovered.

GEORGE LONG.

ROMAN CONSULS

FROM B.C. 49 TO B.C. 44.

(CLINTON'S FASTI.)

B.C.

49. C. Julius Caesar Dictator I. for eleven days.

The Consuls of B.C. 49,

C. Claudius Marcellus,
L. Cornelius Lentulus Cras,
leave Rome in January.

48. C. Julius Caesar Consul II.
P. Servilius Vatia Isauricus.

47. C. Julius Caesar Dictator II.
Q. Fufius Calenus.
P. Vatinus.

46. C. Julius Caesar Dictator III.,
Consul III.

45. C. Julius Caesar Dictator IV.
C. Julius Caesar Consul IV.

B.C.

45. Caesar abdicates the Consulship and Q. Fabius Maximus, C. Trebonius are elected Consuls.

When Fabius dies on the 31st of December, C. Caninius Rebilus is elected Consul for the few remaining hours of the year B.C. 45.

44. C. Julius Caesar Dictator V.
C. Julius Caesar Consul V.
M. Antonius.

After Caesar's murder on the 15th of March, M. Antonius, P. Cornelius Dolabella are Consuls.

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B.C. 47.

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B.C. 47.

Livy, Epit. 113; *Dion Cassius*, 42, cc. 21, &c., 49, &c.; *Appian, B. C.*, ii. 92, &c.; *Cicero's Letters*; *Suetonius, Caesar*, c. 38.

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Livy, Epit. 118; *Bellum Africanum*; *Dion Cassius*, 42, c. 56, &c.; *Appian*, B. C. ii. c. 96, &c.; *Plutarch*, *Cicero*, c. 38, and *Cato*.

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| Aggar, and finds abundance of barley, oil, wine, and figs, but only a little corn—Scipio follows Caesar, who seizes a town named Zeta, where he leaves a garrison—In his retreat Caesar passes Scipio's camp, and is attacked by Labienus and Afranius: he moves slowly, and brings back all his force to the camp—Caesar trains his men to meet the enemy's mode of attack; and as his men were afraid of the enemy's elephants, he accustomed the soldiers to them by using for this purpose elephants which he had ordered to be brought from Italy—Caesar changes his old method of warfare, and hurries his men from place to place, being certain that the enemy will follow him—He offers Scipio battle, but Scipio refuses the challenge—Juba surprises Vaga, which had asked a garrison from Caesar, and massacres all the inhabitants—Caesar on his march to Sarsura is attacked by Labienus, who is put to flight: Caesar takes Sarsura, massacres Scipio's garrison, and distributes among his army the supplies which he found in Sarsura—Caesar still advances south, and reaches Thidrus (El Jem): the magnificent amphitheatre at El Jem—Caesar returns to his camp at Aggar—The people of Thabena destroy Juba's garrison and submit to Caesar—Fresh troops come to Caesar from Sicily—He approaches Scipio's camp, which was near Tegea, and there is a battle, in which Caesar is victorious—Scipio looks on while his cavalry is pursued and massacred | 333 |
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B.C. 46.

Livy, Epit. 114; *Bellum Africanum*; *Dion Cassius*, 43, c. 10, &c.; *Appian*, B. C. ii. 97; *Plutarch*, *Caesar*, c. 17; and *Cato*; *Suetonius*, *Caesar*, 45.

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B.C. 46.

Livy, *Epit.* 115; *Dion Cassius*, 43, c. 14, &c.; *Censorinus*, c. 18; *Appian*, B. C. ii. 101, &c.; *Suetonius*, *Caesar*, c. 26, c. 37; *Cicero's Letters*.

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B.C. 46, 45.

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B.C. 46, 45.

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THE DECLINE OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC.

CHAPTER I.

THE INVASION OF ITALY.

B.C. 49.

THE history of this civil war is written by Caesar in three books, which comprehend the period from the invasion of Italy to the beginning of the Alexandrine war. These books were published after the death of Pompeius; and we must assume that notes were kept by Caesar of the events as they happened. The history is a military history like the Commentaries of the Gallic war; but it is also Caesar's apology, and must be read with some distrust. We have no other contemporary evidence except Cicero's letters, and a few letters of Caesar, Pompeius and others which have been preserved by Cicero. Cicero's statements can never be accepted without careful examination, but he has written so much that it is not difficult to ascertain his opinions, and to discover how far Caesar's story of the events which immediately followed his invasion of Italy agrees with the facts which Cicero reports. The compilers Dion Cassius and Appian, and the biographer Plutarch are still less trustworthy. It would be impossible to construct a history of the civil war from them. Where they agree with Caesar, we gain nothing by their confirmatory evidence; and where they add anything, it cannot be accepted without caution.

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These three books of the Civil war, like Caesar's history of the Gallic war, appear to have been written with great rapidity, for as he was quick in action, so he was also quick with his pen, and he has certainly made some mistakes. The military narrative is clear, though it is sometimes defective, as it seems to a modern reader. The text of the original is very corrupt, and many of the errors are past cure; and consequently the interpretation is sometimes very difficult even after all the labour of many skilful critics.

It was the 1st of January of the year 49 B.C. when Caesar's letter was delivered to the new consuls in the Senate (vol. iv. p. 415). The consuls were C. Claudius Marcellus and L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus. The tribunes or some of them with great¹ difficulty prevailed on the consuls to allow the letter to be read; but the consuls refused to permit any deliberation upon it, and they brought forward for consideration the state of the commonwealth. Lentulus declared that he would do his duty to the Senate and the State, if the senators would boldly declare their opinions; but if they looked towards Caesar and his favour, as they had done on former occasions, he would take his own course and would not regard the opinion of the Senate: he added that he too had the means of securing Caesar's favour and friendship.² Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio, the father-in-law of Pompeius, said that Pompeius would do his duty to the State, if the Senate would imitate him; if they should hesitate and show indecision, they would in vain pray for his aid when they wanted it. The words of Scipio were considered as a direct message from Pompeius, who was outside of Rome, for the meeting of the Senate was held in the city. M. Marcellus advised that the general condition of the Commonwealth should not be discussed until the levies of troops through Italy were completed, and the armies were enrolled, and then the Senate could safely act as they chose. M. Calpidius recommended that Pompeius should go to his Spanish provinces and so remove all cause of war; for as two legions had been taken from him (vol. iv. p. 410), Caesar

¹ Dion, xli. 1; Caesar, B. C. i. 1.

² Kraner omits "Caesaris" in Caesar's text, and gives another meaning to the words.

was afraid that if Pompeius stayed in Italy it might be supposed that he was keeping these legions near Rome as a menace to Caesar. M. Caelius Rufus³ expressed very nearly the same opinion as Calpidius. The consul Lentulus inveighed vehemently against these speakers and others who declared themselves to the same effect; and he said that he would not allow the motion of Calpidius to be put to the Senate. Marcellus was so terrified by the violent language of the consul that he withdrew his proposal, and the majority under the influence of threats and fear, for Pompeius had troops outside of the city (Dion, xli. 2), voted for Scipio's motion: that Caesar should disband his army before a certain day or be declared an enemy to the State. The tribunes M. Antonius and Q. Cassius placed their veto on this resolution; and then the question was put to the Senate on the validity of the tribunes' intercession; which was done conformably to a resolution of the Senate made in B.C. 51 about the provinces (vol. iv. p. 394). A discussion followed in which strong opinions were expressed, and those who were in favour of the most violent measures received the applause of Caesar's enemies.

The Senate having adjourned according to custom at the approach of evening were invited by Pompeius to come out of the city to confer with him. He commended and encouraged those who had shown most hostility to Caesar, and blamed those who had been lukewarm. At the same time Pompeius called to the city many of the old soldiers who had served under him, and they came with the expectation of reward and promotion: soldiers were also summoned from the two legions which Caesar had sent from Gallia, and Rome was filled with troops.

The sittings of the Senate were continued and attended by all the friends of the consuls, and by the adherents of Pompeius and those who had long been Caesar's enemies: the weak members were overpowered by the threats and the presence of these violent partisans, the wavering were strengthened, and the larger part of the senators were deprived of all freedom of action. The censor L. Piso, Caesar's

³ He is the man whom Cicero had formerly defended. Vol. iv. p. 139.

father-in-law, and the praetor L. Roscius, who had been one of Caesar's legati in Gallia, offered to go to Caesar and inform him of the proceedings at Rome: they asked for six days only for the journey to Ravenna and the return. Some senators proposed that commissioners should be sent to communicate to Caesar the resolution of the Senate. These proposals were resisted by the consul Lentulus, by Scipio and by M. Cato. Caesar (B. C. i. 4), who takes great pains to expose the violent behaviour of his enemies and to throw on them the blame of the war, says that Cato was moved by his long settled enmity to Caesar and vexation at his own failure when he was a candidate for the consulship in B.C. 51 (vol. iv. p. 368). Lentulus was deeply in debt, and he expected to set his affairs straight by obtaining the government of a province with an army, and getting money from princes, who were under the protection of Rome, by obtaining for them from the Senate the title of friends of the Roman people: and he was accustomed to boast among his associates that he would be a second Sulla and would rule as Sulla had done. Scipio also expected a province and the command of Roman troops, which his intimate connexion with Pompeius would entitle him to demand: he had some fear also that he might be brought to trial, probably on the charge which he had escaped in B.C. 52 (vol. iv. p. 366) with the help of his son-in-law: he was a vain, ostentatious man, who attached himself to the party which was then in power. Pompeius was urged on by the enemies of Caesar, and as he could not bear any equal or rival, he had detached himself from Caesar and become reconciled to those who were once enemies of both of them, though most of these men had only become Caesar's enemies in consequence of his alliance with Pompeius, who at the same time became Caesar's son-in-law. Pompeius also felt the disgrace which he had brought on himself by using for his own ambitious purposes the two legions taken from Caesar under the pretence of sending them to the East; by which words Caesar may mean, as it has been suggested, that a civil war alone could justify the behaviour of Pompeius and at the same time prove his foresight.

For all these reasons, says Caesar, everything was hurried

on in a violent manner. It is stated by Dion and Plutarch that the Senate changed their dress, or put on mourning, as was sometimes done in time of danger. Caesar's friends had no opportunity allowed of communicating with him, nor could the tribunes maintain their constitutional right of interposing the veto, a privilege which even Sulla had not taken from them (vol. ii. p. 400). On the seventh day from the 1st of January they were compelled to look after their safety by retiring from the city; which the most turbulent tribunes in former times of civil commotion had not done until their term of office had expired. Dion (41, c. 3) states that the consul Lentulus advised the tribunes to leave the Senate; but there is a general agreement among other late authorities that they were driven away by threats or by fear for their lives (Plutarch, Caesar, c. 31; Appian, B. C. ii, 33). Cicero (*Ad Fam.* xvi. 11. 2) affirms that the tribunes fled, though no violence was threatened. The *Senatusconsultum* was now voted, which was never used except when the State was in danger: that the consuls, praetors, tribunes of the people and those who were outside the city invested with proconsular power, should provide for the security of the State (*ne quid res publica detrimenti capiat*). Cicero himself was waiting outside the walls and was of course included in the commission. In the midst of this confusion a crowded Senate demanded a triumph for Cicero, as he says; but Lentulus replied that he would propose this matter for deliberation as soon as he had made all necessary preparations for the public safety, and Cicero waited patiently and prudently without immediately urging his claims. The *Senatusconsultum* was drawn up on the seventh of January. Thus within the first five days from the 1st of January included, on which the Senate could sit, for the third and fourth were "*dies comitiales*," on which there could be no sittings,⁴ the Senate came to a final resolution about Caesar's demands, set aside the "*intercessio*" of the tribunes, and rushed into war with their formidable enemy before they were prepared. The tribunes M. Antonius and

⁴ Cicero *ad Q. Fr.* ii. 2, 3, "*consecuti sunt dies comitiales, per quos senatus haberi non poterat.*" Gellius (xiv. 7, 9), "*Varro docet deinde inibi multa, quibus diebus haberi senatum jus non sit.*"

Q. Cassius accompanied by Curio and Caelius, left Rome on the night of the 7th of January in disguise to join Caesar, who was then at Ravenna. These two inviolable magistrates appeared to be flying from Rome to the protection of the man, who was expecting an answer to what he calls his very moderate demands and hoping or pretending to hope that, if his enemies were reasonable, peace might still be maintained.

On the days which followed the 7th of January the Senate met outside of the city, where Pompeius could be present. He confirmed what Scipio had said in his name, commended the firmness of the Senate, and stated what troops he had at his disposal: he had seven legions in Spain, and two in Italy, the two legions which had been taken from Caesar; he declared that he knew that Caesar's soldiers were ill affected towards him, that they would not defend him, or at least would not follow him. Cicero was not deceived by the language of Pompeius: he tells Atticus (vii. 13. 2) that all their hopes rested on the two legions of Caesar, which had been fraudulently retained in Italy, legions, as he says, which were hardly their own.

The Senate deliberated on the measures necessary for the protection of the State. It was determined that troops should be raised all through Italy; and Pompeius was supplied with money from the treasury. Before the 12th of January, Italy was divided into military districts, each placed under a commander whose duty it was to enlist soldiers and to collect money. Requisitions of arms were made, the municipia were summoned to furnish contributions, and the temples were robbed of their treasures (B. C. i. 6). It is not stated how the commanders of the military districts were chosen: Cicero says that he took the district of Capua, and we may infer that he had his choice, or perhaps rather he took this district at the request of Pompeius; but about the end of January he speaks of the men being unwilling to be enrolled and not liking the prospect of fighting (Ad Attic. vii. 13. 2).

It was proposed in the Senate to send immediately to Mauritania, Faustus Sulla, son of the dictator Sulla, and son-in-law of Pompeius, to secure the kings Bocchus and Bogudes; but Philippus one of the tribunes prevented the mission of

Faustus. It was also proposed that the Numidian king Juba should be declared an ally and friend, but the consul C. Marcellus would not consent for the present. The provinces were assigned to private persons, as Caesar expresses it, but apparently under the rule by which Cicero had been sent to Cilicia. Scipio, who was consul B.C. 52, had Syria, and L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, consul B.C. 54, had Caesar's province of Transalpine Gallia. The appointment of Domitius was therefore in conformity with the *Senatusconsultum* that no praetor or consul should take a provincial government before the lapse of five years (vol. iv. p. 367); but the appointment of Scipio was against the *Senatusconsultum*.⁵ Both Syria and Transalpine Gallia were consular provinces: the rest were praetorian. M. Considius Nonianus had Gallia Cisalpina, which was also Caesar's province: M. Cato had Sicily: M. Aurelius Cotta had Sardinia: L. Aelius Tubero had the province named Africa, and P. Sestius had Cilicia. The legal form of giving to the provincial governors by a *lex curiata de imperio* power to command troops was omitted; and yet the governors after performing the usual religious ceremonies in the Capitol left the city wearing the scarlet cloak, which was the dress of a military commander. The consuls also left Rome, as Caesar says (B. C. i. 6).

When Caesar heard of what had been done in the city, he addressed his men. He complained of the wrongs that he had suffered from his enemies at different times; of the envy and jealousy of Pompeius, whom he had always supported; of the "intercessio" of the tribunes being resisted by violence; and of the resolution (*ne quid res publica detrimenti capiat*), which was a summons to the Roman people to take up arms, and was only used in times of civil commotion, as in the case of Saturninus (vol. ii. c. 10) and the Gracchi; but at the present time there was no pretext or occasion for this declaration. He urged the men to protect their general under whom for nine years they had fought and conquered, and reduced to obedience Gallia and Germania. The soldiers of the thirteenth

⁵ Caesar speaks of Philippus and Cotta, as some MSS. have it, being passed over for party reasons. But the passage is supposed to be corrupt. Kraner has "Paulus et Marcellus," the consuls of B.C. 50.

legion answered with shouts that they were ready to avenge the wrongs of their general and of the tribunes. The thirteenth was the legion which Caesar had sent to Gallia Cisalpina after giving up to Pompeius the fifteenth legion which was then stationed in that country (vol. iv. p. 410), and this thirteenth legion was the only force that he had with him, for others had not yet arrived in Italy.

Being assured of the fidelity of his men Caesar passed the boundary of his province of Gallia Cisalpina with his thirteenth legion and quickly arrived at Ariminum (Rimini).

Plutarch (Caesar, 32) and Appian (B. C. ii. 35) state that Caesar sent forward a small force to take Ariminum, and that after giving a dinner on the evening to his friends he made an excuse for leaving them, and advanced southwards. This statement may be true, for Caesar, as in his history of the Gallic war, omits all circumstances, which are immaterial. He does not even mention the fact of crossing the little river Rubicon (perhaps the Fiumicino), the southern boundary of his province of Gallia Cisalpina, which fact in later times became a favourite topic for rhetoricians and has been embellished by Lucan (*Pharsalia*, i. 213). C. Asinius Pollio, who was with Caesar when he crossed the river, wrote a history of the civil war, and his work may have furnished materials for anecdotes about Caesar (Plutarch, Caesar, c. 46). But we cannot suppose that Pollio was the authority for the wonderful story (Suetonius, c. 32) that when Caesar arrived at the Rubicon in the morning, there appeared a gigantic figure seated and playing on a reed, while shepherds were listening and many of the soldiers and some trumpeters crowded around to hear the music, upon which the phantom snatching a trumpet and blowing a loud blast advanced to the opposite side of the river. Such legends continually occur in all ancient history, and even in later times; they grow up, nobody knows how, and are fixed in popular belief as much as the facts which are possible and credible. Nor can we accept the statements of later writers that Caesar hesitated to cross the Rubicon and made an exhibition of his wavering purpose to his men. It is certain that he gladly accepted the challenge of the Senate, that he had long resolved to bring the quarrel to the decision

of arms, and he could not expect to encourage his men by showing timidity, or even by pretending to be afraid, for such pretence was as inconsistent with his character as real fear which, as far as we can judge, he never felt. Indeed Plutarch in his life of Antonius (c. 6), where he is confuting the false statement of Cicero (Philipp. ii. 22) that M. Antonius was the beginning or, as Cicero expresses it, the cause of the civil war, makes a very just remark: "Caius Caesar was not such a light person or so easy to be moved from his sound judgment by passion, if he had not long ago determined to do this, as to have made war on his country all of a sudden, because he saw Antonius in a mean dress and Cassius making their escape to him in a hired chariot; but this gave a ground and specious reason for the war to a man who had been long wanting a pretext. He was led to war against the whole world, as Alexander before him and Cyrus of old had been, by an insatiable love of power and a frantic passion to be first and greatest; and this he could not obtain, if Pompeius was not put down." It is therefore quite unnecessary to examine, as some writers have done, who was the cause of the civil war. It would have been a fit subject for a declamation among the rhetoricians of the Empire. The course of events in the years immediately preceding the year 49 shows that war was unavoidable; that Caesar, if he did not wish for war, was resolved to maintain his demands, that his enemies in Rome were determined to crush him, if they could, and that Pompeius, as Cicero tells us, was as obstinate as Caesar, and really wished for a war, in which he and his partisans expected to gain the victory. Cicero in a letter to Caesar (Ad Attic. ix. 11) written in March B.C. 49, tells him, that he was wronged by the declaration of war, and that the jealousy of his enemies had moved them to deprive him of a second consulship and his provinces.

Cicero, who knew the Pompeian party well, has recorded his opinions of them.⁶ Some were men who only wished to remain quiet and to enjoy their estates, their little villas and their money. At first they trusted in Pompeius, but as cir-

⁶ The passages in his letters are many, and written at different times: Ad Attic. viii. 13. 2; viii. 16; ix. 11. 4; ix. 9. 2; xi. 6. 2; Ad Fam. vii. 3. 2; Ad Fam. ix. 6. 3.

circumstances changed, they were afraid of him and turned their affections to Caesar, whom they had feared. These good men, these Optimates, how they come in crowds to meet Caesar, he exclaims, and what honour they pay him. The Italian towns receive him as if he were a god; and there is no pretence in this matter as there was when they offered prayers for the recovery of Pompeius (vol. iv. p. 405). You will say, remarks Cicero to Atticus, that they fear Caesar, and perhaps it is so; but they fear Pompeius more. In the same letter Cicero says that he had long known the incapacity of Pompeius in civil affairs, and he now knows that he is equally incapable as a soldier.

This foolish and unjust judgment contradicts Cicero's own opinion expressed on a recent occasion (vol. iv. p. 414), and is in striking contrast with the extravagant adulation which he lavished on Pompeius some years before when he recommended him as the only man fit to conduct the war against Mithridates (vol. iii. p. 135). Pompeius certainly made a great mistake in his estimate of Caesar's troops; and if he was misled by the report of Appius Claudius (vol. iv. p. 411), he showed want of judgment. A long and successful career had filled him with unbounded confidence in himself, but he ought to have formed a more correct opinion of the men who followed the fortunes of his former father-in-law.

The violent partisans of Pompeius were men of a different stamp. Some of them were deeply in debt as Scipio, Faustus Sulla and Libo, and ready to do anything to escape from their creditors. They talked of proscriptions like Sulla's; and what might they not be expected to do if they were victorious? It was even the design of the Pompeians to starve Italy, and for this purpose ships were collected from all parts of the East to intercept the supplies of grain and to take possession of the provinces which fed Italy; and this was not merely Cicero's opinion, but he heard the Pompeians declare their purpose. In a letter written after the death of Pompeius he says that the chiefs of the party had planned a general proscription of the rich and that Atticus would have been among the sufferers. Cicero declares that he dreaded the success of his own party, so cruel were the intentions which they expressed: they threatened to punish those who

had remained neutral or had not actively joined the Pompeian party; and Cicero was one of them.

Cicero thought that the contest between Caesar and Pompeius was a struggle for supreme power; and that unless Pompeius got the victory, the commonwealth must perish; and if Pompeius was victorious, he would be a conqueror after the fashion of Sulla.⁷ Neither Caesar nor Pompeius looked to the interest of the State: both of them only wished to rule. If Pompeius prevails, says Cicero, he will not leave one tile standing in Italy. After the defeat of Pompeius, when Caesar was in the possession of power, Cicero said that it would not have been much different, if Pompeius were in Caesar's place. Cicero's opinion about Caesar's character and behaviour may be compared with the events, which followed the crossing of the Rubicon; and the comparison shows that Cicero was mistaken, as he often was mistaken, in his political calculations. Caesar's first consulship, Cicero observes, showed what he would do in his second. Though he was weak in his first consulship, he was stronger than the Commonwealth; and what will he do when he is consul again? When he was advancing south from Ariminum, Cicero exclaims to Atticus: Am I speaking of a Roman commander or of a Hannibal? The madman, the wretch, who says that he is doing all this to support his just claims; the scandalous robber! It is uncertain whether the tyrant will be a Phalaris or a Pisistratus. The city is left unprotected; and what may we not fear from him? At the close of B.C. 50 Cicero had said that if Caesar overpowered the opposite party, he would neither be more merciful than Cinna to the chief men in the State nor more moderate than Sulla in seizing the property of the rich.—Events soon proved that Cicero's fears were unfounded, and that Caesar was neither a Cinna nor a Sulla; but Cicero could not be cured of his suspicions. Even after Pompeius had left Italy and Caesar had gone to Spain to attack the legati of Pompeius, Cicero expected, if Caesar should return victorious to Rome, that there would be bloodshed, confiscation of private property, recall of exiles, abolition

⁷ Ad Attic. x. 7. 1; viii. 11. 2; ix. 7. 5; vii. 7. 7; vii. 9. 3; vii. 11. 1; vii. 18. 2; vii. 20. 2; x. 8. 2; Ad Fam. iv. 9, 2.

of debts, promotion of worthless men, and the establishment of a regal tyranny intolerable even to a Persian: in fact Cicero never got rid of his fear of Caesar, though he told him, in a letter of B.C. 49, already referred to, that it was many years since he had selected Caesar and Pompeius as the two men to whom he should devote himself before all others, and become their most intimate friend, as in fact he then was, as he says.

Cicero's opinion of Caesar's partisans was expressed to Atticus (vii. 3. 5) in B.C. 50. On Caesar's side were all the men who had suffered condemnation and were branded with ignominy, all who deserved condemnation and ignominy, almost all the young men, all the common sort in the city, a worthless rabble, powerful tribunes, and men burdened with debt, who were a more numerous class than he had supposed: this general abuse of Caesar's followers destroys Cicero's credit as a witness: he knew and he has told us what many of Pompeius' partisans were, and the worst of Caesar's were not worse than the contemptible nobles who were on the side of Pompeius. Cicero knew also that Caesar had many true friends, men who had enjoyed his bounty and admired his talents and character, and might reasonably expect, since Rome must have a master, that Caesar would be a better ruler than the irresolute Pompeius governed by a cabal of foolish and profligate men.

Cicero at this time was in a state of great fear and perplexity: his thoughts were wavering and unsettled, and as he was a man filled with passion and prejudice, his opinions changed with events. He was altogether deficient in sound political judgment. In his letters to Atticus and others, instead of calmly surveying the state of affairs, he breaks out into violent abuse of both sides in turns. All we can say is that he seems to have foreseen the issue of the contest between Caesar and his enemies; and how could he or any man capable of reflection doubt about the result? On the one side was a leader surrounded by a faction, which unwillingly submitted to him and rather made him their instrument than yielded to his authority. On the other side was the conqueror of Gallia, who shared his power with no one, but held in

absolute obedience an army of veterans whom for years he had led to victory and enriched by his liberality; a man who knew how to gain the confidence and affection of his soldiers, ever ready to follow their general in the most hazardous enterprise, and ever confident in the military genius and vigilance of a commander whom they loved and for whom they were ready to die.

CHAPTER II.

CAESAR AT CORFINIUM.

B.C. 49.

CAESAR found at Ariminum the fugitive tribunes with C. Curio and M. Caelius. Suetonius (Caesar, 33) reports that in the presence of these men and before his soldiers, Caesar with tears in his eyes rent his garments and invoked the fidelity of his little army. It is probable that Caesar did address his troops, but the shedding of tears and the tearing of clothes were not in his fashion. He summoned his soldiers in Gallia to join him as he says (c. 8), but, as will afterwards appear (c. 37), only part of them. Pompeius had a larger force than Caesar; but the recruiting went on slowly, and he did not trust the two legions, which had been taken from the proconsul of Gallia.

While Caesar was still at Ariminum, as he says (B. C. i. 8), there came young L. Caesar, son of the L. Caesar who was one of Caesar's legati (vol. iv. p. 331). After despatching the business on which he came, but we are not told by Caesar what it was, though it was doubtless a message in the name of the Commonwealth, he delivered a private message from Pompeius to this effect: that Caesar must not view what Pompeius had done for the State as directed against Caesar: he had always regarded the public interest before private considerations: it would be consistent with Caesar's character also to throw away all passion for the sake of the commonwealth, and not to injure the State in attempting to punish the men who were his enemies. The praetor Roscius, who was present, addressed Caesar in nearly the same words, and said that Pompeius had

expressed such opinions. This message did not appear to Caesar (B. C. i. 9.) in any degree to remove the wrongs which he had suffered, but as he had the opportunity of returning an answer, he requested L. Caesar and Roscius to deliver his message to Pompeius, by doing which they might possibly settle a great dispute. Caesar's reply was this: He had always regarded the interests of the State even more than his own life: that he was vexed at being deprived by his enemies of the permission which the Roman people had given him (B.C. 52) to be a candidate for the consulship of B.C. 48, without presenting himself at Rome: the withdrawal of this permission would compel him to appear at Rome in the middle of B.C. 49, and shorten his proconsular government by six months: still in the interest of the State he had submitted to this infringement of his rights without complaining; when he wrote to the Senate to propose that all who were at the head of armies should give them up, he could not obtain even this request: the Senate were now raising troops in all parts of Italy, they had in their hands the two legions which were fraudulently taken from him on the pretext of a Parthian war, and the State was in arms: what was the purpose of all this, if it was not for Caesar's ruin? However he would consent to anything for the interest of the commonwealth: let Pompeius go off to his provinces, the Senate disband their armies, let all the armed men in Italy lay down their arms, let the citizens be delivered from fear, let the elections be free from constraint, and the whole administration be put in the hands of the Senate and the Roman people: that all this may be the easier effected and on definite terms and ratified by oath, let Pompeius either come nearer to Caesar or Caesar be allowed to approach Pompeius, and then the disputes may be settled by a conference.

This is all that Caesar states. Cicero (Ad Fam. xvi. 12. 3) adds that if his terms were accepted, Caesar proposed to give up Transalpine Gallia to L. Domitius, and Cisalpine Gallia to Considius Nonianus; that he would go to Rome to be a candidate for the consulship and he did not wish his claims to be considered if he was not present. We accepted his terms, says Cicero, on the condition that he should remove his forces

from the towns which he had occupied, so that the Senate could deliberate at Rome without fear about these terms. Roscius, as Caesar says (i. 10), went to Capua, where he delivered Caesar's message to Pompeius and the consuls. L. Caesar is not mentioned by Caesar, though it was he who brought the proposal of Pompeius. Caesar was mistaken in supposing that Pompeius and the consuls were then at Capua. Cicero saw L. Caesar at Minturnae, on the 23rd of January, on his return from the mission to Caesar, and he speaks most contemptuously of the man and of the absurd message that he brought; if indeed, he says, Caesar did send a message by him (Ad Attic. vii. 13. b. 6). Labienus, 'a great man in my opinion,' says Cicero, came to Teanum Sidicinum on the 22nd of January, for he had deserted Caesar, and he there met Pompeius and the consuls. L. Caesar delivered Caesar's message to Pompeius and the consuls at Teanum on the 23rd. An answer was made in writing, that the proposal of Caesar was accepted, provided he would withdraw his troops from the towns which he had occupied south of the limits of Gallia Cisalpina, and then Pompeius and the consuls would return to Rome and settle all things with the advice of the Senate, as Cicero says (Ad Attic. vii. 14. 1). As Caesar (c. 10) reports the answer, it was this: Caesar must return into Gallia Cisalpina, quit Ariminum and disband his armies; and then Pompeius would go to his Spanish provinces: in the meantime, until security was given that Caesar would do what he proposed, the consuls and Pompeius would continue to raise troops. It was not fair, Caesar remarks, to require him to quit Ariminum and to return to his province, while Pompeius kept his provinces and the two legions which did not belong to him; to require Caesar's army to be disbanded and to continue raising troops; for Pompeius to promise to go to his province, and not to name a day when he would go; and the fact of Pompeius not naming a time for the proposed conference destroyed all hope of peace.

L. Caesar was sent with the written answer to Caesar's proposals, and it was copied and posted up in Rome. Cicero complains that Pompeius, who wrote well, had intrusted to Cicero's friend P. Sestius the composition of so important a

letter, which was intended to be communicated to all the citizens: he had never seen anything more truly in Sestius' style (*Ad Attic.* vii. 17. 2). On receiving the answer Caesar sent M. Antonius with five cohorts from Ariminum over the Apennines to Arretium (Arezzo): he stayed at Ariminum himself and began to raise troops. He also occupied Pisaurum (Pesaro), Fanum (Fano), and Ancona, each with a single cohort (*B. C.* i. 11).

We have from Caesar and Cicero perhaps a sufficient statement of the final negotiations about settling the quarrel between Caesar and the Senate. The failure of these negotiations was followed by a war, the result of which brought about the inevitable revolution, which had long been foreseen by prudent men; and though the great change would certainly have happened some time, it seems probable that if it had been deferred, the consequences to Rome and to us who now live in Europe might not have been exactly the same. This civil war is the most important event in the long history of Rome, for it led the way to the foundation of a dynasty of Caesars by a young man not inferior to Caesar in ability, but of a very different character.

There is some difficulty in determining the order of events at this critical time. I am not sure that Caesar has accurately observed the order in his narrative, and we have no contemporary evidence for correcting him except that of Cicero, who is often careless about facts and was now so frightened that he hardly knew what he wrote. Caesar's words literally state that he did not seize the four towns Arretium, Pisaurum, Fanum, and Ancona until he had received the final answer to his proposals (c. 12). Cicero writes to Tiro (*Ad Fam.* xvi. 12. 2) that "we left Rome after Caesar had occupied Ariminum, Pisaurum, Ancona, and Arretium;" and he also speaks of the final answer of the Senate having been sent to Caesar, and of their not yet knowing whether Caesar would abide by his own terms, as Cicero expresses it. This letter was written on the 27th of January from Capua. Now we have Cicero's own statement, that "we" left Rome on the 18th of January (*Ad Attic.* ix. 10. 4),¹ and after Caesar had

¹ This is a valuable letter. It contains extracts from many letters of Atticus
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seized the towns, as Cicero says. On the 23rd of January in the morning Cicero saw L. Caesar at Minturnae, as I have already said, on his return from his first visit to Caesar. At this time it was known that Caesar's old legatus T. Labienus had deserted him. Labienus joined Pompeius on the 22nd at Teanum Sidicinum, and gave him comfort by his report of the small amount of Caesar's force. If Cicero then tells the truth, Caesar seized the four towns before the 18th of January and before he received the final answer of the consuls, which showed that he could not hope for peace. According to Caesar's statement (B.C. i. 14) the Senate did not leave Rome until Caesar had taken Auximum which is south of Ancona. Plutarch (Caesar, c. 33) describes the terror in Italy and at Rome when it was known that Caesar had passed the boundary of his province and taken Ariminum. All was in confusion, and Pompeius "left the city after giving his commands to the Senate to follow, and that no one should stay who preferred his country and freedom to tyranny." The consuls, he adds, fled without even making the usual sacrifices before quitting the city, and most of the senators ran off in a disorderly manner carrying off with them what first came to hand. Appian (B.C. ii. 35) supposed that as soon as Caesar took Ariminum he advanced farther south and seized other places, and these events being known at Rome caused the greatest alarm. "Now," said Favonius, alluding to an arrogant expression of Pompeius, "now is the time to stamp your foot and call armies out of the earth." Pompeius replied, "You shall have the armies, if you will follow me, and leave Rome and Italy too, if it shall be necessary. After uttering threats against those who should desert their country in this time of peril, he immediately went to Capua to his army, and the consuls followed him. The rest of the senators passed the night in the Senate-house, but most of them in the morning quitted the city and went after Pompeius. Dion (41. c. 4—9) in his usual fashion has loaded his narrative with tiresome particulars, but he seems, like Appian, to have supposed that

to Cicero written on the 21st of January and after that date to the 9th of March. The subject of all these letters was whether Cicero should stay in Italy or join Pompeius if he left Italy.

after the capture of Ariminum Caesar immediately moved southwards and took all the towns on his road. Pompeius, he says, not being ready to meet Caesar, sent to him L. Caesar and L. Roscius the praetor to propose terms of agreement, and when they brought Caesar's answer, they were sent to him again; but before the return of the men from the second mission, Pompeius retired to Campania. The probable conclusion from all the evidence is that Caesar had occupied other towns besides Ariminum before Pompeius left Rome, and therefore before the 18th of January, the day on which "we," as Cicero says, left the city.

The events, which followed the interruption of the negotiations for peace to the escape of Pompeius from Brundisium, belong respectively to the retreat of Pompeius into Apulia and thence to Brundisium, and to the advance of Caesar.

After the meeting at Teanum the consuls went to Capua, and Pompeius wished Cicero to go there to aid in the raising of troops. The Campanian settlers (*coloni*) did not answer readily to the appeal. Pompeius went to Larinum near the coast of the Adriatic, and took Labienus with him. Cicero said that Labienus was a hero when he deserted Caesar; and a few weeks after he said that Labienus was not worth much.² Pompeius perhaps had already determined to leave Italy, but Cicero could not discover what his intention was. He wrote to Cicero about the end of January and informed him that he expected to have a strong force in a few days, and that if he advanced northward to Picenum, the Senate might return to Rome (*Ad Attic.* vii. 16. 2). On the 4th of February Cicero went in a heavy rain to Capua to meet the consuls according to their order, but they were not there. It was said that they were coming, but without forces and unprepared; and there was also a report that Pompeius was at Luceria in Apulia with some troops, which were not very trustworthy. It was reported also that Caesar was advancing, not to fight, for there was no one to fight with, but to intercept the flight of his enemies. Cicero declares his readiness to die with Pompeius, if he would stay in Italy (*Ad Attic.* vii. 20). About the middle of February Pompeius invited Cicero to Luceria,

² Plutarch (*Caesar*, c. 34) reports that when Labienus deserted, Caesar sent his property and baggage after him.

where he would be safer than in any other place (Ad Attic. viii. 1). Cicero replied that he did not inquire where he would be safest, and that he would go to Pompeius if he wished it, either for his own sake or for the interests of the State: and he urged him not to leave Italy. Cicero suspected that Pompeius would leave Italy, and he found or thought that he could not safely join him owing to Caesar's rapid advance southwards. Perhaps he never intended to join Pompeius. He wrote to Atticus (viii. 3) a long letter, in which he asked his advice on this question, What should he do, if Pompeius quitted Italy? This letter is a proof that he thought of his own safety more than anything else. He had sufficient evidence of Caesar's friendly disposition towards him even now; and Atticus knew, as Cicero says, that he had long foreseen the present state of affairs and had for this reason secured Caesar's friendship. Cicero certainly preferred the side of the Senate, if we can believe anything that he wrote at this time. Still the issue of the quarrel was uncertain, and what should he do if Pompeius were successful? It is a just conclusion that he would have declared for Caesar, if he had not feared the possibility of Pompeius ultimately gaining the victory, though he did not expect it. At this time Cicero had a ship waiting for him at Caieta on the west coast and another at Brundisium on the east coast: he could escape by two ways. Pompeius was also preparing for flight. He sent Scipio with two cohorts to Brundisium, and on the 20th of February he wrote from Canusium (Canosa) to ask Cicero to join him at Brundisium (Ad Att. viii. 11. D. 4), but Cicero informed him that he could not come: the road was stopped. In the letter just referred to Cicero tells Pompeius that when he wrote a letter, which had been delivered at Canusium, he had no suspicion that Pompeius in the interest of the State would cross the sea; which contradicts what he had already written to Atticus (viii. 3, 1), where he says that he did suspect that Pompeius would leave Italy. Pompeius was at Brundisium about the 22nd of February, and all the troops were ordered to join him there. He had given up, perhaps he never entertained, the purpose of opposing Caesar in Italy, and his sensible remarks in a letter to L. Domitius,

give sufficient reason for his resolve to cross the sea. He could not trust the soldiers that he had with him so far as to hazard a decisive battle: the new troops raised by the consuls were not yet collected, and could not come together soon; and if they did, he writes to Domitius, how little reliance you can place on troops, who do not even know one another, and are opposed to veteran legions, you know very well. Yet Cicero in his arrogant conceit had called Pompeius an incompetent commander. (Ad Attic. viii. 12, and the letters of Pompeius to the consuls C. Marcellus, L. Lentulus; and to L. Domitius.)

On the 2nd of February Cicero informs Atticus (vii. 17. 3) that he had received a letter from his old friend the lawyer Trebatius, who was with Caesar, a letter written on the 22nd of January at Caesar's request: Caesar wished Cicero to be at Rome, for he had just heard of him and others quitting the city. Cicero replied to Trebatius that it would be difficult at that time to comply with Caesar's wish, but he said that he was staying in the country and that he had neither undertaken the raising of troops nor any other business; and further, that he will continue in this mind so long as there shall be hope of peace. Yet he wrote to Pompeius after the middle of February (Ad Attic. viii. 11. B) and reported that on the day when Pompeius left Teanum, the 23rd of January, he had gone to Capua as Pompeius wished him to do, where he found that T. Ampius was busily mustering troops, and Scribonius Libo to whom they were handed over, was most active. Cicero was also present at Capua to meet the consuls on the 5th of February as we have seen. According to his own evidence, he was playing a double part and deceiving Pompeius. He informed Atticus (vii. 21) that while he was at Capua, from the 5th to the 7th of February, there was no levy of troops going on anywhere. On the 7th of February the tribune C. Cassius brought a message to the consuls from Pompeius that they should go to Rome, take the money out of the sacred treasury (*aerarium sanctius*) and return immediately; but this would have been very hazardous, as Cicero says. The consul Lentulus replied that Pompeius should first march into Picenum; but Picenum, says Cicero,

was already lost, and nobody knew it except himself from the letters of Dolabella, who as well as Caelius informed him that Caesar was quite satisfied with the conduct of Cicero. A letter from Philotimus on the 9th of February brought a report about the strength of L. Domitius' army which comforted Cicero's friends, who were with him at Formiae, but Cicero did not trust the report. On the 17th of February Pompeius received a letter from L. Domitius, a copy of which he forwarded to one of the consuls, and requested the consul to join him with his troops, but to leave a sufficient garrison at Capua. Pompeius soon announced to the consuls his intention to retire to Brundisium with the greater part of the troops and to take them over the sea to Dyrrhachium; and the consuls joined him in Apulia before the 20th of February, as Pompeius informed Cicero (*ad Attic. viii. 11. c*). At this time Cicero received frequent letters from Caesar, who expressed his satisfaction at his inactivity, and entreated him to continue quiet; and on the 24th of February the younger Balbus brought him from Caesar a message to the same effect, and a letter and message from Caesar to the consul Lentulus, in which Caesar promised him a province and other things, if he would return to Rome. But it was too late. Cicero on the 25th of February supposed that Pompeius might be at Brundisium, for he had advanced towards this town before his legions left Luceria. "But the vigilance, rapidity and activity of this monster is terrible," says Cicero: "what will happen, I cannot tell." He was afraid that Caesar would overtake Pompeius.

While on the side of Pompeius there was disunion, treachery, irresolution, and no fixed purpose except the resolve of Pompeius to leave Italy without fighting, Caesar pursued his victorious career in the hope of finishing the war by the defeat of his rival. It is necessary to follow Caesar's narrative, though it appears certain that he erroneously supposed or at least he has said that the consuls and Pompeius did not leave Rome until he had taken Auximum. After the occupation of Ancona, being informed that Q. Minucius Thermus, who held Iguvium (Gubbio) with five cohorts, was fortifying the town, and that the townsmen were well disposed to change sides,

Caesar sent Curio with three cohorts. As soon as Thermus heard of Curio's approach, he drew his cohorts out of the town and fled: his men left him on the road and returned to their homes. Curio was received by all the people of Iguvium most willingly. Caesar encouraged by this success drew the cohorts of the thirteenth legion out of the towns which he had occupied and advanced to Auximum (Osimo) south of Ancona. P. Attius Varus held this town with some cohorts, and was sending senators through Picenum to raise fresh troops. When Caesar's approach was known, the decuriones or town council came to Varus, and told him that neither they nor the townsmen would allow Caesar, who had done the State so much service, to be shut out of the place; and they advised Varus to look after his own safety. Varus led his troops out of the town and fled. A few of Caesar's men, who belonged to the first centuria, pursued Varus and compelled him to fight, but his own soldiers deserted him: part returned to their homes and the rest were brought to Caesar, and with them L. Pupius, a centurion of the highest rank, who had held the same post in the army of Pompeius. Caesar praised the soldiers of Varus, set Pupius free, and with thanks to the people of Auximum promised that he would not forget what they had done.

Here Caesar introduces his description of the effect produced at Rome by the report of his victorious progress and his advance to Auximum (B. C. i. 14). The alarm in the city was so great that when the consul Lentulus went to the treasury to take out the money, which the Senate had voted for Pompeius, he forthwith fled from Rome leaving the sacred treasury open (*sanctius aerarium*); for there was a false report that Caesar was expected immediately, and that his cavalry were already there. Marcellus, the other consul, and most of the magistrates followed Lentulus. Pompeius had left the city the day before to visit the two legions, which had been taken from Caesar and placed in winter-quarters in Apulia. The raising of troops in the neighbourhood of Rome was stopped; there was no safety, as the fugitives supposed, north of Capua, but on arriving there they recovered their spirits and began to recruit among the men who were settled

there under the *Lex Julia* which was enacted in Caesar's consulship (vol. iii. p. 416). It seems certain that Caesar's narrative, as it has been already said, does not place the events in the true order; and he seems to contradict himself, for he has already said that Pompeius and the consuls were at Capua when Roscius delivered Caesar's answer to the message brought to him by L. Caesar. The strange story of Lentulus being in such a hurry to run away that he left the sacred treasury open, and that the fugitives did not stop till they reached Capua, appears to have been written to show his contempt for his feeble opponents. Caesar kept a school of gladiators, as the Romans termed the thing, at Capua, and when Lentulus arrived there, he brought them to the Forum or public place, gave them hopes of manumission, mounted them on horses and ordered them to follow him; but Pompeius got rid of the gladiators by assigning two to every head of a family in the conventus of Campania to look after. Caesar wrote a letter to Cicero about his gladiators and Cicero sent an answer (*Ad Attic.* viii. 2. 1).

Advancing south from Auximum Caesar occupied the territory of Picenum, in which Pompeius had many dependants and also large estates. All the *præfecturae*³ of those parts received him gladly and supplied his soldiers with all that they wanted. The townsmen of Cingulum (Cingoli), which Labienus had established and built at his own cost, sent a deputation to Caesar and declared their willingness to obey his orders. Caesar required soldiers, and they were sent. The twelfth legion now joined Caesar, and with this legion and the thirteenth he marched upon Asculum of Picenum (Ascoli), which is on the river Tronto. Lentulus Spinther (consul B.C. 57) held Asculum with ten cohorts, but he fled on hearing of Caesar's approach, and tried to carry off his troops, but the greater part deserted him. This happened before the 7th of February (*Cic. ad Attic.* vii. 21. 2). Lentulus on the road fell in with Vibullius Rufus, whom Pompeius had sent into Picenum to strengthen his friends. Rufus learning from Lentulus the state of affairs took the soldiers whom

³ "Præfecturae" were Italian towns, which possessed all the rights of Roman citizens, but received their præfectus or chief magistrate from Rome.

Lentulus still had, and sent him off. Rufus got together what cohorts he could from those parts, and meeting with Lucilius Hirrus, who was flying from Camerinum with six cohorts, which had been placed there to protect that town, he took the men from Hirrus, and adding them to those, whom he had received from Lentulus, made up thirteen cohorts. Rufus marched with this force as fast as he could to Corfinium (San Pelino) on the Pescara in the mountainous country of the Peligni, and reported the near approach of Caesar with two legions. L. Domitius Ahenobarbus (consul B.C. 54), who held Corfinium, had got together twenty cohorts from Alba, and the country of the Marsi and Peligni. Rufus informed Pompeius by letter that Domitius intended to leave Corfinium on the 9th of February with his army and join Pompeius (Ad Attic. viii. 12. B). After taking possession of Firmum (Fermo) and Asculum, Caesar ordered the men, who had deserted Lentulus to be looked for, and he gave orders for raising new troops. He stayed only one day at Asculum to get supplies for his men and marched on Corfinium. Domitius had sent forward five cohorts to break down a bridge over the Pescara, which was about three miles from the town, but they were met by some of Caesar's advanced force and being quickly driven back retired into Corfinium. Caesar took his legions over the river and encamped near the town wall. Domitius now sent off messengers, who were well acquainted with the country, and offered them great rewards to carry letters to Pompeius who was then at Luceria in Apulia with fourteen cohorts: the purport of the message of Domitius was to entreat Pompeius to come to his relief; that Caesar might be easily prevented from retreating or advancing by two armies aided by the narrow defiles; and if Pompeius did not come, that Domitius and above thirty cohorts and a great number of senators and equites would be in great danger. In the mean time Domitius encouraged his men, placed his military engines on the walls, and assigned the several parts of the city to those who were appointed to defend them: in a speech to his soldiers he promised them lands out of his possessions, for it is said that he had acquired large property in Sulla's time (Dion, 41. c. 11), four jugera to each man and double

to the centurions and *evocati*. Pompeius was informed of these events by a letter from Domitius received on the 17th of February, and in his answer he urged Domitius to join him.⁴

Caesar now received intelligence that Sulmo (Sulmona), which is about seven miles from Corfinium and on a branch of the Pescara, was ready to surrender, but it was held by Q. Lucretius, a senator, and Attius Pelignus with seven cohorts. M. Antonius was sent to Sulmo with five cohorts of the thirteenth legion, and as soon as he was seen the gates were opened, and both townsmen and soldiers went out to receive him. Lucretius and Attius escaped by the wall, but Attius was taken and brought to Caesar, who set him free, and added the seven cohorts from Sulmo to his own force. Caesar began by strongly fortifying his camp near Corfinium and bringing supplies from the neighbouring towns. Within the first three days after his arrival at Corfinium the eighth legion came with twenty-two cohorts newly raised in Gallia and about three hundred horsemen from the king of Noricum. On the arrival of these reinforcements he made another camp on the opposite side of the town and placed it under the command of Curio; and then he began to form his lines of *contrevallation*. A great part of the works were already completed when the messengers sent by Domitius returned from Pompeius with the two letters c. d. as it seems, which we now possess.⁵ Domitius did not let the contents of the letters be known, but he declared in public that Pompeius would soon come to relieve Corfinium, and he urged his men to prepare for the defence of the place, while he was secretly deliberating with a few friends and forming a design to escape. He could not however conceal his anxiety, and all his acts and behaviour showed a timidity which hitherto he had not displayed; and as he was often privately consulting with those about him, and avoided all

⁴ Ad Attic. viii. 12. D. This letter to Atticus contains four letters of Pompeius, one to the consuls, and three to Domitius, marked B. C. D. ed. Orelli.

⁵ Pompeius received a letter from L. Domitius on the 16th of February, to which he sent the answer c. (Cic. ad Attic. viii. 12), and he received another letter from Domitius on the 17th of February, which is the letter D. We do not know how Cicero got copies of these letters. Pompeius may have sent copies of them with the letter A. which was addressed to the consuls.

appearance in public, his designs could no longer be a secret. Pompeius in fact had told him that he would not expose himself to the risk of relieving the town, that it was not through his advice or with his consent that Domitius had placed himself in Corfinium, and that if it were possible, he should join Pompeius with all his force. But the town was now surrounded and escape was impossible. When the purpose of Domitius was known to his men, the tribunes, centurions and some of the best soldiers held a meeting early in the evening. They said that Caesar's works were nearly completed; that Domitius, on whom they had relied, was deserting them and planning his escape, and that they ought to look after themselves. The Marsi, who were in the town, did not agree with them and took possession of the strongest part of Corfinium; and the quarrel became so hot that the two parties were ready to come to blows; but in a short time messages were exchanged, and the Marsi were informed of the intentions of Domitius, of which they knew nothing. Accordingly with one consent they brought out Domitius, set a watch over him, and sent some of their number to inform Caesar that they were ready to open the gates, to obey his orders, and to deliver up Domitius.

Caesar was eager to get possession of Corfinium, and to bring the troops into his own camp that they might not be induced to change their intention by promise of money or by recovering their courage, or by the arrival of false news; for he knew well, as he has remarked again (B. C. iii. 68), that in war great events often depend on small circumstances. He was also afraid that, if he entered the town by night, his men might plunder it. For these reasons he sent off the deputation, and told them to keep possession of the gates and walls. He placed his own soldiers all round the town without any interval between them, and ordered the tribunes and praefecti to be on their guard against any sallies from the town, and to be careful that not a single man escaped. There was no sleep that night in Caesar's camp. About the fourth watch, Lentulus Spinther, who had escaped to Corfinium, told the watch that he wished to see Caesar. His request was granted and he was conducted to the general by some soldiers of Domitius. Len-

tulus entreated Caesar to spare his life : he reminded Caesar of their old friendship and of Caesar's services to him ; that through Caesar he had obtained a place in the college of Pontifices, the province of Spain after his praetorship (B.C. 60), and that Caesar had assisted him in his canvas for the consulship.⁶ Caesar stopped Lentulus by telling him that he had not invaded Italy to do any harm to others, but to protect himself, to restore the tribunes to their authority and to rescue himself and the Romans from the oppression of a small faction. Lentulus was comforted by Caesar's words, and asked permission to return to the town : his pardon, he said, would encourage the rest to hope for the same mercy, for some were so alarmed that they might be driven to commit suicide. Lentulus was permitted to return to Corfinium. It is supposed that Lentulus alluded more particularly to Domitius who in his fright asked his physician for poison and took it, but on hearing of Caesar's clemency he bewailed his rashness, until his physician comforted him by saying that he had only swallowed a sleeping draught (Plutarch, Caesar, c. 34).⁷

At daybreak on the 21st of February, as we learn from Cicero, Caesar ordered all the senators with their children, and the tribunes and Roman equites to be brought before him. Among them were Domitius, Lentulus, Vibullius Rufus, Sextus Quintilius Varus a quaestor, and L. Rubrius ; also a son of Domitius with other youths and a great number of Roman equites and decuriones, whom Domitius had summoned from certain towns, probably as hostages. Caesar protected these men from insult and abuse, briefly reminded some of them of what he had formerly done for them, and set them all free. Domitius had brought with him 6,000,000 sesterces and deposited it in the treasury of Corfinium. The Duumviri of Corfinium brought the money to Caesar, but he restored it to Domitius, though it was known to be public money and to have been given by Pompeius to pay the troops.⁸ This be-

⁶ Lentulus was consul in B.C. 57, when Caesar was in Gallia ; and if he helped Lentulus in his canvas (B.C. 58), in which year Caesar was also in Gallia, he must have assisted Lentulus by his letters or by his friends.

⁷ Suetonius (Nero, 2) has a similar story, but he does not say when or where Domitius attempted to poison himself.

⁸ Cicero (Ad Attic. viii. 14. 3) says that M. Lepidus reported that the money

haviour to Domitius was a singular and unnecessary act of generosity ; but Caesar, as he says, wished to show that he was not more careful in sparing men's lives than in taking their money. Domitius had always been a bitter enemy of Caesar ; and Caelius says in a letter to Cicero (*Ad Fam.* viii. 15. 2) that he wishes the descendant of Venus (Caesar) had put Domitius to death. Caesar ordered the soldiers of Domitius to join his army, and take the military oath of obedience.

After the capture of Corfinium, Caesar's friend Balbus wrote to Cicero and sent him a copy of a letter which Caesar had written to himself and Oppius. Balbus tells Cicero that Caesar will be quite satisfied if he takes no part in the war against him and does not join his adversaries. Caesar had given Balbus permission to be absent from the camp which might be opposed to Lentulus the consul or to Pompeius, that is, absent from Caesar's own camp, for Balbus was under great obligations to Lentulus and Pompeius : he would be content if Balbus without taking up arms would render him private services in the city, and Balbus might do the same if he liked for Lentulus and Pompeius. Accordingly at that time Balbus was looking after the private affairs of Lentulus in Rome. Caesar's letter, of which Cicero received a copy, is one of few which have been preserved, and it shows Caesar's character. He says to his two friends, "I am much pleased to see from your letter that you greatly approve of what I have done at Corfinium. I shall willingly take your advice, and the more willingly because I had myself resolved to act with the greatest lenity, and to endeavour to conciliate Pompeius. Let us attempt in this way, if we can, to recover the affection of all and to make victory lasting ; since others by their cruelty have not been able to escape hatred nor to retain their victory long, except one man, L. Sulla, whom I shall not imitate. Let this be a new way of conquering, to protect ourselves by mercy and generosity. Some things occur to me as suitable for accomplishing this object, and many others may be discovered. I ask you to think about these matters. I have taken N. Magius, a prefect of Pompeius. Of course I followed my

was not given up to Domitius ; but Caesar says that it was, and his statement is better evidence than that of Lepidus.

usual practice and set him free immediately. Two chiefs of engineers of Pompeius have now come into my power and been set free. If they shall choose to show any gratitude, it will be their duty to urge Pompeius to be my friend rather than the friend of those who have always been most unfriendly both to him and to me, and by their intrigues have brought the Commonwealth into this condition" (Cicero, *ad Att.* ix. 7. B. C.).

Caesar's generosity was not what Cicero had expected. He received another letter from Caesar's friend Balbus, who exhorted him to endeavour to reconcile Caesar and Pompeius, and told him that Caesar would feel under the greatest obligations to him, if he would go to Rome. Balbus further said that he wished Pompeius would do the same, though at present he rather wished than expected it; but perhaps, when he had recovered from his alarm, Cicero's advice might have great weight with him. Balbus also said that if the consul Lentulus would follow Cicero's advice and trust Caesar, and discharge the remaining time of his consular office at Rome, he had hopes that with the assistance of the Senate Pompeius and Caesar might be reconciled. Balbus was certain that Cicero would approve of Caesar's behaviour at Corfinium. Cicero sent to Atticus (viii. 15) a copy of the letter of Balbus, "that Atticus might grieve for his unhappy condition, when he saw that he was an object of derision." This appears like a confession that his attempts to mediate would be very absurd after all that he had done and written. Cicero however wrote to Caesar in reply to a letter in which Caesar had asked him to return to Rome and give him his advice and countenance; and he speaks of having already thanked Caesar for his behaviour to Lentulus Spinther (*Ad Attic.* ix. 11). This is the letter in which Cicero declares to Caesar that he is the dearest friend both of Caesar and of Pompeius.

CHAPTER III.

THE FLIGHT OF POMPEIUS.

B.C. 49.

CAESAR was seven days before Corfinium, which he left on the afternoon of the day of the surrender, and yet he made a full day's march (*Ad Attic.* viii. 14. 1 ; ix. 1. 1). His course was through the territories of the Marrucini, the Frentani and of the people of Larinum (*Larino*) into Apulia. Pompeius left Canusium on the morning of the same day on which Caesar left Corfinium, the 21st of February ; and Caesar moved so fast that Cicero feared he would reach Brundisium too soon for Pompeius. But the seven days lost before Corfinium prevented Caesar from cutting off the retreat of his enemy, and when he began the pursuit, he was at least one hundred and thirty miles direct distance from Pompeius, and the first part of his march was through a mountainous country. Pompeius ordered the fresh levies to be brought to him ; and he armed about three hundred shepherds and gave them horses, from which it appears that he was ill supplied with cavalry (*B. C. i.* 24).

L. Manlius, the praetor of Alba Fuentia, who made his escape with six cohorts, and Rutilius Lupus praetor of Terracina with three, were, as it appears, going to join Pompeius, but when they saw at a distance Caesar's cavalry, which was commanded by Vibius Curius, the cohorts left their commanders, and passed over to Curius. Other troops also, which were going to Pompeius, fell among Caesar's men on their march or among his cavalry. N. Magius of Cremona, the chief of Pompeius' engineers, was also taken on the road and

brought to Caesar, who sent him to Pompeius with this message; that since they had never had an opportunity of talking together and he was himself going to Brundisium, it was for the interest of the commonwealth that he should have a conference with Pompeius, for when they were at a great distance from one another and terms of agreement were proposed through others, the same results could not be obtained as if they saw one another. Caesar writes as if he were going to pay Pompeius a friendly visit.

It was the 9th of March, as Caesar himself states,¹ when he arrived at Brundisium with six legions, three of veterans, and the rest newly levied. He had sent forward the cohorts of Domitius from Corfinium to Sicily. Caesar found that the consuls had sailed to Dyrrhachium with a large part of the army, and that Pompeius was in Brundisium with twenty cohorts; but he could not ascertain whether Pompeius remained for the purpose of keeping Brundisium that he might more easily command all the Hadriatic sea by holding the extremity of Italy and the opposite coast of Greece and thus conduct the war on both coasts, or because he had not sufficient ships. Dion (41. c. 12) states that Pompeius sent the consuls off, because he could not trust them, which is probable, for they were in great alarm, and Caesar, as we have seen, had tempted one of them with great offers. Caesar fearing that Pompeius might not intend to quit Italy determined to blockade the port of Brundisium. At the narrowest part of the entrance to the double port, he formed on each side a mole, for the water was shallow in these parts. When the water became deeper and the moles could not be continued, he placed a pair of floats, forming together a square of thirty feet on the side, in the direction determined by the opposite moles, and fixed them by anchors at the four angles. He then fixed other floats of the same size, and covered all of them with earth and other materials.

¹ Letter of Caesar to Oppius and Balbus: "I reached Brundisium on the 9th of March. I placed my camp close to the wall. Pompeius is at Brundisium. He sent N. Magius about peace. I gave an answer such as I thought proper. I wished you to know this immediately. When I have hopes that I can do anything about a settlement I shall immediately inform you." (Cicero ad Attic. ix. 13, and ix. 3. 2.) Balbus sent to Cicero a copy of this short letter.

On the front and both sides the floats were protected by hurdles and breastworks: on every fourth float were placed towers of two stories to protect the floats from the attack of the enemy's ships and from fire. During these operations Caesar found time to write to Balbus and to Q. Pedius, once his legatus in Gallia (B. G. ii. 2), and Cicero received from Pedius a copy of Caesar's letter (Ad Attic. ix. 14. 1) in which he briefly describes his operations, and says that his object was to drive Pompeius out of Brundisium or to prevent his escape.

Pompeius, who had found large merchant ships at Brundisium, placed on them towers three stories high, and furnishing them with military engines and all kinds of missiles, brought them up to Caesar's floats for the purpose of destroying them. There were daily fights with slings, arrows, and other missiles. Yet Caesar did not give up his hope of bringing Pompeius to peaceable terms, though he was much surprised that Magius did not return with an answer to his message to Pompeius.² Still he thought that he ought to persevere in his attempts at a reconciliation, and he sent his legatus Caninius Rebilus with a message to his intimate friend Scribonius Libo. The instructions of Rebilus were to urge Libo to effect a reconciliation, and particularly to induce Pompeius to come to a conference with Caesar, who had great confidence that, if they should meet, their dispute might be settled on fair terms, and if this was accomplished, a great part of the credit would be due to Libo. Libo after talking with Rebilus went to Pompeius, and brought an answer that in the absence of the consuls nothing could be done about a settlement. This refusal of Pompeius is consistent with his previous conduct, and we may conclude that

² It has been said that Caesar here contradicts his own letter to Oppius and Balbus. (Cic. ad Att. ix. 13, A.) Caesar arrived before Brundisium on the 9th of March, and Pompeius then sent Magius to him. Caesar, as he says in the letter, returned an answer to Pompeius by Magius. Now when Caesar (B. C. i. 24) let Magius go and gave him a message to Pompeius, he was on his march to Brundisium, and, as far as we are told, he received no answer until he had pitched his camp before Brundisium, when Magius came with the message to which Caesar alludes in his letter. Caesar gave his answer to this message, but he had no reply. This may be the true explanation, and then there is no contradiction.

he never wished to come to terms with Caesar, and perhaps he now saw more clearly that the terms would be absolute submission. If Caesar did not really wish to settle the quarrel on fair terms, he contrived by his repeated proposals of peace to put Pompeius in the wrong and to improve his own case.

Caesar's works were about half finished in the course of nine days, when the ships returned which had carried over to Dyrrhachium the consuls and part of the army. Pompeius being either alarmed at the progress of Caesar's works, or having from the first resolved to leave Italy, now began to prepare for flight, and, in order to prevent Caesar from breaking into the town while he was embarking his troops, he stopped up the gates, barred the approaches to the several quarters of the town and the open places, dug ditches across the streets and fixing in them sharp-pointed stakes covered them over with light hurdles and earth. The two roads which led to the ports from the parts outside the walls were closed by large beams, pointed at the end. The soldiers were ordered to embark in silence, and light-armed men of the class of *evocati* with archers and slingers were posted at intervals on the town wall and the towers. It was arranged that these men should be summoned to withdraw when all the soldiers had embarked, and light row-boats were left for them in a convenient place. The people of Brundisium, who had been ill-treated by the soldiers of Pompeius and insulted by their commander, were favourable to Caesar, and when they found that Pompeius was leaving the place and the soldiers were hurrying about their departure, they made the fact known to Caesar by signals. Upon this Caesar ordered scaling-ladders to be prepared and to make ready for the assault. Pompeius set sail in the night of the 17th of March, as Cicero was informed by a letter from Matus and Trebatius (*Ad Attic. ix. 15. A.*). The men who had been placed on the walls to keep watch were recalled by signal and hastened to their boats. Caesar's men scaled the walls with the ladders, but being warned by the people of Brundisium against the ditches and stakes they halted, and being conducted by a circuitous road to the port they seized two vessels

which had stuck against Caesar's moles, and took possession of them and the men.*

In about two months of a severe winter season, for the Roman Calendar was in advance of the true time, Caesar drove his enemies out of Italy, and he gained this great victory as much by his prudence and good temper as by his vigilance and activity. (Cic. ad Fam. viii. 15, a letter from Caelius to Cicero.) The Italians were afraid of Pompeius and his party: if they were victorious, it was expected that the bloody deeds of Sulla would be repeated. "Men were delighted," says Cicero (Ad Attic. viii. 16. 2), "with Caesar's insidious clemency, but they dreaded the vengeance of Pompeius;" and not without reason, for he had shown in his youth what he could do, and he was surrounded by men worse than himself, who thirsted for the blood and the property of their fellow-citizens.

Caesar (B. C. i. 29) thought that the best way of putting an end to the war was to cross the sea and pursue Pompeius before he strengthened himself by collecting forces east of the Hadriatic; yet he could not do this immediately, for Pompeius had seized all the ships, and it would require some time to bring other vessels from the more distant parts of Gallia and from Picenum and the Sicilian Straits. In the meantime also the veteran army of Pompeius in Spain and the two Spanish provinces would be confirmed in their fidelity to Pompeius, and one of these provinces was already under great obligations to him for what he had done there in the war with Sertorius; auxiliary troops and cavalry would be got together, and if Caesar crossed the sea, the enemy might make an attack on Gallia and Italy. Accordingly for the present he determined not to follow Pompeius, but to march to Spain.

* Swinburne (*Travels in the Two Sicilies*, i. 389) says that when the entrance into the port of Brundisium was cleared during the last quarter of the eighteenth century, "the workmen drew up many of the piles that were driven in by Caesar: they are small oaks stripped of their bark and still as fresh as if they had been cut only a month, though buried above eighteen centuries seven feet under the sand." He attributes the beginning of the ruin of this fine port to Caesar's operations. See vol. ii. p. 328 of this work.

⁴ Perhaps Caesar means Hispania Citerior or the north-east province of Spain. See vol. ii. chap. 33.

It was a decision on which the successful issue of Caesar's enterprise depended; and the result proved the soundness of his judgment. He ordered the chief magistrates (duumviri) of all the Italian towns to find ships and send them to Brundisium; and as he said in a letter to Cicero (*Ad Attic. ix. 15. 1*), he placed one legion in each of the towns, Brundisium, Tarentum, and Sipontum. He sent his legatus Valerius into Sardinia with one legion, and Curio into Sicily as Proprætor with four legions and orders to take his army to Africa after he had got possession of Sicily. The possession of these provinces was necessary for securing the supply of grain to Rome. Sardinia at this time was held for the party of Pompeius by M. Cotta, Sicily by M. Cato, and Tubero had been appointed to the province of Africa. As soon as the people of Caralis (Cagliari) in Sardinia heard that Valerius was coming, they drove Cotta out of the town, and in his terror, for he thought that all the island was of one mind, Cotta fled from Sardinia to Africa. Cato was actively employed in repairing ships of war in Sicily and was demanding more vessels from the Silician towns. By his legati he was also recruiting Roman citizens in Lucania and among the Bruttii, and making requisitions of cavalry and infantry on the Silician towns. Cato had nearly accomplished his designs, but on hearing of Curio's arrival he complained in public that he had been exposed and betrayed by Pompeius, who being completely unprepared had unnecessarily engaged in war, and when he was questioned by Cato and the other senators had declared that everything was ready. After this public declaration Cato left Sicily. Caesar's statement of Cato's assertion about the want of preparation by Pompeius is exactly the same as Cicero's (*Ad Attic. vii. 15. 3*). Pompeius had neither soldiers, nor money, and he even left part of the money in the treasury for Caesar to take. This is the great reproach of Pompeius: he knew that there would be war, he even provoked it, and yet he did not make sufficient preparation, and so he must either fight Caesar in Italy with the certainty of defeat or quit the peninsula.

When Tubero reached Africa, he found in the province Attius Varus, who after losing his cohorts at Auximum

(p. 23) had fled straight to Africa, and as there was then no *propraetor* in that province, for the *propraetor* of B.C. 50 had quitted it and left his *legatus* Q. Ligarius to wait for the arrival of a new *propraetor*, Varus took possession of the province. Varus raised two legions, for he was well acquainted with the country, having a few years before been governor of Africa after discharging the office of *praetor* of Rome. When the vessels of Tubero approached Utica, Varus would not allow him to land: he would not even permit Tubero's son, who was in bad health, to disembark, and he compelled Tubero to sail away. "When all these things were done," says Caesar (B. C. i. 32), in order to give his soldiers rest, he put them in the nearest towns and set out for Rome.

Caesar's narrative may sometimes be misunderstood, if we do not look carefully at his way of writing. He is treating of military affairs, and he tells us in a few words after speaking of the flight of Pompeius, and his own purpose to visit Spain, how matters stood in Sardinia, Sicily, and Africa. Curio after he had received the appointment to take possession of Sicily, visited Cicero at his villa at Cumae in the middle of April, and Cicero had much talk with him (Ad Attic. x. 4. 7). M. Cato did not leave Sicily until the 23rd of April (Ad Attic. x. 16. 3), as Curio informed Cicero by letter. Cato sailed from Syracuse to join Pompeius. Cicero falsely says that he could have held Sicily without any difficulty and all the "good" would have joined him; but Cicero certainly would not have done so: he was, as usual, looking after himself, and trying to secure the means of escape through Caesar's partisans (Ad Attic. x. 4. 10; x. 7. 1; x. 12. 1). In the same letter (Ad Attic. x. 16. 4), he says, that he wishes Cotta may keep Sardinia, from which it appears that even on the 12th of May he did not yet know that Cotta had fled to Africa.

Cicero was informed by the letter from Matius and Trebatius (p. 34), that Caesar was on his road to Rome, and would pass through Beneventum and Capua to Sinuessa, where he would stay for the night. It was expected that he would reach Sinuessa on the 27th of March. On the 26th Cicero received a letter from Caesar in answer to Cicero's letter of thanks for Caesar's clemency at Corfinium. Caesar's

letter is short: "You judge rightly about me, for you know me well, that nothing is further from my disposition than cruelty. I derive great pleasure from what I have done, and I am exceedingly delighted that you approve of my behaviour. I am not at all disturbed by the report that those, whom I set at liberty, are gone away with the purpose of fighting against me again: for nothing pleases me more than to continue like myself and for them to be always what they have been. I hope you will meet me at Rome, that I may in all matters, as I have been used to do, avail myself of your advice and assistance. You must know that nobody is more beloved by me than your son-in-law Dolabella; and if he shall persuade you to go to Rome, I shall be indebted to him for it; he cannot do otherwise than attempt to persuade you, such is his kindness, feeling, and good-will towards me" (Ad Attic. ix. 16 A).

Cicero saw Caesar at Formiae, and he reported the interview to Atticus (ix. 18). Caesar had ordered public notice to be given at Formiae that he wished to have a full meeting of the Senate at Rome on the 1st of April, and his purpose in visiting Cicero was to prevail on him to be present. Cicero says that at this interview he ordered his language so that Caesar should rather think well of him than have reason for thanking him. Cicero persisted in his resolution of not going to Rome; but Caesar was not so easily satisfied on this head as Cicero expected: he said that he was condemned by Cicero's resolution, and that other senators would be less ready to come, if he did not. Cicero replied that their case was different from his. After much talk, Caesar said, Come then to Rome and discuss the matter of peace. According to my own opinion, do you mean? said Cicero; to which Caesar replied, Must I prescribe what you should do? Then, said Cicero, I shall propose that the Senate do not approve of your going to Spain, nor of troops being taken over the sea into Greece, and I shall say a good deal in commiseration of Pompeius. But, said Caesar, that is what I do not wish to be said. So I supposed, replied Cicero, and that is the reason why I do not wish to be at Rome, because I must either say this, and a good deal which I could not keep

back, if I were there; or I must not go to Rome. The result was that Caesar put an end to the interview by asking Cicero to consider the matter. Cicero could not refuse; and they parted. Cicero thought that Caesar was not well pleased with him; but Cicero says that he was well pleased with himself; which had not been the case for some time. He evidently means that he managed this disagreeable interview better than he expected.

Cicero says at the end of his letter: "Caesar's concluding words (*κατακλείς*), which I was near omitting, were odious: he said, that if he had not the opportunity of making use of my advice, he would take such advice as he could get, and that he would have recourse to any means." Caesar went off to Penum in the neighbourhood of Rome, and Cicero to his native town Arpinum.

CHAPTER IV.

CAESAR IN ROME.

B.C. 49.

MANY of the senators were at this time in Rome and a meeting of the Senate was summoned outside the walls by the tribunes M. Antonius and Q. Cassius, for Caesar being a Proconsul could not legally enter the city (Dion. 41. c. 15). The meeting was probably on the 1st of April, the day which Caesar had fixed, and we know from Cicero (*Ad Attic.* x. 1. 1, 2) that it was before the 3rd. Cicero names the meeting "a congregation of the Senate," for I do not, he says, allow it to be a Senate. Caesar reports (*B. C.* i. 32) his own address to this assembly.

He began by speaking of the wrongs which he had received from his enemies: he maintained that he had sought no unusual honours, but he had waited for the time when he could legally be a candidate for the consulship like any other citizen; it had been proposed by the ten tribunes, though his enemies resisted the proposal, M. Cato most violently and according to his fashion wasting the time by talking, that Caesar might be a candidate for the consulship without coming to Rome, and this was done in the consulship of Pompeius;¹ now if Pompeius did not approve of this, why did he allow it to be done? and if he did approve of it, why had he prevented Caesar from making use of the permission which the people had granted to him? he spoke of his patient endurance in proposing that both he and Pompeius should disband their armies, which was in fact a surrender of his just

¹ Vol. iv. p. 367.

claims: he spoke also of the rancorous disposition of his enemies, who refused to do themselves what they required another to do, and chose rather to throw everything into confusion than to give up their military commissions and their armies: further, he spoke of the wrong done to him by taking the two legions from him, and the harshness and arrogance shown in resisting the authority of the tribunes; he reminded them also of the terms which he had proposed, of the conferences solicited and refused: for all these reasons he exhorted and asked them to undertake the administration of the republic in conjunction with himself: but if they refused this proposal through fear, he would not trouble them by his importunity and he would undertake the administration himself: commissioners ought to be sent to Pompeius about a settlement of the dispute, for he was not afraid that such a mission would have the effect which Pompeius had attributed to it shortly before in the Senate, when he said that a mission of this kind would argue the superiority of those to whom it was sent and the fear of those who sent: but this opinion was evidence of a weak and feeble mind; as for himself, as he had endeavoured to surpass others in his acts, so he would strive to surpass them in justice and equity. This is Caesar's apology in his own words, and the best evidence of what he thought and said: and if it is not all true, we must be content to take it as we have it. Cicero says that Caesar's talk about peace was a mere pretence, and that Atticus thought so too (*Ad Attic.* x. l. 4). After the meeting of the Senate Caesar wrote to Cicero and told him that he excused his not being present and would put the best interpretation on it. Caesar's behaviour shows how much he valued Cicero's support, and it is evidence that there was no man whom he would more gladly have conciliated.

The Senate, says Caesar (*B. C.* i. 33), approved of the proposal to send commissioners to Pompeius about peace, but nobody was willing to go, and chiefly through fear all of them declined the mission; for Pompeius had said in the Senate when he was leaving Rome that he would consider as enemies those who stayed in Rome as much as those who were in Caesar's camp. Three days were spent in discussion and

making excuses. L. Metellus also a tribune was instigated by Caesar's enemies to thwart this design of sending commissioners and everything else that Caesar proposed to do. Caesar perceived his purpose, and after some days had been employed without any result, not wishing to lose any more time, he left the city without having accomplished what he intended and reached Transalpine Gallia about the middle of April. (Ad Attic. x. 8. B.)

This is all that Caesar tells us of his proceedings in Rome. Dion (41. c. 16) reports that he sent to Sicily and Sardinia for corn to supply Rome,^{*} and promised the citizens seventy-five denarii each, but it was not paid till the year 46, after the African war. Caesar however wanted money for his campaign in Spain, and he took it even from the "aerarium sanctius" or reserved money, which was kept in Saturn's temple for great emergencies and had been left untouched by the consuls when they quitted Rome. He might very reasonably suppose that there would never be a more appropriate occasion for taking the money than the present time; and it would not have been prudent to leave it there, when it might be employed against himself. It is Caesar's fashion to be very reserved sometimes, but he would have done better, if he had mentioned this fact. Lucan (Pharsal. iii. 154), in his extravagant fashion has enumerated the various sources of the precious metals contained in the treasury. It is probable that the younger Marius did not spare this sacred deposit when he carried off so much gold and silver from Rome (vol. ii. p. 368). It has been conjectured that Caesar wished to take the money in a regular way, and that a proposal to this effect was made in the Senate and opposed by the tribune L. Metellus, as we may infer from a letter of M. Caelius to Cicero (Ad Fam. viii. 16) in which he strongly urges Cicero to keep quiet and stay in Italy until the result of Caesar's campaign in Spain should be known: Caelius declares that as soon as Caesar arrives there, the Spanish provinces will be in his possession. Caesar, he further says, left the Senate in anger. Appian (B. C. ii. 41) supposed that this reserved treasure had been deposited long before for the event of a Gallic invasion and

^{*} Lucan, Pharsal. iii. 54, &c.

was protected by the denunciation of a curse against touching it except in the case of a Gallic war; but Caesar said that he had secured the Romans against the Galli and so had rendered the curse useless. Metellus, trusting to the sanctity of his office placed himself before the doors of the treasury to oppose the money being taken, but Caesar threatened his life and ordered the doors to be broken open, though he has told us that Lentulus forgot to shut the doors. If this was so, we assume that they were not left open after Lentulus left Rome.³ Caesar took 25,000 bars of gold, 35,000 bars of silver, and forty million sesterces in coined money.⁴ Cicero was informed of this event by Curio on the 13th of April, when he stayed with Cicero at Cumae on his road to Sicily; that Caesar in his passion was very near killing Metellus; that it was not true that Caesar was by inclination or temper averse to cruelty, but he thought that clemency would make him popular; that the people were offended with him about the matter of the treasury, and that Caesar having intended to address a public meeting before he left Rome, did not venture to do so and quitted the city in a very disturbed state of mind. It seems as if Cicero believed all that Curio told him (p. 37).

Caesar left the praetor M. Aemilius Lepidus in Rome with the rank of Praefect of the city; and he gave to the tribune M. Antonius the title of Propraetor with the command of all the troops in Italy. C. Antonius, the brother of Marcus, was entrusted with Illyricum, and Licinius Crassus with Cisalpine Gallia. Dion (41. c. 18), as it seems, is mistaken when he says that Caesar at this time restored to their civil rights the sons of those who had been proscribed by L. Sulla; but he

³ There is a general agreement that Caesar broke open the treasury and took what was in it. (Plutarch, Caesar, c. 35, Pompeius, c. 62; Cic. ad Att. vii. 15, x. 4, 8; Dion, 41. c. 17; Appian, B. C. ii. 41; Lucan, Phars. iii. 114; Florus, iv. 2. 21; Orosius, vi. 15.)

⁴ Plin. N. H. 33. 3. 17. ed. Harduin, and the notes. In 19. 3. 15 Pliny says that Caesar also took 1500 pounds of laserpitium, which the Greeks named silphium, the juice of a plant used medicinally. So the Romans kept in their treasury not only an immense amount of the precious metal, but also physic. I suppose that Caesar would turn the physic into money. Did the Roman Republic deal in physic, as the republic of Hamburg is said to have derived a revenue from the profits of a wine-cellar and apothecary's shop? (Adam Smith.)

released the Jewish prince Aristobulus, who was an enemy of Pompeius, that he might return home and do what he could against Caesar's enemies. Josephus says that Aristobulus was soon poisoned by some of the Pompeian party. Caesar set out with Cicero's best wishes for his defeat in Spain. On the road Caesar wrote a letter to Cicero (*Ad Attic.* x. 8. B.), which we have: he urged Cicero by the regard that he had for him to keep quiet, and for his own interest to take no part in the present contest. It is a most kind and friendly letter, and a certain proof that Caesar wished him well; a proof also of the value that he set on Cicero's neutrality. This letter was written at the request of Cicero's friend Caelius, whom Caesar was taking with him to Spain. M. Antonius also wrote to Cicero a letter which he calls odious. We have this letter too (*Ad Attic.* x. 8. A.). Antonius assures Cicero that, with the exception of Caesar, no person is dearer to him, and that Caesar considers Cicero one of his best friends. Antonius earnestly exhorts Cicero not to cross the sea to Pompeius, who began by doing him a wrong that he might afterwards confer a favour. This is a plain allusion to Cicero's exile, which Pompeius, as Antonius hints, might have prevented. Cicero himself has expressed the same opinion of Pompeius' conduct in this matter (*Ad Attic.* viii. 3. 3). It is an example of Dion's inaccuracy when he informs us that Cicero without having seen Caesar went with other senators to join Pompeius, because they thought that he had the better cause and would be victorious. Dion might have learned better from Cicero's letters, but I am not sure that he ever used them. He has not forgotten however to report the wondrous signs which happened in this year, earthquakes with bellowings, dreadful lightning, and a total eclipse of the sun, which Lucan also (*Phars.* i. 540) has mentioned.

On reaching Gallia Transalpina (B.C. i. 34) Caesar was informed that L. Vibullius Rufus, who had been taken at Corfinium and set free, had been sent to Spain by Pompeius. He heard also that L. Domitius had gone to take possession of Massilia, with seven vessels (*actuariæ*), which he had manned with slaves, freedmen, and his own tenants. These vessels had been got together by private persons in the island of Igilium

(Giglio) and at Cosa on the coast of Etruria. Certain young men of rank, citizens of Massilia, who were deputies at Rome, had been sent home by Pompeius when he was leaving the city, and urged not to let the recent services of Caesar to their town make them forget their former obligations to him. After receiving this message the people of Massilia closed their gates against Caesar; and they summoned to their aid the Albici, a savage people who had long been under their protection and inhabited the hills above Massilia. They brought supplies into the city from the adjacent parts and all the strong posts: they set up workshops for making arms, and were busily repairing the walls and gates and refitting their fleet.

Caesar summoned to him from Massilia the fifteen acting members of the Council of Six hundred (vol. i. 303, and Strabo, p. 179), and urged them not to begin a war: he said they ought to follow the example of all Italy, rather than obey the will of one man. He used all the arguments which he judged suitable for bringing them to a sound state of mind. The fifteen reported his words and brought back an answer from the council to this effect: they knew that the Roman people were divided into two parties, and it was not their business nor were they strong enough to undertake to determine which party had the juster cause: at the head of these two parties were Cn. Pompeius and C. Caesar, both of them patrons of Massilia, one of whom had granted to the state of Massilia the lands of the Volcae Arecomici and the Helvii, and the other after defeating the Salyes^s (vol. i. p. 310) had made them dependent on Massilia and increased the city's revenue: as then they were equally indebted to Pompeius and Caesar, they were bound to show equal gratitude to them, and not to help one against the other, nor to receive either of them in the city and their harbours.

While these negotiations were going on, Domitius arrived at Massilia with his ships, and notwithstanding the declaration made to Caesar, the citizens received him into the town, appointed him governor, and entrusted him with the direction

^s "Victos Salyas" is a conjecture, and not a good one. The reading "victas Gallias" (Oudendorp) is certainly not correct. We know nothing of the lands of the Arecomici and Helvii being granted to Massilia.

of their military affairs. Domitius (p. 7) had been named proconsul of Gallia Transalpina by the party of Pompeius, and the Massiliots, in fact, received him as such. By his orders the Massiliot fleet was sent to cruise in all directions. Merchant ships were seized wherever they could be found and brought into the port of Massilia: those ships which were defective in bolts or in their timbers and tackle were used for furnishing and fitting out the rest: all the grain that could be found was carried to the public stores, and all other merchandize and supplies were reserved for the defence of the town if it should be blockaded. In consequence of this behaviour of the townsmen Caesar brought up three legions to Massilia, prepared towers and covered galleries for an attack on the city, and ordered twelve ships of war to be built at Arelate (Arles), on the Rhone, near the head of the delta of the river. These ships were built and equipped within thirty days from the time when the timber was cut, and brought to Massilia. Caesar gave the command of these ships to Decimus Brutus, who had been employed in the same way in the Venetian war (vol. iv. chap. 6), and he left his legatus C. Trebonius to conduct the siege of Massilia.

While Caesar was busy with these preparations, he sent C. Fabius forward to Spain with three legions, which he had placed in winter-quarters at Narbo (Narbonne) and the neighbouring parts, and he gave instructions to Fabius to occupy with all speed the passes of the Pyrenees, which at that time were held by some troops of L. Afranius. It is said in the eighth book of the Gallic War (c. 54) that Caesar placed C. Fabius with four legions in the country of the Aedui to pass the winter of the year 50-49 (vol. iv. p. 410), and four legions among the Belgae. We must suppose then that three of these four legions stationed among the Aedui were afterwards ordered to remove to Narbo. The remaining legions in Gallia, which were at a greater distance, were ordered to march southward. Fabius following his instructions moved with rapidity to the passes, drove the enemy's force away, and by forced marches advanced against the army of Afranius (B. C. i. 37).

CHAPTER V.

CAESAR IN SPAIN.

B.C. 49.

ON the arrival of L. Vibullius Rufus in Spain the legati of Pompeius made preparation for the defence of the Spanish provinces. Afranius had already served under Pompeius in the wars against Sertorius and Mithridates, and was consul in B.C. 60. Petreius was a more active man than Afranius, and a strong adherent of the Pompeian party to the end of his life. Afranius commanded in Hispania Citerior or the part adjacent to the Eastern Pyrenees with three legions. M. Terentius Varro, the third legatus, had also served under Pompeius in the war against the pirates (vol. iii. p. 120). He commanded with two legions in Hispania Ulterior from the Saltus Castulonensis, or the eastern part of the Sierra Morena, to the river Anas (Guadiana). Petreius with two legions commanded in Lusitania west and north of the Guadiana. It was arranged that Varro should remain where he was and defend his province, and that Petreius should march from Lusitania through the country of the Vettones, who lay east of Lusitania, between the Guadiana and the Douro, and join Afranius. Petreius made requisitions of cavalry and auxiliary troops in Lusitania, and Afranius on the Celtiberi, the Cantabri, and all the barbaric nations which extended to the shores of the Atlantic Ocean. As soon as Petreius had joined Afranius, they agreed in making their defence at Ilerda (Lerida), in Catalonia.

Besides their five legions Afranius and Petreius had about eighty cohorts raised in their provinces, some of which cohorts were armed in Roman fashion (*scutatae*), and the rest were

light armed troops (*cetratae*). They had about five thousand horsemen.

Caesar (B.C. i. 39) had sent forward six legions into Spain. He had also six thousand auxiliary soldiers, three thousand horsemen whom he had employed in his Gallic wars; and a like number were summoned from the two great divisions of Gallia, *Celtica* and *Belgica*, which he had reduced to submission. In addition he had also some good soldiers from Aquitania and the mountaineers who bordered on the Roman Provincia. There was a report that Pompeius was marching with his legions through Mauritania and would soon arrive in Spain. At this time Caesar borrowed from the tribunes and the centurions their money and distributed it among the army; by which he accomplished two things, he secured the fidelity of the centurions, whose money was thus laid out at interest and bought the goodwill of the soldiers by his liberality.¹

Ilerda² was in the country of the *Ilergetes* on the west bank of the *Sicoris* (*Segre*), a river which flows southward from the Pyrenees and enters the *Iberus* (*Ebro*) on the north side. West of the *Sicoris* is the *Cinga* (*Cinca*), which joins the *Segre* near the junction of the *Segre* and *Ebro*. The country between the *Segre* and the *Cinca* is fertile, and also the country about *Lerida*. The modern town of *Lerida* stands on the slope of a hill, the summit of which is occupied by the citadel and cathedral, and along the narrow space, between the hill and the river, on the west bank of the *Segre*.

Fabius endeavoured by letters and messages to induce the neighbouring states to join or assist him. He made two bridges over the *Sicoris* higher up than *Ilerda* and distant

¹ There are difficulties in this chapter (39) both in the text and in the matter. The report about Pompeius is absurd, and, as the text stands, it might mean that the report was one reason why Caesar distributed money among his men. Caesar is very reserved in some things, and certainly we should not have expected this story about buying his soldiers' fidelity, about which, as far as we know, he had no reason to doubt.

² Lucan, *Pharsal*. iv. 11, &c., describes the site of *Ilerda*. He says, v. 16, &c., "At proxima rupes Signa tenet Magni: nec Caesar colle minore Castra levat: medius dirimit tentoria gurgēs." There is a long note by Glareanus in Ouden-dorp's edition on "medius dirimit tentoria gurgēs," which is a mistake. There is a view of *Lerida* in Hare's *Wanderings in Spain*.

four miles from one another. By these bridges he crossed the Sicoris to forage, for he had exhausted the country on his own side of the river. Afranius also sent men to forage on the west side of the river and for the same reason; and the cavalry of the two armies had frequent skirmishes. On one occasion two legions of Fabius crossed the river by the nearest bridge to the camp to protect a foraging party according to their custom, and all the beasts and cavalry were following, when suddenly the violence of the wind and of the stream broke the bridge, and those horsemen who had not crossed were left behind. This accident being known to Afranius and Petreius by the material which was carried down the stream, Afranius quickly took across a bridge, which was close to Ilerda and to his own camp, three legions and all the cavalry and advanced against the two legions of Fabius. L. Munatius Plancus, who had served under Caesar in Gallia, and now commanded the two legions of Fabius, occupied some higher ground when he saw the enemy approaching, and placed his men on two fronts to prevent the cavalry of Afranius from surrounding him. With his inferior force Plancus resisted the legions and cavalry of the enemy. While the cavalry were engaged in fighting, the standards of two legions were observed at a distance and seen by both sides. Fabius, it appears, had now four legions (c. 37), and he sent these two across the river by the more distant bridge to support the other two. The approach of the two fresh legions put an end to the battle, and the troops on both sides were led back to their camps. The narrative shows that at this time the camp of Afranius was on the east side of the river. It was afterwards removed to the west side.

In two days Caesar came with nine hundred horsemen. The broken bridge was nearly repaired, and he ordered it to be completed by night. Having observed the nature of the ground he left six cohorts to protect the camp and the adjacent bridge, and also all the baggage. On the next day with all his troops drawn up in three lines and ready to fight (*triplex acies*)² he marched to Ilerda, and halting below the

² This order of march was used for small distances when the enemy was near, and it was expected that he was ready to fight. The ground of course must

camp of Afranius he offered battle on fair terms. Afranius drew out his men and placed them half-way down the hill, on the summit of which was his new camp. As Afranius refused to fight, Caesar determined to form a camp at the foot of the hill at the distance of about two thousand feet; and in order that his men might not be alarmed by a sudden attack of the enemy while they were working, he ordered a ditch fifteen feet wide to be dug on the side nearest to and opposite to the enemy. The first and second line remained under arms in their original position, and the third line, which was behind the other two and not visible, worked at the ditch, which was finished before Afranius knew what Caesar was doing. At nightfall Caesar brought his legions within the ditch, and the men passed the night under arms. On the following day all the men were kept within the ditch, and as it was necessary to fetch material for the rampart from a distance, he assigned the making of each side of the camp to a legion and ordered ditches of the same size to be made: he placed the rest of the legions under arms to resist any attack. Afranius and Petreius brought their troops down to the bottom of the hill and threatened Caesar's workers; but Caesar trusted to the protection of three legions and the ditch which he had made, and the labour was continued. It appears from this chapter (c. 42) that his six legions (c. 39) were now united. The enemy after remaining a short time and advancing only a little distance from the foot of the hill returned to their camp. On the third day Caesar finished the defences of his camp, and ordered the six cohorts, which he had left in the camp of Fabius, and all the baggage, to be removed to this new camp.

Between the town of Ilerda and the nearest hill, on which Afranius and Petreius had placed their camp, there was a level of about fifteen hundred feet, and near the middle of it was a slight elevation of the surface. This little eminence is represented in an Italian plan of Lerida, and named *Collina*

be such that it was possible to march in this order. In this way Caesar marched to attack the *Usipetes* and *Tenctheri* (vol. iv. p. 155). The men being ready for fight did not carry their haversacks (*sarcinae*), as we see, on this occasion, for all "the impedimenta" were left in the camp (Rüstow, p. 101).

di Cesare. The plan agrees with Caesar's description. The citadel is on the highest part of the hill of Lerida, the side of which turned towards the river is steep. On the south-west side, which slopes to the plain the modern town is built, and also on the narrow space between the steep side of the citadel and the river. North of the Collina di Cesare and west of the hill of Lerida is the height which was occupied by the camp of Afranius. There is another hill near the river, south of the Collina di Cesare, and along the Segre; but this is not the hill which Afranius occupied. Caesar would not pass between the citadel of Lerida and the river, but on the west side of the town, where he found Afranius posted. When he had made his camp, he saw the value of the eminence which Afranius had neglected to secure. If Caesar could get possession of this spot and fortify it, he expected that he should be able to cut off the enemy from all communication with the town and the bridge, and from all the supplies which they had collected in the town. With this hope he brought three legions out of the camp and having drawn them up in a convenient place he ordered the *Antesignani*⁴ of one legion to run forward and seize the eminence. The cohorts, which were on duty in front of the camp of Afranius, were quickly sent by a shorter road to occupy the same position. A fight took place, and as the men of Afranius reached the spot first, Caesar's soldiers were repulsed, and other troops being sent to support the enemy, Caesar's men were finally compelled to turn and to make their way back to the legions.

The way of the enemy was to run forward with great impetuosity, boldly seize a position, not to keep their ranks carefully and to fight in a loose disorderly fashion: if they were hard pressed, they thought it no disgrace to retire, since they were accustomed to fight with the Lusitani and other barbarians in their barbarian manner; for it generally happens

⁴ The *Antesignani*, it is conjectured, were men selected from the legions, a kind of light infantry suitable for quick movement and surprises. The name seems to imply (the men in front of the *Signa* or *Cohortes*) that they did not fight in closed ranks like the other legionary soldiers. It is possible that this corps was formed by taking ten men from every *manipulus*, consequently thirty from every cohort, and three hundred from a legion. (Rüstow, p. 19, *Die Antesignanen*; and Bell. Afric. c. 75, 78.)

that when a soldier has been long stationed in a foreign country, he is ready to follow the habits of the people among whom he has lived. Caesar's men not being used to this style of fighting were put in confusion, for they expected to be attacked on the flank by the enemy, who rushed forward without any order; but they themselves had been taught to keep their ranks and not to leave their standards, nor without good reason to abandon a position. Consequently when the Antesignani were thrown into disorder, their legion did not maintain its place, but retreated to the nearest hill.

Nearly all Caesar's troops were terrified at this unexpected result, but he encouraged his men and sent the ninth legion forward. The enemy, in full confidence, were pursuing the fugitives, but being checked by the ninth legion they were compelled to fly and to take refuge under the walls of Ilerda. The soldiers of the ninth being carried forward by their impetuosity, and wishing to repair the loss which had been sustained, rashly pursued the enemy too far, and coming to a place, where the ground was unfavourable, they advanced up the hill on which Ilerda stood; but when they attempted to retire, the enemy who were on higher ground pressed them hard. The ground was rough and broken, on each side steep, and just wide enough to contain three cohorts abreast;⁵ and consequently no relief could be sent up to them on the two flanks, nor could the cavalry help the troops in their difficulty. But from the town the hill sloped down gently to the distance of about two thousand feet, and by this direction Caesar's men made their retreat. Here the fight was continued on ground disadvantageous to Caesar's men by reason of the narrowness of the space, and also because their position was close to the foot of the hill and every missile fell on them with effect. Still they bravely maintained themselves and endured all their wounds. The enemy's force in the meantime was increasing, and fresh men being sent from the camp of Afranius through the town relieved those who were exhausted. Caesar also found it necessary to send other troops

⁵ "Praeruptus locus erat, utraque ex parte directus," &c., c. 45. Caesar's men made their ascent at the south-west angle of the hill on which the modern citadel stands.

to take the place of his men who could fight no longer. The battle had continued without interruption five hours, during which Caesar's men were hard pressed by numbers and their missiles were exhausted, but at last with sword in hand they drove the enemy up the hill and compelled them to fly. The enemy being pushed close up to the wall and some in their terror having fled into the town, Caesar's troops easily retreated; for the cavalry, although they were down on the lower ground on both sides of the slope, by a great effort made their way to the top of the hill and by riding about between the enemy and their own men facilitated the retreat. Caesar's troops at the first onset lost about seventy men, and among them Q. Fulginius, the "primus" hastatus of the fourteenth legion, who had been promoted for his superior merit from the lower ranks of the centurions. Above six hundred men were wounded. On the side of Afranius, T. Caecilius, a centurion (*primi pili centurio*) of the highest rank, was killed, and four centurions and above two hundred men.

Both sides claimed the victory on this day. The men of Afranius claimed it, because being considered in general opinion inferior to Caesar's soldiers, they had still fought so long at close quarters, resisted their opponents, and from the beginning had held the place, the occupation of which led to the battle, and had routed Caesar's men at the first onset. Caesar's men claimed the victory, because on unfavourable ground and against superior numbers they had maintained the fight five hours, ascended the mountain sword in hand, driven the enemy from his higher position and forced him into the town.

* The ten cohorts of the legion followed one another in rank, according to their number. In each cohort the manipulus of the *Pilani* takes precedence over the manipulus of the *Principes*, and the manipulus of the *Principes* over the manipulus of the *Hastati*. In each cohort the lowest centurion (*hastatus posterior*) must pass through all the ranks of centurion to the highest (*pilus prior*) before he can be promoted to the next higher cohort, which he enters as *hastatus posterior*. Finally he might reach the first cohort, and advance to the highest rank of the six centurions of that cohort, and become *primus pilus*. Fulginius (Fulginius) was *primus hastatus* of the first cohort, either *posterior* or *prior*, for Caesar does not say.

This is Rüstow's explanation (p. 7). Goeler's opinion is expressed in his *Kämpfe bei Dyrrhachium und Pharsalus*, p. 116.

Afranius strongly fortified the eminence for which the armies had fought and placed a force there.

Two days after the fight a furious storm produced a greater flood than ever was known in those parts. The melted snow came down from the mountains, overflowed the banks of the Segre and destroyed both the bridges of Fabius. This misfortune caused Caesar's army great difficulties, for his camp was between the Segre and the Cinca, which were about thirty miles distant from one another and both of them were now impassable. The states which had declared for Caesar could not bring up their supplies, the men who had gone a great distance to forage over the two rivers could not return, and very large supplies which were coming from Italy and Gallia could not reach the camp. It was a time of the year at which there were no stores⁷ of grain, the standing corn was far from maturity, and the stocks in the towns had been exhausted by Afranius, who had conveyed nearly all the corn to Ilerda before Caesar's arrival. All that remained was already consumed by Caesar; and the cattle, which might have supplied the deficiency of corn, had been removed to a great distance by the people of the neighbouring towns. Those who had gone out to get fodder and corn were followed by the light-armed Lusitanians and by the cetrati of Hispania Citerior who were well acquainted with the country, and easily crossed a river, for it was the fashion of all these people to carry skins when they went on a campaign, within which they stuffed their clothes and placing their shields under the bundle swam the rivers. (Livy, 21.c.27)). The army of Afranius had plenty of everything. A great quantity of corn was provided and collected from all parts of the province before Caesar's arrival; and there was a large supply of fodder. The bridge at Ilerda enabled Afranius to bring up everything without any danger, and the parts east of Ilerda, which Caesar could not approach, were still untouched (c. 49).

These floods continued several days. Caesar attempted to repair the bridges, but he was prevented by the rapidity and

⁷ See Krauer's note on "hibernis."

violence of the stream and by the enemy's men who were distributed along the bank. At this time it was reported to Afranius that large convoys, which were going to Caesar, were stopped by the flood. These convoys consisted of bowmen from the country of the Ruteni in Gallia, and Gallic horsemen with many waggons and heavy baggage according to Gallic fashion. There were also about six thousand persons of all kinds with slaves and children; but there was no order, no commander, every man did as he chose, and they were all journeying without any apprehension with the same security as on former occasions of travelling. There were among the number many young men of good family, sons of senators and equites; commissioners from the states, and legati of Caesar. Afranius set out by night with all his cavalry and three legions to surprise this convoy, and sending his cavalry forwards he attacked them unexpectedly. However the Gallic cavalry were soon prepared and began the fight. So long as the contest was only between the horsemen, the Galli though few resisted the greater numbers of the enemy; but when the legions drew near, they retreated to the nearest hills with the loss of a few men. During the battle the rest of the people taking advantage of the opportunity escaped to the higher ground. On that day there were missing about two hundred bowmen, a few horsemen, some camp servants, and a small quantity of the baggage.

The price of provisions was now greatly increased in Caesar's camp, a thing which generally happens when there is scarcity, for it is accompanied by the fear of greater deficiency. Corn had risen to the price of fifty denarii the modius, the strength of the soldiers was impaired for want of food, and the evil increased daily. While Caesar's men were in want of everything, the soldiers of Afranius had abundance. As the towns, which were friendly to Caesar, had not sufficient supplies of corn, he required them to furnish cattle; he sent off the camp servants to the remoter towns, and he relieved the wants of his men in all ways that he could.

Afranius, Petreius, and their friends in their letters to Rome greatly exaggerated Caesar's difficulties. Rumour also added so much to the real facts that it was supposed that the

war was nearly over. When the letters were received at Rome, great numbers flocked to the house of Afranius to make their congratulations, and many left Italy to join Pompeius ; some, that they might be the first to carry the good news, and others that it might not be supposed that they were waiting to see the issue of the war. Cicero was expecting news from Spain with the greatest anxiety and in the hope that all was right there, as he says (*Ad Attic.* x. 13. 3). He was ready to leave Italy, but very disturbed in mind. "The time is come," he writes to Atticus (x. 13. 3), "when I cannot act either with fortitude or prudence." When affairs were in this state, Caesar ordered his men to construct boats, such as he had seen in Britannia. The keel and framework of these boats were made of light wood, over which wicker-work was placed and covered with hides.⁸ The boats were carried on waggons by night to the river to the distance of twenty-two miles from the camp, and the soldiers were taken over in them. A hill near the river was occupied, and quickly fortified before the enemy knew what was going on. A legion was carried across the river, and a bridge was begun on each bank and finished in two days. By these means Caesar enabled the convoys and foragers to join him, and began to furnish himself with supplies. On the same day a large part of his cavalry crossed the river, and falling on the enemy's foragers, who anticipated no danger and were dispersed, captured a great number of beasts and men. Some of the enemy's light cohorts were sent to protect the foragers, but Caesar's cavalry prudently divided themselves into two parts, one of which protected the booty and the other received the enemy's attack. One of the enemy's cohorts, which had rashly advanced beyond the rest, was surrounded and destroyed, and

⁸ These boats were named "carabi" (Isidorus). Vossius supposes that "carabus" is a British or Belgian word, for among these people even now "caravelen" is a kind of river boat, in English, "coricle." See Lucan, *Pharsal.* iv. 130, &c. The word "devehit" might lead us to translate the text: "the boats were carried down the banks of the river to a place twenty-two miles from the camp." But the subsequent narrative shows that they were carried to a higher part of the river. The Emperor Napoléon understood Caesar's text as I have explained it (*Précis des Guerres de César*, p. 130).

the cavalry returned safe over the bridge to the camp with a great booty.⁹

The report of a naval victory gained by Brutus over the people of Massilia reached Caesar at the time when this bridge was made; and the face of affairs was soon changed (B. C. i. 59). The enemy, terrified by Caesar's cavalry, confined their foraging within narrow limits, so that they could easily retire to their camp; or when they went to a greater distance, they took a circuitous road to avoid the places where the cavalry were stationed, and when they did sustain some loss or spied the cavalry from a distance, they threw down their bundles and fled. Finally they stopped their foraging excursions for days together, and contrary to general practice went out by night. In the meantime the people of Osca (Huesca) and of Calagurris,¹ which community was incorporated with Osca, sent commissioners to Caesar and declared their readiness to obey his orders. The people of Tarraco (Tarragona) on the coast, and the Jacetani and Ausetani, both of them north of the Ebro, followed the example. The Illurgavonenses, as Caesar names them, or Ilercaones, as the name is otherwise written, who occupied the coast south of the Ebro perhaps as far as the Uduba, made their submission. Caesar asked for supplies of corn from all these peoples, who made a general requisition of beasts of burden, and brought corn to the camp. A cohort of the Illurgavonenses, being informed of the designs of their people deserted to Caesar. The bridge being finished, five large communities having joined Caesar, the difficulty about supplies being removed, and the reports of Pompeius' approach through Mauritania having died away, many of the more remote states fell off from Afranius and attached themselves to Caesar.

In order to avoid the trouble of sending the cavalry by a circuitous road to his bridge, Caesar discovering a place suitable for his purpose began to dig several trenches thirty

⁹ Caesar has here placed three chapters, 56, 57, 58, in which the naval victory of Decimus Brutus off Marseille is described. His reason for doing this appears from the beginning of chapter 59.

¹ There was a town named Calagurris Nassica on the Ebro (vol. ii. p. 479). This Calagurris was certainly somewhere near Osca, which is north-west of Ilerda; and we conclude that it is the Calagurris named Fibularia.

feet wide, for the purpose of drawing off part of the water of the Segre and making the river fordable. This work was nearly finished when Afranius and Petreius began to fear that they would be cut off from their supplies and from forage, for Caesar was very strong in cavalry; and accordingly they determined to leave the neighbourhood of Ilerda and to transfer the war to Celtiberia, which was south of the Ebro. This resolution was confirmed by the fact, that of the two parties in Spain, those, who had sided with Sertorius and were defeated, feared Pompeius though he was not present, and those, who had continued faithful to him and had received from him great favours, loved him; but Caesar's name was hardly known among the barbarians. In Celtiberia they expected to find great numbers of horsemen and many auxiliaries, and by occupying favourable positions they expected to prolong the war to the winter. With this purpose the two generals ordered boats to be got together from all parts of the Ebro and to be brought to Octogesa, a town on the Ebro and twenty miles from their camp. The modern site of Octogesa is not ascertained, but as it was on the Ebro and twenty miles from Ilerda, it may have been near the junction of the Segre and the Ebro.² At Octogesa they ordered a bridge of boats to be built; and taking two legions over the Segre they made a camp with a rampart (vallum) twelve feet high. If Afranius and Petreius could cross the river at Octogesa, they would enter the country of the Edetani, from which they could make their way to the country of the Celtiberi, who occupied the great central plateau of Spain.

Caesar being informed by his scouts of the enemy's operations kept his men to their work day and night, and so far succeeded in drawing off the water of the Segre that the cavalry could with great difficulty cross the river; but the infantry were prevented from fording by the depth of water,

² The number xx. in Caesar's text may be corrupt; and if Caesar wrote xx. that may not be the true number. Some critics, who amuse themselves with guesses and deceive those who follow them, place Octogesa at Mequinenza in the angle formed by the junction of the Segre and the Ebro, and on the west bank of the Segre. Caesar's narrative shows that this is not true. Others place Octogesa at La Granja, near the junction of the Ebro and Segre, and east of the Segre, which is not impossible and may be true.

which rose as high as a man's shoulders, and also by the rapidity of the stream. It happened however that about the same time, it was reported to Caesar that the enemy's bridge over the Ebro was nearly finished, and he had found a ford in the Segre. This was a reason for the enemy now being in the more haste to move. Accordingly leaving two auxiliary cohorts for the protection of Ilerda they crossed the Segre and joined the two legions which had already passed the river. All that Caesar could do was to harass the enemy with his cavalry, for it was a long circuitous march to his own bridge, and the enemy could reach the Ebro by a much shorter road. His cavalry now crossed the river, and Afranius and Petreius, who had begun their retreat at the commencement of the third watch, suddenly saw Caesar's horsemen close to their rear and hindering the march by spreading themselves around in great numbers.

At daybreak from the high ground near Caesar's camp his cavalry was seen pressing hard on the rear of the enemy, whose march was sometimes stopped; then the enemy would turn round, charge with all the cohorts and drive the cavalry back; but the cavalry would again face round and pursue the enemy. Caesar's men now began to complain that the enemy were allowed to escape and that the war was unnecessarily prolonged: they addressed the centurions and tribunes urging them to tell Caesar not to think of their labour or danger: they were ready to cross the river where the cavalry had passed. Caesar being moved by their ardour and clamour, though he was afraid to expose his army to the stream, still determined to make the attempt. He ordered the weaker soldiers, whose courage or strength appeared unequal to the undertaking, to be selected from all the centuries, and he left them with one legion to protect the camp. Placing a large number of beasts in the river above and below the ford he took over the rest of the legions unencumbered. A few of the soldiers were carried away by the violence of the water, but they were caught and saved by the mounted men, and not a single soldier was lost. When the whole force was safe on the other side, he drew them up in order of battle and advanced in triple line. Such was the ardour of Caesar's men that though

their march was lengthened six miles by the circuitous route and there had been much delay at the ford, before the ninth hour they came up with the enemy who had set out at the beginning of the third watch.

Afranius and Petreius, seeing Caesar's men at a distance and being alarmed at their unexpected appearance, halted on higher ground and drew up in order of battle. Caesar gave his men rest in the plain, for he would not let them fight when they were exhausted by fatigue; but when the enemy attempted to move forwards, he pursued and checked them. They were consequently compelled to encamp sooner than they intended; for the hilly country was near, and about five miles further the passes became difficult and narrow. It was their design to enter the hills in order to escape from Caesar's cavalry, and by placing troops in the narrow passes to stop the advance of his army while they crossed the Ebro without risk or fear. This was what they ought to have attempted and by all means to have accomplished, but being exhausted by the day's fight and the march they deferred their purpose to the following day. Caesar also encamped on the nearest hill (c. 65).

About midnight, some of the enemy's men, who had gone a great distance from the camp for water, were caught by the cavalry and gave information to Caesar that their generals were silently drawing the troops out of the camp. Caesar immediately ordered the signal to be made³ in military fashion. The sound reached the enemy, who fearing that they might be compelled to fight by night, while they were under their burdens, or might be caught at the defiles by Caesar's cavalry, stopped their march and the troops remained in the camp. On the next day Petreius with a few horsemen went out secretly to examine the country. Caesar also sent L. Decidius Saxa to explore the ground. The report of both parties was the same: the first five miles was a level country, and then it was rough and mountainous: those who first got possession of the defiles could easily stop their adversaries there.

³ "Vasa militari more conclamari," signifies the signal made by trumpet or in some way that could be heard through the camp, for packing up and moving.

The two armies had been marching in the plain of Lerida east of the Segre, and their course was south towards the western offsets of the Sierra de la Llena, the mountain range which runs nearly parallel to the southern coast of Catalonia and forms the eastern boundary of the basin of the Segre.

Petrei^{us} and Afranius held a council of war in which the question about the time of setting out was discussed. It was the general opinion that they should march by night, and that it was possible to reach the defiles without being seen. Others thought that as the order for breaking up had been given in Caesar's camp the previous night, it was not possible to move secretly: the cavalry of Caesar was spreading around them during the night and occupying all the ground and the roads; that a night battle ought to be avoided, for soldiers in a state of alarm and engaged in a war with their own countrymen were usually more under the influence of fear than of their military oath; but in the light of day a sense of shame operated on all, and this was increased by the presence of the tribunes and centurions, which circumstances generally kept soldiers to their duty; wherefore they ought by all means to attempt to force a passage in open day, and if they should sustain some loss, yet the mass of the army might be saved and seize the position which it was their object to gain. This opinion prevailed in the council and it was determined to march at break of day.

Caesar having examined the country, took his men out of camp in the grey of the morning, and led them by a very circuitous road where there was no regular track; for the route towards Octogesa and the Ebro was occupied by the enemy who were in front of Caesar's camp. Caesar's soldiers were compelled to cross wide valleys where steep rocks in many parts stood in the way, and made it necessary for the soldiers to pass their arms from one to another, and thus being eased and mutually helped they accomplished a great part of the road. But the soldiers willingly endured the toil, expecting that all their labours would be ended if they could intercept the enemy's march to the Ebro and deprive him of supplies.

The men of Afranius came out of their camp to see the movements of Caesar's troops and were delighted: they used

insulting language, supposing that want of food compelled Caesar to return to Ilerda, for his route was different from that which he had hitherto followed and in the contrary direction as it seemed. The generals were well pleased that they had resolved to stay in the camp, and they were confirmed in this opinion, because they saw Caesar's troops marching without beasts and baggage, and were quite sure that they were suffering from scarcity of food. But when they observed them gradually changing their direction to the right hand, and the head of Caesar's column already passing the position of their camp, it was the universal opinion that they must leave the camp and frustrate the enemy's purpose. The summons to arms was given, and a few cohorts being left to protect the camp, the whole army marched out in the direct line to the Ebro. It depended on speed which army should first occupy the defiles and the mountains. Caesar's men were retarded by the difficulties of the road, and the men of Afranius were checked by the pursuit of Caesar's cavalry. It was a necessary consequence of the movements of Afranius that if his men reached the mountains first, they would be safe, but the baggage of the army and the cohorts left in the camp would be lost, for they would be intercepted by Caesar. Caesar accomplished the distance first, and leaving the rocky tract found a level place in which he drew up his men against the enemy. Afranius seeing his rear pressed by Caesar's cavalry and the enemy in front, took possession of a hill, and halting there sent four cohorts of light-armed Spanish troops to seize a high mountain which was in sight of both armies. The cohorts were ordered to make all speed and to occupy this position, it being the design of Afranius to take his troops there and changing his route to march along the high land to Octogesa. The cohorts attempting to reach the mountain by a cross direction were spied by Caesar's cavalry who fell upon them and meeting with no resistance slaughtered all the men in the sight of both armies. This was a favourable opportunity. Caesar saw that the enemy after such a loss could not stand an attack, especially as they were surrounded by his cavalry and must fight on fair and open ground; and all the army was clamorous for battle. The

legati, centurions, and tribunes all urged Caesar to fight; for the men were eager, and the enemy had exhibited all the signs of fear in not coming to the relief of the Spanish cohorts and not leaving the hill on which they stood: if he was afraid to attack them on the height, there would still be an opportunity of fighting in some place, for Afranius could not stay where he was for want of water. But Caesar hoped to put an end to the campaign without a battle and without any bloodshed on his side, for he had shut out the enemy from getting supplies; and why should he, even if he defeated Afranius, lose any of his own men, or expose deserving soldiers to the danger of being wounded, and finally why should he run any hazard, when it was the duty of a commander to gain the victory by prudence as much as by the sword? He was also moved by pity for his fellow-citizens, who must perish in a conflict, and he preferred accomplishing his purpose and at the same time saving their lives. Caesar's determination was not generally approved; and the soldiers openly declared that since Caesar was throwing away such an opportunity, they would not fight for him when he wished. But Caesar persisted in his resolution, and moved a short distance from his position in order to relieve the enemy from their fear. Petreius and Afranius took advantage of Caesar's withdrawal and went back to their camp. Caesar then placed troops in the mountains to stop all the roads to the Ebro, and made his camp as near as he could to the camp of the enemy.

Caesar has told us his motives for not destroying the enemy, and I do not see why we should attribute other motives to him. He spared his fellow-citizens, both on this occasion, and shortly after as we shall see. It was prudent to act as he did, but that is no reason why we should not believe that he was moved by compassion for his countrymen and also by a desire to save his own men, whom he would want for other service. He was certainly merciful to Romans, though cruel to barbarians. Experience also had taught him, as Suetonius observes (Caesar, c. 60), after many victories to be less inclined to expose himself to hazard, and he knew that he could not gain as much by a victory as he might lose by a defeat. He had a generous nature and ability to command

in the highest degree. Passion never led him to do what his judgment condemned, and no clamour or importunity of officers or men could shake the firmness of his purpose, or make him change his resolves.

On the next day the enemy's commanders having lost all hope of getting supplies and reaching the Ebro, deliberated what they should do. The road to Ilerda was open, if they chose to return to the town; and the road to Tarraco (Tarragona) on the coast was also open. Caesar was on the rear of the enemy. If they returned through the plain to Ilerda, the horsemen would harass them. If they turned east, they must cross the Sierra de la Llena and descend the valley of the river Francoli to Tarragona; but a retreat by this road was hardly possible with the enemy following. While the generals were deliberating, it was reported that the men who had gone to draw water were attacked by Caesar's horse. When this was known, the enemy formed numerous posts of cavalry and of auxiliary cohorts with legionary cohorts interposed, and began to make a rampart from the camp to the water that the men might draw their supplies within the rampart and without requiring the protection of the posts. Petreius and Afranius divided the labour between them and advanced some distance to look after the completion of the work. When they had left the camp, the soldiers having an opportunity of talking with Caesar's men came out and sought their acquaintances and townsmen. First they thanked all of them for sparing them the day before when they were in such alarm, and declared that they were indebted to Caesar's men for their lives. Then they asked whether they could safely put themselves in Caesar's hands, and lamented that they had not done so at first instead of fighting with their own friends and kinsmen. Encouraged by the conversation they asked for a promise from Caesar to spare the lives of Petreius and Afranius, that they might not be considered as committing a crime or betraying their commanders: if the promise were granted, they declared that they would immediately change sides, and they sent centurions of the first class to negotiate with Caesar about terms. In the meantime the men on one side invited their friends into the camp to entertain them; and the men on

the other side were carried off by their friends, the consequence of which was that the two camps had the appearance of one. Several tribunes and centurions went to Caesar and solicited his protection. Certain Spanish chieftains, who had been summoned by Afranius and kept as hostages in the camp, followed the example. All these men looked for their acquaintance and friends who might recommend them to Caesar. Even the young son of Afranius treated with Caesar through the legatus P. Sulpicius Rufus for his own life and his father's. There was universal rejoicing and congratulation on the part of those who supposed that they had escaped such great danger, and on the part of those also who, as they thought, had accomplished such a result without loss. It was the general opinion that Caesar would be well repaid for exercising his usual clemency, and his prudence was now acknowledged.

On hearing of the state of affairs Afranius returned to the camp, prepared, as it was supposed to wait patiently for whatever might happen. But Petreius maintained his resolute character. He armed his slaves and with his praetorian cohort of light-armed Spaniards and a few horsemen named *Beneficiarii*,⁴ whom he used as his personal guard, he hurried to the rampart, broke off the talk between Caesar's men and his own, drove Caesar's soldiers from the camp and killed those whom he caught. The rest formed in a body, and being surprised by the sudden attack wrapped their cloaks round the left arm, drew their swords and defended themselves against the Spanish troops and cavalry, being encouraged by the proximity of their own camp, to which they retreated and where they were protected by the cohorts which were stationed at the gates (c. 75).

Petreius with tears in his eyes now visited the several divisions of the cohorts and entreated the men not to surrender himself to the enemy or betray Pompeius. The men quickly crowded to the Praetorium or general's quarters, and there Petreius compelled them to swear that they would not desert or betray the army and their generals. He first took the oath himself, and compelled Afranius to do the same. The

⁴ "*Beneficiarii*:" so called perhaps because they had received some promotion.
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tribunes and the centurions followed; and the soldiers being ordered to come forward in their several centuries also took the oath. The generals commanded every soldier of Caesar to be produced who was in the camp, and when the men were brought out, they were massacred in the Praetorium. But those who had received Caesar's soldiers in their tents concealed most of them and let them escape by night over the rampart. Thus the generals by striking terror into their men, by this cruelty to Caesar's soldiers, and by again imposing the military oath took from the army all hope of immediate surrender, changed the disposition of the soldiers, and brought back matters to the former state.

Caesar ordered the soldiers of the enemy, who had come to his camp to talk with his men, to be carefully sought out and sent back. Some of the tribunes and centurions voluntarily remained with him, and were afterwards treated with great distinction. He placed the centurions in the first class of that rank, and he gave the Roman equites the same rank of tribune which they had in the army of Afranius.

We may here observe, as in other parts of the books of the Civil War, that Caesar obtained some of his knowledge about the enemy from the men or their officers, and that he could only repeat what he heard and believed. The cruelty of Petreius and his folly are quite consistent with what Cicero has written about the Pompeian party; and Caesar's behaviour too is consistent with Cicero's admissions about Caesar's clemency, which however, as we might expect, he designates as insidious and interested. But whatever Caesar's motives were, his conduct was mild and prudent, and raises him infinitely above the wretched men who had neither his talent nor his generosity. That Caesar looked on his enemies with contempt is apparent from all the history; and we cannot be surprised if such a man despised those whom he did not fear. The bloody massacre and the enforcement of the military oath at the same time are characteristic of the superstitious and cruel character of the Romans; but though the men might be disgusted with their commanders, they would not break the military oath which was the great instrument of discipline in the Roman armies.

The men of Afranius were in want of forage, and they got water with difficulty. The legionary soldiers had some stock of food, for they had been ordered to carry twenty-two days' provision from Ilerda; but the Spanish light troops and auxiliaries had none, for they had little money for purchasing food, and they were not used to carry burdens. Consequently a great number of these men daily deserted to Caesar. In these difficulties it was considered safest for the army to retreat to Ilerda, where they had left some corn, and where they expected that they could determine what ought to be done. Tarraco was more distant than Ilerda, and it was manifest that for this reason the army would be more exposed to danger if they retreated in that direction: the town had also declared for Caesar, as he has informed us, and Afranius and Petreius may have heard this news by report. Having formed this resolution they began the retreat. Caesar sent forward his cavalry to harass the enemy's rear, and followed with the legions. His cavalry were constantly skirmishing with the retreating army. The manner of fighting was this. The light cohorts, which formed the enemy's rear-guard, closed the march, and a greater number of these cohorts would halt where the ground was level in order to protect the retreating army. When it was necessary to ascend a hill, the nature of the ground easily enabled the enemy to repel an attack, for from the higher ground those who had gone ahead, protected their comrades in the ascent: when they came to a valley or a downward slope, those who had gone first could not help those behind, and Caesar's cavalry threw their missiles from a higher position on the enemy whose back was exposed; and thus the danger was great. The consequence was that they could do nothing else, when they came to such places as these, than order the legions to halt and drive back the cavalry by a fierce attack; and as soon as the cavalry were checked, they all plunged with a run into the valley and in this manner crossing it halted again on the high ground. For they were so far from having any help from their numerous cavalry, which had lost all spirit in consequence of former fights, that they were placed in the middle of the marching column and protected by the infantry; and not a single

horseman could move out of the line of march without being caught by Caesar's cavalry. Resisting in this manner the enemy advanced slowly, and often halted to protect their own men. Having advanced four miles greatly harassed by Caesar's cavalry they took possession of a lofty hill, where they began to form a camp on one front only turned to Caesar's army; but they did not unload the beasts of burden. When they saw that Caesar had taken a place for encampment, pitched the tents, and sent the cavalry to forage, they suddenly hurried off about the sixth hour of the same day, and with the hope of gaining time by the dispersion of Caesar's cavalry they began their march. Caesar observing this followed the enemy, leaving the baggage behind and a few cohorts to protect it. At the tenth hour he ordered the foragers to follow and the cavalry to return, which was soon done. There was a fierce fight with the enemy's rear, who were nearly put to flight: many soldiers and a few centurions were killed. Caesar's column now pressed close on the enemy, who were threatened by his whole army.

The enemy were now unable to look out for a fit place of encampment or to advance, and they were compelled to make a camp far from water and in an unfavourable position. Caesar persisting in his resolution to reduce Afranius to surrender without fighting a battle or any loss to his men, did not attack the enemy, and on that day he did not allow his camp to be made, that he might be ready to pursue if they should attempt to push forward either by night or by day. The enemy observing the badness of their position were all night engaged in forming lines of defence and moving forwards from one to the other.⁵ They did the same the next morning at daylight, and they spent the whole day in this work. But the further they pushed forward their works and their encampments, the further they were from water, and by attempting to cure one evil they fell into others. On the first night no man quitted the camp to get water, but on the next day they left a force to protect the camp and went in a

⁵ This is the meaning of the passage (c. 81) "*illi animadverso . . . convertunt.*" They made a line of defence, and then pushed forward and made another, and so on.

body to look for water; yet no men were sent out to forage. By these sufferings Caesar resolved to compel them to sue for mercy, and his purpose was to drive them to a voluntary surrender instead of fighting with them. However he attempted to shut them in by a ditch and rampart in order to check any unexpected sallies, which he thought they must finally attempt. The enemy having no fodder, and in order that they might be less encumbered in their march, killed all the beasts that carried the soldiers' havresacks.

Two days were spent in executing these labours, and on the third a great part of Caesar's works were completed. For the purpose of stopping Caesar's operations Afranius gave the signal about the ninth hour, and bringing the legions out of the camp placed them in battle order close to it. Caesar recalled his legions from their work, summoned all the cavalry and formed his order of battle, for he thought that it would damage his reputation, if contrary to the opinion of his men and his credit as a general, it should be supposed that he avoided a battle. But for the reasons that he has already given he did not wish to fight; and the more for this reason that the shortness of the distance from the enemy's camp, even if they should be defeated, would not be favourable towards gaining a complete victory; for the two camps were not more than two thousand feet apart. Of this space of two thousand feet the two armies occupied two-thirds, and one-third only was left for the attack. If Caesar engaged in battle, the proximity of their camp would give the enemy an easy opportunity of retiring if they were defeated. For this reason he determined to wait for the enemy's attack, and not to attack himself.

Caesar's caution may appear excessive, for he was evidently stronger than the enemy; but, if they were defeated and driven into their camp, he knew that he could not prevent his men from following and there would have been a bloody struggle within the enemy's lines, in which he would have lost many men, though the enemy would probably have been compelled to fly. As far as we know, it was not the Roman fashion to assault an enemy's camp. There is an instance of such an assault in the campaign of P. Crassus in Aquitania

(B.C. iii. 24), but it was an attack on a barbarian camp, and the attack was necessary.

Afranius had formed a double line with his five legions; the third line was a reserve formed by the auxiliary cohorts. Caesar had three lines (*acies triplex*): the first was formed, as usual, by four cohorts from each of the five legions, for one legion had been left behind (c. 64); the second line, as a reserve, contained three cohorts from each legion, and the third line the same number. The archers and slingers were placed in the centre, probably in the intervals between the cohorts, so that they could fall back when it was necessary; the cavalry were on the wings. In this order of battle the generals persisted in their resolution; Caesar would not fight, unless he was compelled; and Afranius only wished to stop Caesar's works. The two armies kept their position to sunset, when each retired to their camp. On the next day Caesar prepared to finish the works which he had begun, and the enemy attempted to find a ford in the river Segre; from which it appears that they had not retreated in a direct line to Ilerda, but had approached the river south of the town. It seems to us absurd that they should have thought of crossing the river with Caesar behind them. The attempt could only have terminated in their defeat and dispersion: but Caesar did not allow them to make the attempt. He sent his light-armed German troops and part of his cavalry over the river and placed them at a small distance from one another along the bank. At last the enemy being hard pressed every way, the beasts without fodder now for the fourth day, and water, firewood and corn having failed, the generals asked for a conference, and, if possible, in a place out of sight of the soldiers. Caesar would not consent to this, but would grant their request if they would confer with him in the presence of the armies. These terms were accepted and the son of Afranius was given as a hostage to Caesar. They met in a place selected by Caesar, and Afranius addressed him within hearing of both armies: neither he nor Petreius, he said, ought to be blamed nor the soldiers for maintaining their fidelity to their general Cn. Pompeius; but they had now done their duty and suffered enough. They had endured want of every kind,

and now being hemmed in on all sides almost like wild beasts they were shut out from water, prevented from moving, and they could not bear their bodily sufferings nor the ignominious condition to which they were reduced. They confessed that they were vanquished, and they earnestly entreated Caesar to show them mercy, that they might not be driven to desperation.* This was said in the most humble and abject manner.

Caesar's answer, as he reports it, is the apology for being in arms against his countrymen which he is continually making; and his apology in the main is true. His answer was this: no man had less reason to complain or less ground to ask for mercy than Afranius: all the rest had done their duty; himself, in that he had refused to fight though he had every advantage of time and place, and he had refused to fight in order that circumstances might remain favourable to the conclusion of peace; his own soldiers had done their duty, in that after receiving wrongs, and after the massacre of their comrades, they had saved and protected the men who were in their power; finally the army of Afranius had done their duty in endeavouring by their own acts to bring about peace, and secure the safety of all their fellow soldiers: thus all the men had shown a merciful disposition; the enemy's generals alone were averse to conciliation; they had not respected the rules observed in a friendly intercourse of soldiers, nor the truce which in fact had been made, and they had with the utmost cruelty massacred those who suspecting no danger had engaged in friendly communication with their own men; the consequence to the enemy's generals had been that which usually happens to the obstinate and the arrogant; they were compelled to accept those conditions and eagerly to seek those terms which they had regarded with contempt: however he would not take advantage of their humiliation or of the present circumstances to make any demand with the view of strengthening himself, but the armies must be disbanded which had been maintained for so many years for the purpose of crushing him: for it was with no other object that six legions had been sent to Spain and a seventh raised there, so

* The words "*ne ad ultimum supplicium progredi necesse habeant*," means to "commit suicide" or kill one another. Comp. B. C. i. 22; and p. 28.

many auxiliary cohorts got together and experienced generals sent over: nothing of the kind was necessary for keeping Spain in obedience, or for the advantage of the province, which had long enjoyed peace and required no aid: all this had long been designed against himself, and for this purpose a new kind of military authority had been established, by virtue of which one and the same man directed affairs at the gates of Rome and held for many years two most warlike provinces by his generals.⁷ It was with the same design against himself that the practice was altered with respect to magistrates, who were not sent to the provinces, according to the usual practice, after being praetors or consuls, but men were sent at the choice and selection of a faction.⁸ With the same object also excuses on account of age were not allowed, for those who had been tried in former wars were again summoned for the purpose of making up armies; in his case alone the rule was not observed by which all former commanders had been permitted after a successful career to return home and disband their armies with some honour or at least without disgrace: yet he had patiently endured all this, and would continue to endure it; nor was it now his purpose to take their army from Afranius and Petreius and keep it himself, which however would not be difficult to do, but he would not let them have an army which they could use against him: his conclusion was in these brief terms: they must leave the provinces and disband the army, and if that were done, he would harm no man; this was the one and final condition of peace.

This proposal was most agreeable to the soldiers, as might be plainly seen by their behaviour and gestures, for instead

⁷ As Velleius says (ii. 48): "Pompeius had taken care that the two Spanish provinces were assigned to him, and he administered them by Afranius and Petreius, being absent himself and looking after affairs at Rome." Caesar has not said that he was himself a party to this transaction, in B.C. 56, which was the result of the conference of Luca (vol. iv. p. 133). It was by consenting to these terms for Pompeius that Caesar obtained his second term of five years in the government of the two Gallic provinces and Illyricum.

⁸ Caesar alludes to the *Senatus consultum* of B.C. 52 (vol. iv. p. 367) which declared that no man should have the government of a province until five years after the expiration of his consulship or praetorship.

of some penalty which they had good reason to expect, they were going to receive a reward by their discharge. When the time and place of the discharge were discussed, the shouts and waving of hands from the rampart, where the soldiers of Afranius stood, declared that the whole army demanded an immediate discharge, for they did not believe that it could be secured, whatever promise was made, if it should be deferred to another time. After this matter had been briefly debated, it was finally settled that those who had a home or land in Spain should be immediately discharged, and the rest when they had arrived at the river Var, the boundary between Transalpine Gallia and Italy. Caesar promised that they should suffer no harm, and that no man should be compelled to enter his service.

Caesar promised to supply the army of Afranius with corn till they arrived at the Var. Further, whatever his own men had in their possession and the enemy's soldiers had lost during the war, he restored to the losers, and making a fair valuation he paid his own soldiers the price of that which they gave up. The soldiers went to Caesar to have any disputes which arose among them settled. The legions of Petreius and Afranius were demanding their pay almost in a mutinous manner, for the generals maintained that it was not yet due; but Caesar was asked to examine the matter, and both generals and men were satisfied with his decision. In the course of two days about one third of the army was disbanded. Caesar ordered two of his own legions to march first, and the rest to follow so that the camps should be made at no great distance between them, and he appointed Q. Fufius Calenus to direct the march. In obedience to these orders the march was accomplished from Spain to the Var, and there the rest of the army of Afranius was discharged.

The day of surrender is fixed by some ancient Calendars on the 2nd of August of the unreformed Roman year, and if we may trust a passage in Caesar (B. C. ii. 32), the campaign lasted forty days after Caesar's arrival at the Segre. In this short time by his prudence, courage and military ability, without fighting a great battle and with little loss to himself he compelled the surrender of a large army well furnished with

the means of carrying on a war. The campaign is worth studying on the spot by those who have the opportunity, and would learn a lesson in the military art from one of the first of all commanders. Caesar had not only an enemy to conquer, but a political object to attain. He wished to convince his fellow citizens that they had nothing to fear from him, and to show his own conduct in contrast with the cruelty of his enemies. If prudence and calculation alone led him to spare an army which he could have destroyed, we must still admire the patience and forbearance of a man whom no passion could move to neglect his real interest. He knew and practised the wise maxim of Thucydides (vi. 78) that a man cannot satisfy his passion and secure his interest at the same time; and he also knew that success very seldom attends passionate efforts, but generally follows after foresight (Thucyd. vi. 13; Herod. vii. 157). He did not even add to the humiliation of the defeated army by making them give up their arms, which would have been a prudent precaution; for we may perhaps make this conclusion from his omission to say anything about it and from his restoration of what they lost. Probably he exacted from the officers an oath that they would not again fight against him, for when he put to death P. Vestrius during the African war, the historian of that campaign (Bell. Afric. c. 64) says that the man was punished for his perfidy and perjury.⁹

⁹ There is a short sketch of this campaign in the *Précis des Guerres de César* dictated by Napoléon at St. Helena to Marchand during sleepless nights. Napoléon observes that "Caesar reduced an army equal in strength to his own by the single superiority of his manœuvres." To a man who reads books superficially and is intolerant of labour this narrative of the Spanish campaign will be dull and tedious, for I have omitted nothing that Caesar wrote; to him who wishes to understand and learn it will give instruction.

CHAPTER VI.

M. TERENTIUS VARRO.

B.C. 49.

By the surrender of Varro who held the Further province all the peninsula was in Caesar's power. Caesar has told the story of Varro's submission in five short chapters (B. C. ii. 17—21) without disguising his contempt for the man, who was named the most learned of the Romans, but was altogether unfit to command an army or to govern a province.

At first on hearing of the events in Italy and having no confidence in the success of Cn. Pompeius, Varro used to speak in most friendly terms of Caesar: he said that he was engaged to the party of Pompeius as he was his *legatus*, and bound by obedience to him: he was indeed equally intimate with Caesar, but he knew what was the duty of a *legatus* who held an office of trust; he knew his own strength and the disposition of his province towards Caesar. This was his usual talk and he did not bestir himself in any way. But when he was informed that Caesar was detained before Marseille, that the forces of Petreius had joined Afranius, that a large auxiliary force was with them, that they also hoped and expected other troops, that the whole Nearer province was in their favour; when he heard too of what had happened and of the straits in which Caesar was before Ilerda for want of supplies, of all which he was informed by the letters of Afranius in which everything to Caesar's disadvantage was magnified, he began to put himself in motion and to follow what he supposed to be the winning party.

He raised troops in all his province, and to his two complete

legions he added about thirty auxiliary cohorts. He collected a large amount of corn to send to the people of Marseille, and to Afranius and Petreius. He ordered the townsmen of Gades to build ships of war, and others to be constructed at Hispalis (Sevilla) on the Guadalquivir. He removed all the money and all the ornaments from the temple of Hercules into the city of Gades (vol. iii. p. 217). This famous temple was in the island in which Gades stood, adjacent to the shore and on the eastern extremity of the island. Gades was at the western and opposite end of the island, and about twelve Roman miles from the temple, which was in that part where the narrow strait between the island and the mainland was only about six hundred feet wide. It was a tradition that the Tyrians built the town Gadeira (Cadiz), and the temple of Hercules, the pillars of which contained a record of the cost of the building (Strabo, p. 169 &c., who says much about Gades, and a wonderful spring in Hercules' temple).

Varro sent to Gades six provincial cohorts to hold the place, and set over the town Gaius Gallonius, a Roman Eques, a friend of L. Domitius, who was sent by him for the purpose of looking after a succession. He carried all the arms in the possession of private persons and all the public stores of arms to the house of Gallonius. Varro himself harangued the people in strong terms against Caesar. He often declared from the tribunal that Caesar had been defeated in battle, that a great number of his men had deserted to Afranius; that he knew this from trustworthy messengers and on good authority. In this way he terrified the Roman citizens in his province and compelled them to promise him for his administration eighteen millions of sesterces, or £159,375, twenty thousand pounds of silver and one hundred and twenty thousand modii of wheat. This was a heavy requisition, which seems to prove that the Roman citizens and the provincials in this province were rich. If he supposed any of the towns to be friendly to Caesar, he laid heavier burdens on them, brought garrisons into the places, and gave judgment against private persons who had said anything against the Roman State: their property was confiscated. He forced all the province to swear allegiance to himself and Pompeius. When

he heard of the events in Nearer Spain, he made preparation for war after this fashion. It was his intention to go to Gades with two legions, and keep all his supplies and ships there, thinking that with these means he could prolong the war in the island. Though Caesar had many and urgent reasons for returning to Italy, he resolved to leave no hostile party in Spain, for he knew that Pompeius had many friends and dependents in the Nearer province.

Accordingly Caesar sent to Further Spain Q. Cassius Longinus, a tribune of the Plebs with two legions, and he moved thither himself at great speed with six hundred horsemen. Q. Cassius was one of the tribunes who fled from Rome to Caesar (p. 6). Caesar sent before him notice to the magistrates and chief men of the Further province, and required them to meet him at Corduba (Cordova) on a certain day. He had been Quaestor and Proprætor in this province where he was well known. The notice was published all over the province, and there was no town which neglected to send part of their senate to Corduba at the time which had been named; there was not a Roman citizen of any note who did not appear at Corduba punctually. The Roman citizens at Corduba of their own proper motion closed the town gates against Varro, placed sentinels and watches on the towers and walls; and they retained for the defence of the place two colonial cohorts of Roman citizens which had by chance come there. During the same time the people of Carmo (Carmona¹), which was far the strongest town in the province (vol. i. p. 19) ejected from the place three cohorts which Varro had put in the citadel as a garrison and shut the gates against them.

The intelligence of these events made Varro move quicker towards Gades with his legions that he might not be stopped on the road or prevented from crossing over to the island, for he found that the province was favourably disposed to Caesar. When he had advanced some distance, he received a letter from Gades which informed him that as soon as Caesar's

¹ Carmo (Antonio Agostini, *Dialoghi*, 232). "Carmona è situata sopra un altissimo monte, et hà nella cima una rocca molto grande et con forma d'antica struttura."

notice was known, the chief men of Gades agreed with the tribunes of the cohorts, which were then in garrison, to expel Gallonius from the town and keep the city and island for Caesar. Having come to this resolution they warned Gallonius to quit Gades, while he could do so without risk; and if he did not go, they told him that they would look after their own interests. Gallonius yielded to these threats and left Gades. When this news was generally known, one of Varro's two legions, named Vernacula, a legion raised in the province, quitted Varro's camp in the sight of the governor, moved off in military order to Hispalis, and planted themselves in the Forum and the colonnades without doing any harm. Their behaviour pleased so much the Roman citizens of that place that they received the men in their houses most readily and entertained them. Varro was so much frightened by these events that turning round and changing his march in the direction of Italica,² he sent notice that he was coming, but he soon learned that the gates were closed and he would not be received. Being now stopped in all directions Varro sent to tell Caesar that he was ready to deliver his remaining legion to any person whom Caesar would name. Caesar sent his kinsman Sextus Caesar, the grandson of Caesar's uncle, Sextus Julius Caesar, consul B.C. 91. When the legion was surrendered, Varro came to Caesar, who was at Corduba: he made a faithful report of the public accounts, delivered up all the money in his possession, and stated what supplies of food he had and what ships.

Caesar held a public meeting at Corduba in which he thanked all classes of people: the Roman citizens, for the zeal which they had shown in keeping possession of the town; the Spaniards of Carmona, for expelling the garrison; the Gaditani, for frustrating the designs of his enemies and asserting their independence; and the tribunes and centurions, who had gone there as a garrison, for supporting the resolutions of the Gaditani by their courage. He remitted the sums of money which the Roman citizens had promised Varro for the public service: he restored their property to those who had been deprived of it for speaking freely. He

² Vol. i. p. 9.

rewarded some communities and private persons, gave the rest good hope for the future, and after a stay of two days at Corduba he went to Gades, where he ordered the money and decorations, which had been removed from Hercules' temple into a private house, to be placed again in the temple. He set Q. Cassius Longinus over the province with four legions. When the Spanish provinces in B.C. 55 were given to Pompeius by the Lex Trebonia, he sent there in the next year as his quaestor Q. Cassius, who plundered the people. Dion (41. c. 24) says that Caesar left Cassius in Spain because he had become acquainted with the Spaniards during his quaestorship; but his behaviour at that time, which we may assume that Caesar knew, would have been a good reason for not leaving him in Spain. However Caesar could not well avoid employing those who had served him, even if he knew that they were not worthy of his confidence. Caesar set sail in the vessels which Varro and the Gaditani by his order had built, and arrived in a few days at Tarragona, where embassies from nearly every part of the Nearer province were waiting for his arrival. Here also he conferred rewards on certain individuals and communities. Tarragona was one of the towns which had declared for Caesar before the surrender of Afranius. He marched from Tarragona through Narbonne to Marseille, and there he received intelligence of a law being enacted at Rome for the appointment of a dictator, and that he had been declared dictator by the praetor M. Aemilius Lepidus.³

³ Lepidus was governor of Hispania Citerior in B.C. 48. Chapter xxi.

CHAPTER VII.

CURIO IN AFRICA.

B.C. 49.

THE history of Curio's expedition is told by Caesar at the end of the second book of the Civil War (cc. 23—44) and after the siege of Marseille. Curio was directed by Caesar (B. C. i. 32) to take his army over the sea to the province Africa as soon as he had got possession of Sicily. It was Caesar's purpose after securing Sicily, which supplied Rome with grain, to prevent his enemies from stopping the corn trade with Africa (the Regency of Tunis), for the Pompeian party, as it has been stated (p. 10), threatened to starve Rome. When Curio sailed, he took only two of the four legions which he received from Caesar; for from the first, as Caesar says, he despised the two legions which P. Attius Varus had raised in Africa (p. 36). Curio took also five hundred horsemen and after a voyage of two days and three nights from Sicily he landed at Aquilaria, about twenty-two miles from Clupea otherwise named Aspis (Kalibia). Aquilaria had a roadstead for ships which was convenient enough in summer, and was in a large bay bounded on the east and west by two promontories, the eastern that of Mercurius now Cape Bon, and the western that of Apollo now Cape Zebib.¹ L. Caesar, the son, who has been mentioned in the first book of the Civil War, the man who

¹ There is a French map of the Regency of Tunis by E. Pellissier, Membre de la Commission Scientifique d'Algérie. He places Aquilaria at the small inlet named Tonnara, about a dozen miles south-west of Cape Bon. The distance between Tonnara and Kalibia corresponds very well with the distance between Aquilaria and Clupea.

was sent by Pompeius on a mission to Caesar, was waiting for Curio at Clupea with ten ships of war. Clupea, where there are some remains of the old Roman port, is on the east coast of the Regency of Tunis, and about twenty miles south of Cape Bon. These ten ships had been laid up at Utica after the end of the war with the pirates (B.C. 67) and were refitted for the present occasion by P. Attius Varus. L. Caesar being afraid of Curio's numerous fleet fled from the open sea, where he had been cruising, and running his decked galley on the nearest shore left it there and made his escape to Adrumetum (Soussa, near the southern part of the Bay of Hammamet). C. Considius Longus with one legion was stationed at Adrumetum to protect the place. The rest of L. Caesar's ships followed him to Adrumetum. The quaestor Marcius Rufus with twelve ships, which Curio had brought from Sicily to protect his transports, pursued L. Caesar when his ships left the open sea, but when he saw the vessel which had been run ashore, he towed it off and returned to Curio.

Curio sent forward Marcius with his ships to Utica, while he marched in the same direction with his army, and in two days reached the river Bagradas (Mejerda).² There he left with the legions the legatus C. Caninius Rebilus, who had served under Caesar in Gallia, and went forward himself with the cavalry to examine the Castra Cornelia or Corneliana, for this place was supposed to be very suitable for a camp. It is described by Caesar as a steep eminence projecting into the sea, abrupt and rough on both sides, but with the slope a little easier on the side turned towards Utica, from which it is distant in a direct line a little more than a Roman mile.³ But in

² Curio landed in the great bay, now the Gulf of Tunis, and at a place twenty-two miles from Clupea, the position of which is known. He could not march to the Bagradas in two days. The Bagradas is the largest river in North Africa west of Egypt. It rises in the Algerian province of Constantina, enters the Regency of Tunis north-west of Kef, and from this point it has a general direction from south-west to north-east. The river now flows into the Gulf of Tunis a short distance south of the Lake Ghar-el-Melah, on which is the small town of Ghar-el-Melah, named by Europeans Porto-Farina, and famed in the times of Barbary piracy. The Mejerda is not navigable in any part in consequence of the inequality of the depth of water. Pellissier, *La Régence de Tunis*, chap. ii.

³ The position of Castra Corneliana is also described by Livy (29. c. 35) as a promontory running some distance out to sea and connected with the mainland

this distance there is a spring, and at this part the sea comes up some distance into the land and all the ground thereabouts is made a marsh, which if a man would avoid, he must make a circuit of six miles to reach the town.

The Bagradas has certainly changed its direction in the lower part of the course since Caesar's time, and it is conjectured that Utica, which was then on the sea, is now represented by some ruins which are seven miles from the sea at a place which Shaw names Boo-shatter (Bou-Chater in the French map). Shaw supposes that the river has forced a way through the swamp between Utica and the Castra Cornelianiana, which he supposes to be Gellah, two leagues east of Boo-shatter.⁴ Gellah is "the most northern and rugged part of that remarkable promontory, where P. Cornelius Scipio may be supposed to have fixed his winter quarters, called thence the Castra Cornelia or Cornelianiana." If Shaw's view is correct, the remains of Utica and the Castra, which are now separated by the Mejerda, were on the same side of the river in Caesar's time, and on the west side.

After exploring the Castra, Curio observed that the camp of Varus was close to the wall and the town of Utica at the gate named "warlike,"⁵ and was very strongly defended by posi-

by a narrow ridge. The passage in Caesar is obscure; perhaps there is some error. He seems to mean this: in the direct line from the hill slope to Utica there was a spring, and the sea came up as far as this direct line. The spring which therefore was close to the sea formed a marsh which touched the sea and spread inland some miles. Guischartt has given I think the correct sense: "Il y a un peu plus de mille pas en droiture de cet endroit à Utique: mais on trouve sur cette route une fontaine, jusques à laquelle la mer s'avance, ce qui fait que toute cette contrée forme un vaste lac." "Quod mare succedit longius, lateque is locus restagnat," appears to be the best MSS. reading. Oudendorp.

⁴ Shaw's *Travels in Barbary*, second edition, 1757. Shaw's Gellah is the Kalat-el-oued of the French map, and of Pellissier's *Description de Tunis*, p. 223. Pellissier does not say how far Bou-Chater is from the sea: he only observes that it is "at a considerable distance." No inscription has yet been found at Bou-Chater. There are on this site ancient cisterns, remains of an aqueduct, an amphitheatre hollowed in the hill of Bou-Chater, and traces of a theatre which was constructed on the prolongation of the greater axis of the amphitheatre.

⁵ So in the editions, but "Bellicam" is some proper name probably, and corrupted. Freinsheim (ad Curtium, iii. 3. 16) suggests that it was the gate of Ibelus.

tion; on one side by the city Utica, on the other side by the theatre, which was in front of the city, and stood on a basement of enormous strength; and thus the approach to the camp was narrow and difficult. Curio also saw along the crowded roads people and beasts carrying property from the country into the city to save it from pillage. Accordingly he sent out his cavalry to make plunder, and Varus at the same time sent out of the town for the protection of the fugitives six hundred Numidian horsemen and four hundred foot soldiers whom a few days before King Juba had despatched to Utica to aid in the defence of the town. Juba was a friend of Pompeius, who in B.C. 81 (Vol. ii. p. 373) had given Numidia to Juba's father Hiempsal; and he hated Curio, who in B.C. 50 in his tribunate had proposed to annex Juba's kingdom to the Roman Republic (Dion Cassius, 41. c. 41; Lucan, iv. 690). The cavalry on both sides had a fight, but the Numidians did not stand even the first attack of Curio's horse, and retired to their camp with the loss of about one hundred and twenty men. In the meantime the ships of war arrived and Curio gave notice to the merchant vessels at Utica, about two hundred in number, that he would treat them as enemies if they did not move off to the *Castra Corneliana*. The ships immediately raised anchor and leaving Utica removed to the place to which they were ordered, and thus Curio's army was plentifully supplied with all that they needed.

Curio returned to his camp on the *Bagradas*, and by the universal acclamation of the army was saluted with the title of imperator. On the next day he led his army to Utica and began to make his camp near the town. Before the works were finished, the horsemen who were posted to look out reported that a large force of cavalry and foot from King Juba were approaching Utica, and at the same time a great cloud of dust was seen, and immediately the head of the enemy's troops was in sight. Curio surprised at this unexpected appearance sent forward the cavalry to sustain the first charge and delay the enemy, and quickly drawing his legions from their work he put them in battle order. The cavalry attacked the enemy, and even before the legions could be set in order, the whole force sent by the king being thrown into confusion,

for they had marched without any order and without any fear of danger, broke into flight, and a great number of the infantry were killed. But nearly all the horsemen escaped along the shore by their speed and took refuge in the town.

On the next night two Marsic centurions with twenty-two soldiers of their manipuli deserted from Curio to Attius Varus. These Marsi were the men who opposed the surrender of Corfinium (p. 27) and were now in Curio's army. The deserters either really believing what they said or wishing to please Varus, reported that all the army was disaffected to Curio, and they advised him to bring his men within sight of Curio's troops and to give them an opportunity of talking with them. Following this suggestion Varus brought his troops out of the camp on the next morning : Curio did the same, and both the armies were set in battle array with a small valley between them. There was in the army of Varus one Sextus Quintilius Varus, who had been in Corfinium (B. C. i. 23), and when he was set at liberty by Caesar went to Africa. Curio had carried over to Africa the legions which Caesar had taken at Corfinium, and the centuries and manipuli remained the same, except that there had been a change in a few centurions. Quintilius taking advantage of this circumstance began to move about Curio's lines and to entreat the soldiers not to forget their first oath which they had taken to L. Domitius and himself as quaestor, and not to fight against those who had sustained the same siege with them, and on the side of those by whom they were insultingly named deserters. He said something also about the rewards which they might reasonably expect from his liberality if they joined him and Attius. Curio's men made no indication that this address had produced any effect on them, and both armies were withdrawn to their respective camps. It is not easy to understand why Curio allowed Quintilius Varus to address his troops and excite them to mutiny. Such a thing could only happen in a civil war, where the men on both sides speak the same language ; but Curio was a careless commander or he would have prevented what Quintilius did.

There was now great alarm in Curio's camp, and it was increased by the men's talk, for every soldier had his own

thoughts about the state of affairs, and his fears made him add something to what he heard from others. What came from one man spread to many, and being reported from one to another produced the appearance of being founded on the authority of many persons.⁶ In this emergency Curio summoned a council of war which consisted of the higher officers, to deliberate on the state of affairs. Some were of opinion that they ought, whatever might be the risk, to attack the camp of Varus, for when the soldiers had such thoughts in their heads, inactivity was most dangerous: and it was certainly better to try the fortune of war by making a bold effort than to be deserted and betrayed by their own men and to suffer barbarous treatment from them. Others thought that they ought to retire at the commencement of the third watch to the *Castra Cornelia*, where there would be time to cure the disposition of the soldiers, and if any disaster should befall them, their numerous ships would secure a safe retreat to Sicily.

Curio did not assent to either proposal: what hope, he said, could they have of success if they attacked so strong a camp, and what would they gain, if they retired from the assault after sustaining great loss? to change their camp would be an ignoble flight, the expression of total despair; and the consequence would be the alienation of the army, for honourable men ought not to have grounds for suspecting that they are not trusted, nor ought the base to know that they are feared: if, he said, we were certain of the truth of what is reported of the disaffection of the army, which he himself believed to be either a false opinion or that the disaffection was less than it was supposed to be, it was better to pretend not to know the fact and to hide it than to add to it their own confirmation: it is even proposed, he said, that we should leave the camp at midnight, to give those who are inclined to be mutinous, I suppose, a better opportunity of effecting their wicked design; for mutiny is checked either by sense of shame or by fear, two restraints which darkness is particularly adapted to destroy. Curio concluded that he was neither rash enough to advise the attacking of the camp without

⁶ The rest of this chapter (29) is corrupt.

hope of success, nor so timid as to lose all spirit; he thought that they ought to try everything before accepting either of the two proposals, and he hoped soon to come to a resolution with which they would in a great measure agree.

The last words of Curio indicated his intention to sound the disposition of the soldiers, whom he immediately summoned and addressed to this effect.⁷ He reminded them of the service which they had rendered to Caesar at Corfinium and thus made him master of a great part of Italy; their example was followed by all the Italian towns, for which reason Pompeius hated them, for through their behaviour he was compelled to leave Italy without fighting a battle. "Caesar, who has treated me as his dearest friend," he said, "has entrusted to your fidelity both me and the provinces of Sicily and Africa, without which he cannot protect Rome and Italy. You are now encouraged to abandon us by men who wish at the same time to ruin us and make you commit an abominable crime. How in their passion can they advise you worse than to betray those who think that they are indebted to you for everything, and to put yourselves in the power of those who consider you as the cause of their misfortunes? Have you not heard what Caesar has done in Spain? two armies defeated, and two generals, two provinces recovered, and all within forty days after Caesar came in sight of his enemies. Is it possible that they who could not resist with unbroken forces shall be able to resist now; and that you, who followed Caesar when victory was uncertain, should now take the side of the vanquished, when you ought to be receiving the reward of your services? They say that they have been betrayed and deserted by you, and they speak of your former military oath. But did you desert L. Domitius or did Domitius desert you? Did he not abandon you when you were ready to endure every extremity? did he not attempt to escape without your knowledge? After being betrayed by him, were you not kindly pardoned by Caesar? How could

⁷ Curio's speech is directed to the soldiers who took service under Caesar after the surrender of Corfinium. Whether the substance of the speech is Curio's or not, is immaterial. It contains Caesar's opinions, and is therefore a real part of the history of this civil war.

Domitius keep you bound by your oath, when after throwing down the fasces and divesting himself of his military authority he had become a private person and a prisoner? After all it seems that you are still under a new kind of obligation, an obligation to break the oath by which you are now bound, and to respect the oath which was made void by the surrender of your general and by his loss of liberty.^a Well, I suppose, if you are satisfied with Caesar, you may have some reason for being displeased with me. I am not going to speak of my services to you, for so far they fall short both of my wishes and your expectations; but soldiers have always looked for the reward of their labours after the issue of a war; and what the issue will be you cannot doubt. Why should I not speak of my own care, in doing my duty or of my success so far? Are you not satisfied with my having carried over the army in safety without the loss of a single ship, with my dispersing the enemy's fleet by my arrival, gaining in two days two victories with my cavalry, with bringing out of the enemy's port two hundred trading vessels and their cargoes, and finally reducing the enemy to such straits that they cannot receive supplies either by land or by sea? Are you ready to throw away such success and to abandon your leaders in order to accept the disgrace of Corfinium, the flight from Italy, the surrender of the Spains, and the defeats from which the issue of this war in Africa can be easily foreseen. For my part I was satisfied with the name of Caesar's soldier: you gave me the title of Imperator, and if you repent of what you have done, I return to you what you have given: restore to me my former name that it may not be thought that you gave me an honourable title for the purpose of dishonouring me."

This speech pleased the men: they frequently interrupted Curio and showed that they were greatly grieved at their fidelity being suspected. When he was retiring, all the soldiers urged him to keep up his spirits, not to hesitate about fighting, and to make trial of their loyalty and courage. Such a change being wrought in the inclination and opinion of the army, Curio with the concurrence of both officers and

^a But the rule of law expressed by the words "*capitis deminutio*," used by Caesar, applied only to a Roman taken by a foreign enemy, not in a civil war.

men determined to fight as soon as he had an opportunity, and on the next day placed his forces in battle order on the same ground which he had occupied on former days. Attius Varus did the same, that he might not lose an opportunity either of exciting Curio's men to mutiny or fighting on favourable ground.

There was between the two armies the valley, which has been already mentioned: it was not wide, but difficult and steep of ascent. Each commander was waiting for the other to cross in the expectation of fighting in a more advantageous position, when it was observed that on the left wing of Attius all the cavalry with many light armed foot interspersed among them were descending into the valley. Curio sent against them his cavalry and two cohorts of Marrucini. The enemy's cavalry did not stand the first shock but fled at full speed to their army: the light armed troops, which accompanied them, being deserted were surrounded and killed by Curio's troops. The army of Varus saw the flight and massacre of their comrades, but did not come to their aid. Curio had with him Caninius Rebilus, a man of great military experience. "You see, Curio," said Rebilus, "that the enemy is struck with terror: why do you not take advantage of the opportunity?" Curio simply reminding his men of what they had promised the day before ordered them to follow and himself led the way. The valley was so steep that the first ranks could not climb the sides without the assistance of those who were behind them; but the soldiers of Attius were so terrified at the flight and slaughter of their comrades that they never thought of resistance and were expecting every moment to be surrounded by Curio's cavalry, and so before a missile could be discharged or Curio's men could come near them, the whole army of Varus turned round and sought the protection of their camp.

In the flight Fabius, a Pelignian, a centurion of the lowest class in Curio's army, who was following close on the most advanced of the fugitives, called aloud to Varus, as if he were one of his own men and wished to say something to him. Varus hearing his name often repeated halted, and while he was asking the man who he was and what he wanted, Fabius aimed at his shoulder with his sword and was near killing

Varus, but he avoided the danger by raising his shield. Fabius was surrounded by Varus' men and killed. The gates of the camp were so crowded by the fugitives that more perished in the crush than in the battle or the flight, and they were very near being driven out of the camp: some even ran right through the camp into the town. The strength of the position and the defences prevented Curio from attacking the camp, and his men having come out only to fight had not with them the means necessary for an assault. Accordingly Curio took his soldiers back to their own camp without having lost a single man except Fabius: the enemy had about six hundred men killed and many wounded. When Curio withdrew, all the wounded men of Varus retired into the town, and they were followed by many who pretended to be wounded, but were only frightened. Varus seeing the alarm of all his army, left only a trumpeter in the camp with a few tents for show, and at the beginning of the third watch silently drew his army into the town. On the next day Curio began to blockade Utica and to form lines of contravallation. The body of the townspeople had long enjoyed peace and had no experience of war; the citizens of Utica were well disposed to Caesar in consideration of certain favours which they had received from him; the Roman citizens in the place were of various political parties, and the alarm in consequence of the losses in battle was great. All talked openly of surrender and urged P. Attius not to ruin them by his obstinacy. In this state of affairs messengers came from King Juba with the news that he would soon arrive at Utica with a powerful force, and they exhorted the citizens to defend the place. The people being thus encouraged recovered their spirits.

Curio received the same intelligence, but for some time he did not believe it, so great was his confidence in his good fortune: Caesar's success also in Spain was now known in Africa through messengers and letters; by all which circumstances Curio was so elated that he thought the king would not dare to oppose him. But when he was informed on undoubted authority that Juba's forces were less than twenty-five miles from Utica, he left his works, and retired to the *Castra Cornelia*, where he began to collect stores of corn, to

fortify the camp, and to lay in stocks of timber-wood; and he immediately sent orders to Sicily for the two legions which he had left there and the rest of the cavalry to join him. The *Castra Cornelia* was very well adapted for protracting the war both by the nature of the position and the fortifications, the proximity of the sea, the abundance of fresh water and of salt, of which a great quantity had already been brought there from the neighbouring saltpans. There was no risk of want of timber, for there were forests, nor of grain, for the country was full of corn. Curio therefore with the approbation of the whole army determined to wait for the rest of his forces and to protract the war.

This salt was, as it appears, the produce of certain adjacent saltpans, probably on or near the coast, or perhaps of some of the salt lakes. A great quantity of salt is still produced from the salt lakes in the Regency of Tunis by the natural process of evaporation in summer. The crystals are fine and very pure, and only cost the labour of collection.

Curio was now informed by some townsmen, who came to him from Utica, that King Juba had been recalled by a war among his neighbours and quarrels among the people of Leptis;⁹ that he was now in his kingdom; and that his general Saburra was approaching Utica with a small force. Rashly trusting the report of these men Curio changed his purpose and resolved to hazard a battle. His youth, his great spirit, his past success, and his confidence in a fortunate issue, all combined to confirm him in this determination. At night-fall he sent all his cavalry towards the enemy's camp which was on the Bagradas and under the command of Saburra; but the king with all his forces was following and had halted about six miles behind Saburra. Curio's cavalry, who had ridden on during the night, attacked the enemy unexpectedly, for the Numidians according to barbarian custom had gone to rest without observing any order. Being fast asleep and dispersed about the ground, a great number were killed, and many fled in terror. After this success the cavalry returned towards the camp with some prisoners.

⁹ This Leptis was no doubt Leptis Minor, the modern Lemta, south of Adrumetum, now Soussa.

During the fourth watch Curio had set out with all his forces, leaving five cohorts to guard the camp. After having advanced six miles he met the cavalry, who informed him of what they had done: he asked the prisoners, who was in command at the camp on the Bagradas, and he was told that it was Saburra. In his eagerness to come up with the enemy Curio made no further inquiry, but turning to the soldiers who were nearest to him he said, "Don't you see, soldiers, that the story of the prisoners agrees with the report of the deserters? the king is not here, and the troops which he has sent are few, which is proved by their inability to resist a small body of horsemen: hasten then to seize your booty, and to gain the glory of a victory that we may begin to think about rewarding your services." The cavalry had indeed been very successful, especially when their small number was compared with the large force of the Numidians; but their reports were greatly exaggerated, which is usual with men who extol their own exploits. Much booty also was displayed, and captured men and horses were exhibited. The consequence was that the army thought that delay only deferred their victory, and the ardour of the soldiers seconded the hopes of the general. Curio ordered the cavalry to follow, and he hurried the march in order to attack the enemy while still in confusion after the flight. But the cavalry, who were exhausted by the night's march, could not follow, and halted, some in one place and some in another. Even this did not diminish Curio's expectation of victory.

The season of the year and the nature of the country would enable us to conjecture what Appian states (B. C. ii. 45), that the weather was hot and the road through a dry and sandy country, and all the streams which flowed in winter were dried up by the scorching sun of Africa. Juba being informed by Saburra of the fight that had taken place in the night sent to his relief two thousand Spanish and Gallic horsemen, who formed the king's body-guard, and also that part of the infantry in which he had most confidence: he followed slowly with the rest of his troops and sixty elephants. As Curio had sent forward his cavalry, Saburra guessed that he would soon arrive himself, and he put his cavalry and infantry in

battle order, with instructions to make a show of fear and to retire a little and draw back ; at the proper time, he said, he would give the signal for fighting, and such orders as circumstances might require.

Curio's former expectations were encouraged by the appearance of the enemy flying, and he led his men from the higher ground to the plain. He advanced some distance further and then halted, for the army was exhausted by a sixteen miles' march. Saburra now gave the signal, formed his line of battle and went round to cheer the men ; but he sent his cavalry only to make the attack and kept the infantry at a distance in sight of the enemy. Curio did his duty as a general and urged his men to trust to their courage. Neither the soldiers though fatigued by the march, nor the cavalry though few in number and exhausted by their exertions, showed any want of ardour and spirit ; but the horsemen were only two hundred, for the rest had halted on the road. The enemy gave way before the attack of Curio's cavalry, who were however unable to follow up the pursuit or to press their horses forward. The enemy's cavalry now began to surround Curio's flanks and to trample down the men from the rear. When Curio's cohorts ran forward towards the enemy, the Numidians, who were quite fresh, avoided the attack by their activity, and when Curio's men attempted to retire to their ranks they were surrounded and cut off from their comrades. Thus it was neither safe for them to keep their ground and maintain their ranks, nor to rush forward and try the hazard of battle. The forces of the enemy were continually increased by the reinforcements which the king sent up : the strength of Curio's men was failing from exhaustion, and the wounded could neither retire nor be withdrawn to a place of safety, for the whole army was surrounded by the enemy's cavalry. The wounded lost all hope, and as men are used to do at their last moments, were either deploring their own unhappy fate or recommending their fathers and mothers¹ to those who might

¹ "Parentes suos:" fathers and mothers. They are represented as young unmarried soldiers.

be lucky enough to escape from the danger. There was universal terror and lamentation.

In this general consternation Curio seeing that neither his exhortations nor entreaties were listened to, and that in the desperate state of affairs there was only one chance of escape, ordered all the army to make their way to the nearest hills and the standards to be turned in that direction. But the hills were already occupied by the cavalry of Saburra. Curio's men now were reduced to complete desperation: some fled and were cut down by the cavalry, and others unwounded fell down from exhaustion. Cn. Domitius, commander of the cavalry, having a few horsemen with him urged Curio to save himself by flight and to attempt to reach the camp; and he promised Curio that he would not abandon him. But Curio declared that after the loss of the army, which had been entrusted to him, he would never return into Caesar's presence, and he fought till he was killed. A few horsemen escaped from the battle. Those who had stayed behind to rest their horses, as soon as they saw from a distance the rout of the army retired in safety to the camp. The soldiers were killed to a man; a legion and a half. The head of Curio was brought to Juba (Appian, B. C. ii. 45).

When the report of this disaster reached the quaestor Marcus Rufus, who was left in the camp by Curio, he exhorted the men not to lose heart. They begged and entreated him to carry them back to Sicily, which he promised to do, and he ordered the masters of the vessels to have all their boats ready on the shore at nightfall. But in the general alarm some declared that the forces of Juba were already present, that Varus with his legions was close at hand, and that the dust raised by the troops was visible; all which was completely false. Some feared that the enemy's fleet would soon appear. Amidst the universal consternation every man looked after himself. Those who were on board the ships of war were hurrying their departure, and their flight moved the masters of the transports to follow. Appian (B. C. ii. 46) gives the name of Flamma to the cowardly commander of the fleet. A few small barks did their duty and obeyed the orders; but the shore was crowded with the fugitives, and

there was such a struggle to get first into the boats that many were sunk by the weight, and the rest were afraid to come near the land. The result was that only a few soldiers and citizens² who found friends in this extremity or were looked on with compassion or could swim to the vessels were taken on board and carried to Sicily. The remainder sent some centurions by night to Varus to offer their surrender. These soldiers on the following day were seen by Juba before the town and claimed by him as his prisoners, and a great many of them were massacred. He picked out a few and sent them to his kingdom. Varus complained that the king broke the promise that he made to the soldiers, but he did not dare to make resistance. Juba entered Utica on horseback followed by many senators, among whom were Servius Sulpicius and Licinius Damasippus. After giving brief orders about what should be done at Utica and staying there a few days Juba returned with all his forces to his kingdom. On the report of Juba's services being carried to Pompeius in Macedonia, he received from Pompeius and the senators who were with him the title of king. But Juba was declared an enemy to Rome by Caesar and his partisans in the city, and Bocchus and Bogudes received from Rome the title of kings on account of their hostility or assumed hostility to the party of Pompeius.³

Caesar in his history of Curio's unfortunate campaign has clearly explained the causes of his defeat. The first and great mistake of Curio was contempt of his opponent, a thing which

² "Patres familiae:" does he mean married soldiers? or, as it has been translated, "aged men?"

³ Dion (41. c. 41 &c.) has told the story of Curio's campaign and particularly his final defeat more correctly than usual. Appian's narrative (B. C. ii. 44 &c.) is defective, as usual, in geographical accuracy, and he has used other authorities besides Caesar, whom indeed he may not have used at all. Asinius Pollio was with Curio, and he may be Appian's authority. Appian reports that before Curio landed, his enemies supposing that he would occupy the Castra Cornelia poisoned the water there, and that his men suffered much from using it, which was the reason why he encamped near Utica. Lucan in his historical poem (*Pharsal*. iv. 581) has told the story of the defeat and death of Curio, the man whom Caesar is said to have bought:

"Momentumque fuit mutatus Curio rerum,
Gallorum captus spoliis et Caesaris auro."

has ruined many men. He took over to Africa only two legions when he had four at his disposal. He left his safe position at the *Castra Cornelia*, where he had abundant supplies and the command of the sea, and plunged in the hot season into the waterless interior to attack an enemy who would never have dared to assault his camp. He was deceived by deserters and by a palpable trick of the barbarian prince whom he had once attempted to strip of his dominions. Folly and want of common sense brought ruin on his army and on himself, for after such miserable mismanagement he could do nothing else than die by the sword of the enemy. Caesar has generously spared all reproach of his young friend, but he has disguised none of his faults. In fact, Caesar was blamable for appointing an inexperienced headstrong young man to an important command, when he might have chosen *Caninius Rebilus*, whom he knew well and had tried. But Caesar did what has often been done since: *Curio* was a useful political partisan and expected to be rewarded for his services; and Caesar gratified *Curio's* wishes even at the risk of losing an army and a province. There is no indication of the source from which Caesar derived his narrative of this unlucky campaign.

Caesar sustained another loss some time in this year, and it has been conjectured that he spoke of it in his third book (iii. 8) in a passage which is now defective. He alludes to this loss in another passage (B.C. iii. 10). The story is thus briefly told by *Dion* (41, c. 40): "While these things were going on in Rome and in Spain, *M. Octavius* and *L. Scribonius Libo* using the fleet of *Pompeius* drove out of *Dalmatia* *P. Cornelius Dolabella*, who was acting for Caesar in those parts; and when *C. Antonius*, the brother of *M. Antonius*, attempted to aid *Dolabella*, *Octavius* and *Libo* shut him up in a small island, where *Antonius* being deserted by the natives and hard pressed by famine was taken with all his men except a few: for some of them succeeded in escaping to the mainland; and others who attempted to escape on rafts were caught and killed themselves." The surrender, as Caesar says (B.C. iii. 67) was effected through the treachery of *T. Pulio* or *Pulfio*, whose courage is recorded by Caesar in his history of the

Gaulic War (B.G. v. 44). Pompeius incorporated in his own army the men of C. Antonius who surrendered (Caesar, B.C. iii. 4), fifteen cohorts, as Orosius states (vi. 15).

Florus (iv. 2. 81) says that "Dolabella and Antonius being ordered to occupy the entrance of the Hadriatic, Dolabella placed his camp on the shore of Illyricum, and Antonius on the shore of Curicta, and as Pompeius was in the possession of these seas, his legatus Octavius Libo surrounded both of them with a large force. Famine compelled Antonius to surrender. Rafts also which were sent by Basilus (one of Caesar's commanders, B.G. vi. 29), such as he had constructed for want of ships, were captured by a new trick of the Pompeian Cilicians, by letting ropes down into the sea, in the fashion in which wild beasts are snared. The rising tide however enabled two of the rafts to escape. One of them which carried the soldiers belonging to Opitergium (a town of Venetia) stuck in the shallows with a memorable result; for a body of hardly one thousand men resisted for a whole day the missiles of an army which surrounded them, and when their courage offered no chance of escape, to avoid a surrender and at the exhortation of the tribune Vulteius, they killed one another." Florus probably followed or used Lucan in his story (Pharsal. iv. 402—581); but we do not know who was Lucan's authority. Florus writes Octavius Libo, instead of Octavius and Libo. If we had Caesar's text complete, the narrative might not occupy more than a chapter or two.

The island was Corcyra Nigra (Curzola), in the Hadriatic, according to Caesar's text (B.C. iii. 10) and that of Florus before it was altered; but Caesar's words "ad Corcyram" were changed to "ad Curictam" by P. Rubenius; and late editors of Caesar and others have accepted the alteration.⁴

⁴ As to the reading "Curictico litore" in Florus, the notes on Duker's edition may be consulted; and the notes in Oudendorp's edition of Lucan on the line (iv. 406)—

"Illic bellaci confusus gente Curictum."

The island Curicta (Veglia) is in the Gulf of Quarnero or Fiume, but the place where C. Antonius was caught, is as Lucan writes (iv. 404),—

"Qua maris Hadriaci longas ferit unda Salonas,
Et tepidum in molles Zephyros excurrit Iader."

The Iader is a river (il Giadro) which flowed into the Hadriatic near Salonae or Salona. The alteration in Caesar's text of "ad Corcyram" into "ad Curictam" cannot be justified. Curicta is far out of the way, if we may trust Lucan's description of the position of the place where C. Antonius was caught; and also so far north that it was much beyond the limits of any military operations in Illyricum. See the note of Vossius on B. C. iii. 10, ed. Oudendorp.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE SIEGE OF MASSILIA.

B.C. 49.

WHILE Caesar was in great straits at Ilerda (B. C. i. 56), the inhabitants of Massilia following the advice of L. Domitius made ready seventeen ships of war, of which eleven were decked.¹ They also prepared many small vessels, for it was their design to terrify the Romans by numbers. They embarked a large body of archers, and of the Albici, who have been already mentioned, and encouraged them by gifts and promises. Domitius asked for a certain number of ships, which he manned with the "coloni" (tenants, p. 44) and shepherds whom he had brought with him. With the fleet thus equipped the Massiliots advanced with great confidence against the ships commanded by D. Brutus, which were stationed at an island opposite to Massilia. This island is one of the dismal rocks near the entrance of the port of Marseille, now named Ratoneau and Pomègue.²

Brutus was much inferior in the number of ships; but Caesar had assigned to him the bravest men selected from all the legions, "antesignani" (p. 51) and centurions, who had volunteered for this service. The men were provided with hooks and grappling irons, and a great number of pila or

¹ "Naves tectae," named also "constratae" (Bell. Alex. c. 11). The vessels which were only partially covered at the head and stern were named "open" (apertae).

² The islands and the smaller rocks near them seem to be the Stoechades of Agathemerus. They are not the Stoechades of Pliny (N. H. 3. 11) and of Strabo (p. 184), who speaks of them as five in number and cultivated by the Massiliots. The Stoechades of Pliny at least seem to be the Isles d'Hières.

heavy javelins, darts and other missiles. Having notice of the approach of the Massiliot fleet they came out of port and began the engagement. The struggle was very fierce on both sides : the Albici, a race of hardy mountaineers, well trained to the use of arms, were scarcely inferior to the Romans in courage, and having recently parted from the townspeople they were animated by the promises which had been made to them ; the shepherds of Domitius also were encouraged by the hope of freedom, and fighting under the eye of their master were eager to merit his approbation. The Massiliots confiding in the easy movements of their vessels and the skill of the helmsmen eluded the attacks of Brutus' ships ; and so long as they had plenty of sea-room, they endeavoured by extending their line to surround the vessels of their adversaries, or to attack single ships with several ships, or to sweep past them and break the oars. When they were compelled to come to close quarters, where the skill and dexterity of the helmsmen were of no use, they relied on the courage of the mountaineers. The men of Brutus had rowers of less experience and less skilful helmsmen to aid them, for they had been taken from merchant-ships and had not yet learned even the names of the tackle ; and besides this, the ships being built of unseasoned timber were not so light and manageable as those of the enemy. However when there was an opportunity of coming to close quarters, the men of Brutus were well content to fight against a couple of the enemy's ships with a single vessel, and when they had fixed their grappling irons on both ships and held them fast, they boarded, and slaughtered a great number of the Albici and of the shepherds. In this way they sank part of the enemy's fleet, captured some vessels with the men in them and drove the rest into the harbour. The Massiliots lost nine ships, captured and sunk.

Caesar was still busy in Spain when his legatus C. Trebonius began the siege of Massilia by raising earthworks in two places and pushing his galleries and towers towards the town. One place was close to the port and the ship-yards ; the other was on that side of the town by which it was approached from Gallia and Spain ; or, as Caesar explains it,

at that part of the sea which lies towards the mouth of the Rhone. The port, named Lacydon, was, as Strabo describes it, beneath a theatre-formed rock looking towards the south; and it was on the south-east side of this port where Trebonius made one of his earthworks. The other was made on the east side of the town. Caesar describes Massilia as washed by the sea on three fourths of the circuit; and the remaining fourth part was the approach on the land side. On this fourth side also the part which extended to the citadel being defended by the nature of the ground and a very deep valley made the attack tedious and difficult. In order to construct his earthworks Trebonius sent for a great number of beasts and men from all parts of the Provincia, and got together brushwood and timber. By these means he raised an earthwork to the height of eighty feet.³ (B. C. ii. 1.)

Massilia had always possessed great military stores and numerous engines, which no galleries (vineae) made of osiers could resist. Wooden stakes twelve feet long pointed with iron and discharged from powerful ballistae pierced through four layers of hurdles and entered the ground. Accordingly the galleries of the besiegers were covered with pieces of wood a foot in the square fastened together, and under this cover the material for the earthworks was passed from hand to hand. A Testudo⁴ or cover sixty feet wide was pushed on in front for the purpose of levelling the ground: it was constructed of very strong pieces of wood and covered with everything that could protect it against fire and stones. But the magnitude of the works, the height of the wall and the towers and the number of the enemy's engines retarded the operations of the

³ The old port was evidently not the modern port, but was at the part named in some maps the Catalan village and harbour; and it must have been constructed in Greek fashion by artificial moles. The modern city is built round the modern port. Eumenius states that Massilia was connected with the mainland by a space of fifteen hundred paces, which, as D'Anville remarks (*Notice de l'Ancienne Gaule, Massilia*) is too much, "for from the bottom of the port measured in a direction towards the sea as far as the place called La Grande Pointe, it is only 700 or 800 Roman paces." The modern port has probably been chiefly formed by dredging a shallow natural inlet, which is still shallow and only kept accessible to merchant-ships by constant labour.

⁴ The Testudo described by Vitruvius (x. 14) had a square basis of twenty-five feet to the side.

besiegers. Frequent sallies also were made by the Albici and fire was thrown on the earthworks and the towers, but the sallies were easily repelled with great loss to the assailants, who were driven back into the town.

In the meantime L. Nasidius, who was sent by Cn. Pompeius to relieve Massilia with sixteen ships, a few of which had brazen beaks, passed through the straits of Sicily without being observed by Curio, who had not then left Sicily. Nasidius brought his ships up to Messana (Messina), and as the alarm drove away the chief inhabitants he was able to carry off one of the ships from the naval station. With this addition to his fleet he directed his course to Massilia, and sending before him a small vessel he announced his approach to Domitius and the Massiliots and earnestly pressed them to join him in fighting another battle with Brutus.

After their defeat the Massiliots brought out old ships from the ship-yards to make up the number which they had lost, and repaired and fitted them out with wonderful expedition. They had an abundant supply of rowers and helmsmen. They also had some fishing-vessels which they covered over to protect the rowers against missiles, and they filled these vessels with archers and military engines. With a fleet thus equipped and encouraged by the tears and entreaties of the old, the matrons and the young women to protect their native city in this great extremity, the men embarked with no less spirit and confidence than they showed before the late defeat. It is a common fault of mankind, observes Caesar, to trust more to the unseen and the unknown, and also to be more alarmed by them : and the first thing happened now ; for the arrival of L. Nasidius filled the citizens with hope and made them ready to fight. They left the port with a fair wind, and sailed to Tauroeis, a fort belonging to Massilia, where they found Nasidius, put their ships in order and prepared for a second battle. After deliberation the right wing was assigned to the Massiliots, and the left to Nasidius. Tauroeis was probably on the right of the entrance of the bay of Ciotat, which is between Marscille and Toulon ; for there is still a place named Taurenti in that part of the coast.

Brutus sailed to Tauroeis with his fleet increased ; for in

addition to the ships built at Arelate, he had six vessels which had been taken from the Massiliots, and were now repaired and well equipped. Encouraging his men to despise an enfeebled enemy whom they had defeated in all their strength, he advanced against Nasidius and the Massiliots full of hope and spirit. It was easy to see into the city from the camp of Trebonius and from the heights. All the young men who had been left in Massilia to keep guard and all the older people with their wives and children were stretching their hands from the wall in a suppliant attitude to heaven, or visiting the temples and praying prostrate before the statues for victory. There was not a person in the city who did not believe that his own fate depended on that day's battle; for the young men of the best condition and those of highest rank of every age had been summoned by name, and entreated to man the fleet, so that, if the Massiliots should be defeated, it was plain that they would be unable to make another effort; but, if they should be victorious, they were confident that they would save the city either by their own means or with aid from without.

When the battle began, the Massiliots showed no want of courage. Remembering the recent exhortation of their friends they fought with a conviction that they would never have another opportunity, and that those who fell in battle would only perish a little sooner than the rest of the citizens, who would have the same fate when the city was taken. The ships of Brutus being gradually separated from one another by the skilful manœuvres of the enemy's helmsmen, the Massiliots had an opportunity of taking advantage of the ease with which their vessels were worked, and if the Romans ever succeeded in holding any ship with their grappling irons, the enemy came from all directions to aid their countrymen. At close quarters also joined with the Albici the Massiliots fought with spirit and were little inferior in courage to their adversaries; at the same time a great number of missiles discharged from their smaller vessels inflicted many wounds on the Romans. Two of the enemy's triremes spying the ship of Brutus, which was easily known by the admiral's flag, came right against it from two directions; but Brutus perceiving their design took

advantage of the easy movements of his vessel and just escaped in time. The ships which were at full speed came into such violent collision with one another that both were greatly damaged, and one of them had the beak broken and was crushed altogether. The ships of Brutus, which were nearest, observing what had happened fell on the two disabled ships and quickly sunk them.

The ships of Nasidius did nothing and soon retired from the fight, for the men had neither the sight of their native town nor the entreaties of kinsmen to urge them to risk their lives. Accordingly they did not lose a single ship; but of the Massiliot vessels five were sunk, four were taken and one escaped with the ships of Nasidius, all of which sailed to the coast of Nearer Spain. One of the remaining ships of the Massiliots was sent forward to announce the defeat. As soon as it approached the city, all the people came out to hear the news, and such was the lamentation that the city appeared as if it were already in the hands of the enemy. However the citizens began to make all preparation that they could for the defence of the place (c. 7).

The soldiers of Trebonius, who were employed at the works on the right hand, observed that it would be a great protection to them in that part against the frequent sallies, if they should build under the wall a brick tower which they could use as a fort and a place of retreat. At first they made the tower low and small to protect them against sudden attacks: to this tower they withdrew when there was occasion, defended themselves in it against any violent assault, and sallied out themselves to drive back and pursue the enemy. The tower was a square of thirty feet in the side, and the thickness of the walls was five feet. Afterwards however, as experience is the great teacher, inventive talent showed that the tower might be made very useful if it was raised higher; which was done in this manner. When the tower was raised to the first story, they fitted the ends of beams into the walls in such wise that they were covered by the outer part of the brick work so that no part of the beams should project and be exposed to danger from fire. Above the flooring of this first story they built up with bricks as high as the blinds (*plutei*) and

covered galleries would allow, and then they placed two cross beams⁵ resting at points not far from the extremities of the walls, which beams were designed to support the wood-work intended as a roof for the tower. Above these beams at right angles to two opposite walls they laid joists and tied them together with planks. These joists were made to project a little beyond the outside of the walls, that coverings might be suspended from them to ward off missiles from the men while they were completing the walls up to the height of the roof. The surface of this roof was covered with bricks and clay to protect it from fire from the enemy, and mattresses also were thrown over to prevent missiles from the military engines breaking through or stones from the catapults disturbing the brickwork. They also made of ships' cables three mats equal in length to the width of the walls (thirty feet) and four feet wide, which mats were hung on the projecting beams on the three sides of the tower exposed to the enemy; for this was the only kind of protection which in other places had been found to be impervious to any missile or engine. When that part of the tower was finished and protected against the attacks of the enemy, they removed the blinds (*plutei*) in order to employ them for other works: and then they began to raise the roof of the tower by pressure from below⁶ upwards from the floor of the first story. When they had raised this roof as high as the hanging curtains allowed (four feet), the workmen within the curtains being thus protected continued to build up the walls with bricks, and then again by using pressure from below they made fresh room for building. When it was time to make another flooring, they laid down beams, as they had done at first, which were protected by the outer part of the walls, and from this floor again they raised the surface of the roof and hung the curtains. Thus without suffering any wounds and with no danger they built up six stories, and left openings in suitable places for the discharge of missiles from engines.

When they felt confident that from this tower they could

⁵ Perhaps these beams crossed one another and were fastened together at the centre thus X, so that the extremities would reach the four angles. Guischart understands it so; and Kraner.

⁶ By windlasses and screws.

protect the surrounding works, they began to build a hut (musculus) sixty feet long of timber two feet in the square, for the purpose of pushing it forwards from the tower to the enemy's tower and wall. The form of the "musculus" was this. Two balks of equal length were laid on the ground at the distance of four feet, and in these balks were fixed small pillars five feet high and of course opposite to one another. These pillars were joined together by rafters (capreoli) forming on each side a gentle slope and intended to support the beams placed on them for covering the roof. Over these rafters were laid beams two feet in the square and fastened together with plates and nails. At the outer margin of the roof of the "musculus" and the outer part of the beams they fixed quadrangular pieces of wood four fingers' breadth in width, for the purpose of supporting the bricks which would be laid on them. Thus the "musculus" being made with a sloping roof, and the beams placed upon the rafters, it was covered with bricks and clay in order to be safe against fire thrown by the besieged. Hides were spread over the bricks to prevent water discharged from pipes from washing away the bricks, which we must suppose to have been only slightly baked; and further, the hides were covered with mattresses to save them from damage by fire and stones. All this work was accomplished under the protection of covered galleries (vineae) close to the tower; and all at once, when the enemy were not expecting, it was pushed forward on rollers, such as were used for moving ships, close up to the tower of the enemy. Caesar has described the construction of the tower and "musculus" with as much minuteness as the bridge which he built over the Rhine. He seems to have been pleased with mechanical contrivances and to have understood them well. There is some difficulty in the translation, but the general meaning is clear. Guischart (Mémoires Militaires, vol. ii.) has explained the passage in Caesar without having made a simple translation, and he has added what he thought necessary for the understanding of the text. He remarks that up to his time no commentator had explained this bold undertaking, and he thinks that he has done it. Perhaps he has; at least I cannot find much fault with his explanation. He condemns Folard's

plan and description of this siege as altogether different from Caesar's text.

The townsmen, alarmed by the danger which now threatened them, pushed forward with levers the largest stones that they could, and rolled them down on the "musculus;" but the strength of the structure resisted the force of the blows and all the stones slipped off the roof. Then they filled casks with pine-wood and pitch which they set on fire and sent down on the "musculus;" but these also slipped off at the sides and were removed by the soldiers with poles and forks. In the meantime the soldiers working under the "musculus" pulled up with levers the stones at the foundation of the enemy's tower, while the "musculus" was protected by missiles discharged from the brick tower, and the enemy were driven from the wall and their own towers. Many stones had now been removed from the enemy's tower when part of it fell with a sudden crash, and the remaining part threatened to follow. The inhabitants, terrified at the expected plunder of the city, came out in a body from the gates in the guise of suppliants and stretched out their hands to the commanders and the army. This strange spectacle stopped all acts of hostility, and the soldiers turned aside to see what was going to be done. When the enemy reached the commanders, they fell down at their feet, and entreated them to wait for Caesar's arrival: they saw that their city was now taken, the Roman works were completed, their own tower was undermined, and accordingly they would make no further defence; they knew that if they did not submit to Caesar's orders when he came, nothing could save them from immediate plunder; and that if the whole tower fell, the soldiers could not be restrained from breaking in and plundering and destroying the town. These considerations and more to the same effect were urged in a way to excite compassion, for the Massiliots were well versed in the art of rhetoric. The legati moved by the words of the suppliants drew away the soldiers, stopped the siege, and left only men to take care of the works. A kind of truce was made out of compassion, and they waited for Caesar's arrival: no missiles were discharged from the town wall nor by the Romans: all was quiet as if the siege was finished. Caesar

had by letter earnestly enjoined Trebonius not to allow the town to be taken by assault, for fear that the soldiers irritated by the defection of the townsmen, by the resistance which they had made and their own long toil should kill all the full-grown males, as they threatened to do, and indeed they were with difficulty restrained from immediately breaking into the town, and they complained grievously that Trebonius was the only obstacle to their taking possession of the place.

But the enemy were faithlessly looking for the opportunity of accomplishing a treacherous purpose. After waiting a few days for a time when the Romans were off their guard at mid-day, some having retired and others after their continuous labour having gone to sleep in their works, all their arms being laid aside and covered up, the Massiliots suddenly issued from the gates and aided by a strong and favourable wind set fire to the Roman works. The wind spread the flames, and at once the earthworks, the blinds, the testudo, the tower and the military engines took fire, and were consumed before it could be discovered how this calamity had happened. The Romans roused by this unexpected accident seized such arms as they could, some hurried out of the camp to assist, and all fell upon the enemy; but they were prevented from pursuing by the arrows from the wall and the missiles sent by the engines. The Massiliots retiring beneath the wall burnt the "musculus" and the brick tower without any hindrance. Thus the labour of many months perished in a moment through the treachery of the enemy and the violence of the wind. On the following day the citizens repeated the attack, and having the wind still favourable they made an assault with more confidence on the second tower and earthwork and threw fire on them; but the Romans warned by the misfortune of the previous day were prepared for the defence, and accordingly after killing many of the enemy they drove the rest back into the town without having accomplished their purpose.

Trebonius now began to repair his losses, and the soldiers worked with still great ardour; for they saw that all their labour had been useless, and they were greatly irritated that by the treachery of the enemy during a time of truce their valour would be a subject of derision to the townsmen. There

were no means of getting more timber for the earthworks, for all the trees far and wide about Massilia had been cut down and employed for the siege, and therefore it was determined to make a terrace of a new kind, consisting of two brick walls each six feet thick which were connected by cross pieces of timber, and were about the same height as the former terrace. Where either the distance between the walls or the weakness of the timber seemed to require it, pillars were placed, cross-beams were laid on them to strengthen the work, and all the wood was covered with hurdles, and the hurdles with clay. Under this covering the soldiers being protected on the right and left by the wall and in front by blinds brought up without danger all that was wanted. The work went on quick, and the loss of the works which had cost so much time was quickly repaired by the skill and labour of the soldiers. Openings were left at places in the wall for the convenience of sallying out.

When the enemy saw that the damage was so soon repaired contrary to their expectation, and that there was no opportunity for practising further treachery or making fresh sallies, and no means remained of attacking the Roman soldiers or firing their works, and the new terrace showed that all the city on the land side might be shut in by walls and towers in the same way and they would then be unable to show themselves on their walls, because the Roman terrace was raised close up to them, and the shortness of the distance prevented them from using the military engines on which they greatly relied; and further, when it was plain that they must now fight from the wall and towers on equal terms with the Romans for whom they were no match in courage, they asked and obtained a truce on the same terms as before (B. C. ii. 16).

Caesar now returned from Spain and was before the town. Exhausted by all their sufferings, reduced to great want of food, twice defeated in a naval battle, routed in frequent sallies, afflicted also with pestilence from being so long shut up, and by the change of diet, for they were compelled to eat old panic⁷ and musty barley which had been collected in the

⁷ Panicum is a genus of grasses, and the name *Panicum miliaceum* is given to millet, which is cultivated in the south of Europe and in tropical countries and is used as food. See Pliny, 18. 7. 3.

public granaries for such an emergency; one tower also being thrown down, the wall in great part damaged, with no hope of aid from the provinces and the armies which, as they now knew, had submitted to Caesar, the Massiliots at last determined to surrender without treachery. A few days before the surrender L. Domitius having learned the intention of the Massiliots secured three vessels, two of which he assigned to his friends and one he kept for himself, and having taken the opportunity of a storm he set sail. The ships of Brutus, which according to custom were on the watch near the port, raised anchor as soon as they saw the three vessels and pursued. The vessel of Domitius made a great effort to escape and being aided by the storm got off; the other two alarmed by the presence of the Roman vessels returned to the port. The Massiliots obeying Caesar's commands produced their arms and military engines, brought their vessels out of the port and dockyards and delivered up all the money in the treasury. When this was done, Caesar spared the place more out of regard to the name and antiquity of the town than for any service that it had done to him. He left two legions there as a garrison, sent forward the rest to Italy, and marched towards Rome.

Caesar says nothing of the treachery of the townsmen nor does he give any other reason for his clemency than these few contemptuous words. The townspeople had caused much trouble, and their base behaviour during the truce merited punishment; but the sack of the town and the massacre of the people would have damaged Caesar's cause. He deprived the Massiliots of the power of injuring him, and he was satisfied.*

* Vitruvius (x. 16) describes some mining operations during a siege of Massilia, which may be Caesar's siege. I know of no other: the townsmen suspecting that the besiegers were mining under the wall and ditch, made a deeper mine under the ditch, and thus their counter-mines, which were deeper, caused the bottom of the ditch to fall in. In those parts where a mine could not be made under the wall they constructed a long and broad excavation, like a fish-pond, opposite to the parts where the enemy's mines were driven, and filled it with water. When the mines were opened, the force of the water which flowed in threw down the supports of the mines, and the men in them were destroyed by the water and the fall of the roofs of the mines.—There is something more.

CHAPTER IX.

CAESAR IN ROME.

B.C. 49.

On his road to Rome, as it seems, Caesar was delayed a short time by a mutiny of some of his soldiers at Placentia. This fact is not mentioned in the Civil War, and it has been conjectured that the passage in which Caesar spoke of it has been lost. It is also possible that he said nothing about it. We can hardly suppose that the compilers invented the story.

Caesar's soldiers (Appian, B. C. ii. 47) when they reached Placentia complained to the commanders that they were still kept in service and had not received the five minae which Caesar had promised them at Brundisium. But in fact they were probably dissatisfied, as Dion states, with Caesar because he had not allowed them to plunder and do as they liked, for they thought that, as he wanted their services, he must gratify their wishes. However Caesar was not a man who would allow his soldiers to spoil his designs, and he taught them a useful lesson. He never showed his great talents and resolute character more than in dealing with mutinous soldiers. On hearing of the mutiny Caesar hastened from Massilia to Placentia and addressed the men. Dion Cassius (41, c. 27) has in his usual fashion written a tedious speech and presented it to us as Caesar's. It consists of nine rhetorical chapters. Appian has given a short address. Caesar said to the soldiers: "You know what speed I employ in all that I do: the war is prolonged not by us, but by our enemies who fly before us: you, who in Gallia have had your reward in serving under me, and have sworn to follow me to the end of this war, are now

deserting me in the midst of it, mutinying against your commanders and attempting to impose your orders upon those whose orders it is your duty to receive." He then told the soldiers that he would follow the usage of the Romans and decimate the ninth legion, which began the mutiny. This declaration was received with loud lamentations, and the tribunes entreated Caesar to pardon the men. With difficulty he was prevailed upon to limit the decimation to one hundred and twenty men, who were judged to be the chief movers in the mutiny, and out of this number twelve were taken by lot and executed. However it was proved that one of the twelve was not in the camp, when the mutiny began, and in place of this soldier Caesar executed the centurion who had denounced him. Suetonius (Caesar, c. 69) reports that the whole legion was ignominiously disbanded and only admitted to service again after much entreaty and the punishment of the guilty.

M. Antonius, whom Caesar had left to take care of Italy, discharged his duty to his master faithfully. He lived a loose irregular life, but he did not neglect his business, which was to look after suspected persons and to make himself popular with the soldiers. Cicero says (Phil. ii. 24) that in one of his progresses Antonius rode in an "essedum," preceded by lictors among whom appeared in an open palanquin the mima or actress Cytheris, whom respectable persons from the towns on the route of Antonius were obliged to meet, and they saluted her under the name of Volumnia. There followed a waggon load of abominable fellows, as Cicero describes them. Antonius' mother Julia brought up the rear and followed the mistress of her filthy son as if the woman were her son's wife. Cicero states that this was better known to all who were then in Italy than to himself who was not then in Italy; and yet he was in his villa at Cumae, as he says in one of his letters (Ad Attic. x. 16), when the actress appeared in one of the progresses of Antonius. Cicero (Ad Attic. x. 13. 1), gives another instance of the man's manners. At certain towns, Antonius summoned the ten chief decuriones and the magistrates (iv. viri). They came to his villa in the morning. First of all he slept to the third hour. Then, when he was told that the deputies from Naples and Cumae were waiting, he

ordered them to come the next day; he wished to take his bath and a purge. But the man was wakeful enough to look after Cicero. He had already urged him not to leave Italy, and to trust in Caesar who was then in Spain. But Cicero wished to be out of the way, and he often wrote to tell Antonius that he had no hostile intentions towards Caesar, that he had not forgotten Caesar's friendship, that he could have been with Pompeius, if he chose; that he did not like going about with his lictors, whom he still retained, as if he had not yet given up the hope of a triumph, and this was the reason why he wished to go away though he had not quite made up his mind about the matter. Cicero has preserved the answer of Antonius (Ad Att. x. 10) which is a curious piece of evidence and gives us as much information about the state of affairs in Italy as if the events happened in our own times. "How truly," says Antonius, "do you tell me of your purpose; for he who intends to be neutral, stays at home: he who goes away is considered to pass judgment on one of the two parties. But it is not my business to determine whether a man can properly go away or not. Caesar has imposed this duty on me not to permit any person to leave Italy, and therefore it is of no importance whether I approve of your design or not, if I cannot allow you to be an exception to his orders. I advise you to write to Caesar and ask his permission. I do not doubt that you will obtain it, especially as you promise that you will have regard to our friendship." Cicero was much annoyed at this laconic and sharp note as he calls it (*σκυτάλη Λακωνική*). He saw that this man, who was devoted to pleasure, was sharp enough to discover his intentions.

Appian states that when Caesar arrived at Rome, the terrified people elected him Dictator without a vote of the senate or any magistrate proposing him; and yet, if Appian ever read Caesar's own history, he must have known that Caesar heard of his appointment before he left Massilia. The election, as Dion (41, c. 36) remarks, was contrary to usage, for Lepidus was a praetor, and a man could only be named Dictator by a consul and after a *Senatusconsultum* had authorized the nomination. Cicero also (Ad Attic. ix. 9. 3; ix. 15. 2) states that the conduct of Lepidus was unconstitutional.

It was Caesar's object to be elected consul for the next year (B.C. 48), but there were no consuls in Rome; and if *Interreges* were appointed, as was usual in such cases, they were of necessity taken from the Patricians, and they might be unfavourable to Caesar's election. Caesar himself therefore as Dictator presided at the consular elections, and he was himself elected consul with P. Servilius Isauricus, the son of the consul of B.C. 79, for his colleague. This is his own statement (B. C. iii. 1); and he adds that this was the year in which he could legally be elected consul a second time; for ten years would thus intervene between his first consulship (B.C. 59), and the second (B.C. 48. vol. i. p. 85).

After the election he employed himself in restoring confidence in Italy. Credit no longer existed and no debts were paid. Caesar appointed persons, whom he names "*arbitri*," to make an estimation of the value of estates and movables before the war, and to hand them over to the creditors at this estimation. This brief statement in Caesar's text is not easy to explain. He may mean that an enactment was made under which all claims of creditors in court against debtors were settled by "*arbitri*" or a kind of jury, who assessed the former value of all property that had been pledged as a security for debts, and settled on the basis of this estimation the disputes between creditors and debtors. It was necessary to do something, for as Dion says (41. c. 37), in the present state of affairs many debtors could not pay their debts even if they wished, for they could neither sell their property nor borrow in order to pay existing debts. If a man had been forced to sell his property or to surrender it at the present value, he might have been totally ruined, for as sales could not be made because there were no purchasers, the present value of all property was reduced to nothing. By ascertaining the value of property before the civil war began, it was possible to bring debtors and creditors to a settlement on this basis, and as no sales could be effected, creditors would take the property of the debtor or part of it at the former value and so extinguish the debt by a transfer to the creditor of the whole or of a part, as the case might be, of that property which was no longer saleable. Suetonius (Caesar, c. 42) adds that whatever had

been paid in interest, or charged as interest, was deducted from the capital sum of the debt, and thus the creditor sustained a loss of about one fourth of his debt. This had been done at Rome before. Caesar thought that this measure was the best thing that could be done to remove the apprehension of a general act of insolvency (*novae tabulae*), which, as he observes, generally followed wars and civil commotions, and to maintain the credit of debtors. Cicero in his exaggerated fears at the time of Caesar's invasion of Italy (*Ad Attic. vii. 11. 1*) predicted that Caesar was planning a general abolition of debts (*χρεῶν ἀποκοπῆς*),¹ restoration of exiles and numerous other crimes. He (*Ad Att. x. 8. 2*) repeated the same apprehensions during Caesar's contest against Afranius in Spain: if Caesar should conquer, he expected murder, seizure of private property and abolition of debts.

This measure about the settlement of debts may have been necessary at Rome, but we know that the best means of re-establishing credit are the establishment of confidence and security, and that this was not possible, because the issue of the contest between Caesar and Pompeius was still uncertain. Dion Cassius (41. c. 38) mentions another measure which seems to us neither wise nor practicable. He reports that it was said that many persons were in possession of large sums of money which they concealed. Hoarding, as we know, is not uncommon even in modern times and in countries where confidence is weak. It is however the practice in such countries of small peasant proprietors and not of the rich. Caesar, says Dion, forbade any person from keeping by him more than fifteen thousand denarii in silver or gold coin: he did not propose this law as his own measure, but as a renewal or revival of an old law. Dion did not know whether the object of the law was to enable debtors to make some payment to creditors, and to induce others to lend to those who wanted money, or whether the purpose was to discover who were rich, and that no man should possess a large amount of ready money and so cause disturbance at Rome during Caesar's absence. The multitude were much excited by this

¹ Cicero uses the same Greek expression which Appian (*B. C. ii. 48*) afterwards used.

proposed law and demanded that rewards should be offered to slaves, who should aid in making the law effective by giving information against masters; but Caesar refused to add such a clause to the law, and prayed that a curse might fall on him, if he ever gave credit to a slave who made any declaration against his master. This is what Dion states, and we may understand it as we can.² Caesar says nothing on the matter. Caesar also brought about the restoration of many exiles, some of whom had been condemned for *Ambitus* (bribery at elections) under the *Lex Pompeia* of B.C. 52 (vol. iv. chap. xx.). The praetors and tribunes proposed the enactments on this matter to the popular assembly; and the tribune M. Antonius was very active on this occasion (Cicero, *Phil.* ii. 23). Caesar speaks of these men as condemned under the *Lex Pompeia* at a time when Pompeius had legionary troops in the city, and he says that the trials were severally finished in a day, and that one set of jurymen heard the evidence, and another set voted on the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is almost unintelligible, and is a proof either that Caesar was imperfectly acquainted with the facts or did not take the trouble of learning what they were. The reader may compare what I have said about the trial of Milo and other trials of the year 52 in the chapter in a previous volume to which I have just referred. Caesar remarks that the men who were restored were those who had offered their services to him in the beginning of the Civil War, and that he considered the offer the same as if he really had accepted it. He determined that these men, as he says, ought to be restored rather by the decision of the popular assembly than that they should appear to receive their restoration as a favour from himself; for he might either seem ungrateful to these men, if he did not allow the people to restore them by a vote, or he might appear arrogant if he conferred a favour which ought to come from the people. Caesar takes every opportunity in his history of justifying his conduct in the Civil War. It is a probable conclusion that the work was published soon after the death of Pompeius when Caesar returned to Rome.

² It is supposed by Reimarus (*Dion Cassius*, 41. c. 38) that the passage in Tacitus (*Ann.* vi. 16) refers to this law; but it seems very doubtful.

Caesar however effected the restoration of other exiles besides those who were condemned under the *Lex Pompeia*, and among them was *Gabinus*, one of the great enemies of *Cicero*; for we may assume that the restoration of *Gabinus* took place at this time. *Milo*, *Cicero*'s friend, was not recalled, nor *C. Antonius*, *Cicero*'s colleague in the consulship, until a later time. Caesar also restored to their full civil capacity the sons of those who were proscribed under *Sulla*'s bloody rule, which *Cicero* had refused to do in his consulship. This humane and just measure is assigned by *Plutarch* (*Caesar*, c. 37) to the present occasion; but *Dion* (41. c. 18) fixes it at the time when Caesar was in Rome before his Spanish expedition. Caesar says nothing about the matter (p. 43).

It was now in Caesar's power to reward his old dependents and friends the *Transpadani*, who occupied that part of Italy which is north of the *Po*. His connexion with this part of *Gallia Cisalpina* had long existed, and in his consulship (B.C. 59) the colony of *Comum* received the Roman citizenship. He now made or caused an enactment to be passed which gave the Roman citizenship to the *Transpadani* (*Dion*, 41. c. 36). The *Cispadani* or inhabitants of *Gallia Cisalpina* south of the *Po* had possessed the Roman citizenship since B.C. 89, in which year the *Cispadan* towns became Roman *Municipia*, and the *Transpadan* received the title of *Coloniae Latinae*. By the law of B.C. 49 all the *Transpadan* towns became Roman *Municipia*, with the exception of *Cremona* and *Aquileia*, which as old Latin *Coloniae* became *Municipia* in B.C. 90, and with the exception of *Eporedia*, which probably at the same time received the Roman citizenship. "From the year B.C. 49 then there existed in all Italy and in *Cisalpine Gallia* no other communities than those which were composed of Roman citizens. All the countries which were out of Italy were *Provinces* and governed from Rome. Many towns indeed had great privileges, freedom from taxes, and self-legislation; but at this time we find only insignificant beginnings of a fusion with the condition of Italian towns. *Municipia* did not exist in the provinces before Caesar's time, and only a few *coloniae*."³

The poor citizens of Rome were not forgotten: they received

³ Savigny, *Vermischte Schriften*, iii. 307—313.

an allowance of corn. This expenditure was made at a time when Caesar wanted all the money that he could get, and Dion (41. c. 39) affirms that he took the valuable things which were dedicated in the temples of Rome, as he clearly means, and in the Capitol: he took all. This may be true, though it is not easy to understand how he could at that time convert these valuables into money, which was the thing that he wanted.

After Caesar's election as consul, the other Comitia were held for the election of magistrates, and arrangements were made for the administration of the provinces. M. Lepidus had the government of Nearer Spain, and Q. Cassius Longinus remained in Further Spain, where Caesar had left him. A. Postumius Albinus had Sicily; Sextus Peducaeus had Sardinia; Decimus Brutus, Transalpine Gallia; and M. Calidius, Gallia Cisalpina. Caesar celebrated the festival of the *Feriae Latinae* conformably to custom, and then abdicated the Dictatorship after holding it eleven days. He left the city in the month of December of the unreformed Calendar and arrived at Brundisium, without waiting for the first day of the new year to enter on his consulship at Rome. The people accompanied him out of the city and urged him to come to terms with Pompeius. When he had left Rome, the boys formed themselves into two parties Pompeians and Caesarians, and had a battle without arms, in which the Caesarians were victorious.

Caesar had summoned twelve legions and all his cavalry to Brundisium, but he found there only sufficient vessels to transport with difficulty fifteen thousand⁴ legionary soldiers and six hundred horsemen. This want of ships was an obstacle to the speedy conclusion of the war, which was his

⁴ It has been concluded from c. 6 that there is an error in Caesar's text (c. 2), which is "*xv millia legionariorum militum*," but it is said to be the reading of all the MSS. However it is argued that the text is incorrect; for Caesar writes (c. 6) that he put on board his ships six legions, "as he had stated before" (c. 2). Now he has said (c. 2) that his vessels could barely carry fifteen thousand legionary soldiers and six hundred horsemen. If this reading (c. 2) is right, the six legions contained only 15,000 men, which is possible. Still the word "*infrequentiores*" makes a difficulty, and Nipperdey proposes to read (c. 2) "*lx cohortes legionariorum militum*," that is six legions, as in c. 6.

great object. His legions were not complete, for the numbers had been diminished in the Gallic campaigns, and in the long march from Spain; and the sickly autumn season passed in Apulia and the parts about Brundisium by troops which had come from the healthy parts of Gallia and Spain had tried them severely. (B. C. iii. 2.)

Pompeius after leaving Italy had near a year for making preparation for war, while Caesar was employed in settling the affairs of Italy and carrying on the war in Spain. Caesar has taken pains to enumerate all the forces which Pompeius had collected, and he would easily obtain this information after the defeat of his rival. Pompeius got together a large fleet from Asia, which means the Roman province Asia, the Cyclades, by which Caesar probably means the Aegean islands generally, from Corcyra, Athens, Pontus, Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phoenice and Egypt; and he ordered a large fleet to be built in all parts east of the Hadriatic. He had raised a great sum of money by requisitions on Asia, Syria, and the kings and petty rulers in the continent of Asia, whom Caesar names dynasts and tetrarchs. He had also levied large sums on the free towns of the province of Achaia, and he had got a large amount from the farmers of the taxes (Publicani) in those provinces which he had in his power. Money was coined at Apollonia while Pompeius held the place (Cic. ad Fam. xiii. 29. 4).

Pompeius had formed nine legions of Roman citizens, five^a of which he took over the sea from Italy. He had one legion from Sicily,^b which being compounded of two legions he

^a Two of these were the legions which Caesar gave up at the command of the Senate. (Vol. iv. p. 410.)

^b This is the MSS. reading, which Clacconius (B. C. iii. 88) proposed to alter to Cilicia, or to write "Siciliensis" in B. C. iii. 88. Kraner has accepted this conjecture, and he supposes these two Cilician legions to be the two defective legions which Cicero had in Cilicia (Ad Att. v. 15. 1). But Oudendorp observed against the proposal of Clacconius that Scipio brought the Cilician legions with him (Lucan, vii. 223), and that he had not yet joined Pompeius. He concluded that this legion from Sicily was brought by M. Cato when he quitted the island, but it is not said by Caesar (B. C. i. 30) that Cato left the island with any troops. Curio had four legions at his disposal in Sicily (B. C. ii. 23. 87), but Caesar sent him to Sicily with only three legions, according to the MSS., and the number iii. (B. C. i. 30) has been changed to iii., to make the

named Gemella; one from Crete and Macedonia of veteran soldiers, who being disbanded by former commanders had settled in these provinces; and two from the province Asia, which Lentulus the consul of B.C. 49 had raised. Pompeius had also a great number of men from Thessaly, Boeotia, Achaia and Epirus, whom he distributed among the legions to make up deficiencies, and he joined to them the soldiers of C. Antonius who had been taken at Corcyra (p. 96). Besides these forces he was expecting his father-in-law Scipio with two legions from Syria, of which province Scipio was governor (p. 7). He had from Crete, Lacedaemon, Pontus, Syria, and other places, three thousand bowmen, two cohorts of slingers each containing six hundred men, and seven thousand horsemen. Of these horsemen Deiotarus, tetrarch of the eastern part of Galatia, brought six hundred Galli or Galatians; and Ariobarzanes five hundred horsemen from Cappadocia. Cotys from Thrace sent five hundred horsemen with his son Sadalas. Two hundred came from Macedonia under Rhascypolis a commander of ability. Cn. Pompeius, the son, brought with the fleet from Alexandria five hundred of the horsemen of Gabinus, Gauls and Germans, whom Gabinus in B.C. 55 (vol. iv. p. 186) had left in Egypt to protect Ptolemaeus Auletes after his restoration to the throne (B.C. iii. 108). Pompeius had got together eight hundred horsemen from his own slaves and shepherds and those of his friends. Tarcondarius Castor⁷ and Donnilaus supplied three hundred horsemen from Galatia: Donnilaus came himself, and Castor sent his son Castor. Two hundred horsemen were sent by Antiochus king of Commagene, who was indebted to Pompeius in B.C. 64 for his kingdom (vol. iv.

passages in the two books agree. If Caesar sent Curio with three legions, which is certainly more probable than four, we may suppose that Curio made up a legion out of the troops which M. Cato left behind. The difficulty cannot be entirely removed in any way. The numerals in the text of the Civil War are sometimes corrupt.

⁷ This name Tarcondarius appears in the form Tarcondimotus (Cic. ad Fam. xv. 1. 2), and Strabo (p. 676) speaks of a Tarcondimotus as a king in the mountains of Amanus in his time. In another passage (p. 568) Strabo speaks of Castor, son of Saokondarius, and of Saokondarius as the son-in-law of Deiotarus, who was therefore the grandfather of Castor.

p. 170) : most of these horsemen were mounted bowmen. Pompeius also had some Dardani and Bessi, mountain tribes about the range of Haemus, part of whom were hired and part served from compulsion or to please Pompeius. He had some Macedonians also and Thessalians, and others from adjacent parts. All these troops made up the number of seven thousand. Pompeius even sent Lucilius Hirrus to Orodes king of the Parthians to ask for aid, but he had the disgrace of sending and not obtaining what he asked for (B. C. iii. 82). The supplies of Pompeius were derived from Thessaly, the province Asia, Egypt, Crete, Cyrene and other parts. Pompeius had determined to keep his troops in winter quarters at Dyrrhachium (Durazzo), Apollonia, and other maritime towns on the east coast of the Hadriatic for the purpose of preventing Caesar from crossing the sea, and with this object he had placed his fleet all along the coast. His son Cn. Pompeius commanded the Egyptian fleet; D. Laelius and C. Triarius the ships from the province Asia; C. Cassius the Syrian ships; C. Marcellus and C. Coponius the Rhodian ships; and Scribonius Libo and M. Octavius commanded the Liburnian and Achaic fleet. But the admiral commanding in chief was M. Bibulus, Caesar's colleague in his consulship B.C. 59. Plutarch (Cato, c. 54) states that Pompeius at first intended to give M. Cato the command of all the fleet, but perceiving or being reminded by his friends that it was Cato's policy to liberate his country, and that, if Caesar should be defeated, Cato would require Pompeius to lay down his arms and obey the laws, he changed his mind and appointed Bibulus.

Pompeius had gained his reputation as a soldier by his victories over the pirates and Mithridates. He was well-known to the petty kings and peoples of the East, where he had commanded; and he drew soldiers and supplies from all the parts east of the Hadriatic. But, as the enumeration shows, he commanded a mixed body of many nations and languages; he appeared like an oriental king who was threatening Italy with a host of hateful foreigners. Though he was commander-in-chief, he was surrounded by Romans who were unwilling to obey him, and whose first thoughts were vengeance on their

political adversaries, proscription and plunder. Caesar's name was great in Gallia, Spain, and Italy; but he was almost unknown in the East. He had however a hardy body of soldiers whom he knew how to command; and his own abilities and energy gave him an immeasurable advantage over a rival of inferior powers though still a skilful general, but weakened by long inactivity. The contest, of which the history and the result are contained in the third book of the Civil War, is the evidence of Caesar's audacity, which approached to rashness, of his talent as a soldier and a writer, and of his generous behaviour to his fellow-citizens who were in arms against him. It is a portion of history, which those, who study it carefully, will find as full of exciting interest as any campaign ancient or modern.

Pompeius passed the winter at Thessalonica, where it was said, as Dion states (41. c. 43), that there were two hundred senators and the consuls of the year B.C. 49. A place was set apart for taking the auspices, that things might appear to be done in regular form, and the people and the city be supposed to be there. The same magistrates were retained and only their titles were changed; the consuls were named proconsuls, the praetors propraetors, and the quaestors proquaestors, for elections could not be held, nor could the Imperium be conferred by a Lex Curiata. Pompeius sent his wife Cornelia with his son Sextus to the island Lesbos to be out of the way of danger.

Where was Cicero now? He had procured a ship at Caieta, and after waiting some time he set sail on the 7th of June B.C. 49 with his son, as he informed his wife Terentia by a letter of the same date (Ad Fam. xiv. 7). He went to join Pompeius, but we are not informed when or how he reached Dyrrhachium. We learn from Caesar that Pompeius did not winter at Thessalonica, as Dion states. He perhaps intended to winter there, but Caesar's landing made him change his plans.

CHAPTER X.

CAESAR IN EPIRUS.

B. C. 48.

WHEN Caesar reached Brundisium, he addressed his soldiers: he told them that as they were now near the end of their toils and dangers, they must be content to leave their slaves and baggage in Italy, and embark free from all incumbrance, which would allow a greater number of soldiers to be put on board the vessels; and they must place their hopes in victory and the liberality of their general. We conclude that Caesar's men had got slaves in their campaigns and a good stock of booty, which for other reasons than those which Caesar has mentioned he would wish them to leave behind. His address was answered by a universal acclamation, that they would do whatever he commanded. He sailed on the 4th¹ of January, B.C. 48, of the unreformed Calendar with six legions. On the next day he reached the coast of Epirus in the territory of the Germinii. He found among the rocks and other dangerous places a safe roadstead, for he avoided all the ports which were supposed to be in the possession of the enemy, and bringing all his ships in safety to the shore, he landed his men at a place named Palaeste.² This Palaeste is supposed to be Palása or

¹ "On the 14th of October, B.C. 49, according to the present calendar," Goeler.

"On the 5th of November, B.C. 49, according to the true calendar," Kraner.

The 14th of October is the time fixed by Usher. See the note of Davis, ed. Oudendorp, c. 9.

² This word rests on the authority of Lucan, v. 460:—

"Lapsa Palaestinas uncis confixit arenas."

The reading of all the MSS., says Oudendorp, is "Pharsalia;" but Paulus Marsus bears evidence that he found in one MS. "Palaeste." Leake states that Caesar's landing-place is now named Strada Bianca, or in modern Greek Aspri Ruga.

Paleassa (Goeler) south of Oricum at the base of the Acroceranunian mountains, and the landing-place is so small and exposed that at present no vessels anchor there except of necessity or in summer.

Lucretius Vespillo and Minucius Rufus were at Oricum in the great bay north of Caesar's landing-place with eighteen Asiatic ships under the orders of D. Laelius; and M. Bibulus was at Corcyra (Corfu) with one hundred and ten ships. But Vespillo and Rufus were not bold enough to come out of port, for Caesar had brought twelve ships of war, of which four were decked, to protect his transports; and Bibulus whose ships were not ready to put to sea and whose rowers were dispersed, could not meet his enemy in time, for Caesar's fleet was seen close to land before any report of it reached those parts. When the men had disembarked, the ships were sent back to Brundisium the same night to bring over the rest of the legions and the cavalry. This business was entrusted to Fufius Calenus, one of Caesar's legati; and he was ordered to be active in executing his duty: but the vessels left the coast of Epirus too late to take advantage of the night wind and were unfortunate, for Bibulus being informed of Caesar's arrival thought that he might fall in with part of the loaded transports. But he fell in with the empty ships on their return voyage, and seizing about thirty of them vented on these vessels his vexation at his own carelessness: he burnt all of them with the sailors and masters who were aboard, expecting by this cruelty to deter the rest of the troops from crossing over. We have many examples of Roman brutality, and particularly towards enemies, but I do not remember so monstrous an act of barbarity committed by Romans against their own countrymen, as some at least of these unfortunate men must have been. After this inglorious success Bibulus occupied all the ports, roadsteads, and all the shore from Salonae (Spalato) to Oricum with his ships and kept careful watch. During the severest part of the winter Bibulus remained at sea, and spared no labour to prevent the arrival of the troops which Caesar was expecting.³

³ There is some defect at the end of this chapter and probably something has been lost, as we may conclude from the beginning of the next chapter (c. 9).

M. Octavius now came with his ships from Illyricum to Salonae. He stirred up the Dalmatae and the neighbouring barbarians and drew away from Caesar's cause the island of Issa (Lissa). But he was unable to move the Roman citizens in Salonae either by promises or threats, and accordingly he began to blockade the town, which was strong both by the natural character of the spot and by part of it being on a height. The Roman citizens made wooden towers for the defence of the place, and as they were too weak to resist owing to the smallness of their number and were exhausted by many wounds, they resorted to what the Romans viewed as the last resource, as it must be in a country where slavery exists: they manumitted all the male slaves of full age, and the women cut off their hair to supply cords for the military engines. Seeing the resolution of the townsmen Octavius began a contrevallation by making five camps round the place and at the same time pressed the town by blockade and assault. The people of Salonae, who were resolved to hold out as long as they could, suffered most from want of provisions, and they sent messengers to Caesar to entreat him to supply the deficiency: everything else they were prepared to endure without help. After some time, when the continuance of the siege had made the men of Octavius more careless, the townsmen, seizing an opportunity at midday when the enemy had retired, placed the youths and women on the walls, that there might appear to be no neglect of their usual defence, and strengthened by the manumitted slaves made a sally⁴ against the nearest camp of Octavius. After storming this camp they immediately attacked a second, then a third and a fourth, and next all the remaining works of the enemy, and drove them out. They killed a great number of the besiegers and compelled Octavius with the rest to fly to the ships. This success put an end to the siege. The winter was now approaching, and after these losses Octavius, despairing of being able to take the town,

Kraner conjectures that the story of the defeat of C. Antonius and of P. Cornelius Dolabella was told here.

⁴ Compare Dion 42. c. 11, who says that the women joined in the sally and that it was made at midnight. It is impossible to conjecture where he found this absurd story.

retired to Dyrrhachium to join Pompeius. The remark about the winter approaching shows that the Roman Calendar was then in advance of the true time. Appian (B. C. ii. 54) then is mistaken when he says that Caesar embarked at the winter solstice, but could not set sail from Brundisium, on account of bad weather, before the first day of the new year. He had probably forgotten that the Calendar was at that time in disorder, and he supposed that as Caesar sailed at the beginning of January, this date represented the true time. His narrative proves that he used other authorities besides Caesar, and that if he did use Caesar, he used him carelessly. Plutarch also (Caesar, c. 37) says that Caesar sailed from Brundisium at the winter solstice and the commencement of January.

It has been stated that L. Vibullius Rufus, a praefectus of Pompeius, had twice fallen into Caesar's hands and been set at liberty, once at Corfinium and a second time in Spain.⁵ After having treated Vibullius so liberally Caesar thought that he was a fit person to send with a message to Cn. Pompeius, with whom Caesar knew that he had some influence. We infer from Caesar's narrative that he had kept Vibullius with him, and Plutarch (Pomp. c. 65, where the name is corrupted) says that Vibullius was Caesar's prisoner. This was the substance of the message: That both of them ought to put an end to their obstinacy, to lay down their arms and not to tempt fortune any longer: both of them had sustained loss enough, which ought to be a lesson and a warning against what might happen in the future: Pompeius had been driven from Italy, he had lost Sicily, Sardinia, and the two Spains, with one hundred and thirty cohorts of Roman citizens in Italy and Spain; and that he himself had suffered by the death of Curio with the destruction of his army in Africa, and the surrender of the soldiers at Coreyra: ⁶ they ought therefore to spare themselves and the commonwealth, since both of them by their losses had

⁵ Manutius conjectured that Vibullius was a praefectus fabrum, and he refers to Cicero ad Atticum, ix. 7. c, a letter from Caesar, which does not prove his conjecture. It has not been said by Caesar that he took Vibullius prisoner in Spain, but it appears from this passage that he had taken him somewhere, and kept him.

⁶ Coreyra, see p. 96.

proved the power of fortune in war : that the present was the only opportunity of treating about peace, while both of them were full of confidence and were considered to be a match for one another : if fortune should give a little advantage to either of them, he who should be viewed as having the superiority would not listen to terms of peace, nor would he be content with a fair share when he expected to be able to get all : that the terms of peace, as they could not hitherto be agreed on, ought to be determined at Rome by the senate and the people : in the meantime it ought to satisfy the commonwealth and both of them, if they should severally in a public assembly immediately swear to disband their armies within the next three days : if they laid down their arms and gave up their forces, both of them must agree to be satisfied with the decision of the Senate and the people : he added, that to induce Pompeius more readily to accept his proposals, Caesar would disband all his land forces and troops in garrison in towns.⁷

As far as we can judge, Caesar could not expect that Pompeius would accept these terms, and it is difficult to believe that Caesar would have really done what he proposed to do in the last few words of his message. If this conjecture is true, the message is only another example of Caesar's efforts to justify himself by throwing on his adversaries the blame of the war. But if we can see this, others also must have seen it and believed that Caesar's proposals were only made with the view that I have suggested.

Vibullius thought that it was no less necessary to inform Pompeius of Caesar's unexpected landing, that he might act upon the information, than to communicate the message, and accordingly travelling day and night, and for greater expedition changing horses, he reached Pompeius and reported that Caesar was near. Pompeius was at this time in Candavia on his way from Thessalonica to the winter quarters of Apollonia and Dyrrhachium. Candavia does not appear to be the name of a country, but of a mountain range which formed the western boundary of the basin which contained the lake Lychnitis (Ochrida). The Via Egnatia from Dyrrhachium to Thes-

⁷ "In garrison in towns," "urbiumque copias." Kraner has "naviumque copias."

salonica crossed this mountain range, which Pliny places at the distance of seventy-eight Roman miles from Dyrrhachium (N. H. iii. c. 23). Pompeius being disturbed by this unexpected news advanced at a greater rate towards Apollonia for fear that Caesar might take possession of the coast towns.

On the same day on which Caesar landed his troops and sent the ships to bring over the rest of his forces from Brundisium, he crossed the Ceraunian mountains to Oricum by night, as Appian (B.C. ii. 54) found it in some of his authorities, but not in Caesar. The track was rough and narrow, and the troops were much dispersed in consequence of the difficult nature of the ground, and might have been easily attacked, if the enemy had known that Caesar would have advanced by this road. But Pompeius cannot be blamed for not occupying the defiles of these rugged mountains: the blame was due to Bibulus and others who did not prevent Caesar's landing. About daybreak Caesar with difficulty got his men together and reached Oricum^a (Erikhó) by descending the valley of the small river Celydnus. On his arrival L. Torquatus, who by the order of Pompeius commanded in the town and had a garrison of Parthini, a people who lived in the neighbourhood, closed the gates and ordered the Greeks^b to man the walls, but as they declared that they would not fight against a Roman consul, and the townsmen were ready to admit Caesar, Torquatus, seeing that he could not resist, opened the gates and gave up the town to Caesar, who pardoned him. From Oricum Caesar marched straight to Apollonia (Pollína or Pollóna) ten stadia from the right bank of the Aous (Vouissa) and sixty stadia from the sea, as Strabo (p. 316) states. A road from Apollonia met the road from Dyrrhachium to Thessalonica, the Egnatia, at a place named Clodiana west of the Candavian mountains. L. Staberius, who was in command at Apollonia, hearing of Caesar's approach ordered water to be carried into the citadel and the place to be strengthened, and he demanded

^a Goeler reckons that Caesar would have eight hours' march from Palaeste to Oricum, and nine hours' march from Oricum to Apollonia.

^b According to Caesar's text, the townspeople were Greeks. Kraner says that "Graecos" in Caesar's text is equivalent to "Parthinos," but I cannot see how he makes this conclusion.

hostages of the townspeople ; but they refused to give them or to close the gates against the consul ; they could not presume to act in opposition to the decision of all Italy and the Roman people. Staberius seeing their resolution secretly made his escape from Apollonia, upon which the people sent commissioners to Caesar and admitted him into the town. Their example was followed by the people of Bullis, the Amantini, and the other neighbouring places, and in fact by all the country of Epirus : all sent to Caesar and declared their readiness to obey his orders. Bullis was probably situated on the Aous, some distance above Apollonia. Amantia is placed by Leake on the Polyanthes a branch of the Aous and on a site nearly due east of Oricum. Caesar has said that he was used to do his work quick, and we have an instance of his celerity in the capture of these towns before his adversary could reach the coast.

Pompeius hearing of the capture of Oricum and Apollonia, was afraid of losing Dyrrhachium where he had great stores, and pressed forward without resting day or night. It was reported that Caesar was approaching, and such was the terror of the army in this hurried and continuous march that almost all the men from Epirus and the neighbouring states deserted, a great many threw away their arms and the march had the appearance of a hasty flight. When Pompeius halted near Dyrrhachium and ordered a camp to be made, Labienus, Caesar's old legatus who was now with Pompeius, seeing the army still in a state of alarm, came forward and swore that he would not abandon Pompeius and would share his fate whatever it should be. The rest of the legati took the same oath : the tribunes and centurions followed the example and all the army did the same. Caesar being frustrated in his design by the rapid march of Pompeius, halted and pitched his camp in the territory of Apollonia on the left or south bank of the Apsus (now the Beratinos, or Ergent, as some authorities name it), a river which rises in the lofty range of Pindus and enters the sea between the Aous and Genusus, which is north of it. His purpose was to protect Apollonia and Oricum, and to wait there for the arrival of the rest of the legions from

Italy. He put his men under tents for the winter, or as he expresses it, "under skins"). Pompeius placed his camp on the north side of the Apsus, and collected there all his legions and auxiliary troops.

Calenus embarked his legions and cavalry at Brundisium, according to Caesar's orders, as far as the number of his vessels allowed, and set sail; but he had not advanced far from port when he received a letter from Caesar which informed him that the harbours and all the shore on the east side of the Hadriatic were blockaded by the enemy's fleet. Upon this he retired to Brundisium and recalled all his ships. One of the vessels which continued the voyage and did not follow the orders of Calenus, for it carried no soldiers and was under the command of a private person, arrived before Oricum where it was taken by Bibulus, who massacred the slaves, free men, and even the boys. This was the second act of cruelty of this brutal Roman. On such an accident as the timely receipt of his letter, remarks Caesar, depended the safety of the whole army. He frequently speaks of the power of fortune, and of great events in war depending on small matters; a remark which is true of all human affairs, and particularly of the events of war.

Bibulus, as it has been said, was with his fleet off Oricum; and as he shut out Caesar from the sea and the ports, so was he himself shut out from the land all along that coast, for Caesar occupied the shore with troops, and Bibulus could not get wood or water, nor bring his ships close to the land. He was in great difficulties and in want of everything: he was obliged to bring his supplies and even wood and water from Corcyra in transports; and it happened once, when there were contrary winds, that the men were compelled to collect the night dew from the skins with which the ships were covered.¹ Yet the men endured all their sufferings patiently, and considered it to be their duty not to leave the shore unguarded or to give up the blockade of the ports. While they were in these straits Libo joined Bibulus, and both of

¹ These ships "*pellibus tectae*" were probably not decked ships, and the skins were used as a covering for the men at night, like tents.

them from the vessels entered into conversation with Manius Acilius and Statius Murcus, two of Caesar's legati, one of whom commanded in the town of Oricum, and the other commanded the forces on the coast: Libo and Bibulus said that they wished to speak with Caesar on matters of the greatest importance if an opportunity was allowed; and to confirm what they said, they added a few words which were understood as expressing a wish to come to terms. In the meantime they asked for a truce which was granted. The legati thought that this communication was of great importance: they knew that Caesar was very desirous to come to an agreement with Pompeius and they supposed that the instructions given to Vibullius had produced some result. Caesar had set out with one legion to receive the submission of some remoter towns and to provide supplies which he was much in want of, and at this time he was at Buthrotum which is opposite to the north part of Corcyra. On receiving a letter from the legati, which informed him of the request of Libo and Bibulus, he left the legion at Buthrotum, returned to Oricum, and invited Libo and Bibulus to a conference. Libo came alone and made an excuse for Bibulus, who was a man of very hasty temper and had been on bad terms with Caesar ever since they were aediles and praetors together (vol. iii. p. 219): this was the reason why Bibulus avoided the conference, for fear that his temper might be an impediment to a settlement so much desired and so advantageous. Libo said that it was the earnest wish of Pompeius and always had been that a settlement should be made and both sides should lay down their arms, but they had no authority in the matter, for the Senators who were with Pompeius had entrusted him with the direction of the war and of everything else: if Caesar would tell them his demands, they would send to Pompeius, who would alone transact the rest of the business and they would not fail to urge him to do so. They prayed that the truce might continue until an answer was returned by Pompeius and that hostilities should be suspended. He said a few words more on the matters in dispute, and about the forces and auxiliary troops of his party; to which Caesar neither thought that it was necessary to make any answer at

that time, nor, he says,* "do we now think that there is sufficient reason for reporting what these few words were." Caesar's demands were these: that he might be allowed to send commissioners to Pompeius under a safe conduct, and that Libo and Bibulus should undertake to secure this safe conduct, or themselves conduct the commissioners to Pompeius: as to the truce, the state of affairs was this; they by their fleet prevented his ships and troops from crossing the sea, and he prevented them from getting water or landing on the shore; if they wished this hindrance to be removed, they must remove the hindrance of their blockading fleet: if they maintained the blockade, he would also maintain his watch over the shore: still the negotiation about terms of peace might go on, even though they should not agree about these mutual concessions, for this should be no obstacle. Libo answered that he would neither receive Caesar's commissioners nor be answerable for their safety: he referred everything to Pompeius: but he still insisted on the truce and urged his demand very strongly. Caesar seeing that Libo had made this oration merely to extricate themselves out of their present danger and distress, and that he had no prospect of peace or any terms to offer, turned all his thoughts to the prosecution of the war.

Bibulus, who had been prevented from landing for many days, was now suffering from severe illness brought on by cold and fatigue, and as he could not receive sufficient attention on board his ship and would not retire from his post, he could no longer resist the violence of his disease. After his death there was no commander-in-chief: every officer managed his own fleet just as he chose. Dion Cassius (41. c. 48) says that Libo succeeded Bibulus, but he may mean that Libo took the command of the ships which were immediately under the orders of Bibulus.

When the confusion had subsided which was caused by Caesar's sudden arrival, and as soon as there seemed to be a convenient opportunity, Vibullius calling in Libo, L. Luc-

* Caesar writes "neque . . . putamus." This is not the only instance in which he has used the first person plural. The words "ut memoriae prodantur" have been understood in a different way by some French translators.

ceius and Theophanes, with whom Pompeius was used to consult on affairs of the greatest moment, determined to communicate Caesar's proposals. L. Lucceius was the historian, whom Cicero had once asked to write the history of the glorious consulship of the year 63 (vol. iv. p. 135), and Lucceius had himself been a candidate for the consulship of the year 59 in opposition to Caesar. Theophanes was the Greek of Mitylene, the companion of Pompeius in his Mithridatic campaign, and also the historiographer of the war, and Pompeius had made him a Roman citizen. Cicero (*Ad Attic.* ix. 1. 3; ix. 11. 3), writing in his usual bad temper and despondency in the year 49, means to say that Lucceius and Theophanes were not the men who would advise moderate measures. As soon as Vibullius entered on the matter, Pompeius stopped him, "What is life," he said, "or country to me, if it shall be thought that I am indebted for them to Caesar's favour? And it will not be possible for people to think otherwise when they believe that I have been brought back to Italy after leaving it." In this instance the judgment of Pompeius appears to have been sound. It was not possible for him to come to any terms with Caesar and retain a high place at home. It was after the close of the war, as Caesar informs us, that he learned the facts about this conference from those who were present. Though he had failed in his attempt to make peace he still attempted to accomplish it by other means,³ as he says (c. 19).

Between the camps of Pompeius and Caesar there was only the river Apsus, and the soldiers of the two armies had frequent talk with one another, for they had agreed that during these conferences no missiles should be thrown. Caesar sent his legatus P. Vatinius to the bank of the river to do what he could about peace, and to ask repeatedly in a loud voice, whether citizens might be permitted without any risk to send commissioners to their fellow-citizens, which had been allowed even to the fugitives in the defiles of the Pyrenees by Pom-

³ The text has "*aliis rationibus per colloquia de pace agere.*" The words "*per colloquia*" seem very doubtful. If there is any meaning in them, they may perhaps be explained, as Kraner suggests, by a reference to B. C. i. 74, and the events mentioned in that chapter.

peius himself (vol. ii. p. 480), and to the pirates whom he defeated; the purpose of this mission would be to prevent citizens from fighting with citizens. Vatinius said a good deal with earnest supplication, as it was the duty of a man to do who was speaking in behalf of himself and all; and he was listened to in silence by the soldiers on both sides. On the side of the Pompeians the answer was that Aulus Varro declared that on the next day he would be present at a conference,⁴ and would consider how commissioners might safely come out and state what they pleased. A time was fixed for this business. When they met the next day, there was a great number of soldiers on both sides, much expectation was raised and the minds of all seemed disposed towards peace. T. Labienus came forward out of the crowd and began to speak in terms of great moderation about peace, and to hold a discussion with Vatinius. Their talk was suddenly interrupted by missiles thrown on all sides. Vatinius was protected by the shields of the soldiers, but many were wounded, and among them Cornelius Balbus, M. Plotius and L. Tiburtius centurions, and some soldiers. Then Labienus called out: "It is time to give over talking about peace, for there can be no peace for us until Caesar's head is brought."

This strange affair reminds us of the friendly greeting of the Roman soldiers of Caesar and Afranius in the Spanish campaign,⁵ and of the attempt of Attius to seduce the soldiers of Curio in Africa. Caesar says that he sent Vatinius to the soldiers of Pompeius, who did not prevent his men from listening to him, as it appears; for we can hardly suppose that Pompeius did not know what they were doing. Still less can we suppose that the next day's meeting was arranged without the consent of Pompeius, whatever may have been his reason

⁴ The text of Caesar seems to be corrupt here.

⁵ Dion 41. c. 47 states that Caesar sent persons to Pompeius about a settlement and attempted to protract the time in this way; which Pompeius observing determined to fight with him immediately and for this purpose attempted to cross the river; but when the bridge broke under the weight upon it and some of those who had crossed first were thus left alone and destroyed, Pompeius desisted, for he was discouraged by this failure of his first military attempt.—This is an invention by Dion or some writer whom he followed.

for consenting to it; unless we should conjecture that it was arranged by Labienus alone and with a treacherous purpose as the result appears to show. Caesar has barely reported the facts and left us to understand them as we can. He has plainly told us that he sent Vatinius to parley with the enemy; and possibly he sent him in the expectation that the soldiers of Pompeius might waver in their military fidelity when they knew how eager Caesar was to make peace. In times of civil war it must happen that the commanders on opposite sides feel that they cannot rely on their soldiers as much as they can when they are in the presence of a foreign enemy. Caesar appears to charge Labienus with treachery in this interview, and with a design of putting an end to all proposals for peace. This skilful commander under Caesar in Gallia became his bitterest enemy after he deserted to Pompeius.

Caesar now turns to Italy and in three short chapters describes the state of affairs at Rome, which Dion treats of (42. c. 22, &c.). M. Caelius Rufus, one of Cicero's friends whom he had defended in an extant speech (vol. iv. p. 139), was praetor, and praetor peregrinus as we infer, for C. Trebonius was praetor urbanus. Caelius on pretence of maintaining the interests of debtors, as soon as he entered on his duties placed his tribunal near the official seat of C. Trebonius, and gave notice that he would hear any appeal about the valuation of property and about the payment of debts from the decisions of an "arbiter" appointed under the regulations of Caesar during his last visit to the city. But through the equity and moderation of C. Trebonius, who under the present circumstances thought that the administration of justice ought to be conducted in a mild and reasonable manner, there were no debtors who would set the example of making an appeal. It might be thought that it showed only a small amount of boldness for debtors to allege their poverty, to complain either of their own misfortunes or the hardness of the times and the difficulty of making sales by auction; but it was, says Caesar, exceeding boldness and impudence for those who admitted their debts to retain their property, when means were provided for surrendering it in part or entirely to their creditors. Indeed the proposed measures of Caelius

turned out to be more unfavourable to the debtors; for having made a beginning in this business, in order that he might not be considered as having failed in his disgraceful attempt, he promulgated (gave notice of) an enactment that debts should be paid without interest within a limited time.*

We must collect from other authorities the motives which led Caelius to attempt this foolish disturbance of Caesar's arrangements, for Caesar has not told us. Velleius (ii. 68) describes Caelius as a man very like Curio in eloquence and audacity, but superior in both respects, and no less cunning in his wicked designs, and so loaded with debt that the state of his affairs was even worse than his designs. It is not difficult to see from Cicero's oration for Caelius that his young friend was a licentious fellow, but Cicero had no objections to such associates, if he could make use of them. Dion Cassius states that Caelius was vexed at Caesar for not giving him the office of praetor urbanus, and for conferring it on C. Trebonius, instead of allowing it to be determined by lot, according to usage, which of the praetors should hold this office. But Caesar had reasons for preferring Trebonius, who in B.C. 55 had proposed the continuation of his proconsulship for five years, afterwards served under him in Gallia, and directed the siege of Massilia successfully. A man who is making his way to power must repay those who have assisted him. If Caelius accompanied Caesar to Spain, which seems to be the fact (Cic. ad Fam. viii. 16, 17), or perhaps, as Caelius says, Caesar took him there, we do not hear of any service that Caelius did; and when Caesar allowed him to be praetor at Rome during his campaign against Pompeius, we may reasonably conjecture that Caesar did not think that he would be of any use to him, and that an office in Rome might satisfy his ambition.

Servilius the consul and the other magistrates resisted the attempts of Caelius, and this resistance led him to fresh agitation. He proposed to abolish Caesar's law about the settlement of debts and promulgated two new laws, by one of which

* The words, which express the time, are corrupt. The emendation of Manitius, which some editors have accepted, is not satisfactory; nor is any other emendation.

he remitted a year's rent⁷ to tenants of houses and lodgings, and by the other he abolished all claims for debts. Landlords in all countries particularly of small houses in towns often lose their rents through the inability of tenants to pay or through their knavery; but to make tenants legally a present of a year's rent or more can only happen in revolutionary times, and in such disturbed state of affairs landlords will always suffer. The total or partial abolition of debts was already known to the Romans. Either before or just after these impudent proposals, with the aid of the rabble Caelius attacked C. Trebonius and drove him from the judgment-seat. In this fray some persons were wounded. Dion, whose narrative agrees substantially with Caesar's text, has a strange fashion of inventing circumstances to enliven his stories; he says that Caelius would have killed Trebonius, if he had not disguised himself and made his escape. The escape might be easy, but the disguise under the circumstances hardly possible. After having said that Caelius promised tenants the remission of a year's rent, and after describing the attack on Trebonius, Dion adds, that Caelius having failed in this attempt promulgated a separate law, which allowed all tenants to live in other person's houses rent free, and abolished debts. Such a proposal would prove that Caelius was entirely without sense, a supposition which is inconsistent with what we know of him. It is probable that the historian is here inventing after a fashion of which his history contains many examples.

The end of this affair is told by Caesar in his usual brief way. Servilius laid before the Senate the behaviour of Caelius, and the Senate resolved "that he must be removed from the commonwealth," an expression which means in Latin that he must be deprived of his office. After this decision the consul

⁷ "*Mercedes habitationum annuas.*" One sense of "*merces*" is the money paid for the use of a thing, here a house or lodging. The rent is also named "*pensio.*" The movables in a house or lodging (*invecta, illata*) were a security to the lessor for the lessee's rent (Dig. 2. 14. 4), and the suspension of the power of distraining for a year's rent may have been contained in Caelius' bill. The Roman lawyers founded the legal doctrine of distress for rent on what they named tacit convention; but in fact it was founded on usage which had long been recognized by competent authority (Dig. 20. tit. 2: "*In quibus causis pignus vel hypotheca tacite contrahitur,*" and the margin in the edition of D. Gothofredus).

would not allow him to enter the Senate, and when he attempted to address the people, Servilius ordered him to be taken away from the Rostra. Hot with indignation at his disgrace Caelius openly declared that he would go to Caesar, but he secretly sent a message to Milo, who had been condemned for the murder of P. Clodius, and invited him to Italy. Milo had exhibited great shows of gladiators in former days, and there were still some remnants of these dangerous men, whom Caelius intended to employ. Accordingly Caelius associated Milo in his designs, and sent him into the territory of Thurii, which was on the west side of the gulf of Tarentum, to stir up the shepherds in that mountainous region.

It was probably about this time that Caelius wrote to Cicero the seventeenth and last letter of the eighth book of Cicero's letters (*Ad Fam.*), all which are from Caelius. The letter was certainly written after the return from Spain and after Cicero had crossed the sea to join Pompeius. In a former letter (*Ad Fam.* viii. 15) Caelius had said to Cicero that in civil disturbance men ought to take the better side; but if war breaks out, the stronger side; and they must consider what is safest to be best. In this last letter Caelius says that he was induced to join Caesar's party through hatred of Appius Claudius, who was a Pompeian, and through friendship for C. Curio: even now he has not lost confidence in Caesar's success, but he would rather die than be a witness of the behaviour of his partisans at Rome; and he adds, "we of Caesar's faction should long since have been ejected from Rome, if the people had not feared the cruelty of your party; for except a few money-lenders there is not a man in Rome who is not a Pompeian: you may say, what is the meaning of this talk? wait and see, I will compel you to conquer in spite of yourselves."

With this idle brag the foolish man, foolish in his conduct, though he sometimes wrote sensible letters, went off to Casilinum in Campania, but there he heard that his military standards and arms had been seized at Capua, his slaves arrested at Naples, and the intention of betraying the town to him was well known. Thus his designs being discovered and Capua being closed against him, he saw his danger, for the Roman

citizens in Capua had taken up arms and treated him as an enemy. Accordingly he desisted from his enterprise and went away.

In the meantime Milo sent letters round to the Municipia, in which he said that he was acting under the orders of Pompeius which he had received through Vibullius, and he endeavoured to stir up those who were labouring under debt, but he did not succeed. He then broke open some *ergastula*, the places in which field-slaves were confined, and made an attack on Cosa somewhere in the territory of Thurii, where he was struck with a stone from the walls and an end was put to his restless life. Caelius who had set out, as he said, to go to Caesar, on arriving at Thurii attempted to corrupt some of the inhabitants of the place: he also promised money to Caesar's Gallic and Spanish cavalry, who had been placed there as a garrison, but these men put him to death. Thus, says Caesar, the beginnings of great enterprises, which kept Italy uneasy at a time when the magistrates had enough to do and circumstances caused much trouble, had a speedy and easy termination.

Caesar places these events as occurring in Italy at the time when the two armies were encamped on opposite sides of the Apsus.

Plutarch (Caesar, c. 38), Appian (B. C. ii. 57), and Dion (41. c. 46) report a strange adventure of Caesar. When he was at Apollonia and very uneasy about the ships, which he was expecting from Italy, he resolved without informing any person of his design to pass over to Brundisium. Disguising himself as a slave he embarked by night in a twelve-oared boat and throwing himself down lay quiet. The boat descended a river, which Plutarch names the Anius; probably he means the Aous. But the swell at the mouth of the river, which was caused by a wind blowing from the sea all night, made it impossible for the boat to advance, and the master ordered the men to turn the boat round. Caesar then discovered himself, and said to the master, "Have courage and fear not: you carry Caesar and his fortunes in your boat." The sailors now renewed their efforts to get out of the river, but after the boat had taken much water and run great risk, Caesar unwillingly

agreed to put back. On his return the soldiers blamed him for exposing himself to such danger on account of those on the other side of the sea, and not trusting in the men whom he had with him. Appian improves the defective story of Plutarch by saying that Caesar sent before him three slaves to hire a boat and a skilful master for the purpose of carrying over the sea a messenger from Caesar. Appian's narrative in other respects differs a little from Plutarch's, but he does not forget to mention the words of encouragement to the master, "You carry Caesar and Caesar's fortune." Dion fixes the time of this adventure before the death of Bibulus and the encampment of the two armies on opposite sides of the Apsus. Appian, who is always careless and inaccurate as to the matter of time, places this adventure after the two armies were face to face on the river Alor, which ought clearly to have been named Apsus. But it is impossible to admit that Caesar would have left his troops on the Apsus in the presence of such generals as Pompeius and Labienus, when he had no legatus fit to command an army, or even if he had. He says nothing himself about this unsuccessful attempt. Lucan (v. 504) makes a most tedious story of it, and Suetonius (Caesar, c. 58) briefly mentions it.

We must conclude that there was a well-known story of this daring adventure, but we cannot say whether the story was true or false. Caesar did send messages to Brundisium, and it is possible that some unsuccessful attempt of some person to cross the sea is the foundation of the story; but we cannot hazard any conjecture about the famous words which are attributed to Caesar. Florus of course did not forget them (iv. 2. 37).

CHAPTER XI.

ANTONIUS JOINS CAESAR.

B.C. 48.

LIBO setting sail from Oricum with his fleet of fifty ships arrived at Brundisium and took possession of an island which is opposite to the town, for he thought that it was better to occupy a single spot which Caesar's troops must pass, if they came out of the port, than to blockade all the shores and harbours. The island is one of those which are in front of the outer port of Brundisium. As Libo came unexpectedly, he seized some merchant-ships which he burnt, and he carried off one laden with corn. His arrival alarmed the troops in Brundisium; and landing by night some soldiers and archers he dislodged a body of cavalry from their post. He succeeded so well by seizing this convenient position that he wrote to tell Pompeius, that he might, if he chose, haul up and repair the rest of the ships, for his own fleet was sufficient to prevent Caesar's troops from crossing the sea (c. 23).

M. Antonius, who was then at Brundisium, trusting in the courage of his men took about sixty boats belonging to the ships of war and protected them with hurdles and blinds. He put on board picked soldiers, and placed the boats separately in various places along the coast. Two triremes, which he had built at Brundisium, were then sent to the entrance of the port under the pretext of exercising the rowers. Libo seeing these vessels advance boldly, and hoping to intercept them, sent forward five quadriremes; but as soon as they had come near

the ships of Antonius, the veterans on board began to retreat into the harbour, whither the enemy, eager in the pursuit, incautiously followed. Antonius now gave the signal to the boats, which coming from all points against Libo's vessels immediately took one with the rowers and all the men, and compelled the rest to make a disgraceful retreat. In addition to this damage inflicted on Libo's fleet Antonius by placing horsemen along the coast prevented the enemy from getting water; which is very scarce in these parts. In consequence of this difficulty and the loss which he had suffered, Libo left Brundisium and abandoned the blockade.

Many months had now passed, the winter was at an end, and the ships and legions had not arrived from Brundisium. Dion (41. c. 46) asserts that Caesar suspected the fidelity of M. Antonius and others; but it is Dion's fashion to suspect everybody. Caesar does not say that he distrusted Antonius; and if he had done so, he would not have published it to the world, and I conclude that Dion has asserted as a fact that which he could not know. Some opportunities for sailing, as Caesar thought, had been neglected, for the winds had often been favourable, and it was necessary to run the risk. The longer the attempt to make the passage was delayed, the more vigilant were the naval commanders of the enemy in watching the coast, and the more confident they were in their ability to prevent the landing of Caesar's troops. Pompeius frequently by letter charged them, as they had not prevented Caesar from coming, to take care to stop the rest of his men: and they might do this more easily as the stormy season, which was unfavourable for crossing the sea, might be daily expected. Caesar's troops by waiting for gentler winds would really have a more difficult season for crossing the sea.¹ For these reasons Caesar wrote sharply to his commanders at Brundisium, that when they had a fair wind they should not neglect the opportunity, if they could direct their course to the shores of the

¹ This passage is difficult. I have attempted to give the sense, but not to translate it. Kraner has changed "*lenioribus*" in the text to "*pejoribus*" and "*expectabant*" to "*expectabatur*," which is bad. The suggestion of Terpestra, mentioned by Kraner, to place the words "*duriusque cotidie . . . expectabant*" after "*committendum existimabat*" is ingenious, but not necessary.

territory of Apollonia and drive their ships ashore there ; for these parts were less watched by the enemy, who did not venture to go a great distance from the harbours.

M. Antonius and Fufius Calenus now made ready to leave Brundisium, and the soldiers themselves strongly urged them to set sail : they were ready to run any risk to save Caesar. Accordingly the troops embarked with a south wind and on the next day sailed past Apollonia. The ships being seen from the land, Coponius who commanded the Rhodian fleet at Dyrrhachium, brought his vessels out of port, and, as the wind was slack, he came near to Caesar's fleet, but the south wind freshened again and helped the ships of Antonius. Coponius however did not give up the pursuit, but he hoped by the exertions of his rowers to deprive the enemy's ships of the advantage of the wind, and when they had passed Dyrrhachium in a strong gale he still followed. The ships of Antonius were favoured by fortune, but still they were afraid of the enemy, if by chance the wind should fall. However they reached a harbour named Nymphaeum, which is three miles north of Lissus and brought their ships into it. Lissus is at the mouth of the Drilo (Drino) : the modern name of Lissus according to Goeler, is Alessio ; other authorities name it Lesch. This port of Nymphaeum, says Caesar, was protected against the south-west wind, but not safe against a south wind. Caesar's men however thought the danger from the wind to be less than the danger from the enemy's fleet. As soon as the ships were in the port of Nymphaeum, by wonderful good fortune, the south wind which had blown two days, turned to the south-west (c. 26).

Caesar observes that this was an instance of the sudden turn of fortune ; for those who had been in great danger were sheltered in a safe port, and those, who had threatened his ships with destruction, were driven to look after their own safety. The storm, which protected the ships in port, fell with such fury on the Rhodian fleet that all their decked vessels, sixteen in number, were wrecked ; part of the numerous body of rowers and fighting men were dashed on the rocks and killed, and part were saved by Caesar's men. All who thus escaped were sent home by Caesar's orders.

Two of the vessels of Antonius, which lagged after the rest, being overtaken by night and not knowing where the rest had been brought to shore, anchored off Lissus. Otacilius Crassus, who was in command at Lissus, sent out some boats and small vessels with the intention of taking these ships, and at the same time he treated with them about surrendering and promised to spare the men. One of these ships had on board two hundred and twenty men belonging to the legion of recruits: the other contained soldiers of a veteran legion, not quite two hundred. This occasion was an example of the security which men derive from firmness of mind. The recruits terrified at the number of ships and exhausted by the voyage and sea-sickness, and relying on the oath of Otacilius that they should suffer no harm, surrendered themselves. But as soon as they were brought to Otacilius, they were all most brutally massacred in his sight. On the contrary the soldiers of the veteran legion, who had also endured the same bad weather and the foulness of the bilge water, resolved to abate nothing of their former courage. By treating about terms and pretending that they would surrender they contrived to get through the early part of the night, and then they compelled the helmsman to drive the ship ashore, where the soldiers finding a suitable place passed the rest of the night. At daybreak Otacilius sent against them about four hundred horsemen who kept watch on that part of the coast, and the armed men of the garrison who followed them; but the legionary soldiers defended themselves and after killing some of the enemy joined their comrades in safety.

The body of Roman citizens who were in possession of Lissus,² which town Caesar had before this time granted to them and had provided for the defence of the place, received

² This must have been done during Caesar's proconsulship when Illyricum was one of his provinces. Lissus appears to have been the southern boundary of Illyricum. When Caesar uses the word "attribuerat" he means that he had assigned the administration of Lissus and probably of the territory to a body of Roman citizens settled in Lissus. As to the position of the place with respect to the provinces of Macedonia and the region of Epirus, see Pliny, N. H. 3. c. 22 and 23. He makes Oricum the beginning of Epirus, and Lissus the nearest Illyrian town to Macedonia. Thus all the coast between Lissus and Oricum belonged to Macedonia.

Antonius and supplied his wants : Otacilius fled out of the town and went to Pompeius. Antonius now landed his troops, which consisted of three veteran legions, one of recruits, and 800 horsemen. He sent back most of the ships to Italy to bring over the rest of the soldiers and horsemen ; but he left at Lissus some "pontones," a kind of Gallic vessel, with this purpose that if Pompeius supposing Italy to be unguarded should take his army thither, Caesar might have some means of following him. At the same time Antonius sent messengers to inform Caesar where he had landed and what force he had brought (c. 30).

These events were known to Caesar and Pompeius about the same time, for they had seen the ships sail past Apollonia and Dyrrhachium and they marched in the same direction, but they did not know at what part of the coast the fleet had arrived. Caesar's design was to join Antonius as soon as possible : Pompeius intended to meet Antonius on his march and to attack his troops by laying an ambuscade. Both Caesar and Pompeius brought their troops out of the two camps on the Apsus, Pompeius secretly and by night, Caesar openly and in the day. But Caesar's march was longer because it was necessary to make a circuit and ascend the river to find a ford. Pompeius had no river to cross, and he advanced against Antonius by great marches, and as soon as he knew that Antonius was near, placed his troops in a proper position, kept the men within the camp and forbade fires to be made that his arrival might not be betrayed. Antonius however received the intelligence from some Greeks, and sending a message to Caesar kept within his camp for one day ; on the next day Caesar joined him. When Pompeius heard of Caesar's junction with Antonius, he quitted his position, to avoid the danger of being hemmed in by two armies, and marched with all his forces to Asparagium in the territory of Dyrrhachium and there he made his camp.

Goeler assumes that Antonius on leaving the coast ascended the valley of the Hismo, a river which enters the sea between Lissus and Dyrrhachium and flows nearly from south to north. About the parallel of Dyrrhachium he would cross the Graba Balkan, a range which connects the Candavian

mountains with the high land that forms the eastern boundary of the territory of Dyrrhachium.

When Caesar heard that Pompeius was at Asparagium,³ he marched in that direction from the east with his army, and took on his way a town of the Parthini in which Pompeius had a garrison. On the third day he entered Macedonia and pitched his camp near to Pompeius who was at Asparagium. This passage shows that the province of Macedonia at this time extended to the coast of the Hadriatic.⁴

The two armies were now face to face, Caesar strengthened by the arrival of M. Antonius, and Pompeius without any addition to his forces, and discredited in opinion by his inactivity during so many months. The history of the campaign shows that he feared Caesar and dared not hazard a decisive battle. Caesar's bold enterprise in taking his forces across the sea to land on a coast occupied by an enemy's fleet was finally successful, but success alone will not justify everything. The Emperor Napoleon (*Précis des Guerres de César*, p. 148) says, "The twelve legions which Caesar collected at Brundisium came from Spain, from Gallia, or from the banks of the Po: it seems then that he would have done better to lead them through Illyria and Dalmatia to Macedonia: from Placentia,

³ Goeler concludes that Asparagium was on the left side of the Genusus, now the Uschkomobin, as he names the river; for Caesar when retreating from Dyrrhachium "crossed the Genusus to arrive at Asparagium" (Goeler). But Caesar says (B. C. iii. 76) "that after having taken his army over the Genusus he rested in his old camp opposite to Asparagium." This means that Asparagium was on the right bank of the Genusus. Caesar also says that Pompeius, who was following him on the same day rested in the evening at his old camp at Asparagium (ad Asparagium), but he says nothing of Pompeius crossing the river on that day and the rest of the chapter proves he did not.

⁴ Leake says that the word "Macedoniam" (B. C. iii. c. 41) "is one among several instances of the incorrectness of Caesar or his text as to names of places: no part of the territory of Dyrrhachium could be in Macedonia." But this is not correct. It is certain that Macedonia extended to the Hadriatic, for when L. Piso was governor of Macedonia (in B.C. 57, 56), Dyrrhachium and Apollonia were in his province (Cicero, de Prov. Cons. c. 3, in Pis. c. 35). Macedonia extended along the coast from Lissus on the Drilo and perhaps at least to the Aous, north of which Apollonia is situated. Dyrrhachium, it is said (Dion 41. c. 49), was in the country which originally was the land of the Illyrian Parthini, but in Caesar's time this country of the Parthini belonged to Macedonia. I cannot explain "in Macedoniam ad Pompeium pervenit," for Caesar had not been out of Macedonia. Compare p. 142, Note 2.

the point of intersection of the two routes, the distance is almost the same to reach Epirus: his army would have arrived there united; he would not have had to pass the sea, which was so great an obstacle, and which was near being so fatal to him to cross in the presence of a superior squadron. This obstacle, it is true, was much less strong then than it would be at present. Navigation was in its infancy; the vessels were not suited for cruising and sailing close to the wind; it appears even that they were not supplied with water for a long time, for some days of contrary winds exposed the fleet of Bibulus to being entirely deprived of it."

There were three things which Caesar might have done after the Spanish campaign. He might have stayed in Italy and waited to see what Pompeius would do. But he might have waited long, and waited to no purpose, for it is impossible to believe that Pompeius would have dared to invade Italy while Caesar was there. Further, could Caesar have stayed in Italy without dissatisfying many of his veterans, and could he have kept his army together, and fed Rome, while the fleets of Pompeius commanded the sea? It was necessary for Caesar to bring the war to an end in some way, and to let the Romans know who was their master. If he had remained in Italy, his inactivity would have brought him down to the level of Pompeius, and we cannot conjecture how the quarrel would have ended. If these considerations are just, it was necessary for him to seek his enemy. The voyage from Brundisium was hazardous. The march by land would have been practicable and comparatively safe, but there might have been difficulties about supplies; and if Caesar had reached Lissus by land, he would not have had the opportunity of feeding his armies in the countries south of Dyrrhachium. If we suppose Caesar to have marched to Lissus, would he have found Pompeius there? Pompeius might have crossed to Italy with his ships and legions, which was neither impossible nor improbable (B. C. iii. 29). In that case the two generals would have changed places, and it is useless to speculate on the probable course of events.

The conclusion is that Caesar did right in crossing the sea. He might have perished, and of course he knew that; but if

we understand the man's character, he preferred the risk of losing his life to the danger of leaving the dispute between him and his adversary undecided. Caesar's critic may have been his equal as a soldier; but he had not the daring of the Roman, though he showed that he had sometimes as much rashness.

CHAPTER XII.

SCIPIO AND DOMITIUS.

B.C. 48.

CAESAR now suspends his narrative and turns to the affairs of the East (c. 31). P. Scipio, the proconsul of Syria, after sustaining some loss in the mountains of the Amanus, the northern boundary of his province, had assumed the title of Imperator.¹ He made large requisitions of money on the towns of Syria and the petty rulers: he also exacted from the farmers (publicani) of the taxes the amount of two years' payment then due to the Roman treasury; and he also demanded as a loan the sum which would be due for the next year; and he required cavalry from all the province. Syria, we may be assured, would be compelled to make up to the farmers the money which had been extorted from them by the grasping proconsul. Scipio left behind him his neighbouring enemies the Parthians, who had destroyed M. Crassus in B.C. 53, and blockaded M. Bibulus in B.C. 50. He led his forces from Syria across the Taurus towards the province Asia, though Syria was in a state of the greatest anxiety about a Parthian war, and it was known that some of the soldiers had expressed their discontent and declared that they were ready to follow their commander against the enemy, but that they would not fight against a fellow-citizen and a Roman consul. However Scipio brought his men to Pergamum, one of the chief towns of the province Asia, where he placed them in winter quarters

¹ Caesar's words contain a bitter sarcasm on the proconsul of Syria, and in these three chapters he has exposed the greediness of Scipio and his contempt for the man.

and in the richest cities; and he satisfied his discontented soldiers by great bounties and giving the towns up to them for plunder to secure their fidelity.

The money requisitions laid on the province of Asia were exacted with the utmost severity; and many devices were invented for satisfying the proconsul's greediness. A tax was imposed on every head, both slave and free: taxes were laid on columns and doors; corn, soldiers, arms, rowers, military engines, carriages were the subjects of requisitions: any name was used as a sufficient pretext for imposing a tax.¹ Men with military authority were set over cities, and even small villages and fortified places; and he who exercised his power most severely, was considered to be the best man and the best citizen. The province was full of lictors and of men invested with power, it swarmed with *præfecti*² and extortioners, who besides the money demanded as a requisition took more for themselves. They said that they were driven from home and country and were in want of all necessities; and so they used this pretext as a cloak for their villany. In addition to all this there happened what is usual in time of war: the rate of interest rose very high in consequence of the demand imposed on all; and in those two years debt in the province was increased. Nor did these exactions save the Roman citizens of the province, for certain sums were levied on the several judicial districts (*conventus*) and on the several towns: and it was declared that these sums were exacted as a loan under a resolution of the Senate; and the Roman citizens must of course contribute to the loan. The *Publicani* also advanced as a loan the taxes which they would collect in the following year. At Ephesus Scipio ordered the money to be taken from the temple of Diana, which it was an ancient practice to

¹ If a man had columns to his house, he would be taxed in respect of the columns, for they would be taken as evidence of wealth. We tax in the same way. In England a man pays a tax on his carriage and horses, because the possession of them is evidence that he has more money than many other people; and as money is wanted for state expenses, such a man is selected as a contributor. So Scipio used any name as a pretext for taxing: it might be coach or horses, or plate, or columns or doors.

² *Præfecti*. See vol. iv. p. 424.

deposit there,⁴ and a day was fixed for this purpose. When Scipio had gone to the temple accompanied by several senators as witnesses, he received a letter from Pompeius, which informed him that Caesar had crossed the sea with his legions, and that Scipio must hasten with his army and postpone everything else. On receiving this letter Scipio dismissed those whom he had summoned, made preparation for his march to Macedonia, and set out a few days later. So the treasure at Ephesus was saved.

Here we learn that Scipio was in the province Asia when Caesar crossed from Brundisium to Epirus, and consequently Scipio had marched from Syria in the summer or autumn of B.C. 49, a fact which explains Caesar's expression "in those two years." Scipio passed the latter part of B.C. 49 in Asia and did not leave it before the early part of B.C. 48. The story of his quitting the temple on receiving the letter and not completing the robbery which he had begun, appears very improbable; but each person may explain the matter if he can.

After his junction with the army of Antonius, Caesar took from Oricum the legion which he had placed there, for he thought it prudent to attempt to get possession of the adjacent parts and to advance farther into the interior. Ambassadors from Thessaly and Aetolia had informed him that if he would send a protecting force, the towns of those countries would obey his orders. Accordingly he sent to Thessaly L. Cassius Longinus, the younger brother of C. Cassius Longinus, with a legion of recruits, named the twenty-seventh and two hundred horsemen; and C. Calvisius Sabinus with five cohorts and a few horsemen into Aetolia. They were instructed particularly to look after the corn supplies, as these parts were near to Caesar's camp. Caesar ordered Cn. Domitius Calvinus (consul B.C. 53) with two legions, the eleventh and twelfth and five hundred horsemen to march into Macedonia, for Menedemus, a chief personage in that part of the province which was called Free Macedonia,⁵ who had been sent as an

⁴ "Depositae antiquitus." These words seem not to mean "money which had long been deposited in the temple," but deposits which it had been usual to make for a long time past.

⁵ Libera Macedonia, Free Macedonia, is described by Strabo (p 326) thus:

ambassador, declared that his countrymen were in favour of Caesar. As soon as Calvisius arrived in Aetolia, he was received by the people with hearty goodwill, the garrisons of the enemy quitted the towns of Calydon and Naupactus on the Corinthian gulf, and all Aetolia was in the power of Calvisius. When Cassius with his legion reached Thessaly, he found two parties in the country: Hegesaretus, a man who had great influence was a partisan of Pompeius, and Petraeus a young man of the highest rank with his friends was strongly in the interest of Caesar.

At the time when Domitius reached Macedonia, where embassies from the towns came to meet him, it was also announced that Scipio was near with his legions. He had crossed from Asia to the European side and advanced by the Via Egnatia through Thessalonica. Scipio's arrival caused much excitement and rumour through the country, apparently from an expectation that he would do great things, for when something unusual surprises us, as Caesar says, report generally exceeds the reality. Without halting Scipio advanced impetuously against Domitius, but when he was about twenty miles distant, he suddenly changed his route and marched against C. Cassius Longinus towards Thessaly. This was done with such expedition that Scipio's presence and his approach were announced at the same time; and in order that his march might not be delayed, Scipio left M. Favonius on the Haliacmon (Indjeh Kara-su), a river which separates Macedonia from Thessaly and enters the north part of the Thermaic gulf. Favonius with eight cohorts was instructed to protect the baggage and to make a fort. At the same time the cavalry of King Cotys (p. 119), who had been used to hover about Thessaly, hurried towards the camp of Cassius. Alarmed by hearing of Scipio's approach, and seeing the cavalry which he supposed to be Scipio's, Cassius turned towards the mountains which surrounded Thessaly and began his march to the south-west towards Ambracia, which is on the north side of the Ambraciot bay, now the gulf of Arta. While Scipio was hastening in "they called the parts about Lyncestis and Pelagonia and Orestias and Elimeia by the name of Upper Macedonia; but at a later time it was called also Free."

pursuit of Cassius, he was overtaken by a letter from Favonius which informed him that Domitius with his legions was near and that he could not defend his post without aid. On receiving this letter Scipio changed his purpose and the direction of his march: he gave up the pursuit of Cassius, and marching day and night reached Favonius so opportunely that the dust raised by the army of Domitius and Scipio's advanced parties were seen at the time.

Goeler says (p. 14), "When Cn. Domitius arrived at the place of his destination, the neighbourhood of Heraclea, Scipio also at the same time arrived with his two legions from Syria." There is no evidence of the truth of this statement, which assumes that Domitius was on the Via Egnatia, and if we admit that he was, no conclusion can be derived from Caesar's text as to the positions of Domitius and Scipio when they were so near one another. Scipio, we assume, had advanced by the Via Egnatia, and almost the only fact which enables us to conjecture how far he had advanced, is that by turning south he came to the Haliacmon.

Scipio on his return waited two days in his camp on the Haliacmon, which was between him and Domitius: on the third day at dawn he led his army over the river by a ford and made a camp, and on the next day in the morning he drew up his forces in front of it. Domitius then determined to bring out his legions and to fight. There was between the two camps a plain about six miles in extent, and Domitius led out his troops and made his order of battle on lower ground than Scipio's camp; but Scipio persisted in not leaving his entrenchments. Domitius had great difficulty in keeping his men from fighting, which he did chiefly because a stream with steep banks, which ran below Scipio's camp, made the attack difficult. Scipio observing the ardour of the enemy for battle, and suspecting that on the next day he should either be compelled to fight, or to his disgrace he must keep within his camp after raising great expectation by his arrival, retreated across the river by night, without even giving the usual signal for packing up the baggage, returned to the place from which he had come, and fixed his camp in an

elevated position near the Haliacmon, A few days later he placed by night an ambuscade of horsemen in a place to which on former days the men of Domitius had been accustomed to go to forage; and when according to daily usage, Q. Varus,⁶ commander of the cavalry of Domitius, had arrived at the spot, the horsemen of Scipio, suddenly rose from their ambuscade. The men of Domitius bravely resisted the attack, and though they were dispersed when the enemy fell on them, every man was soon in his place again and all united charged their adversaries, of whom about eighty were killed and the remainder were put to flight. They returned victorious to the camp with the loss of only two men.

After this success Domitius hoping that he might be able to draw Scipio to a battle, pretended that he was moving his camp for want of provisions, and after giving the usual military signal he advanced three miles, and placed all his army and cavalry in a convenient position where they could not be seen. Scipio prepared to follow, and sent forward a large part of his cavalry to explore the road which Domitius had taken. When the cavalry had advanced some distance, and the first companies had entered the ambuscade, the neighing of the horses roused their suspicion and they turned round to retreat towards their friends: at the same time those who were following them halted when they observed this movement. When Domitius' men saw that the ambuscade was discovered and that it would be useless to wait for the rest of the horsemen, they seized the opportunity and fell on two companies, those which first entered the ambuscade, under the command of M. Opimius, who appears to have escaped. The rest of the two companies were either killed or taken prisoners to Domitius.⁷

There have been different opinions about the direction which Scipio took when he went in pursuit of Cassius. Caesar probably did not know this part of the country, and if his narrative is founded on the report of Domitius, he could do no more than state what Domitius said or wrote. Caesar sent Domitius into Free Macedonia, and he did this on hearing

⁶ He had served in the Gallic war, B. G. viii. 28.

⁷ This passage is perhaps corrupt.

from Menedemus that this country was favourable to him. He says nothing of Domitius being sent to stop the march of Scipio to Pompeius; but we cannot doubt that Caesar had heard of the advance of Scipio, who would march by the Via Egnatia, and through part of that country which Caesar supposed to be favourable to himself. Leake says that it "is improbable that Domitius entered Macedonia by Mount Candavia, that being the great route from Thessalonica to Dyrrhachium, by which Pompeius had entered Illyria, and which with his superior numbers must have been entirely in his possession." I do not see anything in the narrative of Caesar which shows this improbability. Pompeius required all his force to oppose Caesar who was strengthened by the arrival of M. Antonius, and he could not spare troops to occupy the Via Egnatia; nor is there any reason for supposing that he knew anything of the line of Domitius' march into Free Macedonia. If Pompeius had posts on the Egnatia, Domitius with his two legions and superior cavalry would have easily dispersed them. If Domitius advanced no farther than Free Macedonia, he would be a long way from Thessalonica, when Scipio, who evidently had heard where he was, arrived within twenty miles of him and turned aside towards Thessaly against Cassius, with the purpose, as we may assume, of destroying the single legion before he ventured to attack Domitius. Leake does not admit that Scipio turned off the main road so soon after leaving Thessalonica that he would take the maritime route along the west side of the Thermaic gulf at the east foot of Olympus, for "he must have entered Thessaly through the vale of Tempe;" and he adds "it is very unlikely that he should have risked his safety in a long pass, where a very small force in the adjacent mountains might impede the largest army." It is indeed very unlikely. If Scipio took this route, he must have been even a worse commander than he proved to be; and as he was only twenty miles from Domitius when he quitted the main road, he might expect Domitius to follow him at least far enough to make him turn round. He did in fact turn round to save his camp on the Haliacmon when he heard of Domitius being near it; but the question is on what part of the Haliacmon

did he leave Favonius. Scipio did cross the Haliacmon somewhere, and enter Thessaly, of which the Haliacmon was the boundary at the part where he crossed, as Caesar says; but if Scipio took the maritime road and crossed the Haliacmon near the mouth, as he must have done, he was still in Macedonia and would not be in Thessaly until he had entered it by the pass of Tempe, and then he could not have returned by the same road or by any other road in time to save Favonius. These considerations lead to the certain conclusion that Scipio crossed the Haliacmon at some point high up the river and far from the west shore of the Thermaic gulf.

There is still a difficulty. The northern and natural boundary of Thessaly was the Cambunian mountains, which separated the basin of the Peneius from the basin of the Haliacmon; and the country immediately north of the Cambunian range was never a part of Thessaly Proper. Caesar however describes the Haliacmon as the boundary between Macedonia and Thessaly, and it is quite possible that this is an error. If it is not, we must suppose that at this time, the name Thessaly was extended northward as far as the middle course of the Haliacmon, but I cannot find any evidence for this except in the passage of Caesar. However it is certain, I think, that Caesar could never have made the Haliacmon the boundary between Macedonia and Thessaly along the Thermaic bay.

Leake, whose opinion is valuable in such a matter, supposes that the camp of Domitius was at a place which he names Siátista ($40^{\circ} 25' N. lat., 21^{\circ} 35' E. long.$), on the east side of the Haliacmon. He describes this place as commanding "a remarkable pass leading from the valley of the Haliacmon to the N.E., and consequently that Scipio occupied the country about Grevená," on the opposite side of the river. This seems to be a probable explanation; but it also makes it probable that Domitius came down there from the Via Egnatia, which Leake does not admit. He thinks that Domitius marched up the valley of the Apsus by the modern Beráti and thence crossed the mountains into the valley of the Haliacmon. This is indeed possible and even probable. Leake assumes that when Scipio pursued Cassius, he crossed

the Cambunian mountains into Pelasgiotis, one of the divisions of Thessaly. This supposition appears to be quite impossible, if Domitius was within any moderate distance from Favonius, when Scipio set out in the pursuit of Cassius. The march from the Haliacmon to the nearest part of Pelasgiotis and the return would have taken so much time, that Domitius, who was within twenty miles of Scipio when Scipio turned south, might have destroyed Favonius. Scipio, according to Caesar, was in Thessaly when he had crossed the Haliacmon, and Cassius, whether he was north or south of the Cambunian range, moved away in flight as fast as he could.

This is a long discussion on a small matter, but it may not seem useless to those who wish to understand the facts of this eventful campaign. Caesar says no more about Scipio and Domitius: "These two opponents," as Goeler remarks, "held one another in check while Caesar and Pompeius measured their strength at Dyrrhachium."

When Caesar drew his garrison troops from the sea coast, as it has been stated, he left three cohorts at Oricum to protect the town and the ships of war which he had brought from Italy. Manius Acilius, one of Caesar's legati, was appointed to discharge this duty. Acilius brought the vessels into the inner port behind the town and made them fast to the land. He sunk a merchant ship at the entrance of the port and placed near to it another ship, and upon these he built a tower at the entrance to the port and filled it with soldiers, who were ordered to defend the tower against any sudden attack. Cn. Pompeius the son, who commanded the Egyptian fleet, hearing of the state of affairs at Oricum went thither, and towed off the sunken vessel with a strong windlass^a and many ropes, and he attacked with numerous vessels the other ship which Acilius had placed there. Pompeius had erected in his vessels towers of equal height with the tower of Acilius in order that by fighting from a high position and

^a "Navim remulco multisque contendens funibus adduxit." Vossius (B. C. iii. 40. ed. Ouden.) has a long note on the "remulus" and a plate of the supposed form of the machine. It was a windlass worked on a ship, I suppose, or, some critics suppose, fixed on the land.

sending up fresh men to supply the place of those who were fatigued, and by attacking the town walls at the same time by ladders from the land and by his fleet he might separate the forces of his opponents. By great efforts and showers of missiles he overpowered the men of Acilius and having driven away all the defenders, who escaped in boats, he got possession of the second ship. At the same time on the other side, where there was a narrow natural mole, which reduced the site of the town almost to the form of an island, he carried across this mole on rollers⁹ moved by levers four biremes into the inner part of the harbour, and thus attacking on both sides the ships of war, which were fastened to the land and had no men on board, he carried off four and burned the rest.

Pompeius left D. Laelius, who was withdrawn from the Asiatic fleet, to keep watch at Oricum and to prevent supplies from being brought into the town from Bullis and Amantia. Pompeius then sailed to Lissus where he burnt within the port thirty transport ships left there by M. Antonius. He also attempted to take Lissus, but it was defended by the Roman citizens who belonged to that district (*conventus*), and by the soldiers whom Caesar had sent to protect the place. Pompeius stayed only three days before Lissus, and after losing a few men in the attack on the town he left it without accomplishing his purpose (c. 40).

Caesar thus lost his ships on the east side of the Hadriatic, and was cut off from Italy, Sicily and all the western parts of the Roman Empire. He was left in the presence of an enemy more numerous than himself without the possibility of receiving aid from the sea, and he could only find supplies of food in the parts of Greece which were near him. But he had confidence in himself and in his soldiers: he knew his own great powers, and he never despaired. Instead of being discouraged by misfortunes, as ordinary men are, he vigorously commenced the campaign against a general of great abilities and experience well provided with all the munitions of war, and master of the sea.

⁹ Caesar here names these rollers "*scutulae*." In B. C. ii. 10 he has named them "*phalangae*."

CHAPTER XIII.

BLOCKADE NEAR DYRRHACHIUM.

B.C. 48.

THE day after Caesar's arrival at Asparagium (c. 41), he brought out all his troops and offered Pompeius battle. But Pompeius would not leave his position, and Caesar led his men back to their camp.

On the next day he set out with his army and took a very circuitous and difficult road to Dyrrhachium, in the expectation that Pompeius might either be forced to retire thither or might be cut off from communication with this place in which he had stored his supplies and munitions of war. Pompeius not knowing Caesar's purpose, and seeing that he set out by a route which was in a different direction from the road to Dyrrhachium, thought that he was compelled to leave his position by want of supplies; but being informed by scouts of the road which Caesar had taken, he broke up his camp on the next day in the hope of being able by a shorter road to frustrate Caesar's design. This was what Caesar expected. Exhorting his men to bear patiently the fatigue, and giving them rest from their march only for a small part of the night, he reached Dyrrhachium in the morning, just at the time when the head of Pompeius' columns was seen at a distance coming in sight; and there he made a camp.

Goeler supposes that Caesar, instead of marching from the neighbourhood of Asparagium in a north-west direction, took an eastern direction as if he were seeking the interior of Macedonia; and the scouts of Pompeius did not know that his course was to Dyrrhachium till they saw his army climbing

the steep sides of the Graba-Balkan, and then turning to the north west. Caesar certainly could not have marched direct to Dyrrhachium, for he was face to face with Pompeius on the Genusus; and his purpose in turning to the east was to deceive the enemy as to his real object, which he has explained. Caesar succeeded in placing himself on the south-west side of Dyrrhachium, and Pompeius was thus shut out from communication with the town by land. Goeler (p. 16) computes that Caesar made this march in two days and two nights, halting during the first night. Pompeius perhaps made his march during the night,—the night of the day which followed Caesar's departure from his camp,—for Pompeius' advancing columns were seen by Caesar in the morning. The time of the year was about the end of February or the beginning of March, when the days were short and the roads bad. Goeler reckons Caesar's march at fifteen or sixteen hours; and that of Pompeius, which was due north from Asparagium, at five hours and a half. But Pompeius did not advance as far as Dyrrhachium, for Caesar had placed himself between Pompeius and the town. By this hard marching, which is equal to German endurance in the last French war (1871), Caesar anticipated his less vigilant adversary.¹

It is necessary to know the nature of the ground about Dyrrhachium, if we would understand the obstinate struggle between the two armies before this town. I shall follow Goeler's description, which is founded on the valuable Austrian map of this part of Turkey, published in 1829.²

¹ A remark may be made here. A short chapter of Caesar often contains matter for much thought and reflection, and it is worth the labour, if the campaign is worth studying; and I think that it is. There is some difficulty about the words "*postero die*" which occur twice in this chapter (41). If we suppose that Caesar was only one night on the road, the march would be impossible.

² "*Die vortreffliche Karte des K. K. Oesterr. Generalquartiermeisterstabs über die Türkei.*" Goeler, himself a soldier, apologizes for differing from the Emperor Napoleon's remarks on the blockade of Dyrrhachium in his *Précis*: first because the emperor had not such maps as Goeler had; and second, because Napoleon did not occupy himself with those minute inquiries which are necessary in the examination of Caesar's Commentaries, which assume as known to the reader so much that is unknown and can only be learned by laborious inquiry. Goeler's observation is true, and those who read Caesar without this necessary knowledge cannot understand him.

Four hours north of a place named Ilbessan on the Genusus, the Graba-Balkan mountains run due east to Mount Spileon. At the western end the Grabo-Balkan joins the mountains which enclose the valley of the Lisana, at the head of which is a fort now named Petrella. From this junction the Graba-Balkan sends out three branches to the Hadriatic Sea. The northern branch runs in a north-western direction to Cape Rodoni, which is a little south of the site of Lissus. The middle branch runs due west, and forms the narrow peninsula on which Dyrrhachium (Durazzo) stood, and terminates in the present Cape Pali. This middle branch, at a point about three hours east of Dyrrhachium, itself sends out a branch in the form of a bow and in a south-west direction; this secondary branch encloses the coast of the bay of Dyrrhachium in the form of a half-moon, and makes a natural amphitheatre, which was the scene of the contest between Pompeius and Caesar.

The valley of the little river Lisana lies between this northern and middle branch, but in the lower part of its course the river turns north through a great swamp which is north of Dyrrhachium, and enters the sea about four hours' distance from that town.

The southern branch from the Graba-Balkan runs at first nearly due south, and then turns west when it approaches the north bank of the Genusus. It continues a western course along the Genusus to the sea, and thus forms the northern boundary of the lower basin of the Genusus, and the southern boundary of the basin of the small river Palamnus, now the Spirnatza. The northern boundary of the basin of the Spirnatza is the middle mountain range which terminates in the peninsula of Durazzo.

The coast immediately north of Durazzo contains numerous rocks and steep cliffs, and still farther north is the great swamp. In a coast of six hours in length there is no landing-place. South of the mouth of the Genusus as far as Aulon (Aulona) south of the Aous, the shallowness of the sea prevents a landing. It is only in the bight of the bay of Dyrrhachium that we find tolerable landing-places, and even here in some places the coast is high and rocky.

Lucan (vi. 19—28, Oudendorp) has a good description of the site of Dyrrhachium. The place was not protected by art and the labour of man, but by natural defences. On all sides it was shut in by the sea and by rocks which dashed back the assault of the waves, and there was only a little hill which prevented the site from being an island :

“The dread of ships, high cliffs support the walls,
And when the south wind stirs the Ionian wave,
Temples and houses shake, drench'd with the spray.”

Dyrrhachium had long been the usual landing-place for those who crossed the Hadriatic from Brundisium to the opposite coast. From Dyrrhachium, as already observed, the great Roman military road, the Via Egnatia, ran to Thessalonica, and it was continued east of Thessalonica as far as a place named Cypsela near the river Hebrus (Maritza). There was a shorter passage from Hydruntum (Otranto) south of Brundisium to Apollonia on the opposite coast, and a road was made inland from Apollonia and joined the Egnatia (p. 127).

Pompeius being shut out from Dyrrhachium, made his camp at Petra,³ an elevated place which formed a tolerable harbour for vessels and protected them against some winds. He ordered part of his ships of war to assemble here, and corn and supplies to be brought from the province of Asia and all the countries which were in his power. Petra is a high rocky position on the coast, about three miles south of the isthmus which connects the peninsula of Dyrrhachium with the main land. Caesar's camp was also on the coast opposite to Pompeius and between him and Dyrrhachium. It appears also from what follows that he occupied the isthmus of Dyrrhachium and thus shut in the town on the land side : a small force was sufficient for this purpose. Caesar judging that the war would

³ Goeler contends that Petra is a rocky height, where there is a small bay, and he places it south of Dyrrhachium and north of the Palamnis. It has been placed at the northern extremity of a small peninsula which is north of Dyrrhachium, now Cape Pali : and it is placed there in my Atlas ; but it is a great mistake. Goeler has proved (p. 21) that the struggle between Caesar and Pompeius was south of that town ; and this is quite plain as soon as we compare Caesar's narrative with a good map, such as those in Goeler's work. Tafel i. ii.

be prolonged had no hope of receiving supplies from Italy, for all the coasts were well guarded by the ships of Pompeius; and his own vessels, which were built during the winter in Sicily, Gallia, and Italy, did not arrive. He therefore sent Q. Tillius and his legatus L. Canuleius into Epirus to look after corn; and as these parts were at some distance, he established magazines in certain places and required the neighbouring towns to carry their grain to them. He also ordered all the corn to be collected from Lissus, from the country of the Parthini and all the fortified places; but the amount was small, for owing to the poverty of the soil in these rough and mountainous parts, the inhabitants generally consumed imported grain, and Pompeius also had plundered the Parthini by sending among them his cavalry, who broke open and carried off all the stores of corn which the people had buried in their houses, to hide them from the plunderer; or it may have been their usage to keep the corn in subterranean cellars, as was once done in Apulia.⁴

For these reasons Caesar formed his plans according to the nature of the ground. The camp of Pompeius was surrounded by many lofty and rugged hills, which Caesar occupied with detachments of troops, and he constructed forts there. Then making use of such facilities as each spot presented, he drew his line of contravallation from one fort to another with the design of enclosing Pompeius; and as Caesar was in want of supplies and Pompeius was strong in cavalry, with the further purpose of securing grain and other necessities for his army with less risk and also preventing the cavalry of Pompeius from foraging. He had also another object in view, which was to diminish the reputation on which Pompeius chiefly relied for his influence among foreign nations, when it should be reported all over the world that he was blockaded by Caesar and did not dare to fight. Pompeius would not leave the coast and Dyrrhachium, where he had placed his material of war, missiles, arms, and military engines, and was furnished with supplies by his ships; nor could he prevent Caesar from making

⁴ And may be still. "All the large streets and open squares of Foggia are undermined with vaults, where corn is buried and preserved sound from year to year." (Swinburne, *The Two Sicilies*, i. 138.)

his lines, unless he resolved to fight, which at that time he had determined not to do. This is Caesar's opinion of Pompeius' mode of carrying on the war. He had fled before Caesar from Italy, and now with forces superior in number he did not venture to meet him in the open field. All therefore that Pompeius could do was to occupy as many of the hills as he could, and to hold as much ground by detachments of troops as was possible and so divide Caesar's forces. Pompeius constructed twenty-four forts which embraced a circuit of fifteen miles and within these limits he found forage, and much cultivated ground from which he could get food for his beasts. Caesar had formed a continuous line of enclosure extending from every fort to the next nearest forts, in order to prevent Pompeius from breaking out in any part; and Pompeius formed within Caesar's contrevallation a line of defence⁵ to prevent Caesar's men from breaking in and attacking Pompeius in the rear. But Pompeius had the advantage of superior numbers and of an inner and consequently a shorter line to fortify. Consequently, as often as Caesar had occasion to take possession of any point, though Pompeius had not resolved to fight a battle, yet his practice was to send archers and slingers, of whom he had a great number, to convenient positions, who wounded many of Caesar's men, and made them dread the arrows so much that most of them contrived for themselves jackets or coverings of felt or cloth or skins as a protection against the missiles. Both sides used all their efforts to occupy convenient places with detachments of troops: it was Caesar's object to confine Pompeius within the narrowest possible limits; and Pompeius endeavoured to occupy all the hills that he could and the greatest extent of ground; and thus frequent skirmishes took place.⁶

⁵ Goeler remarks (p. 23, note 8) for the benefit of those who are not military men that the lines of Pompeius formed a large fortified camp, and cannot strictly be called a "circumvallation;" nor yet a "contrevallation;" for lines of both kinds, in technical language, are only constructed by the besieger, and Pompeius was the besieged. Caesar made a contrevallation against the fortified position of Pompeius, and began a circumvallation to protect himself against a possible attack from the outside, or, what is the same thing, on his rear.

⁶ Goeler (p. 24) says that "Pompeius with his right wing was in possession of the ground as far south as the little river Palamnus, and Caesar intended

On one occasion when Caesar's ninth legion had begun to fortify a certain place, Pompeius took possession of a neighbouring and opposite hill and began to stop Caesar's men from working. As the approach to the position of the ninth legion was on one side nearly level, Pompeius first ordered the archers and slingers to throw themselves round it, and then sending forward a great number of light-armed troops and bringing forward his engines he interrupted Caesar's works; for it was not easy for the men to defend themselves and to continue their labour at the same time. Caesar seeing that his men were assailed on all sides and wounded, ordered them to withdraw and to leave their position. The retreat was down a slope, and the enemy for this reason were pressing harder and attempting to prevent the escape of Caesar's troops whom they supposed to be retiring through fear. It is reported that Pompeius said boastfully that he would consent to be called a commander of no experience, if Caesar's legion made their retreat without great loss from this place to which they had rashly advanced. To secure the retreat of his soldiers Caesar ordered hurdles to be brought to the edge of the summit of the hill and to be planted in front of the enemy, and a ditch of moderate width to be dug by some of the men under the protection of these hurdles, and the ground all around to be made as difficult to traverse as it was possible. He also placed slingers in convenient places to protect the soldiers in their retreat; and when all was ready, he ordered the men to retire from the hill. Upon this the Pompeians began to press Caesar's troops with more confidence and broke down the hurdles in order to cross the ditch. Caesar was afraid that it might appear that his soldiers were rather driven back than withdrawn, and that they might sustain some loss, and accordingly when they had retired about half way down the slope, he ordered M. Antonius, who commanded the ninth legion, to encourage the men, the

to extend the left wing of his contravallation over the hills, which in the neighbourhood of the mouth of the Palamnus command the left bank of the river, for the purpose of preventing the Pompeians from getting water from that part of the Palamnus, for it was his purpose to prevent them from getting water anywhere, as far as he could." The reader will not find this in Caesar's text; but Goeler may still be right. See his book *Taf. ii. fig. i. 8.*

signal to be given with the trumpet, and an onset to be made on the enemy. The soldiers of the ninth legion animated by one spirit discharged their javelins (*pila*), and though they were on lower ground they ascended the slope, drove the men of Pompeius before them and compelled them to turn their backs. In this hasty retreat the enemy were greatly impeded by the scattered hurdles, the upright stakes, and the ditch. Caesar's men were satisfied with escaping without loss, for five only were killed, but many of the enemy fell. Thus they withdrew in safety, and halting at a little distance in the line of their retreat, they occupied other heights and established the communication of the lines.

Goeler observes (p. 27) what the student of Roman military history cannot have overlooked, that high ground with a steep ascent in front gave a great advantage to him who occupied this position, as Vegetius explains (iii. 13); for the assailant had to contend both against the ascent and the enemy, whose missiles descended upon him from above with increased force. The power of modern projectiles has no need of being increased by a higher fall.

It was a new kind of war, as Caesar remarks, both in respect to the number of forts, and the extent of ground, and the length of the lines, and the whole character of the blockade, and in other ways too. For when one enemy attempts to blockade another, it is when he attacks a terrified and weak opponent, who has been defeated in battle or distressed by some bad luck, while the blockading party himself is superior both in cavalry and infantry; and the purpose of the blockade has generally been to cut off the supplies of the blockaded enemy. But Caesar with an inferior number of soldiers was blockading an enemy whose troops were intact and had sustained no loss, and had abundance of everything supplied by ships. On the contrary Caesar had consumed all the corn of the country to some distance and was in the greatest straits; but his men endured everything with singular patience. They remembered that they had suffered the same the year before in Spain and yet by their perseverance they brought a very formidable war to a happy termination; they remembered that in B.C. 52 before Alesia they suffered much from want of pro-

visions, and still more before Avaricum (Bourges) and yet had come off victorious. When barley or leguminous vegetables were now given out to them instead of corn, they were well satisfied, and they had the flesh of the cattle which were brought to them from Epirus in great numbers. A root was also found in abundance named Chara,⁷ which mixed with milk and made into a kind of bread greatly relieved the wants of the soldiers. The men made loaves of it, and when the soldiers of Pompeius taunted Caesar's troops with their distress, they pitched the loaves at them to show that they were not going to die of hunger.⁸

It was now the season when the corn was beginning to ripen, and Caesar's soldiers endured the present scarcity in the confidence that they would soon have plenty. When they were on watch and in their conversation with one another, they were often heard to say that they would rather live on the bark of trees than let Pompeius escape. They also gladly heard from deserters that the horses of Pompeius were nearly starved; and that the rest of the beasts were dead; that the men too were suffering in consequence of being shut up within narrow limits and of the stench from the number of carcases:⁹ they were exhausted also with the daily toil to which they were unaccustomed, and were suffering greatly from want of water, for Caesar had either diverted all the streams which ran into the sea or dammed them up. The

⁷ There is a note by Vossius in Oudendorp's edition of Caesar in which he concludes that the Chara of Caesar, and the Chara and Lapana of Plinius, and the Cera (κέρα) of Theophrastus are the same. Kraner says that in the opinion of modern botanists the plant is *Crambe Tartarica*, "*Russischer Meer Kohl*" of the Germans, which has a thick sweet root, and prepared in various ways is used as food by the Tartars. Others suppose that it is the "*Kümmelwurzel*, *carum calvi* of Linnaeus. Goeler observes that Le Deist de Botidoux thinks that the plant is what he names "*Blumenbinse*" or "*Wasservellohen*," which has a bulbous root and is used as food by the Kalmucks, Jakuts and other tribes in Russia, both in the natural state and roasted: bread can be made out of it, and Caesar's soldiers would diminish the bitter taste by the addition of milk. He also speaks of another root which may be that which Caesar mentions. It does not appear to be certain what the plant is. Perhaps it might still be found on the spot.

⁸ Compare the story in Suetonius, c. 68, Plutarch, Caesar, c. 39, Appian, B. C. ii. 61.

⁹ If this was so, Pompeius was very careless.

country was hilly, and the water flowed down in deep narrow ravines, across which stakes were driven and backed by earth to stop the flow of water. The soldiers of Pompeius were obliged to resort to the low and marshy parts and to dig wells, which were at a considerable distance from some posts, and were soon dried up by the heat. But Caesar's army was in the best state of health, and had abundance of water, and supplies of all kinds except corn, which the approaching harvest promised them.¹

¹ This chapter (49) would require more explanation, if a man were writing a commentary on Caesar, but I have given the meaning of the text. Compare Goeler, p. 30, &c., who says that the hills and the narrow ravines of this part of the country correspond to Caesar's description.

CHAPTER XIV.

BLOCKADE NEAR DYRRHACHIUM.

B.C. 48.

THE men of Pompeius having discovered by Caesar's fires that the cohorts bivouacked at night near their lines, used to approach them without making any noise, when the whole body of the assailants would discharge their missiles at once and immediately retire. Taught by experience Caesar's men made their fires in a different place from that in which they bivouacked. As it was summer, the fires were not made to warm the men, as Goeler justly remarks, but they were used to light the intervals between the forts and to prevent a night attack by the enemy. When the men bivouacked near the fires, the enemy could easily see them, and Caesar's men could not see the enemy approaching in the dark. Caesar's men made a great mistake. They should have placed their fires at some distance in front of their lines, as a military writer, quoted by Goeler, advises.

Between the end of the fiftieth chapter (Book iii.) and the fifty-first there is a defect in the manuscripts of Caesar, and we see in the fifty-eighth chapter evidence of this defect; for there Caesar refers to something which he has said, and that which he refers to is not in our present text. It appears also from this chapter that Pompeius had sent cavalry to Dyrrhachium in ships.

Appian (B. C. ii. 60) states that Caesar in the expectation that Dyrrhachium would be betrayed to him came according to agreement with a few men by night to the gates of the

city and the temple of Artemis; but here the narrative ends abruptly and the Greek text is defective. Dion Cassius (41. c. 50) who, as Goeler truly observes, is not a careful writer about military events, reports that "Caesar expecting that Dyrrhachium would be betrayed to him came by night to that part of the town which is between the marshes and the sea, and he advanced as far as the isthmus and had a battle with the defenders of the town; but he was attacked in front by large numbers, and also in the rear by many who had been conveyed to the place in vessels and suddenly fell upon him: Caesar lost many men and narrowly escaped himself." Here we have the story of Caesar's attempt to take Dyrrhachium, founded on some authority, but told imperfectly, and in a way of which we have numerous examples in Dion. Goeler has constructed the story by conjecture, which may not be far from the truth.

Caesar (iii. 58) had occupied two narrow roads which led to Dyrrhachium and joined at the isthmus. At the present day two roads still lead to Dyrrhachium and unite in front of the town. North of the junction of these two roads was the great swamp, which has been described, and south of this junction is the sea. Pompeius' cavalry was suffering for want of fodder, and he sent them by sea to Dyrrhachium for the purpose probably with the aid of the force in the town of making a sally against Caesar's troops and breaking out to forage. Caesar, who was in his camp on the right wing of his line of contravallation, when the cavalry of Pompeius was observed, left his position with some troops to protect his men who were before Dyrrhachium and to maintain possession of the two narrow roads. Pompeius, who could see Caesar's movements, appears to have taken advantage of his absence to attack the line of contravallation (c. 51). He fell on a fort occupied by a cohort of the sixth legion, for this is probably the attack which is described by Suetonius (Caesar, c. 68). The cohort defended themselves, according to the story, against four legions until P. Sulla,¹ whom Caesar had left in command of the camp, came to their relief with two legions

¹ P. Sulla was a nephew of the Dictator Sulla, and the man whom Cicero defended in an extant speech (vol. iii, p. 367).

and easily repelled the forces of Pompeius. Sulla recalled his men from the pursuit. Most persons thought that if Sulla had allowed his troops to follow the flying enemy, he might have finished the war on that day. But Caesar says that Sulla did right; for the duties of a subordinate commander and a commander-in-chief are different: the first must act in conformity to orders; the commander-in-chief directs everything according to his own judgment. Caesar always strictly maintained the commander's authority and he allowed no man to act independently of the orders which he had received. Sulla, who had been left in the camp by Caesar, was satisfied with saving the men and had no intention of fighting a battle, which would have been equivalent to an assumption of the authority of the commander-in-chief; and besides this, it was possible that a battle might have been followed by some unfortunate result. The nature of the ground made a retreat difficult for the soldiers of Pompeius, who had advanced along rising ground and taken their place on the top of it: if they attempted to retire down the slope, they might be attacked by Caesar's troops pursuing them from higher ground; and it was also near sunset, for in the hope of breaking through Caesar's lines, the enemy had deferred the attack almost to nightfall. Pompeius therefore was obliged to do the best that he could, and he occupied a certain height which was not far from Caesar's fort, but far enough removed to be beyond the reach of any missile from the military engines. On this height he fixed himself, fortified the place, and kept all his troops together there. At the same time there was a fight in two other places, for Pompeius attacked several forts for the purpose of dividing Caesar's forces and preventing the adjacent forts from aiding those which were assaulted. In one of these places Volcatius Tullus² with three cohorts resisted the attack of a legion and drove it off: in the other place Caesar's Germans³ sallied from the lines, killed many of the enemy and made their way back in safety.

² Volcatius Tullus. See B. G. vi. 29.

³ Goeler supposes that the Germans were in the army of Pompeius, that they broke through Caesar's lines, killed some of Caesar's men and retired in safety to their own place. Kraner has the same, and he refers to B. C. iii. 4, where it

In this one day, Caesar remarks, six battles were fought, three before Dyrrhachium, the narrative of which has disappeared from Caesar's text, and three at Caesar's line of contravallation; and when a reckoning was made the result was that two thousand men of Pompeius were killed, with many *evocati* and centurions. Caesar did not lose more than twenty men in these fights, and six military standards were taken from the enemy. His loss is incredibly small; unless there is an error in the text.

In the fort which Pompeius attacked there was not a single soldier left unwounded, and four centurions of one cohort lost their eyes. As a proof of their efforts and their danger, they counted out before Caesar about thirty thousand arrows which had been shot into the fort, a number which Suetonius (Caesar, c. 68) or his copyists have magnified to one hundred and thirty thousand. The shield of Scaeva a centurion was brought to Caesar, in which there were counted one hundred and twenty holes. This veteran, as Suetonius reports, also lost an eye on this day: his thigh and shoulder were pierced through and yet he maintained his place at the gate of the fort which had been entrusted to him. As a reward for his great services Caesar gave Scaeva two hundred thousand *sesterces*, and promoted him from the rank of a centurion of the eighth cohort to the rank of a *primipilus* or first centurion of the first cohort, for it was through him in a great degree that the fort had been saved. Caesar afterwards allowed to all this cohort double pay, a double allowance of corn, and decorated them most amply with military honours.

Pompeius, as we have seen, had left his camp on the coast

is stated that Pompeius had some Germans in his army. Caesar had light-armed Germans with him in Spain, and I assume that he brought these useful men with him, when he crossed over from Brundisium. Appian also (ii. 64) speaks of Caesar having Germans in his army at the capture of Gomphi in Thessaly (B. C. iii. c. 80); and he had them also in Egypt. Oudendorp mentions a reading "*aggressi*," which would make Goeler's interpretation possible. I do not understand how he could make such a mistake, and Kraner also. Caesar says that the Germans sallied out from "*our*" lines (*egressi*): he does not say that these Germans crossed (*transgressi*) Caesar's lines. Besides Caesar declares that his loss in these fights did not exceed twenty men, and therefore "*com- pluribus interfectis*" does not apply to his men.

to attack Caesar's lines, and not being able to make his retreat safe he had taken a position near Caesar's *contrevallation*, and he strengthened it during the night. On the following days he built towers, and raised his works to the height of fifteen feet, of which the depth of the ditch would be nine feet and the height of the rampart six. He also protected by "*vineae*" or covered galleries that part of his works which lay between the towers.⁴ Pompeius remained five days in this position when he took advantage of a cloudy night and stopping up with all materials that he could find the gates of the camp, at the beginning of the third watch he silently drew his troops out and returned to his old camp.

On several successive days Caesar (c. 56) brought out his troops and placed them on ground equally favourable to both sides. It was a challenge to the enemy. Caesar's legions even advanced close up to the camp of Pompeius, and the first line was only so far from the enemy's rampart that it could not be reached by a missile thrown by the hand or discharged from an engine. In order to maintain his reputation Pompeius placed his troops in front of his camp, yet in such a manner that the third or rear line was close to the rampart and all the army was under the protection of the missiles which might be thrown from it. There was no battle, but the result was that Pompeius' fear of a general engagement on fair terms was made manifest.

It appears that the cavalry of Pompeius was still at Dyrrhachium looking out for an opportunity of foraging outside the town, which Caesar resolved to prevent. He therefore strengthened the two narrow approaches to Dyrrhachium, which he says that he has described; but, as I have already explained, the passage, in which he spoke of these two roads, is not in our present text. He also built forts to command these two roads.

⁴ The words "*eam partem*" have caused some difficulty. I suppose that they refer to "*in altitudinem . . . operibus.*" Goeler's plate (Taf. iv. fig. 1) refers it to the towers, but he represents the "*vineae*" or covered sheds as extending also on each side of the towers; and he supposes that they were intended to protect the intervals between the towers. Goeler (p. 41) compares the description of Caesar's works in the war with the *Bellovaci*, B. G. viii. 9. Vol. iv. p. 373.

Pompeius seeing that his cavalry could not accomplish their purpose, after a few days brought them back by sea and received them within his lines. There was such scarcity of fodder that the horses were fed with leaves from the trees and the roots of reeds and marsh plants bruised; for all the corn which had been sown within the lines was consumed. It is probable that Pompeius had sown this corn himself to provide forage for the cavalry. It was necessary for him now to bring forage by sea from Coreyra and Acarnania;⁵ and because the supply was insufficient, for it was now the hot season, the deficiency was made up with barley, and the horses were just kept alive. But the barley and fodder began to fail; every green thing was cut for use, even the leaves of the trees were exhausted, and the horses being now unfit for service, Pompeius resolved to make an attempt to break through Caesar's lines.

Caesar had gained Aetolia, Acarnania, and Amphilochia a territory at the eastern extremity of the Ambraciot gulf (the gulf of Arta), "as we have already stated," says Caesar:⁶ and he now thought it expedient to attempt to secure Achaia and to push his enterprise further. Accordingly he sent Q. Fufius Calenus to Achaia, and Calvisius Sabinus and Cassius were ordered to join him with their cohorts, the number of which does not appear from Caesar; but Plutarch (Caesar, c. 48) states that Calenus with fifteen cohorts placed himself about Megara and Athens; and this number of fifteen agrees with Caesar's text (B. C. iii. 84). When their approach was reported, Rutilius Lupus, who had been sent into Achaia by Pompeius, and was in possession of the country, determined to occupy the Isthmus of Corinth by forming a line of defence there and to exclude Calenus from the country south of the Isthmus. Calenus received the voluntary surrender of Delphi, Thebes, and Orchomenus in Boeotia; he took some towns by storm, and he sent round to the other towns com-

⁵ Only the coast we must assume, for Acarnania had declared in favour of Caesar.

⁶ The passage to which he refers is c. 34; but this chapter contains only a statement of what L. Cassius and Calvisius Sabinus were instructed to do. In c. 35 it is said that Calvisius got possession of all Aetolia.

missioners to gain them to Caesar's side by conciliatory means.

While these events were taking place in Achaia and near Dyrrhachium, and it was known that Scipio had entered Macedonia, Caesar, who, as he says, still maintained his original purpose of attempting a friendly settlement of the quarrel, sent A. Clodius to Scipio. Caesar does not fix the time of this mission except in this general way. A. Clodius was a friend of Scipio and of Caesar, to whom he had been originally introduced by Scipio, and Caesar reckoned him one of his intimate friends. Clodius received a letter from Caesar and oral instructions also, of which the substance was as follows: that Caesar had made every effort to bring about peace, but he had hitherto failed, and the failure was caused by those whom he had employed for this purpose being afraid that they might convey his message to Pompeius at some time which was not opportune: Scipio however had such authority that he could freely express his opinion, and could even in a great degree force Pompeius and bring him into the right way: he was at the head of an army in his own right as pro-consul, and thus besides his influence he had also power to coerce; and if he would use his influence and his power to bring about a settlement, everybody would acknowledge that Italy would be indebted to him for tranquillity, the provinces for peace, and the Roman empire for salvation. Clodius carried this message to Scipio and during a few days, as it seemed, Scipio listened favourably to Caesar's proposal; but afterwards Clodius was not admitted to Scipio's presence; for Favonius, as it was discovered after the close of the war, had sharply reproved Scipio. Clodius returned to Caesar without having accomplished the object of his mission. This last attempt of Caesar to bring Pompeius to terms was apparently sincere. It was in fact an attempt to seduce Scipio from his son-in-law Pompeius, and to bribe him, as we may certainly assume, by great promises. If Scipio had accepted Caesar's proposal, it would have been equivalent to changing sides, and his force added to what Caesar had before Dyrrhachium and elsewhere might soon have reduced Pompeius to unconditional submission.

There were in Caesar's cavalry two brothers of the nation of the Allobroges, a people included in the Roman Provincia of Gallia. They were named Raucillus and Egus, the sons of Adbucillus, who for many years had held in his own state the highest dignity; both of the sons were men of merit and had served Caesar in all his Gallic wars most faithfully. As a reward for their services Caesar had given them the highest offices in their state, and had caused them to be made members of the senate without being subject to the usual rules of election: he had also given them land in Gallia which had been taken from the enemy, large presents in money, and in fact from being poor he had made them rich. This passage and others in the Commentaries of the Gallic War, show how Caesar used the natives of Gallia to aid him in the subjugation of their countrymen. These two men were greatly honoured by Caesar, and beloved by the army; but relying on Caesar's friendship and elated by the folly and arrogance which characterize barbarians they despised their countrymen, fraudulently retained the pay of the cavalry and appropriated all the booty to themselves. The horsemen being vexed at this treatment went to Caesar to complain of their wrongs; and they also told him that Raucillus and Egus made a false return of the number of horsemen for the purpose of appropriating to themselves the additional pay. Caesar did not think that it was a convenient season for punishment, and he deferred inquiry into the matter from regard to the services of the two brothers; but he reprimanded them privately. He also reminded them that they might expect everything from his friendship and that they ought to measure their hopes of the future by what he had already done. But this very moderate rebuke gave the men great offence and diminished their credit, as they found both from the reproaches of others, and from those who were immediately around them, and their own reflections. Thus prompted by shame and suspecting that they were not really pardoned, but their punishment was reserved for another time, they resolved to desert from Caesar. If these men remembered the fate of Dumnorix, the Aeduan, whose treachery Caesar at first pardoned, but finally punished, perhaps they formed a just judgment of their own case (vol.

iv. p. 202). They conferred with a few of their dependents, to whom they ventured to communicate their purpose, and at first attempted to murder C. Volusenus, commander of the cavalry, as it was discovered after the close of the war,⁷ that they might recommend their desertion to Pompeius by some signal service. As they could discover no means of accomplishing the death of Volusenus, they borrowed all the money that they could on the pretext of doing justice to their countrymen and making amends for their fraud, and also purchased many horses with which they went over to Pompeius attended by those who were privy to their design.

As these men were of honourable birth and came richly furnished, and had a reputation for courage, and as such an event was new and contrary to experience, Pompeius took them round to all his posts and showed them to the army. For up to this time neither soldier nor horseman had deserted from Caesar to Pompeius; but men were almost daily passing over from Pompeius to Caesar, and the soldiers who had been levied in Epirus and Aetolia, and belonged to the countries which were in Caesar's power, came over to him in masses.

The two brothers were well acquainted with everything in Caesar's army: they knew what part of the lines was incomplete, and what part those who were skilled in military matters considered to be defective; they knew also the times at which everything was done, and the distances between the several points; and they had observed the various degrees of care shown by those whose duty it was to keep watch, and the way in which these men discharged this duty: and all this they reported to Pompeius. After receiving this information, Pompeius ordered the soldiers to make osier coverings for their helmets, and material for filling up ditches, fascines, and the like, to be collected. When all was ready, he placed by night a large number of light-armed troops and archers and all the material in boats and small row-vessels; and immediately after midnight he

⁷ Caesar has several times said the same thing, for the purpose, as it seems, of explaining his statements about matters which he could not or did not learn during the war.

led by land sixty cohorts, taken from his largest camp and the forts, to that part of Caesar's lines which extended to the sea and was farthest distant from Caesar's largest camp also. To the same place he sent forward the vessels, which conveyed the fascines and the light-armed troops, and he sent also the ships of war which he had at Dyrrhachium, and gave instructions about everything that he wished to be done. Caesar had placed at this part of his lines Lentulus Marcellinus, his quaestor, with the ninth legion; and as the health of Marcellinus was not good, Fulvius Postumus was sent to assist him.

In this part of the lines the ditch was fifteen feet wide, and the height of the rampart, which was turned to the enemy, was ten feet; and the width of the rampart (the banquette) was about ten feet also. Behind this rampart and at the distance of six hundred feet was another rampart, a line of circumvallation, turned in the opposite direction or to the south, and it was made a little lower than the first rampart. Caesar some days before, fearing that his men might be attacked both in front and in rear, if the enemy made a landing at this part, had made the lines double by adding the line of circumvallation just mentioned. But the magnitude of the works and the continuous labour had not allowed Caesar time to complete what he had begun and the cross rampart turned towards the sea, which would have connected the lines of contrevallation and circumvallation was unfinished. This circumstance was made known to Pompeius by the Allobroges who had deserted.

A description of military operations, which a map makes intelligible, is difficult to understand without one; but I will endeavour to explain the events which I am going to describe.

If the reader will take one of the right-hand pages of this book and suppose the highest border of the page to be the north, the thing may be conceived thus. In the north-west angle of the page is the narrow isthmus which connects the main land with Dyrrhachium. From the isthmus the line of coast, which is a little irregular, has a general south direction to the mouth of the small river Palamnus, which

has a course nearly west from the interior to the sea. A short distance south of the mouth of the Palamnus there is some uneven ground close to the sea, and here, in the south-west angle of the page, was the extreme southern and western limit, bordering on the sea, of Caesar's line of contravallation. Here also bordering on the sea he had begun to form his circumvallation to protect himself against the enemy if his rear should be attacked ; but the rampart of communication between the two lines, was not finished, as I have already said.

Caesar's large camp was at the north near the sea and immediately south of the isthmus ; and the camp of Pompeius was at Petra, also on the sea, and due south of Caesar's camp. Caesar's contravallation extended from his camp inland over the hills in a semicircular form till it reached the sea south of the mouth of the Palamnus, where he had placed the ninth legion. The line of defence of Pompeius was of course within Caesar's contravallation and a shorter line. We may then conceive Caesar's contravallation from the sea on the north to the sea on the south as an irregular semicircle or large segment of a circle, of which the chord is the coast line from Caesar's camp on the north to the position of the ninth legion on the south close to the sea. The length of Pompeius' line of defence was fifteen thousand Roman paces, but Caesar's line was seventeen thousand ; and hence Goeler computes that the average distance between the lines of Pompeius and Caesar was six hundred and thirty seven paces, a distance sufficient to protect each from the missiles of the other. (Goeler, p. 40.)

The cohorts of Caesar's ninth legion had bivouacked close to the sea, and the men of Pompeius suddenly approached at day-break. At the same time the soldiers who had been brought in ships, began to throw their missiles into the exterior line or circumvallation, and to fill up the ditch with the fascines. The legionary soldiers of Pompeius, the sixty cohorts, who had come from the north by land, set scaling ladders to the inner rampart and with all kinds of missiles from engines and the hand struck terror into the defenders of this line, who were also assailed by a great number of archers. Caesar's soldiers had no missiles except stones, against which their assailants

were protected by the osier caps fixed on their helmets. While they were thus hard pressed in every way and resisted with difficulty, the enemy observed the defect in the communication between the two lines, and landing in this unprotected interval they fell on the rear of Caesar's men, drove them from both lines, and compelled them to fly.

When this unexpected attack was reported to Marcellinus, he sent some cohorts from his camp to relieve the men who were in danger. The camp of Marcellinus is placed by Goeler outside of the circumvallation and close upon it; and as the interval between the two lines was so narrow, there was neither room for the fugitives to escape nor for those cohorts to advance, who were sent to their relief. The cohorts, which were sent to carry relief saw the fugitives approaching, but were unable to check their flight, nor could they themselves resist the impetuosity of the enemy. All the additional troops which were sent forward were seized with the same panic as the fugitives, and increased the danger, for escape was made more difficult by numbers.

In this fight the man who carried the eagle received a severe wound, and his strength was failing when he saw the cavalry and called out: "During my life I have carefully defended this eagle for many years, and now when I am dying I faithfully restore it to Caesar: do not, I entreat you, allow that to happen which has never happened in Caesar's army, that any disgrace should fall on our arms, but carry this eagle safe to the general." The eagle was saved, though all the centurions of the first cohort were killed, except the princeps prior or the second centurion of the legion.

The men of Pompeius were now making great slaughter of Caesar's soldiers and approaching the camp of Marcellinus, whose remaining cohorts were struck with terror; but M. Antonius, who had the command of the next post and had received a report of what was going on, was seen descending from the high ground with twelve cohorts. His arrival made the soldiers of Pompeius halt and encouraged Caesar's men to recover from their alarm. Soon after smoke signals were made in Caesar's forts, according to the usual practice, and Caesar taking some cohorts from different posts arrived on the spot,

from his camp at the north. He saw the mischief which had been done, that Pompeius had broken through the lines and was able to forage freely and keep up the communication with his ships; and accordingly he changed his plans, since he had failed in confining the enemy within his lines, and he ordered a camp to be made near the sea and close to the position which Pompeius had occupied (c. 65).

The attack on Caesar's lines had been made at daybreak, which would be very early in the morning at this season of the year when the days were at the greatest length. Goeler supposes that Caesar, who came from the northern part of his lines, and also collected troops from various forts, might still have arrived at the field of battle at nine in the morning: but we may suppose, I think, that he arrived earlier. His coming however put an end to the fight. Goeler does not determine whether Pompeius and Caesar made use of the existing lines for their new camps; but he thinks that as the lines of contravallation and circumvallation were only six hundred feet apart, there would not have been room within these narrow limits for the large forces which Pompeius and Caesar had with them. He supposes therefore that both camps were made immediately south of the line of circumvallation, the camp of Pompeius near the coast and that of Caesar due east of the camp of Pompeius and close to it.

When Caesar's camp works were completed, his scouts observed that certain cohorts of the enemy, which seemed to be about a legion, were marching behind a wood into an old camp; the position of which was this. Some time before when the ninth legion had been placed opposite to the forces of Pompeius in this part of the lines and were endeavouring to shut them in by working at the contravallation, as it had been already stated (B.C. iii. cc. 45, 46), they made in this place a camp, which was close to a wood and about 300 paces from the sea. Goeler supposes this camp to have been on a height close to the left bank of the Palamnus. Caesar afterwards changed his design, for some reasons, which he does not mention, and moved his encampment to a place a little beyond this encampment, as he expresses it, which seems to mean a little further from the coast. A few days later Pompeius oc-

cupied the camp which the ninth legion had left, and as he intended to place several legions there, he formed a more extensive line of defence, but left the ditch and rampart of the original camp still standing within his new lines. Thus the smaller camp being included in the larger camp was equivalent to a fort and citadel. Pompeius also made a line of defence from the left angle of the camp to the Palamnus, a distance of about four hundred paces that his soldiers might get water with less danger. But Pompeius also changed his purpose for some reason, which, says Caesar, it is not necessary to mention, and retired from this camp. So it had been left vacant several days; and all the defences were entire.

It appears then that Pompeius after occupying this camp left it before he made the night attack on Caesar's lines; and this circumstance may support Goeler's conjecture about Caesar's not mentioning the reason why Pompeius abandoned the camp; for Caesar writes as if he knew the reason but did not choose to mention it. Goeler observes that by taking his troops from the camp Pompeius intended to divert the attention of Caesar's ninth legion from that place, in order to show himself the more unexpectedly when he made his night attack, in which design he succeeded and Caesar's men were deceived.

It was this deserted camp into which Caesar's scouts reported that a force equal to a legion had been introduced by the enemy, and the fact was confirmed by the movement having been observed from some of the higher forts. This camp was about five hundred paces from the new camp of Pompeius near the coast. Caesar in the hope of surprising this legion and being eager to repair the loss which he had just sustained, left two cohorts at his camp to make the enemy believe that he was still employed on his works. He took the remaining thirty-three cohorts, among whom was the ninth legion, which had lost many centurions and was reduced in numbers, and led them by a circuitous road in a double line (*duplex acies*)^{*} against the legion of Pompeius and the smaller camp, which Caesar has also named the old camp. His object was not to

^{*} Goeler explains "*duplici acie*" by "two corps, a corps of the right and a corps of the left wing." See Rüstow, Heerwesen, &c., C. Julius Caesar's, p. 118.

fight a battle, but to surprise the enemy. Nor was he deceived in his expectation at first, for he reached the camp before Pompeius knew anything of the attack, and though the defences were strong, yet on the left wing, where Caesar was, the men of Pompeius were soon driven from the rampart. The gates of the camp were secured by an "ericius," as Caesar names the thing, a strong piece of wood or beam drawn across the door and filled with iron points; and here there was a fight for a short time, Caesar's men attempting to break in and the enemy making resistance from the inside and especially T. Pulio⁹ (or Pulvio), the man of whom Caesar says that he has already spoken of him as the betrayer of the army of C. Antonius. Caesar's men succeeded in cutting the beam, and broke into the larger or exterior camp, and then into the inner camp into which the legion of Pompeius was driven to take refuge, and some of them who still resisted were killed there.

But fortune, Caesar observes, who is all-powerful in every thing and particularly in war, often produces great changes by small means. While the cohorts on Caesar's right were looking for a gate, they followed that line of defence, which, as already explained, extended from the camp to the river, and being unacquainted with the ground they supposed this line to be part of the camp. When they had discovered that it extended to the river, they broke down part of the rampart and crossed over followed by all the cavalry. From this circumstance that the soldiers on the right were not acquainted with this rampart which extended to the river, Goeler justly concludes, that the ninth legion which was acquainted with the ground, was on Caesar's left wing.

When Pompeius was informed of Caesar's attack, he summoned five legions who were employed on the works of his camp near the sea and led them to the relief of the single legion. At the same time his cavalry began to approach Caesar's cavalry; and the men who had seized the camp saw the force of Pompeius advancing. In a moment everything

⁹ Pulio or Pulvio is the centurion whose bravery is recorded in the "Commentaries on the Gallic War," v. 44. His treachery is recorded in a passage of this book.

was changed. The legion of Pompeius encouraged by the hope of speedy help attempted to resist at the Decumana Porta or back gate of the camp and even to attack Caesar's men. Caesar's horsemen were still making their way through the narrow passage, which had been formed in the rampart that led to the river, and across the loose earth with which a small part of the ditch had been filled, and as they saw that a retreat would be difficult, they set the example of flying. The right wing was separated from the left, for the right had only crossed the rampart that extended from one corner of the camp to the river, and between them and the left wing were the fortifications of the camp. When they saw the flight of the cavalry, they were afraid that they should be caught within the rampart which they had crossed, and they attempted to retire at that part where they had made a breach; but the greater part of them in their eagerness to avoid this narrow passage threw themselves from the rampart into the ditch a fall of about nineteen feet. Those who went first were crushed, for they who came after passed over their bodies and thus saved their lives.

Caesar's soldiers on the left wing, seeing the approach of Pompeius and the flight of the right wing, were afraid that they might be surrounded, for they had the enemy both without the camp and within, and began to think of retiring to their new camp by the way by which they came. All was confusion, terror and flight. When Caesar attempted to lay hold of the standards and commanded the bearers to stay their flight, some still continued running,¹ others through fear dropped the standards, and not a single man would face about. It is said² that Caesar had a narrow escape. He laid his hand on a tall strong man who was running past him and ordered him to turn round to the enemy; but the man bewildered with fear raised his sword to strike Caesar, who was only saved by his shield-bearer cutting off the man's arm at the shoulder.

Two things helped to save the army from destruction. Pompeius, as Caesar supposes, fearing an ambuscade, for the

¹ "Alii dimissis equis." This is unintelligible. See Goeler's note p. 58.

² Plutarch, Caesar, c. 39, Appian, B. C. ii. 62.

success was more than he expected after having just seen his men flying from the camp, for some time did not venture to approach the ramparts, and his cavalry were checked at the narrow breaches in the line leading to the river which were also occupied by Caesar's soldiers. Thus small circumstances produced great results both ways. The lines from the camp to the river prevented Caesar's victory from being complete though the camp of Pompeius was already stormed; and the same lines by stopping the pursuit of Pompeius' cavalry saved Caesar's army. These facts may have been the foundation of the words attributed by Plutarch (Caesar, c. 39) to Caesar, who is reported to have said to his friends, "To-day the enemy would have had a victory, if they had possessed a general who knew how to conquer" (Sueton. Caesar, c. 36).³

In these two fights on one day Caesar lost nine hundred and sixty men. The number of horsemen who perished is omitted in our texts. One of the horsemen who were killed was Tuticanus Gallus, son of a senator, and the distinguished Roman equites, C. Fleginas of Placentia, A. Granius of Puteoli, and M. Sacrativir of Capua. Thirty-two tribunes and centurions also lost their lives. But the greater part of the men perished without a single wound, in the ditch and at the ramparts and on the banks of the river, being trampled down by their own comrades in the flight and confusion. Thirty-two standards were also lost (c. 71). Pompeius was saluted with the title of Imperator by his army, and he retained the title and allowed himself to be addressed by it; but neither in the letters which he wrote nor on the fasces did he display the usual decorations of the bay. Labienus asked for the prisoners to be given up to him, and Pompeius consented to surrender them to this renegade, who after

³ Appian (B. C. ii. 62) found somewhere a story that Labienus, being deprived of his wits by the deity, advised Pompeius to pursue the fugitives, when, as the historian thinks, he might have easily seized Caesar's camp where there were only two cohorts. There is no doubt that Pompeius might easily have seized Caesar's camp, but it is possible that he would have gained nothing by doing so; and if Labienus advised him to kill as many as he could of Caesar's men in the confusion, so far from having lost his wits, we conclude that he was in full possession of them. If Pompeius had broken into Caesar's camp, Caesar might have rallied his men and seized the camp of the enemy.

bringing them out and addressing them by the title of fellow-soldiers asked them in the most insulting manner whether veteran soldiers were accustomed to run away, and then ordered them to be massacred before the whole army. Caesar supposes that Labienus made this display of excessive zeal for the purpose of increasing his credit; for deserters are not generally trusted by those to whom they pass over. But the guilt of this scandalous act must rest with Pompeius, who from early years had shown a cruel disposition, and he well knew the violent character of Labienus. We cannot accept the statement of Dion (45. c. 52) that Pompeius refused to assume the bays because he was unwilling to triumph over fellow-citizens.

This success increased the confidence and presumption of the Pompeian party: they no longer thought of the mode of carrying on the war; they supposed that it was ended. Caesar has made his apology for this unfortunate day (B. C. iii. 72). He says that the men on the side of Pompeius did not take into account the inferiority of Caesar's numbers, nor the unfavourable nature of the ground and the straits in which they were placed by having seized the camp and having an enemy on both sides, within the ramparts and without; nor did they take into account the fact that Caesar's force was cut into two parts so that the one could not help the other. Nor did they reflect that there had been no fierce shock and onset between them and their enemy, that no battle had been fought, and that Caesar's men had inflicted more damage on themselves by crowding in the narrow passages than they had received from the men of Pompeius. Finally they did not think of the accidents of war which befall both sides, nor how often small causes arising from groundless suspicion or sudden terror, or superstitious fear had caused great loss, whenever either through the fault of a commander or tribune some blow had been inflicted on an army; but just as if they had gained a victory by their own valour, and no change of fortune were possible, they spread the fame of that day's success through the world by report and letters.

Caesar has not concealed his loss; and he had received a

greater check even than that before Gergovia (vol. iv. 318). Perhaps if he had succeeded in his enterprise he might have brought Pompeius to a general battle; but if his adversary wanted courage to prosecute the advantage which he had gained, he had certainly shown the ability of a good general in transporting his troops to the south-western extremity of Caesar's lines and breaking through them.. Caesar's right wing caused the mischief by taking the line of defence from the camp to the river for one of the sides of the camp. But it seems that Caesar himself deserves blame, so far as we can understand the matter for allowing such a mistake to be possible, for this line of defence was within sight of his camp; unless it was hid by the wood; and this may have been so. We may then perhaps assume that Caesar did not know that this line existed, for if he did, he might have sent some cohorts of the ninth legion against that side, and they were well acquainted with the ground where they had themselves made the smaller camp.

Napoleon remarks (*Précis des Guerres de César*, p. 149): "The manoeuvres of Caesar at Dyrrhachium are extremely rash, and he was well punished for them. How could he hope to maintain himself advantageously on a line of contravallation six leagues in length, blockading an army which was master of the sea and occupied a central position?" The emperor does not say what Caesar ought to have done instead of blockading his enemy, who would not fight; nor would it be easy for any man to say what Caesar ought to have done. Appian (B. C. ii. 64) states that Caesar repented of having encamped before Dyrrhachium, where Pompeius had all his supplies, and said that he ought to have drawn him off to some other place "into like difficulties." Appian's meaning is sometimes very obscure. Perhaps "like difficulties" may be such difficulties as Caesar suffered. The remark taken in any way is very foolish and therefore not Caesar's. Pompeius would not leave a good position to follow Caesar to a worse, when he evidently was afraid to meet him in the field.

CHAPTER XV.

THE MARCH INTO THESSALY.

B.C. 48.

CÆSAR had failed in his design, and now saw that he must change his plans. He drew off his men from the posts which they occupied, and discontinuing the blockade he brought all his force together and addressed the men. He exhorted them not to be discouraged nor to give way to fear, but to set off against one inconsiderable loss their many victories. They ought to be grateful to fortune for having got possession of Italy without bloodshed, reduced to submission the two Spains, and for having secured the provinces, Sicily and Sardinia, which supplied corn to Rome; finally they should remember with what good luck they had crossed the sea amidst hostile fleets when the ports and shores were occupied by an enemy. If they had not been altogether fortunate, they must make amends for any want of success by increased care. The recent misfortune ought to be attributed to any cause rather than to him. He had given them fair ground to fight on, he had seized the enemy's camp, and had expelled and defeated them. But whether their own fears, or some mistake or even fortune had interrupted a victory already won and in their hands, every man ought to do his best to repair the damage which had been sustained. If this should be done, their loss would turn out to be a gain, as it had happened at Gergovia, and those who at first had been afraid to fight would be ready to offer battle.

After this address he declared some of the standard-bearers to be disgraced, and he degraded them. So great was the

vexation of the army and their zeal to wipe out this infamy, that not a single soldier required the bidding of either tribune or centurion, but every man was ready to impose on himself heavier labour, and all were eager to fight: even some of the higher officers moved by Caesar's words,¹ thought that they ought to remain before Dyrrhachium and try the hazard of a battle. But Caesar had not sufficient confidence in his soldiers, who were under the influence of recent terror, and he thought that time ought to be allowed for them to recover their spirits: besides, after abandoning his lines he was afraid that he should have great difficulty in procuring supplies. Accordingly after providing for the wounded and sick he silently sent forward at nightfall all the baggage under the protection of one legion to Apollonia, with orders not to halt before reaching this town. At the beginning of the fourth watch all the legions except two marched out of the camp by several gates to save time and followed the baggage. After a short interval he ordered the signal for breaking up the camp to be given, that the usual military practice might not be neglected, and the enemy might hear of his departure as late as possible. If no signal had been given, the enemy would soon have seen that Caesar was retreating, for it was near daybreak; but it was a point of honour to avoid the appearance of a flight by giving the signal for breaking up as if no enemy was near. Caesar now immediately set out with the two remaining legions and coming up with the rear of those who were in advance was soon out of sight of the camp.

Later writers found other histories of this war besides Caesar's and made use of them. Appian (B. C. ii. 63) reports that Pompeius expected that Caesar's men would come over to him as they were suffering from hunger, and were in despair after the defeat: and he particularly expected the superior officers to desert through fear of punishment. But if Pompeius had these expectations, he was deceived in his reckoning. Appian also reports that after Caesar had begun his retreat, Pompeius called a council to deliberate on what he should do; which is not literally true, for he set out in pursuit

¹ "*Oratione permoti*" appears to be a better reading than "*ratione permoti*."

of Caesar as soon as it was known that his adversary had left his camp. It is however probable that there was some deliberation about the future conduct of the war. Afranius, who was now with Pompeius, recommended that the naval force should be employed in looking after Caesar, who would be wandering about in great difficulties. This advice is very absurd in the form in which Appian represents it, but it is in the manner of this historical compiler, who sometimes abridges and condenses until his readers cannot discover the meaning. Something follows however which may help us. Afranius also proposed that Pompeius should cross the sea to Italy with his land forces and take possession of it, which would be easy, and that then he should make himself master of Gallia and Spain, and finally return to attack Caesar. The fleet in the meantime could be employed in watching Caesar's movements, and preventing him from using any ships which he might collect for a second invasion of Italy. It seems very probable that Pompeius or his advisers did think of sailing back to Italy, which could have made no resistance. Appian decides that it was the best thing that Pompeius could have done, and those who have a taste for speculating on the probable results of events, if they had been different from what they were, might make a rhetorical declamation in support of Appian's opinion. But wiser men let such things alone, and limit themselves to the facts of history and their consequences. If Pompeius did deliberate, his deliberation was short, for it was time to act when he saw that his dreaded antagonist had left his camp, and not without some purpose as Pompeius well knew. He listened then to those who told him that it would be disgraceful not to pursue Caesar in his flight, and for the conqueror himself to fly as if he were defeated. This advice may have had some effect in determining the resolution of Pompeius; but there was another reason which Appian also mentions, the danger of Scipio in Macedonia being attacked by Caesar; and this was in truth a very sufficient reason for Pompeius pursuing. Plutarch (Pompeius, c. 66) appears to have followed the same authority as Appian, unless Appian followed Plutarch, who further states that Caesar led his troops into Macedonia to oppose Scipio, "for he concluded that

he should either draw Pompeius after him to a country where he would fight without the advantage of having the same supplies from the sea or that he would defeat Scipio if he were left to himself." Plutarch has a story that Caesar after his great loss spent a restless night in agony and perplexity, blaming himself for not having carried the war into Macedonia and Thessaly which were rich countries, and for having placed himself near the sea which the enemy commanded, and where he was rather the besieged than the besieger. This is in Plutarch's usual style.

Pompeius seeing or guessing Caesar's design left M. Cato² with fifteen cohorts to protect Dyrrhachium and the stores, and followed Caesar with the rest of his army in the hope of overtaking his troops marching in column and incumbered with baggage. He sent forward his cavalry to check the rear of Caesar's retreating army, but they were unable to overtake it, as Caesar's men were without baggage and were a long way a head of the pursuers. But when they had reached the river Genusus, the banks of which were an impediment to the march, the cavalry of Pompeius came up with Caesar's rear and fell upon it. Caesar sent his cavalry with four hundred *antesignani* (p. 51) distributed among them to resist the attack; and his men did their duty so well that they drove the enemy back, killed many of them, and without sustaining any loss joined the retreating column.

Having completed the regular distance on that day's march according to his design Caesar took his army over the Genusus and rested in his old camp opposite to Asparagium. He kept all the soldiers within the lines, but sent out the cavalry for forage, with orders to return immediately by the decuman gate, which was turned from the enemy. Pompeius also having completed the same day's march halted in his old camp near to Asparagium. His soldiers being unemployed, for the works of the camp were still entire, some of them went a great distance to find wood and forage; and others, who had left behind a large part of their heavy and light baggage in consequence of the sudden orders to march, were tempted by the proximity of their former camp to leave their arms in their

² Cicero, M. Varro and others also remained at Dyrrhachium.

present quarters and to fetch their property. They supposed that Caesar would not stir, for he had apparently sent his cavalry to forage, but the behaviour of the men shows that the discipline in the army of Pompeius was bad. The enemy being now unable to pursue, as Caesar had foreseen, about midday he gave the signal for marching; and by advancing eight miles further he made the whole day's march double of that which he had already done. On the evening of this day also Caesar sent forward his baggage at nightfall, and on the following morning at early day he set out himself; by which arrangement, if he should be compelled to fight, his army would be free from all incumbrance. He did the same on the following days, and was thus enabled to cross deep rivers and to march by difficult roads without suffering any damage. Pompeius after losing time on the first day, and striving by long marches on the following days to come up with the army, gave up the pursuit on the fourth day.

It was necessary for Caesar to visit Apollonia, in order to leave his wounded there, to pay his army, to encourage his friends in those parts and to put garrisons in their towns. But he did all this in the least possible time, for he was afraid that Domitius might be attacked by Pompeius, and he advanced to join him with all speed. He explains his plan of the future campaign in a few words. If Pompeius should march against Domitius, who was in Macedonia, he must leave the coast and the stores which he had collected in Dyrrhachium, he would be separated from his magazines of food and all his supplies, and would be compelled to fight Caesar on equal terms. If Pompeius should cross over to Italy, Caesar would join Domitius and march through Illyricum, the country on the east side of the Adriatic, to protect Italy. Further, if Pompeius should attack Apollonia and Oricum and attempt to cut off Caesar from all communication with the coast, Caesar would blockade Scipio in his camp, for he assumed that Scipio would not meet him in the field, and thus Pompeius would be forced to come to Scipio's aid.

Accordingly he sent written instructions to Domitius, and he left four cohorts to defend Apollonia, one cohort at Lissus and three at Oricum with the wounded. Caesar does not ex-

plain how he could leave one cohort at Lissus, which is north of Dyrrhachium; but he may have given orders that this cohort should march to Lissus, if Pompeius should advance to Macedonia and thus leave the way to Lissus open. When he had provided for the safety of these places Caesar began his march through Epirus and the country named Athamania.³ As Caesar's march was directed to Aeginium (Stagús) in the north-west angle of Thessaly near the river Peneius, his course was up the valley of the lower Aous as far as the junction of that river with a smaller branch now named Dryno, then up the valley of the Dryno and past Joánnina to the pass of Méztovo in the range of Pindus, at the eastern extremity of which pass stood the town of Aeginium.

Pompeius, who had conjectured Caesar's design, determined to hasten his march to join Scipio, for the purpose of supporting him if Caesar moved in that direction; and if Caesar should not leave the sea-coast and Oricum, because he might be expecting legions and cavalry from Italy, Pompeius would still join Scipio and attack Domitius.

For these reasons both Caesar and Pompeius advanced with all speed, each to support his own general and to surprise if possible the general of his enemy. Caesar's march to Apollonia had led him from the direct route to Thessaly; but Pompeius had an easy road through Candavia along the Via Egnatia into Macedonia. Caesar had also another and an unforeseen difficulty. Domitius, who for many days had been encamped opposite to Scipio, had left this position and gone to Heraclea to look for supplies. Heraclea.⁴ Lyncestis was on the Via Egnatia east of Candavia, and thus Domitius without knowing it had placed himself on the road along which Pompeius was marching. But Caesar at the time knew nothing of this. Pompeius also had sent letters to all the provinces and towns after the fight at Dyrrhachium, and thus a report

³ The old editions of Caesar have "per Epirum atque Acarnaniam," which is manifestly wrong, and has been corrected in recent editions. Plutarch (Caesar, c. 66) found Athamania either in Caesar's text or somewhere else.

⁴ The MSS. of Caesar have (c. 79) "Heracleam Senticam," which means "Heraclea Sintica," a town a long way east near the Strymon. "Senticam" appears to be an interpolation made by some copyist.

had been spread abroad in which the truth was greatly exaggerated, that Caesar was defeated with the loss of nearly all his army and was a fugitive. In consequence of this rumour Caesar found enemies on his march; some states which had been friendly fell off from him, and the messengers from Caesar to Domitius and from Domitius to Caesar were unable to accomplish their mission. Domitius was saved by his own enemies. Some Allobroges, the friends of Raucillus and Egus, who had deserted to Pompeius, spied as they were on the march a reconnoitering party of Domitius, and either moved by the remembrance that they had been comrades in the Gallic wars, or by their boastful temper, told them all that had happened before Dyrrhachium, and that Caesar had marched away and Pompeius was close at hand. As soon as Domitius was informed of his danger, for he was only four hours' march from Pompeius, he turned due south and at Aeginium met Caesar as he was on the road into Thessaly.

The course of Domitius in a direct line from Lyncestis to Aeginium was between eighty and ninety English miles, and it is not said that he was molested on the march. Caesar and Domitius united their forces at Aeginium, which was at the entrance of the great basin of Thessaly. This town, which had been plundered in the Macedonian war by L. Aemilius Paulus, was perhaps a deserted place, for Caesar names Gomphi, to which he marched from Aeginium, the first town of Thessaly as you come from Epirus. Gomphi is placed by Leake at the site of Episcopí on the left bank of a tributary of the Peneius, the Bliuri, probably the ancient Pamisus, and near the great mountain range of Pindus. A few months before the people of Gomphi had sent commissioners to Caesar to place all their resources at his disposal and to ask for a garrison. But the report of Caesar's loss at Dyrrhachium had reached Gomphi in a greatly exaggerated form; and Androstenes, praetor of Thessaly, as Caesar names him, preferring to join Pompeius in his victory to being on the side of Caesar in his bad luck, brought all the slaves and freemen from the country into the town, closed the gates and sent messengers to Scipio and Pompeius to ask for help: he had confidence in the defences of the town, if relief came quick, but he could not sustain a long

siege. When Scipio heard of the two armies quitting Dyrrhachium, he led his troops across the Cambunian mountains to Larisa in Thessaly on the lower course of the Peneius, and Pompeius was not yet near Thessaly. Scipio would cross the mountains by the pass which Livy (44. c. 2) names Volustana, and descend into the valley of the Eurotas, the Titareus of Homer, which flowing from the north joins the Peneius below Larisa.

Caesar having made his camp ordered scaling-ladders, "musculi" (mantelets) and fascines to be prepared for an immediate assault.⁵ When all was ready, he pointed out to his men the advantage of getting possession of a well-stored and rich town, which would supply all their wants, and the capture would also strike terror into the other towns of Thessaly; but the work must be done quick before any help could come to the town. The soldiers, who were tempted by so many good things, responded with ardour to the general, who made the attack in the afternoon of the same day, and though the walls were very high, Caesar stormed the town before sunset and let his men plunder it. He immediately left Gomphi and marched to another town named Metropolis before the inhabitants heard of the capture of Gomphi. Caesar's expression "immediately" (statim), as Goeler remarks, must not perhaps be taken literally. His men would require a few hours to sack Gomphi to their heart's content and after the labour of the assault and the debauch which followed, they would hardly be got together before the next morning.

Caesar never troubles himself about reporting excesses committed at the sack of a town. But others did and they have recorded some things which Plutarch and Appian have copied. Caesar's men had long been on short allowance, and they found little to eat on the road to Thessaly, for the people through whose territory they marched refused to supply Caesar with food. But the capture of Gomphi satisfied all their wants, and those who were in an unhealthy state in consequence of privation were cured by the abundance of wine which they found in the town (Plutarch, Caesar, c. 41). If the wine was

⁵ As Caesar could have carried little heavy baggage, he must have made all this siege material on the spot in a short time.

good, a drunken debauch would probably put them all in sound condition. Appian (B. C. ii. 64) says that the soldiers who were very hungry filled themselves full in Gomphi, and got beastly drunk, and that Caesar's Germans were worst of all and made themselves most ridiculous. The historian thinks that if Pompeius had come upon Caesar's men in this condition he might have had a splendid success, which is very probable; but he adds that Pompeius despised his enemy and for that reason did not pursue him. Appian evidently had not the least idea of the position of Pompeius. There were probably many stories of the sack of Gomphi. Appian has reported one. There were found in a doctor's shop the bodies of twenty old men of the first rank lying on the floor, without any wound, and with cups by them as if they had sat down to a wine entertainment; and there was one seated in a chair, who might be a doctor or acting as such, who had furnished the poison to the rest.

Metropolis was a town south of Gomphi and near the lofty mountains which form the western boundary of the basin of Thessaly. Leake fixes the position at the small village of Paleókastro. The people of Metropolis, who had heard the same reports as the people of Gomphi, followed their example, closed the gates and filled the walls with armed men; but when they heard of the capture of Gomphi from the prisoners whom Caesar produced before the wall, they opened the gates. Caesar protected the townsmen against all harm from his men, and the consequence of this prudent behaviour was, that the Thessalians, contrasting the good fortune of Metropolis with the sufferings of Gomphi, joined Caesar, and there was not a single city except Larisa, which was occupied by Scipio's large force, that refused to submit and obey his orders. Caesar's words cannot be accepted literally, I think. He was in the possession of the south-western angle of Thessaly, and Pompeius, or Scipio, who represented him, was at Larisa, and we may assume that each of them commanded the obedience of those towns which were nearest to each.

Caesar⁶ found a convenient position in the open country,

⁶ "Ille idoneum locum in agris nactus" (B. C. iii. 81). Kraner says that "ille" can only refer to Scipio, not, as it has been supposed, to Caesar, and the

abounding in corn, which was then nearly ripe, and there he determined to wait for Pompeius.

The convenient position which Caesar occupied was, as we shall afterwards see, near Pharsalus which was not far from the south-eastern branch of the Peneius. He says nothing of his march from Metropolis to Pharsalus, for it was no military movement that required notice. Appian (ii. 64), who has reported the capture of Gomphi, does not mention Metropolis, but he says that Caesar after a continuous march of seven days encamped near Pharsalus. He seems to reckon the seven days from Gomphi. This distance from Gomphi past Metropolis to Pharsalus would not be more than fifty miles; and as Caesar (c. 84) speaks of having got ready his supplies before the battle, we may perhaps conclude that he collected provisions on the march from Metropolis to Pharsalus.

A few days later Pompeius arrived in Thessaly, and made an address to the united army. He thanked his own men, and exhorted the soldiers of Scipio to be ready to take their share of the booty and rewards which would follow a victory that was already won. All the legions were placed within one camp, and Pompeius shared with his father-in-law Scipio the honours of the commandership-in-chief by allowing him to give the military signal with the trumpet and to have a praetorian tent. Thus in fact there were two independent generals in one camp each commanding his own army. It has been conjectured with great probability that Pompeius wished to quiet the jealous Roman nobles about him by the show of giving up some of that power which they had from necessity conferred upon him.

Caesar says nothing of the route which Pompeius took to reach Larisa; nor in his military history was it of the slightest importance. We know that he did arrive in Thessaly, and that is sufficient. But men will conjecture, even when conjecture is useless, and it has been supposed that Pompeius continued his march along the Via Egnatia to Pella, where he took the great road to the south, between Olympus and the sea and then went up the valley of Tempe to Larisa. We

pronoun itself proves this. Goeler contends that "ille" refers to Caesar, and gives good reasons for his opinion.

have been told that Pompeius was within four hours' march of Heraclea when Domitius left that place and turned to the south. Scipio also when he left the Haliacmon or whatever his position then was, went south by a well-known pass to the basin of the Eurotas and halted at Larisa. The reasonable conjecture is that Pompeius followed in the same direction as Scipio, instead of adding to the distance between Heracleia and Larisa by taking a circuitous route past Pella. Caesar, as I assume, and shall hereafter attempt to prove, had crossed the great branch of the Peneius, named Apidanus by Goeler, and Enipeus by other critics, and had placed himself in the plain north of this stream, which lay between him and Pharsalus.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE BATTLE.

B.C. 48.

THE evidence about the battle named the battle of Pharsalia consists of two parts, Caesar's own narrative (B. C. iii. 82—99), and the statements of later writers. From these materials and by the aid of some conjecture attempts have been made to determine the position of the two armies before the battle and some circumstances which happened after it. There are also two ways in which a modern writer may construct his narrative of this great event: he may compound a story from Caesar's text and other later authorities; or he may present the narrative of the conqueror as he has left it, and then attempt to supply deficiencies with the help of later writers and some probable conjecture. I think that the second way of telling the story is the true way.

Caesar, who, as I have said, made his three books of the Civil War an apology, neglects no opportunity of showing the folly, presumption and divided counsels of his opponents. When the force of Pompeius was increased by the junction of two large armies, the former expectations of his partisans were confirmed, and the hope of victory was so strong that all the intervening time was considered as so much delay of the return to Italy: and if Pompeius ever showed any slowness and circumspection, his advisers would say that a single day was enough to settle the affair, but Pompeius was pleased with the possession of power and having men of consular and praetorian rank as slaves about him. They were already quarrelling about recompenses and priestly offices, and were fixing for

several years in advance who should be consuls; and some were making claims to the houses and property of those who were with Caesar. There was a great dispute at their meetings whether Lucilius Hirrus, who had been sent by Pompeius on a mission to the Parthians, should be allowed to be a candidate in his absence at the next election of praetors: his friends prayed Pompeius to keep the promise which he had made to Hirrus at his departure, that it might not be said that Hirrus had been deceived by relying on the influence of Pompeius; while those who intended to be candidates objected that when all shared the labour and danger alike, no one man should be preferred to the rest.

Caesar had been Pontifex Maximus since B.C. 63, and many men were ambitious of this high office, which they expected to be soon vacant. L. Domitius, the hero of Corfinium (p. 25), L. Scipio and P. Lentulus Spinther were daily quarrelling about the matter and using the most abusive language. Lentulus urged in behalf of his claim the respect due to his age; Domitius, his popularity in Rome and his exalted rank; and Scipio relied on his affinity to Pompeius. Acutius Rufus charged L. Afranius before Pompeius with betraying the army in Spain. In a council of war L. Domitius proposed that when the war was finished, a court should be formed of the senators who had been with Pompeius in the war, that each member of the court should have three tablets, and they should pass judgment on all who had stayed in Rome, or had been within the lines of Pompeius and had discharged no military duty: one tablet would express complete acquittal; a second, condemnation; and a third, a fine. In short all of them were looking after their own promotion, or their pecuniary interest, or about taking vengeance on their enemies; they never thought about the means of victory, but only how they should use it. Cicero in a letter to Atticus (xi. 6) written at the end of November of this year and after the death of Pompeius, speaks of the cruel designs of Pompeius' party and their intention to seize the property of their political enemies. L. Lentulus, he says, claimed the house of Hortensius, and Caesar's gardens and his house at Baiae. There was the same disposition, he adds, in Caesar's partisans, but the greediness

of Pompeius' faction had no bounds, and all who had stayed in Italy were considered their enemies.

When Caesar had secured his supplies, and his soldiers had recovered their spirits, and sufficient time had passed since the loss at Dyrrhachium to make him sure of the temper of his men, he determined to try what the purpose of Pompeius was, or what inclination he had to fight. Accordingly he led his army out of the camp and put it in battle order, at first within the limits where he was master of the ground,¹ and at some distance from the camp of Pompeius. On the following successive days he advanced further from his camp and finally placed his order of battle at the base of the hills on which Pompeius was encamped. He thus gave his army more confidence every day. As his cavalry was much inferior in numbers to the cavalry of Pompeius, he followed a practice which he had already adopted; he took a number of young men from the Antesignani, who were selected for their activity, and distributed them among the cavalry, that by daily practice they might be accustomed to this manner of fighting. The result was that Caesar's thousand horsemen even in tolerably open ground, when it was necessary, ventured to stand the attack of Pompeius' seven thousand and were not much alarmed by their numbers. Caesar's cavalry was even so successful that they had the advantage in a skirmish and killed one of the two Allobroges who had deserted.

Pompeius always drew up his troops at the foot of the hill, in the expectation, as it seemed, that Caesar might place himself in a disadvantageous position. Caesar, thinking that Pompeius could not be induced to fight, determined to move his camp and to be always on the march; for by going from place to place he would have better supplies, and might also find some opportunity of fighting, and by daily marches he would weary the army of Pompeius, which was not accustomed to fatigue. All through this campaign we observe that the men of Pompeius were inferior to Caesar's in power of marching and working with the spade. The signal had been given and the tents were struck, when it was observed that the army

¹ "Suis ocis :—" "innerhalb des durch seine Vorposten besetzten Terrains," is Goeler's explanation (p. 76).

of Pompeius had advanced further from the front of the camp, and there was an opportunity for Caesar to fight without being on unfavourable ground. The men were just leaving the gates of the camp when Caesar said, "We must defer our march at present and think about fighting as we have always wished: let us be ready for battle; we shall not easily find another opportunity:" and he immediately put the troops in order.

Pompeius also, as it was afterwards known, by the persuasion of all those who were about him, had determined to fight; and in a council of war some days before he had said that Caesar's army would be routed before the two lines met. Most of those who heard him expressed some surprise at what he said, but Pompeius added, "I know that what I promise you is almost incredible, but I will tell you my reasons for thinking so, that you may go to battle with greater confidence. I have persuaded our cavalry, and they have promised to do what I wish, as soon as the two armies have come near to one another, to attack Caesar's right flank where it will be exposed, and when they are in the rear of this part of the line to drive it forward in confusion before a single missile is discharged by us against the enemy; and so without any danger to the legions and almost without a man being wounded we shall finish the war; and this is not difficult to do, when we are so much superior in cavalry." He gave them notice to be ready when the time came, and since there was now an opportunity for fighting, not to let their acts fall short of what was expected from them.

Labienus followed Pompeius. After expressing his contempt for Caesar's forces and highly praising the plan of Pompeius, he said, "Do not suppose, Pompeius, that this is the army which subdued Gallia and Germania. I was in all the battles in those countries, and I do not speak rashly about that of which I know nothing. A very small part of that army remains; a great part has perished, which was a necessary consequence of so many battles; the sickly autumn season in Italy carried off others; many also have gone off to their homes, and many were left in Italy. Have you not heard that cohorts were formed at Brundisium of those who stayed behind on account of sickness? The forces which you see are recruits

raised in Gallia Citerior in the last few years, and most of them are from the colonies north of the Po. All Caesar's veterans have been destroyed in the two fights at Dyrrhachium." He concluded by swearing that he would not return to the camp except victorious, and he urged the rest to follow his example. Pompeius commended what Labienus had done and took the oath; and all the rest did the same. The members of the council separated with great hopes and great rejoicing: already they anticipated victory, for they thought that in a matter of such importance no unfounded assurance could be given by so experienced a commander.

When Caesar had approached the camp of Pompeius, he saw that his battle was ordered in this manner. On the left wing were the two legions which Caesar had given up to Pompeius in pursuance of the *Senatus consultum* (vol. iv. 410), one of which was now named the first, and the other the third. On the left wing was Pompeius, and L. Domitius commanded under him. Scipio occupied the centre with the legions from Syria. The Cilician legion and the Spanish cohorts which were brought by Afranius,² were on the right wing under Lentulus (Appian ii. 76). Pompeius considered these to be his most trustworthy troops. The rest of the cohorts he had placed between the centre and the wings, and thus made up the number of one hundred and ten cohorts, or 45,000 men. There were about two thousand "evocati," who had joined him out of the men ("beneficiarii") who had formerly served under him: these "evocati" were dispersed among the whole force. The remaining seven cohorts he had placed in the camp and the adjoining forts. His right wing was protected by a stream with high banks, for which reason he had placed all the cavalry and the archers and slingers on the left wing.³

² The junction of the Spanish troops with Pompeius is not mentioned in Caesar's present text; but as he here refers to this junction, we may suppose that the passage has been lost.

³ Pompeius had nine legions, 2000 evocati and the fifteen cohorts of C. Antonius (B. C. iii. 4; Kraner's note); also the cohorts of Afranius, the number of which is not stated, and the two legions of Scipio. Goeler estimates the number of cohorts of Pompeius thus: ninety in the nine legions, fifteen cohorts of C. Antonius, twenty in Scipio's two legions and seven of Afranius, as Goeler assumes; in all one hundred and thirty-two. By deducting the seven cohorts

The following is Goeler's statement (p. 82) of the whole force of Pompeius in the battle :—

| | |
|--|--------|
| 1. Legionary soldiers in the battle . . . | 45,000 |
| 2. Legionary soldiers in the camp and forts (seven cohorts) | 3,000 |
| 3. Veterans (Evocati) | 2,000 |
| 4. Archers and slingers about (perhaps) . . . | 4,200 |
| | <hr/> |
| | 54,200 |
| 5. Cavalry about | 7,000 |
| 6. Auxiliary troops, number not known. | |

Appian (B. C. ii. 70) in stating the number on both sides says that writers did not agree about them, and that he followed the best Roman authorities; but he does not mention Caesar. Appian says that his authorities make no mention of the number of the auxiliary troops on each side, as they reckoned them of no use. According to the most trustworthy authorities, he adds, on both sides 70,000 Italians were in the battle; or less than 60,000, as some say. Others exaggerated the whole number to 400,000; which is absurd, for how could these two skilful commanders encumber themselves with so many useless men, whom they could not feed? Pompeius had with him besides most of the Greeks, men from nearly all parts of the Mediterranean coast to the east, even Hebrews and Arabs; Deiotarus also the tetrarch of the eastern Galatians, and Ariarathes king of the Cappadocians, but Appian ought to have said Ariobarzanes; Armenians west of the Euphrates under Taxiles, and Armenians from beyond the Euphrates under Megabates, a satrap of king Artapes, as Appian names him. This rabble must have come with Scipio from the east, and the fact explains a passage in Caesar (B. C. iii. 81) where he speaks of Scipio occupying Larisa with large armies (*magnis exercitibus*). Appian (B. C. ii. 75) describes the auxiliaries of Pompeius as consisting of many tongues, but his auxiliaries and Caesar's also were only used for show. Pompeius placed the Macedonians, and Peloponnesians and Boeotians

left in the camp and forts, and the fifteen at Dyrrhachium, he obtains one hundred and ten cohorts, the number which Caesar gives.

and Athenians, who were accustomed to discipline and could keep silent, on a line with his Italian troops, but the rest he placed apart according to their tribes to look on, and when the battle was begun to get round the enemy and to pursue and to seize Caesar's camp. These facts will help to explain the dreadful confusion and loss on the side of Pompeius, who must have known that this motley force of auxiliaries could do no good, and might only make a defeat worse.

Caesar, observing his former practice, placed on the right his favourite tenth legion, and on the left he placed the ninth, which had been greatly diminished in the fights at Dyrrhachium, but he joined to it the eighth legion, and out of the two made nearly one complete legion, each part of which was ordered to support the other. He had seventy-five cohorts⁴ in line of battle which contained 22,000 men, and two cohorts were left to protect the camp. M. Antonius commanded the left wing, P. Sulla the right, and Cn. Domitius Calvinus was in the centre. Caesar stood opposite to Pompeius. As soon as he saw the order of Pompeius' battle, being afraid that the right wing might be turned by the enemy's numerous cavalry, he drew six cohorts (c. 89, 93), one from the third line of each of the six legions, for the junction of the ninth and eighth legions reduced the number of seven legions practically to six, and made of these six cohorts a fourth line or a reserve, which he opposed to the enemy's cavalry, and he told them that the victory depended on their courage.⁵ The six cohorts were

⁴ Kraner remarks that Caesar had ten legions, six of which he brought over the sea, and M. Antonius (lii. c. 29) brought over four more; in all he had a hundred cohorts. He had left eight cohorts at Apollonia, Oricum and Lissus; fifteen had been sent into Achaia, and two were left in the camp. Accordingly there were seventy-five in the battle. Appian (B. C. ii. 70) estimates Caesar's force in the battle at 22,000, and his cavalry at about 1000. He estimates Pompeius' force at more than twice this number, the cavalry included, which was 7000. Plutarch (Caesar, c. 42, Pompeius, c. 69) has the same numbers. Orosius (vi. 15) makes the number of Caesar's cohorts eighty, and so it is in Oudendorp's text of Caesar, which Goeler has followed. Caesar's auxiliary troops (Appian, B. C. ii. 70) were Gallic horsemen, and some from Gallia Cisalpina, and light-armed Greeks, Dolopes, Acarnanians and Aetolians. Appian does not here speak of the Germans, who, as he has told us, got drunk at the sack of Gomphi.

⁵ Frontinus, Strat. ii. 3. 22, mentions these six cohorts; and Lucan, vii. 521, speaks of this reserve.

placed behind the right wing, where Caesar's cavalry also was, but he has not mentioned this fact. The third line and the army generally were directed not to make the onset without his orders: when the time came, he would give the signal by hoisting the purple flag (*vexillum*).

Caesar according to military usage encouraged his men to battle and while speaking of his uninterrupted care of the army, especially reminded them that they were witnesses to the eagerness with which he had sought peace, to what he had attempted in the conference through Vatinius, his negotiations with Scipio through A. Clodius and to his urgent request at Oricum to Libo about sending commissioners to Pompeius. He said that he had always tried to spare the blood of his soldiers and to save for the republic one of the armies. After this address his soldiers showed their eagerness for battle and he gave the signal with the trumpet.⁶

There was in Caesar's army an *Evocatus*, named Crastinus, who in the previous year had been first centurion in the tenth legion, a man of unusual courage. When the signal was given, he said, "Follow me you who have been of my company (*manipulares mei*), and render to your commander the service which you owe. We have only one battle more, and then he will recover his proper dignity and we shall have our freedom." At the same time turning to Caesar he said, "General, I shall have your thanks to-day either living or dead." With these words he sprang forward before the rest from the right wing, followed by about a hundred and twenty volunteers, picked soldiers of the first century (c. 91).

Between the two lines there was only room enough for both armies to make the charge. Pompeius however had given orders to his men to wait for Caesar's attack; and this, it is said, was done by the advice of C. Triarius (B. C. iii. 5, 92). The design of Pompeius was to allow the force of the first rush of the enemy and the strength of Caesar's soldiers to be weakened, and the line to be thrown into disorder, so that his own men keeping their ranks should attack the enemy who would be dispersed.

⁶ Appian (B. C. ii. 78) says that Pompeius, seeing that the delay disturbed his auxiliaries, and fearing that they might set the example of disorder before the fight began, gave the signal first, and Caesar followed.

He also expected that the javelins (*pila*) of the enemy would fall with less force, if his men held their ground, than if they should meet the discharge of these missiles; and further, that Caesar's men having double the distance to run would be out of breath and exhausted. But Caesar says that in his opinion Pompeius had no good reason for giving such orders; for every man naturally has a certain mental excitement and readiness, which are roused by the ardour for battle, and a commander ought to encourage and not to repress these feelings. Accordingly from ancient times it had been the Roman practice for the signals to be made through the army by the trumpets and for the men to give a universal shout, by which it was supposed that the enemy would be terrified and the Romans encouraged.⁷

As soon as the signal was given, Caesar's men rushed forward; but when they saw that the enemy did not stir, they halted without the word of command about half way, that they might not come to close quarters with their strength exhausted. After a short pause they renewed the charge, threw the javelins (*pila*), and quickly, according to Caesar's orders, drew the sword. The soldiers of Pompeius received the discharge of the missiles, stood the onset of the legions, maintained their ranks, and after throwing their javelins took to the sword. At the same time the cavalry of Pompeius, following orders, sprang forward in one mass from the left wing, and all the archers spread themselves out. Caesar's cavalry did not stand the attack, but gradually gave way, which

⁷ "A ringing cheer is inseparable from charging. I do not believe it possible to get a line in action to charge in silence; and were it possible, the general who would deprive himself of the moral assistance it gives the assailants, would be an idiot. It encourages, lends nerve and confidence to an assailant: its very clamour makes men feel their strength as they realize the numbers that are charging with them. Nothing serves more to strike terror into a force that is charged than a loud ringing cheer bespeaking confidence. It doubtless brings with it a certain amount of disorder, but that is an unavoidable attendant upon the meeting of two hostile forces.—To await in the open an advancing enemy and depend upon driving him back by your fire, is to court danger."—Colonel Wolsley's *Soldier's Pocket Book*, p. 249.

Plutarch (Caesar, c. 44) quotes Caesar's opinion about the order of Pompeius, and Appian (B. C. ii. 79) also; but Appian refers to Caesar's *Letters* as if there was a collection of them, and does not refer to the *Books of the Civil War*.

caused the enemy's cavalry to press them more vigorously, and to deploy in squadrons and surround Caesar's right flank which was exposed. As soon as Caesar saw this, he gave the signal to the six cohorts which formed his reserve, who made so furious an assault on the cavalry of Pompeius that not a single man stood his ground, and the whole body turning round quitted the field and in hasty flight made for the highest part of the hills. When the cavalry were routed, all the archers and slingers being unprotected were cut down. The six cohorts kept up their impetuous attack, and as the infantry of Pompeius on his left wing still fought and resisted, they turned this flank and attacked them in the rear.⁸

At this critical time, while Caesar's first and second lines were engaged with the enemy, he ordered the third line which had stood still (c. 94) to advance to the attack; which it might do by passing between the intervals, which as usual were left between the cohorts of the first and second line. Thus these fresh troops relieved those who were exhausted, while others were falling on the enemy in the rear, and the men of Pompeius being unable to resist any longer, turned round and took to flight. Caesar then was not mistaken when he said, as he had done when he addressed his men, that the way to victory would be shown by the six cohorts, which had been placed in the fourth line; for it was they who in the first place repulsed the cavalry, it was they who slaughtered the archers and slingers, and got on the rear of the enemy's left wing and made their adversaries take to flight.⁹

⁸ Goeler (p. 89) says, "the reserve or fourth line marched forward in column and then turned to the right, so that their front being at right angles to the line of the other troops of Caesar, would cover the right flank which was threatened by the cavalry of Pompeius." Goeler adds in a note that Caesar does not describe correctly the position taken up by the reserve, but that his own explanation agrees with the other circumstances of the battle. Lucan, he says, (vii. 521,) gives a hint of the position of the reserve:—

"Tum Caesar metuens ne frons sibi prima labaret,

Incursu tenet obliquas post signa cohortes."

This strange circumstance of a few infantry, supported, we must suppose, by Caesar's cavalry, who had rallied, attacking a large force successfully, is explained by Appian (B. C. ii. 78) and Plutarch (Caesar, c. 45; Pompeius, c. 71). Caesar ordered the reserve not to throw their javelins, but to push them against the faces of the enemy's horsemen, who could not stand this unexpected kind of attack.

⁹ Florus (iv. 2. 48) attributes the decisive result to the German troops, on

As soon as Pompeius saw the cavalry routed, and that part of his army¹ on which he placed most reliance, struck with terror, having no confidence in the rest of his troops he left the battle and straightway rode into the camp, where he called out to the centurions at the praetorian gate, loud enough for the soldiers to hear, "Protect the camp and defend it vigorously, if it should be attacked: I am going round the rest of the gates to encourage those who are stationed there." After uttering these words he went into the praetorium with no hope of a favourable issue of the battle and yet waiting for it.

When the troops of Pompeius had been driven within the camp, Caesar who judged that he ought to give them no time to rally from their defeat, urged his soldiers to take advantage of the favour of fortune and to assault the camp. Though the heat was great, for the fight had now continued to mid-day, the men were ready to endure any toil and obeyed the general's command. The camp was bravely defended by the seven cohorts which had been left there, and more bravely still by the Thracians and other barbarian auxiliaries, but by these troops only. The soldiers of Pompeius who had made their escape from the battle, struck with terror and exhausted with fatigue, most of them also without their arms, which they had thrown down, and without their standards, were thinking more of securing themselves by further flight than of defending the place. At last the men on the rampart could no longer resist the multitude of missiles, and being badly wounded, they followed their tribunes and centurions and fled to the highest part of the hills near the base of which the camp was placed.

In the camp of Pompeius were found huts constructed of the branches of trees, a great quantity of silver plate laid out, and tents with the floors made of fresh turf. The tents of L. Lentulus and some others were covered with ivy. There were also many other indications of excessive luxury and confidence

which a German writer, quoted by Kraner, supposes that Caesar, as he did in many other cases, purposely omitted to mention the services of these Germans, for he does not say what was the nation of these six cohorts. The remark shows that he who made it did not read carefully, for Caesar says, as Kraner observes, that he took the six cohorts from the third line of his legions, and of course, he tells us, though not in express words, that the six cohorts were Italian troops.

¹ The first and third legions, which had been trained under Caesar.

of victory. And yet these were the men who used to bring the charge of luxury against Caesar's suffering and enduring army, who had always wanted everything even for necessary use.²

Caesar's men were already within the camp, when Pompeius mounted a horse and throwing off the decorations which he wore as commander-in-chief hurried out by the back gate (*decumana*) with four attendants and rode northward towards Larisa. Nor did he halt there, but having met with a few more of his friends, who had escaped, he continued his flight through the vale of Tempe with the same speed all night accompanied by thirty horsemen till he reached the sea and went on board of a corn vessel, frequently complaining, as it was said, that he had been so much disappointed in his expectations that it seemed as if he were almost betrayed, for the men from whom he had expected victory set the example of running away.³

When Caesar had got possession of the camp, he urged his soldiers not to busy themselves about the plunder and so lose the opportunity of making the victory complete. They readily obeyed and he began to surround with his lines the heights to which the enemy had fled; but as there was no water on the hill, the soldiers of Pompeius left it and began their retreat towards Larisa along the high land connected with these heights. Caesar observing their attempt to escape divided his troops: he ordered part of the legions to remain in the camp of Pompeius, and sent back part to his own camp. He took four legions himself and followed a more convenient road with the intention of intercepting the enemy, which he did after advancing six miles, and then drew up his men in battle order. The soldiers of Pompeius now halted on a hill at the foot of which there was a stream.⁴ Though Caesar's men were ex-

² "And yet." The meaning of the original is perhaps doubtful. See Kraner's note, and Suetonius (Caesar, c. 67).

³ Appian (B. C. ii. 81) and Plutarch (Pompeius, c. 72) have told the story of Pompeius' flight, each in his own way.

⁴ "The mountain towards Larisa into which the Pompeians retreated when Caesar encamped opposite to the foot of it, was probably near Scotussa, for there alone is any mountain to be found with a river at the foot of it. This river I take to be the same which Herodotus (vii. 129) has named Onchonous. If we

haunted by continuous exertion, and it was now nearly dark, he encouraged them to cut off the enemy from the water by digging a trench. When the works were finished, the enemy sent commissioners to treat about surrender. A few men of senatorian rank, who had accompanied the soldiers, made their escape in the night. At dawn the next day Caesar ordered all who had rested on the hill to come down and give up their arms, which was immediately done; and the men with outstretched hands throwing themselves on the ground asked for mercy. Caesar comforted them and bade them rise: to remove their fears he spoke a few words to them about his well-known lenity, pardoned all, and commended them to the care of his soldiers, that no man should suffer any violence or lose any of his property. After thus making the victory complete Caesar ordered the legions from the camp to come to him, and those whom he had taken with him to return to the camp and rest. On the same day he arrived at Larisa.⁵

In the battle only two hundred of Caesar's men fell, but he lost about thirty centurions; Crastinus was killed by a cut from a sword in the face, and made good his promise, for Caesar considered his service in the battle to surpass those of any man.⁶ It was reckoned that about 15,000 of Pompeius' army perished, and above twenty-four thousand surrendered,

suppose Caesar to have computed his distance of six miles from the banks of the Enipeus north-eastward of Pharsala, and to have encamped at some little distance short of the Onochonus, the march would not have been much greater than six miles, though it seems rather underrated at this number." Leake. I think that Caesar (B. C. iii. 97) computed the six miles from the hill on which the camp of Pompeius stood, wherever that was. Leake suggests that the Onochonus is the same river as the Onchestus, which flows past Scotussa into Lake Boebeis and that Herodotus (vii. 129) has made a mistake. I am not inclined to accept this suggestion; but the matter is of no importance here. Goeler (p. 94) also supposes this stream at the foot of the hill to be the Onchestus, Sarliki, which flows into the Lake Karlas (Boebeis).

⁵ Velleius, ii. 52, proclaims Caesar's generosity, and Cicero also in his defence of King Deiotarus (c. 12). It is said that Caesar burnt without reading the papers of Pompeius which came into his hands (Dion, 41. c. 63; Seneca de Ira, ii. 23). Pompeius did the same with the papers of Sertorius (vol. iii. p. 478). Dion (41. c. 62) states, that the Senators, who were taken prisoners and had once been pardoned, were now executed with some exceptions. Dion's narrative of the battle of Pharsalia is worse than usual with him.

⁶ The body of Crastinus was found. Caesar decorated it with military honours,

including those cohorts which defended the forts, for they surrendered to Sulla. Many also escaped to the neighbouring towns. One hundred and eighty military standards won in the battle were brought to Caesar and nine eagles. L. Domitius, the man of Corfinium attempted to escape from the camp to the hill, but his strength being exhausted, he was overtaken by the cavalry and killed.⁷

The difference in the loss on the two sides was very great, if the text is right. We ought not however to accuse Caesar of falsification; for he has stated without disguise his loss at Dyrrhachium, and before Gergovia in the Gallic War. Appian (B. C. ii. 82) observes that the loss among the auxiliary troops was not counted, for they were not thought worth the reckoning; but there fell of the Italians on Caesar's side thirty officers and two hundred legionary soldiers, or, as others state, twelve hundred. On the side of Pompeius there fell ten senators, of the cavalry about forty men of rank, and of the rest of the army the number of 25,000, which Appian considers to be an exaggeration. Asinius Pollio, who commanded under Caesar in the battle, says that there were found six thousand Pompeians on the field.⁸

The victory was complete. It was due to the ability of the general and the courage of his hardy, well-disciplined men.⁹ Pompeius was also a skilful commander, but he feared a battle in the open field, and whatever show of confidence he made, we

and interred the brave centurion by himself near the mound which contained the soldiers. (Appian, B. C. ii. 82.)

⁷ Cicero (Phil. ii. 29) charged M. Antonius with killing "this most illustrious nobleman."

⁸ See Napoleon's remarks on the difference between the loss of men in ancient and modern battles (Précis, &c. p. 152).

⁹ Compare Appian B. C. ii. 79, 80 as to the auxiliaries. He says that they were merely spectators of the fight and did not attempt to attack Caesar's camp, but when they saw the left wing of Pompeius give way, they turned to flight and hurrying to their tents seized whatever they could carry off. Caesar, it was said, called out to his legions to spare their countrymen and to fall on the allies. The legions of Pompeius accordingly soon saw that they would be saved, if they made no further resistance, and Caesar's men passing by them and falling on the auxiliaries slaughtered them without difficulty; and the greatest part of those who were killed were the auxiliaries. All this may not be true; but it explains in some degree the great loss on the side of Pompeius.

may certainly conclude that he had no hope of victory. So experienced a general soon saw that he was defeated, and he lost his presence of mind. It was a pitiable conclusion of a life spent in the service of his country and signalized by great victories. He was ruined by the men about him, who did not allow the commander-in-chief to exercise his own judgment; and the battle is an instructive lesson for all times. Divided counsels and bad discipline even with superior numbers must yield to an inferior force of brave soldiers directed by a single man of courage and ability.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE BATTLE FIELD.

B.C. 48.

I HAVE given the narrative of this battle as correctly as I can according to Caesar's text and nearly in his own words ; and I have added in the notes certain passages from the compilers which may contain some truth so far as they do not contradict Caesar. The reader may thus understand this great battle, great in the results, if in no other way. The story in Caesar is quite intelligible : it is told in the simplest words, and we can add nothing to it. Caesar gives no name to the battle field, nor to the river. The only place that he mentions is Larisa, whither Pompeius fled.

I shall first state Goeler's opinion about the site of the battle. Goeler used the Austrian map of European Turkey. He says : " The ancient writers who give us information on this matter, Plutarch, Dion Cassius, Appian, and Strabo, write so little from a military point of view, that they often directly contradict Caesar's description in this respect, without even suspecting it. We must therefore keep to Caesar's account, for to the soldier he is the most trustworthy witness."

Appian (B. C. ii. 75) states that Pompeius made his order of battle "between the city Pharsalus and the river Enipeus, where Caesar also placed his troops to oppose him." Goeler observes that Appian had either not seen the place, or he was too little of a soldier to discover the improbability of his statement. He might have added that Appian is a great blunderer in geography. Frontinus (Strat. ii. 3. 22), who lived under Nerva before Appian wrote, states that the right wing of

Pompeius rested on the Enipeus, but he does not say that Pompeius formed his order of battle between Pharsalus and the Enipeus. In fact he contradicts Appian, unless Pharsalus and Palaepharsalus are the same place, for he says that Pompeius drew up his army at Palaepharsalus; and all that Frontinus says of the battle is quite plain.

According to Strabo (p. 432) the Enipeus rises in the range of Othrys and flowing past Pharsalus enters the Apidanus, which flows into the Peneius. Goeler in his map names the small stream which flows past Pharsalus the Enipeus; and the larger stream which is joined by this small stream below Pharsalus, is named in his map the Apidanus. If we admit this small stream which flows by Pharsalus (Fársala) to be the Enipeus, it is easy to prove, as Goeler does, that the battle was not fought on the banks of this stream.

But though this small stream which flows by Pharsalus is one of the upper branches of a larger stream, it may not be certain that this small stream was named Enipeus, unless we trust Strabo; this name may belong to the larger stream into which the river of Pharsalus falls. This larger stream is named Apidanus by Goeler, and Enipeus by Leake.

Goeler however is probably right when he supposes that Palaepharsalus or old Pharsalus lay on the north side of his Apidanus, which I shall henceforth call the Enipeus; and if the battle was fought north of the Enipeus, we can hardly suppose that Palaepharsalus was south of the river, and that it was the name of the old citadel of Pharsalus at the time when Livy and Strabo wrote, as Leake conjectures. Hirtius (Bell. Alex. c. 48) speaks of the battle of Palaepharsalus. Frontinus, as already observed, does the same; Strabo also (p. 796). Strabo certainly describes the Enipeus as flowing past Pharsalus, and he speaks of Palaepharsalus as a different place, for he says (p. 431) "some later writers name Hellas a country, and say that it extended from Palaepharsalus to Thebæ of Phthiotis; and in fact in this country is the Thetidium, or temple of Thetis, not far from both places named Pharsalus, the old and the new." Livy also (44. c. i.) speaks of Palaepharsalus as a town of Thessaly; and Orosius (vi. 15) speaks of the battle at Palaepharsalus. Orosius also speaks of the

Pharsalian plains (Pharsalici Campi) as the place of battle; and Plinius (H. N. iv. c. 8) uses the expression 'Pharsalici Campi,' by which no doubt he means, as Goeler remarks, the plain which lies both on the left and on the right bank of the river Apidanus (Enipeus). It appears then that Palaepharsalus and Pharsalus are different places, and the supposition that in the time of Livy and Strabo the acropolis of Pharsalus and the upper part of Pharsalus were named Palaepharsalus ought to be rejected. Still there is no direct evidence that Palaepharsalus was separated from Pharsalus by the river Enipeus.

Goeler (p. 137), who limits, as I have said, the name Enipeus to the small stream which flows past Pharsalus, the modern name of which he writes Pharsa, into the larger stream which he names Apidanus, remarks that there is no room for the two armies between this small stream and Pharsalus, and that according to Caesar's statement such a position of the two armies is impossible; and further that if the right wing of Pompeius rested on the Enipeus, his army would have been placed either with the front turned to the south in the small triangle between the Enipeus and the Apidanus, or with the front turned to the north on the left bank of the Enipeus (Tafel iii. fig. 1).

The first of these two positions, he says, is not credible, because in the event of a retreat it would have been too dangerous, and even destructive, and quite at variance with the known prudence of Pompeius, especially as the Apidanus is a very rapid stream (Lucan, vi. 372); if we may trust the poet.¹

The Apidanus (Enipeus) would have caused such difficulty to the flight of Pompeius' troops, and have contributed so greatly to the breaking up of his army that Caesar would

¹ Ovid says Met. i. 579 :

"Populifer Spercheios, et irrequietus Enipeus
Apidanusque senex"

where "senex" perhaps means "slow."

It seems that there is some confusion between these two rivers, and that it was not settled which river flowed into the other. In my Atlas the stream from Othrys, which flows past Pharsalus, is named Enipeus; and the other stream further east, which also flows from Othrys and joins the Enipeus, is named Apidanus, and the united stream, which takes a west-north-west direction, is named Apidanus, as Goeler also names it.

certainly not have omitted to mention this circumstance. The cavalry of Pompeius after their defeat went at full speed to the high grounds. If they had been obliged to cross the river, it would have been difficult, and the crossing is nowhere mentioned. (Goeler.)

The second position, says Goeler, contradicts all the other facts of the battle; for the front of Pompeius could not have been turned to the north, because his troops after the battle directed their retreat towards Larisa, consequently to the north; and because Pompeius escaped to Larisa through the back gate of the camp, the Decumana. All this is quite true, if we suppose that the battle was fought on the small stream which flows past Pharsalus; but if the name Enipeus belongs to the river which is formed by the junction of the small stream and the other stream east of it, that makes the case different; and the question is whether the battle was fought north or south of the Enipeus, Goeler's Apidanus.

Goeler concludes that the battle was fought in that part of the Pharsalian plains which is north of his Apidanus (Enipeus), and Pompeius' position was north of Caesar's. He supposes that the hill or mountain which Pompeius had in his rear was Cynoscephalæ, near Palaepharsalus, which is now Subaschi, as he supposes.

Goeler places the battle order of Pompeius, and the right wing of Pompeius on a nameless stream west of Palaepharsalus, which flows from Cynoscephalæ into the Apidanus (Enipeus). Caesar's left, according to Goeler, was also on this stream; and he supposes that Caesar's camp, which was opposite to and south of the camp of Pompeius, may have been so placed on the right bank of the Apidanus (Enipeus), that like a tête-de-pont it secured the passage over this river. If Caesar's position had the Apidanus (Enipeus) in the rear, as Goeler supposes, such a tête-de-pont seems necessary for his security, if he should be defeated.

I agree with Goeler that the battle was fought somewhere north of the Apidanus (Enipeus). Caesar does not say that Pompeius crossed this river to take a position south of it, which fact he would, I think, have mentioned, if Pompeius had done so, for it was a part of the arrangements for battle.

As to his not mentioning his own passage of the Apidanus (Enipeus), when he came from Metropolis, there was no reason for doing so. He had taken his position before Pompeius entered the Pharsalian plains. It is impossible to believe that so good a general as Pompeius, who left his great dépôt behind at Larisa, would have placed any considerable stream between himself and Larisa. Even, if he was confident of victory, which we cannot believe, it would have been a useless risk to cross this river, when he knew that Caesar was ready to fight him on any level ground.

Leake (Northern Greece, vol. iv. p. 481) supposes "that the camp of Pompeius was on the heights to the east of Férsala (Pharsalus), and that of Caesar at or near Hadjeverli, at the foot of the rocky height which advances into the plain three miles westward of Férsala. Here a fertile plain surrounding copious sources furnished exactly the conveniences which Caesar had sought for (B. C. iii. 81. 84). The two armies when drawn up for battle stretched from the Enipeus towards Pharsalus, and occupied a line of near three miles beyond which there was a space near the foot of the hills sufficient for the operations which occurred between the light troops of Pompeius and the six cohorts of Caesar with their respective cavalry."

Leake supposes then that Pompeius coming from Larisa crossed the Enipeus (the Apidanus of Goeler), the banks of which he says "are not high, though sufficient to form an impediment to cavalry." But the passage of this river is not credible. Caesar was in the plain of the Enipeus before Pompeius left Larisa; and I do not see any possibility of Caesar having permitted Pompeius to cross the river and occupy the strong position east of Férsala.

Leake has also examined the subject in the Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature, Second Series, vol. iv. 1853. He says "the walls of Pharsalus, when compared with the words of Caesar and Appian furnish a monumental and infallible testimony as to the field of battle. The acropolis and town walls of Pharsalus are about four miles in circumference and enclose the summit and northern face of a mountain rising to the south from the plain of the Enipeus. On

the eastern and western sides the walls follow the steep slope of the mountain. The northern walls at the base of the triangle are not much elevated above the plain. The eastern walls are separated by a deep ravine from another mountain similar to that of Pharsalus. It was on the northern side of this mountain that the camp of Pompeius was situated." But there is nothing in the walls which furnishes an infallible testimony. If the camp of Pompeius was on this northern side, it faced the north, and he made his escape from it by the south gate, the Decumana. Leake therefore, as his plan shows, supposes that when the two armies were drawn up along the south bank of the Enipeus, the face of Pompeius was turned to the west, and Caesar's face to the east.

The battle was fought during great heat and continued to midday (B. C. iii. 95), and therefore it began much earlier than midday. Lucan (vii. 214) when he is describing the position of the army of Pompeius writes,

"Miles ut adverso Phoebi radiatus ab ictu
Descendens totos profudit lumine colles,
Non temere immissus campis : stetit ordine certo
Infelix acies."

He therefore supposed that the army of Pompeius faced the morning sun. On this passage there is a note by Lambertus Hortensius (ed. Oudendorp), "*radiatus* : hoc est *radius solaribus* a fronte percussus, quod incommodum non parum obfuit Pompeio, et aversus sol non mediocriter Caesarem juvit. Ordinaturus enim aciem tria debet ante prospicere Solem, Pulverem, et Ventum, juxta praecepta rei militaris."

On the morning when Pompeius offered Caesar an opportunity of fighting, Caesar was just breaking up his camp (B. C. iii. 85) to march towards Scotussa, as Plutarch says (Caesar, c. 68). Leake observes in a note: "This name is supplied by Plutarch: its situation on the map will be found to agree perfectly with the circumstances of the narrative." But Scotussa is not marked on the map which accompanies Leake's essay; nor is it marked on the map which contains a "Delineation of the marches of the contending armies prior to the battle of Pharsalia." However the site of Scotussa is fixed by Leake himself in his Northern Greece. It is north of

the Apidanus (Enipeus), north-east of Pharsalus (Férsala); and in the territory of Scotussa are the hills of Cynoscephalæ.

Caesar then being a few miles west of the camp of Pompeius was going to cross the Apidanus (Enipeus) in the face of the army of Pompeius in order to reach Scotussa, if Leake's view is correct. Caesar was a daring man and wished to fight, but who will believe that he was going to run this unnecessary risk in the sight of an enemy who was so near and had seven thousand horsemen?

Leake further says: "Mr. Merivale is at a loss to understand how the army of Pompeius could have effected its retreat in safety to Larisa. What was there to hinder them? The same route by which they came was still open to them: they had begun their retreat before Caesar attacked and took the fortified camp, which attack with its consequences must have occupied some hours. After such a battle the legionaries of Caesar were not in the best condition to begin a long chase, even were it likely that Caesar should have permitted them to do so, after he had issued his command that the adverse legionaries should be spared.² It was different with regard to the cohorts, who, when the camp was taken, had ascended the mountain which rises immediately above the position of the Pompeian camp. These cohorts were still in a state of resistance to Caesar; for which reason when he found that they had taken a road to Larisa, which was naturally, for the purpose of avoiding him, somewhat circuitous, there could be nothing more consistent with the other facts, related by him, than that he should have resolved upon endeavouring to intercept them by a more direct line."

Leake asks what was there to hinder a safe retreat to Larisa? Nothing except the impossibility of a defeated army retreating under such circumstances. But there was no retreat to Larisa even under the more favourable circumstances which existed on the real field of battle north of the Enipeus. When Caesar's third line advanced, the men of Pompeius could resist no longer, and they all turned and fled (B. C. iii. 94). This is what Leake names a retreat, but it

² This is only in Appian (B. C. ii. 80), and it is told in an absurd and incredible way, quite inconsistent with Caesar's narrative.

was a disorderly flight, and across a river, if the battle was fought south of the Apidanus (Enipeus). Leake has been led to form his ill-connected theory by mixing up the statements of Appian, a blundering compiler, with the clear description of the battle by the victorious general.

Some time in the year 1856 I received from my friend the late Henry L. Long³ a letter on the battle of Pharsalia addressed to him by General W. Napier. I made some remarks on it, which were forwarded to General Napier; and there was a letter or two more on the matter. Napier placed the battle on the right bank of the Apidanus (Enipeus), as Goeler does.

Napier's objections to the place for the battle assigned by Leake are these: it seems impossible that a great general like Caesar should allow Pompeius to pass the Apidanus (Enipeus) before him and cut him off from Pharsalus and Scotussa and also from one of the roads to Thermopylae, which endangered Caesar's troops in Greece. It is also impossible that so great a general as Pompeius would pass the Apidanus (Enipeus) in the face of Caesar's army, leaving his own place of arms Larisa open to his enemy: moreover Caesar does not mention Pompeius' passage of the river; he does not indeed mention his own, but there was no need of that: it was part of his march when no enemy was near him.

Napier asks how could Pompeius fly to Larisa by the Decuman gate, if the battle was fought where Leake places it? Caesar's troops were between him and Larisa. Also, how could the flying men of Pompeius cross the Apidanus (Enipeus) and make for Larisa? They would have been cut to pieces before they could cross the river. Napier makes some other objections.

By placing the battle ground on the north side or on the right bank of the Apidanus (Enipeus) Napier finds all difficulties removed. Caesar of course before Pompeius advanced from Larisa would cross the Apidanus (Enipeus) to communicate with Scotussa and other neighbouring places: from his position he also menaced Larisa and covered one road to

³ He was a very accomplished man and a good geographer. He had examined Caesar's campaigns carefully and Alexander's Indian campaign.

Thermopylae. Pompeius would naturally advance from Larisa and "post himself on the mountains overhanging the Apidanus (Enipeus)." Napier places Caesar with Scotussa in his rear and of course his camp faced west. He places the camp of Pompeius facing the east at the foot of some heights which border the Apidanus (Enipeus). He sent with his remarks a plan of the battle field, which exhibited the position of the armies south of the Enipeus according to Leake; and the position of the armies north of the Apidanus (Enipeus) according to his own opinion. I do not know whether he had any authority for the heights marked on this map, except Leake, or whether he added something from conjecture. Goeler's plan (Tafel iii. fig. 1), I assume, is founded on the Austrian survey. Whether it is quite correct, future travellers may determine. There may still be some difficulties about the battle and the pursuit after the battle; but I maintain that the arguments for placing the field north of the Apidanus (Enipeus) cannot be answered, and that the arguments for placing it south of this river are, I would say, almost absurd.

Leake did not examine Caesar's narrative by itself, but he took other evidence as of equal authority with Caesar, and neglected those strategical reasons which must determine the field of battle chosen by two skilful generals. Leake was an excellent geographer and a most honest and laborious inquirer. Every scholar knows how much we are indebted to him. He cannot now defend himself, but others may defend him, if they choose.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE DEATH OF POMPEIUS.

B.C. 48.

DION CASSIUS begins his forty-second book with certain reflections, which are in the style of some modern historians and such as are much approved by some critics. Pompeius, he says, had not provided for the possible case of a defeat, and when it came, there was no longer time to consider what he ought to do. The historian truly remarks that there can be no prudent deliberation when a man is under the influence of fear: if he has thought of possible danger before it comes, he is able to drive away fear, but if danger comes first and deliberation follows, fear prevails over prudent counsel. This was the reason then why Pompeius was so helpless; and he might perhaps, if he had exercised sufficient foresight, have soon recovered from his defeat, for many of his soldiers had escaped from the disastrous fight, and he had still great forces at his command. He had also abundance of money, and was master of all the seas.

The historian's speculation about the possibility of Pompeius still making successful resistance, if he had acted more wisely than he did before the battle, is one of those foolish remarks made after an event which we often hear from the silliest of men. We cannot tell what would have happened if certain antecedents had been different from what they were, though we may certainly see, when great mistakes have been followed by bad consequences, that it will be prudent not to make the same mistakes again under similar circumstances. If we may form conjectures in the present case, it seems probable that no foresight could have saved Pompeius

after such a complete defeat, and that he could never have recovered his authority over the discontented and ambitious nobles, who grudged him the power that he had, and drove him to his ruin. It is true that the strength of the Senatorian party was not destroyed by the victory of Pharsalia, as Caesar found in his African and Spanish campaigns, but the defeat of Pompeius was the overthrow of his power and led the way to his death, which Cicero, as he says, foresaw.

Caesar determined to pursue Pompeius whatever direction he should take, that he might not have the opportunity of collecting another army and renewing the war. Accordingly he advanced daily as fast as he could with his cavalry and ordered one legion to follow by shorter marches. He does not say in what direction he advanced, but his course was determined by that of Pompeius, which was well known (c. 102).

Pompeius was accompanied in the vessel from the mouth of the Peneius by P. Lentulus Spinther, consul B.C. 57 and a friend of Cicero, by L. Lentulus Crus, consul B.C. 49, and by Favonius. The Galatian king Deiotarus was also with Pompeius. Favonius, who had often on former occasions bitterly reproached Pompeius, now waited on the fallen general like a servant. At Amphipolis a notice had been put up in the name of Pompeius, that all the young men of the province of Macedonia, both Greeks and Romans, were required to come together and to take the military oath; but, as Caesar says, it was not known whether this was done to prevent suspicion that Pompeius intended to continue his flight, or whether he designed, if he was not closely pursued, to raise fresh troops and to attempt to maintain himself in Macedonia. Pompeius remained at anchor one night before Amphipolis or probably at the mouth of the Strymon, and summoning his friends who were in Amphipolis borrowed money of them for his necessary expenses. Hearing of Caesar's approach he left Amphipolis and in a few days arrived at Mitylenae in the island of Lesbos, where his wife Cornelia and her younger son Sextus were residing.

Cornelia, who had only heard of the defeat of Caesar before Dyrrhachium, was overpowered with grief when she was informed of her husband's unexpected arrival and received the

message which he forwarded from the ship. She hurried to the shore, where she was received in the arms of Pompeius, who attempted to encourage her with the hope of better fortune. She sent for her slaves and property from the city and joined her husband, who refused to enter Mitylenae and advised the people to submit to Caesar. Then turning to the philosopher Cratippus, who had come from the city to see him, Pompeius expressed some doubts about Providence, but the philosopher prudently did not use the opportunity for arguing with him on such a matter. Contrary winds detained Pompeius two days before the city, and it was at this time probably that king Deiotarus left him (Cic. *Pro Deiotaro*, c. 5). After collecting a few light vessels Pompeius set sail for Pamphylia and Cilicia and thence passed over to the island Cyprus. On his voyage he stopped at Attaleia (Attalia) in Pamphylia, where he was joined by some galleys and about sixty senators. At Syedrae,¹ near Selinus on the coast of the mountainous Cilicia, Pompeius and his friends deliberated where they should finally seek refuge. Pompeius, it is said, proposed that they should make an alliance with the Parthian king Orodes, who had refused to assist Pompeius in the war against Caesar and had put in chains his ambassador Hirrus. Dion Cassius (42. c. 2) cannot believe that Pompeius ever thought of so foolish a thing as putting himself in the power of Rome's greatest enemies; but it is impossible to say what a man will think of when he is reduced to desperate extremities. Lucan represents one of the Lentuli as dissuading Pompeius from the disgrace of seeking the aid of the Parthians.

When Pompeius reached Cyprus, he heard that the people of Antioch and the Roman merchants there had seized the citadel, with the intention of shutting him out if he should come there, and had also sent notice to the fugitive partisans of Pompeius, who were reported to have taken refuge in some of the neighbouring towns, not to approach Antioch, under pain of death. L. Lentulus and P. Lentulus with some other Romans, who followed Pompeius in his flight, touched at the island of Rhodes, but they were not allowed to enter the

¹ Lucanus, viii. 259.

town or even the port, and received orders to leave the island. It is possible that they joined Pompeius again, either in Cilicia or Cyprus, but we have no further information.

Whether the final resolution was taken at Syedrae or at Cyprus is immaterial, and it cannot be determined. It was now generally rumoured that Caesar was approaching, and this report combined with the news from Syria was sufficient to drive Pompeius to a decision. A modern historian, who possesses a wonderful power of seeing into the unknown, informs us that Pompeius ought to have gone to his fleet at Corcyra² and employed it in collecting the crowd of fugitives; but as he did not do this, which was the proper thing, he could only act foolishly. The advice of Theophanes, the favourite of Pompeius, finally prevailed and it was resolved that Pompeius should go to Ptolemaeus the young king of Egypt, whose father Auletes had been restored (B.C. 55) by Gabinius under the advice of Pompeius. Among other good reasons for dissuading Pompeius from trusting himself to Parthian treachery, it was urged that his young wife would not be safe from insult among this people.

Pompeius took the money which was in the hands of the farmers general of Cyprus and also borrowed from private persons, and thus he was enabled to put on board of his vessels a large amount of money for payment of his two thousand armed men, whom he collected in part from the slaves of the companies of the farmers general, in part from those of the merchants, and he made up the number by others whom their masters, being partisans of Pompeius, considered to be suitable for the purpose.

When Pompeius reached Pelusium which stands near the sea on the east side of the Delta, he found that there was civil war in Egypt. According to the testament of Ptolemaeus Auletes, who died in B.C. 51, his elder daughter Cleopatra and his elder son Ptolemaeus Dionysus were appointed to reign together over Egypt, and after the fashion of the Greek kings of Egypt they should be married. The king was only thirteen years old, and under the guardianship of the eunuch Pothinus, next to whom in power and influence

² This appears to be Appian's opinion, B. C. ii. 83.

was Achilles, a man of singular audacity, as Caesar says, and the commander of the royal forces. There was also about the king Theodotus a rhetorician from Chios or Samos, as Appian says, who was the king's teacher. The kinsmen and friends of the king had expelled Cleopatra from Egypt a few months before the arrival of Pompeius. But she was too bold and enterprising to submit to the cabal which surrounded the king, and she was now on the eastern border of Egypt with an army at Mount Casius not far from Pelusium and only a little distance from the forces of the king.

Pompeius on arriving at the coast sent messengers to Ptolemaeus to remind him of the services which his father had received, and to pray that Pompeius might be admitted into Alexandria and protected by the king. Those who were sent on this mission, after discharging their business, began to speak rather freely to the king's soldiers and to urge them to exert themselves in favour of Pompeius and not to despise his present fallen fortunes. In the Egyptian army there were some old soldiers of Pompeius, who were taken from his army in Syria and led to Alexandria under Gabinius, and at the close of the Egyptian war were left with Ptolemaeus Auletes, the young king's father.³

Caesar, who probably knew the facts better than any other writer, states that the advisers of the king observing the behaviour of the messengers of Pompeius were afraid, as they afterwards declared, that if the king's army were seduced, Pompeius might take possession of Alexandria and Egypt. Caesar apparently did not give much credit to this declaration, for he suggests that they looked with contempt on the abject condition of Pompeius, as it generally happens that when misfortune overtakes a man, friends become enemies. Accordingly though they gave a favourable answer to the messengers of Pompeius they determined to murder him. Pothinus, who acted the part of first minister, summoned a council. Opinions were divided: some advised that they should drive Pompeius away, but others were willing to receive him. The rhetorician Theodotus attempted to convince the council that it was not safe to do either: if they received

³ Compare B. C. iii. c. 4.

Pompeius, he would become their master and Caesar their enemy: if they drove Pompeius away, he would be their enemy, and Caesar too because of the trouble which he would have in the pursuit of Pompeius. His conclusion was that it was best to kill Pompeius, for they would thus please Caesar and have nothing to fear; for he said with a smile, "a dead man does not bite." The remarks of Theodotus determined the decision of the council, and the execution of the murder was intrusted to Achilles.

The royal army was drawn up along the shore in the sight of Pompeius' vessel, and the king was in the midst of his troops conspicuous by his scarlet dress. Achilles taking with him L. Septimius, a Roman tribune, Salvius a centurion and a few slaves embarked in a fishing-boat to invite Pompeius to land. Those who were with Pompeius, seeing a reception so different from their expectations, suspected treachery and advised him to escape while it was still in his power. When the boat came near to the ship, Achilles and Septimius addressed Pompeius respectfully, who was the readier to leave his vessel because he recognized Septimius as one of the centurions who had served under him in the war with the pirates. Achilles, who spoke in Greek, invited Pompeius to enter the boat, and at the same time made an apology for not bringing a ship of war to receive him, which the shallow water would not allow.

After embracing Cornelia, who anticipated his fate, Pompeius ordered two centurions to step into the boat with a freedman named Philippus and a slave, and while he was entering himself, he turned round to Cornelia and his son and repeated the lines of Sophocles:—

"Whoever to a tyrant bends his way,
Is made his slave, e'en if he goes a free man."

The boat proceeded towards the shore and no one spoke, till Pompeius interrupted the silence by saying to Septimius, "I am not mistaken, I think, in recognizing an old comrade in you;" to which Septimius only replied by a nod. Pompeius then began to read a small roll on which he had written in Greek a speech which he intended to address to

the king. As they neared the shore, Cornelia and her friends, who were anxiously watching the event, had good hopes when they saw some of the king's people assembling at the landing-place as if they were going to give Pompeius an honourable welcome. But while Pompeius was taking the hand of Philippus to rise more easily, Septimius stabbed him in the back, and Achilles and Salvius also fell upon him. Drawing his toga with both hands close over his face and making no resistance, but only uttering a groan, Pompeius submitted to the blows of the murderers.⁴ A shriek from Cornelia's vessel was heard even to the land. The anchors were quickly raised, and a strong breeze carried the fugitives to the open sea out of the pursuit of the Egyptian ships.

The murderers cut off the head of Pompeius and threw the naked body out of the boat. Philippus stayed by it till the people were satisfied with looking at the corpse, when he washed it with sea-water, wrapped it in his own tunic, and made a funeral pile out of the wreck of a small fishing-boat. While he was engaged in this pious duty, he was joined by an old Roman who in his youth had served under Pompeius, and now requested that he might be allowed to assist in the obsequies of Rome's greatest general.

On the next day L. Lentulus, who was coming from Cyprus and did not know what had happened, was sailing along the shore when he saw the pile and Philippus standing by it. Lentulus landed, but was seized and put to death. This is Plutarch's story. Caesar after speaking of the murder of Pompeius, merely says that L. Lentulus also was seized by the king and put to death in prison. He was the man, who in the division of the spoil before the battle of Pharsalia, claimed the house of Hortensius, and the gardens of Caesar with his house at Baiae (p. 199).

⁴ Pompeius was born in B.C. 106 on the day before the first of October of the unreformed Calendar, as Plinius states (H. N. 37. c. 2, 6). He was murdered in B.C. 48 on the day before his birthday, and had therefore exactly completed his fifty-eighth year (Velleius, ii. 58). As September at this time had only twenty-nine days, Pompeius was murdered on the 28th of September; on the day, says Dion Cassius in his chapter of reflections (42. c. 5) on which he had once triumphed over Mithridates and the pirates. (Vol. iii. 384, where there is a mistake about the day, which is corrected here.)

In the course of time the tomb of Pompeius was entirely covered with sand; and some bronze figures which the relatives of Pompeius dedicated near Mount Casius were so much disfigured, by the atmosphere probably, that they were carried into the adytum or inmost place of a temple, which, it appears, had been built there. During the life of Appian, as he tells us (B. C. ii. 86), the emperor Hadrian, when he was in those parts, discovered the place, cleared the monument of the rubbish and restored the figures (Spartianus, Hadrian c. 14; Dion, 69. c. 11). It is stated by Plutarch (Pomp. c. 80) that Cornelia obtained the remains of her husband and interred them in his Alban villa. The monument at Mount Casius then was a cenotaph.

CHAPTER XIX.

GENERAL STATE OF AFFAIRS.

B.C. 48.

ABOUT the same time, says Caesar (B. C. iii. 100), as the battle of Pharsalia D. Laelius with his fleet arrived at Brundisium, and, as Libo had done before, he took possession of an island which lay in front of the harbour. Vatinius, who was in command at Brundisium prepared some decked boats, and contriving to draw from their position the ships of Laelius, he seized in the narrow entrance of the harbour a quinquereme and two smaller vessels which had advanced too far. He also placed cavalry at different points along the coast to prevent the enemy from getting water; but as the season of the year was favourable, Laelius was able by employing transports to bring water from Coreyra and Dyrrhachium, and he maintained his position until he heard of the battle of Pharsalia.

About this time also C. Cassius Longinus arrived in Sicily with his fleet of Syrian, Phoenician and Cilician ships. Caesar's fleet was divided: one part was at Vibo (Bivona) on the south-west coast of Italy not far from the Straits under the praetor P. Sulpicius: the other part was at Messina in Sicily under M. Pomponius. Cassius reached Messina before Pomponius knew anything about his approach, and finding him unprepared and everything in confusion, he took advantage of a strong favourable wind and sent against the fleet of Pomponius a number of merchant vessels filled with pine-wood, pitch, tow and other combustibles. The fire-ships destroyed the thirty-five vessels of Pomponius, of which twenty were decked ships. Such was the alarm in Messina

that, though there was a legion there, the place was with difficulty defended against the enemy's attack ; and if it had not happened that news was brought just at this moment of Caesar's victory by horsemen stationed in relays, probably along the south-west coast of Italy, it was the general opinion that Messana would have been taken. But the town was saved by the opportune arrival of this intelligence. Cassius now sailed to Vibo, where the ships of Sulpicius about forty in number were lying close to the shore for fear of an attack ; for we must conclude that the news of the destruction of the fleet at Messana had reached Vibo. Cassius used the same stratagem here also, and the wind being favourable he drove his fire-ships against the fleet of Sulpicius. The flames seized the two extremities of the line and five vessels were destroyed. The wind blew strong and all the fleet was in danger of being burnt, when those veteran soldiers, who had been left sick at Vibo for the protection of the fleet, were roused by this disgraceful condition of affairs, and without waiting for orders embarked on the vessels and put off from the shore. The fleet of Cassius was attacked with such vigour that two quinqueremes were taken, in one of which was Cassius, but he got into a boat and escaped. Two of his triremes were sunk. Soon after the news of the battle of Pharsalia was confirmed, and the partisans of Pompeius could no longer doubt the truth, for up to this time they thought that it was a false report spread by Caesar's commanders and friends. Cassius and his fleet now sailed away from these parts.

The victory at Pharsalia secured to Caesar the possession of Greece. Fufius Calenus, who had been sent to the south before the battle, took among other places Piræus the port of Athens, which was defenceless, for Sulla had greatly damaged the walls, and we assume that the damage had not been repaired (vol. ii. chap. xxi.). Athens however held out, though the territory was ravaged by the Roman soldiers, but after the victory at Pharsalia, the city surrendered, and the people were not punished. Caesar remarked, as it is said, that the guilty living were saved by the dead ; by which he meant that the Athenians were pardoned for the sake of their ancestors' glory and merit (Dion Cassius, 42, c. 14). Megara resisted Calenus,

but finally was taken by storm and treachery combined. Many of the citizens were massacred and the rest were sold, which Calenus considered to be a proper punishment for their obstinacy; but as it appeared that the city might become completely deserted, some of the prisoners were sold to friends for a very small sum with the view of being restored to liberty. Calenus then led his troops against Patrae (Patras) in the north-western part of Peloponnesus. This town, as Dion states (42, c. 13) had been occupied by Cato and those with him, when they were sailing south from Corcyra, and at Patrae they were joined by Petreius and Faustus Sulla, the son-in-law of Pompeius. But when Calenus approached Patrae, Cato and his men quitted the town, and Calenus took the place without resistance.

After the battle of Pharsalia M. Octavius retired to Illyricum with a large fleet. Gabinius, who had been recalled from exile and had joined Caesar, took no part in the war against his old patron Pompeius, but he was now summoned to support Q. Cornificius, Caesar's legatus in Illyricum. Cornificius was sent to Illyricum in the summer of B.C. 48 with two legions (Bell. Alex. c. 42), and though the province contained small means for the support of troops, and had been exhausted by the war about Dyrrhachium, and by internal dissensions, Cornificius not only maintained himself there, but got possession of several hill forts, which had given those who held them the opportunity of coming down to plunder the country. The booty taken in these forts, though it was small, pleased the soldiers of Cornificius. With the few ships which the town of Iader (Zara) could furnish, for this place had always been faithful to Caesar, Cornificius seized some of the dispersed vessels of Octavius, and with other vessels which he had taken he was now a match for his enemy by sea. At this time when Caesar was pursuing Pompeius, Cornificius heard that many of those who had escaped from Pharsalia, had entered Illyricum. Accordingly he wrote to Gabinius to come over the sea with the new troops lately raised in Italy and to aid him in protecting the province, and if his help should not be required there, to lead his forces into Macedonia, for Cornificius supposed that Macedonia and the adjoining parts would renew the war so long as Pompeius was alive.

It was winter when Gabinius arrived in Illyricum, where he found few supplies, and some of the people were hostile; the bad weather also prevented him from obtaining supplies by sea. The author of the Alexandrine War suggests that Gabinius in his excess of confidence had not provided himself sufficiently before he sailed. Under great difficulties and in a severe season Gabinius was compelled to assault forts and towns, and often with loss. The barbarians despised him so much that on his retreat to the maritime town Salona, which was in the possession of a brave and faithful body of Roman citizens, he was compelled to fight on the road. Gabinius lost above two thousand men, thirty-eight centurions and four tribunes, and with the remainder reached Salona, where he was surrounded by difficulties, and died in a few months. His unsuccessful campaign and his sudden death gave Octavius great hopes of recovering the province, but he was disappointed (Chapter xxi.).

We know very little of Gabinius except what Cicero tells us. In one passage (*De Imp. Cn. Pompeii*, c. 17) Cicero speaks in honourable terms of him as the tribune who proposed the *Lex Gabinia*, which gave the command of the war against the pirates to Cn. Pompeius. But after Cicero's banishment, to which Gabinius in his consulship contributed, Cicero poured on him all the abuse which his well-stocked vocabulary supplied.¹

Caesar left Q. Cassius Longinus as *Propraetor* of Farther Spain (*Bell. Alex.* c. 48); and his governorship lasted during the time that Caesar was before Dyrrhachium and while he was engaged in the Alexandrine war. Cassius had been *quaestor* in Spain under Cn. Pompeius in B.C. 55 and the following years, and was so much hated that an attempt was made on his life. He was disliked much more when he came a second time among the Spaniards, and he attempted to make up for the want of popularity by gaining the affection of his army, to whom he promised a hundred sesterces for each man.

¹ Drumann (*Geschichte Roms*, iii. 60) has collected the passages of Cicero in which he abuses Gabinius. Some of these passages are taken from the spurious orations. The same friendly hand has also collected the passages in which Cicero has abused L. Calpurnius Piso, the colleague of Gabinius in the consulship (*Geschichte Roms*, ii 77).

Shortly after he stormed the Lusitanian town Medobriga (the site of which is supposed to be Marvao) and got possession of the Mons Herminius to which the people of the town had fled. The troops saluted Cassius as Emperor and he paid them what he had promised. He made many large presents also to individuals, and thus appeared to gain the love of his men, but he was gradually weakening military discipline.

After placing the legions in winter quarters, Cassius went to Corduba to hold the courts. He had contracted great debt there, and he determined to release himself by imposing heavy demands on the province. Requisitions of money were made on the rich, and Cassius not only allowed, but ordered this money to be set down as paid to his account. Slight grounds of offence were invented; and no manner of gain either great or small was neglected, whether the profit came direct to the governor's residence or reached his hands through the courts of justice. No man who had anything to lose escaped from being either brought into court or charged with some offence; and thus the fear of personal injury was added to loss of property. As Cassius after receiving the title of Emperor, continued the same practices which he had followed as quaestor, the provincials conspired against his life as they had done before. Their hatred was strengthened by some of the members of Cassius' household, who, though associated with him in plundering the people, yet hated the man in whose name they committed crime. Whatever plunder these men got, they set it down as acquired by themselves; whatever did not reach them or was stopped on the way, they put to the blame of Cassius. The governor raised a fifth and new legion in addition to the four which he had, and thus increased his unpopularity, as well as by the additional expense imposed on the province. The cavalry was raised to the number of three thousand, and equipped in the most expensive manner. In fact, the province had no repose from the exactions of the governor. (Dion, 42. c. 15, 16.) The rest of the story of Cassius is told in chapter xxi.

So long as the issue of the contest between Caesar and Pompeius was uncertain, the people of Rome openly showed themselves in favour of Caesar, being indeed compelled to do

so for fear of the force which he had left in the city and by the presence of Caesar's colleague, the consul Servilius (Dion, 42. c. 17, &c.). Men also were sent about as a kind of police to watch and hear everything that was done or said. But in secret the enemies of Caesar and the friends of Pompeius both acted and spoke very differently from what they did in public. Thus the minds of men were long kept in suspense, and were disturbed by continual reports every day and even every hour. When the news arrived of the battle of Pharsalia, many persons doubted about the truth of the report, for Caesar sent no despatches; and the result appeared incredible, when it was contrasted with the means at the disposal of the two generals and with men's expectations. When at last the news was confirmed, some of the people threw down the statues of Pompeius and the dictator Sulla which stood near the Rostra. Then came the report of Pompeius' death, but this also was disbelieved until his seal-ring, which had been brought to Caesar, arrived in Rome. The device cut on the stone was the three trophies of Pompeius, like that which had been represented on the seal-ring of Sulla. This is Dion's statement (42. c. 18). But Plutarch says that the device of Pompeius was a lion holding a sword.

The victory of Caesar and the death of Pompeius being now quite certain, men acted as they always have acted in such circumstances: Caesar was extolled, Pompeius was abused; and they were ready to confer any honour on Caesar. Most of the nobles vied with one another in their adulation of the conqueror, as if he were present, expecting, says Dion, to be repaid with offices, priesthoods and money for their services, though they were not voluntary, but enforced. Dion apologizes for not entering into minute particulars of the ordinary kind of honours conferred on Caesar; and he mentions only those which were extraordinary and unusual (Dion, 42. c. 19).

After the battle of Pharsalia Caesar sent M. Antonius to Italy to look after affairs there. Antonius landed at Brundisium where he saw Cicero who still had his lictors about him. After the defeat of Pompeius Cicero had returned to Italy (chapter xxiv). In a letter to Atticus (xi. 7), written on the 17th of December, B.C. 48, after speaking of these

lictors Cicero says: "Why should I speak about my lictors when I have almost been compelled to quit Italy; for Antonius sent me a copy of Caesar's letter to him, in which Caesar said that he heard that Cato² and L. Metellus had returned to Italy with the intention of appearing at Rome; which he would not allow because some disturbance might follow: Caesar also said that all persons were forbidden to return to Italy except those who should receive his permission. This letter was expressed in strong terms. Thereupon Antonius wrote to me and begged that I would excuse him, but he could not do otherwise than obey Caesar's orders. Upon this I sent L. Lamia to inform Antonius that Caesar had ordered Dolabella (Cicero's son-in-law) to write and tell me to return to Italy as soon as possible, and that I had returned on the authority of Dolabella's letter. Antonius then published a general order in conformity with Caesar's instructions, but I and Laelius were excepted by name. I wish that he had not done so; for I might have been excepted in general terms without mention of my name." Cicero wished to have the benefit of Caesar's permission without publication of his name; for it might happen that Caesar's adversaries should still gain the victory, and if they did, what would become of Cicero, who had put himself under the protection of Caesar?

In his violent invective against Antonius named the second Philippic (c. 24) Cicero represents him as being met at Brundisium by his favourite Cytheris with whom he afterwards made a progress through Italy. Cicero must have been rather puzzled to find matter for abuse when he could lay hold of such a trifle as this jovial soldier's going about the country with his mistress. However, Cicero charges Antonius with worse than this. He seized M. Piso's house and lived there. His companions were Cytheris, and the mimi Hippias and Sergius, and others who could contribute to his pleasures, and he got beastly drunk on one occasion. Money was wanted for his scandalous expense, and Cicero hints that he got it by dishonourable means; but he gives no particulars. We can believe that Antonius lived a dissipated life, but he attended to the business for which Caesar sent him to Italy.

² Cato was gone to Africa.

The extraordinary powers and honours conferred on Caesar by the Roman people were these: they gave him power to treat the partisans of Pompeius as he pleased; but, as the historian observes, he had the power already, and the Roman people only gave to the power a legal form. He also received authority to make peace and war; and the pretext for conferring this authority was the combination now forming against Caesar by those who had fled to Africa. These and all the other powers which were conferred on Caesar, he might have taken against the will of the Romans. He was appointed consul for five years in succession, and dictator not for six months, but for a whole year; and he received the tribunitian authority for life, which seems to be the origin of that authority or title which the Roman emperors always had. It was also declared that he should preside at all the Comitia, except the Comitia Tributa. The consular provinces, it was settled, should be conferred by the people, but Caesar should name those who should hold the praetorian provinces. Flattery went so far as to decree a triumph over the African king Juba for a victory which was not yet won (Dion, 42. c. 20).

Caesar assumed the dictatorship in September B.C. 48 when he was in Egypt, and he named M. Antonius his master of the horse, though he had never been praetor.³ The consul Servilius gave way to Antonius, for after the appointment of a dictator, all other magistracies ceased. The augurs indeed made a show of resistance on the ground that no master of the horse could hold his office more than six months; but people only laughed at these foolish men who had allowed Caesar contrary to ancient usage to be made dictator for a year, and now wished to enforce the observance of the custom in the case of the master of the horse. The only magistrates elected for the next year (B.C. 47) were the tribunes.

Caesar interrupts his narrative of the Civil War by two chapters about the events at Brundisium, in Sicily, and at Vibo; and I have followed his example. I have also added other facts, which it was necessary to report somewhere, and I could find no other place so convenient. Caesar also tells

³ The beginning and the end of Caesar's second consulship and of his second dictatorship did not coincide; and the case was the same in subsequent years.

the story of the flight and death of Pompeius (B. C. iii. 102—104); and he resumes his narrative with his arrival in Asia.

Caesar came to Amphipolis after Pompeius left, and then continued his pursuit to the Hellespont. As he was crossing this channel in small boats, he fell in with C. Cassius, who had seventy triremes, as Appian says (B. C. ii. 88), but Suetonius says only ten, and was sailing from Corcyra to the Black Sea to stir up Pharnaces the son of Mithridates the Great against Caesar. Though Cassius might easily have taken Caesar, he surrendered all his ships and asked for pardon, which, as we may suppose, would not be refused. Suetonius (Caesar, c. 63) and Dion Cassius (42, c. 6) have the same story with some variations. Caesar says nothing about this affair, and it seems impossible to believe the story in the form in which the compilers have transmitted it to us.

On arriving in Asia (B. C. iii. 105) Caesar found that T. Ampius Balbus had attempted to carry off the money which was deposited in the temple of Diana at Ephesus, and had summoned all the senators in the province to be present as witnesses of the amount that was taken; but he was interrupted by the arrival of Caesar and made his escape. Ampius probably intended to take the money as a loan and therefore proposed to secure evidence of the amount; but if he had laid hold of the treasure, it is very unlikely that the debt would have been repaid. This was the second time, as Caesar says, that he saved the treasures in this temple (p. 150). Perhaps it was the circumstance of this deliverance, which suggested to Caesar the mention of certain wonderful signs which happened before the battle of Pharsalia. At Elis in the temple of Minerva a figure of victory which was in front of the statue of the goddess with the face towards her turned round to the doors and the threshold of the temple. By reckoning backward it was ascertained that this wonder happened on the day of the battle of Pharsalia. On the same day at Antioch in Syria twice there was heard such a shout from an army and such a sound of signals that the citizens seized their arms and manned the walls. The same happened at Ptolemais. At Pergamum in the secret recesses of a temple

there was the noise of drums. At Tralles in the temple of Victory, where there was a statue of Caesar, there rose from the pavement a palm-tree close to the base of the statue. When we consider that Caesar's three books of the Civil War were written as an apology, we are not surprised that he recorded such signs of the favour of the gods as would have an effect on the superstition of his countrymen.⁴

Caesar stayed only a few days in the province Asia, where he remitted one third of the taxes, which was prudent and just, for the people had suffered dreadfully from the rapacity of Scipio (Plutarch, Caesar, 48). Dion states that Caesar however made requisitions of money in the province, but he does not say how. The fact however is probable, for Caesar always provided himself with money. The historian also states, but in a vague way, that Caesar limited the demands of the farmers of the taxes to fixed money payments. He gave a free constitution to Cnidos, which thus became what the Romans called a *Libera Civitas*; and this was done to please Theopompus, the collector of mythi. Caesar left Cn. Domitius Calvinus to administer Asia and the adjoining provinces. According to Appian (B. C. ii. 89) he crossed over to Rhodes, and having heard that Pompeius had been seen in Cyprus, and conjecturing that he would fly to Egypt, Caesar took the legion which had followed him from Thessaly, and another which he had summoned from Achaia, where it was under the command of Q. Fufius Calenus, and also eight hundred horsemen. He carried these troops to Alexandria in ten Rhodian ships of war and a few vessels belonging to Asia, as he says himself. He does not mention the ships of Cassius, which Appian speaks of as being used for the voyage with Rhodian ships: in fact Caesar says nothing in any way direct or indirect about Cassius, and so we may probably conclude that the surrender of Cassius is a fiction; unless some ingenious modern writer can suggest a good reason for Caesar's omission

⁴ Plutarch (Caesar, 47, Pompeius, 68), and Lucan (vii. 172—204), have recorded various wonders. Plutarch (Caesar, 47) speaks of a meteor being seen before the battle of Pharsalia, and he adds, "Caesar himself said that he witnessed it as he was visiting the watches;" but there is nothing about this meteor in the Civil War.

of the surrender of Cassius; and it would not be difficult to discover a plausible reason.

Caesar's two legions contained only 3200 men, for the rest were suffering from wounds and the fatigues of the march, and could not join him. But trusting to the fame of his great deeds he did not hesitate to sail with so small a force, for he thought that he was equally safe everywhere. Before he landed, he heard of the death of Pompeius, and Theodotus brought him the embalmed head and the seal-ring of his former son-in-law. Caesar says nothing of this matter, but the compilers report that he turned with horror from the head, which he ordered to be interred in a temple dedicated to Nemesis in the suburbs of Alexandria, which remained to the time when the emperor Trajan was quelling an insurrection of the Alexandrine Jews who destroyed the temple as a measure of defence (Appian, B. C. ii. 90).⁴

As soon as Caesar landed at Alexandria, he heard the clamour of the soldiers, whom the king had left there to protect the place, and he saw a great concourse of people moving towards him, who were indignant at the sight of the Roman fasces which preceded the consul. It was declared to be a disparagement of the king's majesty. It was probably known also that Caesar in his aedileship (B.C. 65) wished to annex the Egyptian kingdom to the Roman empire (vol. iii. 221). The tumult was quieted, but for several successive days there was great disturbance owing to the people assembling in crowds, and some of Caesar's soldiers were murdered in various parts of the city. The men no doubt had straggled about Alexandria to enjoy themselves, after the manner of soldiers when they have an opportunity.

Seeing the state of affairs Caesar ordered other legions to be brought to him from Asia, which he had composed of the soldiers of Pompeius; for he was detained himself at Alexandria, as he says by the etesian or north winds, which blow right against those who sail from Alexandria. He writes as if he

⁴ Lucan (ix. 1038) says that Caesar shed no tears until he had looked at the head long enough to know that it was the head of Pompeius, and that he shed hypocritical tears. Dion of course (42. c. 8) charges Caesar with hypocritical sorrow.

would have quitted Egypt, if the winds had not been against him, or that he would have gone himself to bring the fresh troops and would have left in Alexandria those which he had with him. It is not easy to see exactly what he means. While he was waiting for new troops, he considered that it was the business of the Roman people and of himself as consul to settle the disputes in the royal family, and the more so because in his former consulship an alliance had been formed by a law (*lex*) and a *senatus consultum* with Ptolemaeus Auletes the father of the young king. Accordingly Caesar informed Ptolemaeus and his sister Cleopatra that it was his pleasure that they should disband their armies and settle their affairs before him as judge. It was agreed at the time when Auletes became an ally of the Romans, that he should pay a large sum of money. Suetonius says (Caesar 54; vol. iii. p. 415) that Caesar and Pompeius received it, which is not probable. It is more likely that Auletes agreed to pay it to the Roman treasury. Plutarch (Caesar, c. 48) states that Auletes owed Caesar 17,500,000 denarii, but Caesar now only claimed 10,000,000. and this sum was claimed for the support of his army. Caesar says nothing about this demand of money; and his narrative is probably defective in other matters.

The eunuch Pothinus had the general administration of the kingdom. At first Pothinus complained to those about him and expressed indignation at the king being summoned to plead his cause, and as soon as he found some of the king's friends ready to aid him in his designs, he secretly summoned the army from Pelusium and gave Achilles the command of all the forces. Achilles was urged by letter and by messengers, and encouraged by great promises from Pothinus and the king to execute the orders which he received. Auletes the father in his testament adjured the Roman people by all the gods and by the treaty which he had made at Rome to see that his will was duly executed. One copy of the will had been carried to Rome by the king's commissioners to be deposited in the Roman treasury, but as this could not be done on account of the disturbed state of affairs, it was placed with Pompeius: the other copy, which was exactly the same,

was kept sealed at Alexandria, and this copy was now produced.

While this matter was debated before Caesar, who was very desirous as a friend to both sides and as an arbiter to settle the dispute between the royal personages, it was announced that the king's army and all the cavalry were advancing on Alexandria from Pelusium. Caesar's forces were not sufficient to enable him to risk a battle outside of the town; and therefore he kept them within Alexandria in convenient positions, and waited to see what Achillas would do. But he ordered all the soldiers to be under arms, and he urged the king to send as commissioners to Achillas those of his intimate friends who had most influence, and to let Achillas know what the royal pleasure was. The king sent Dioscorides and Serapion, both of whom had been at Rome as ambassadors, and had enjoyed great influence with the king's father. As soon as these two men came into the presence of Achillas, before hearing or inquiring on what mission they were sent, he ordered them to be seized and killed: one of them was wounded, but saved by being carried off by his attendants as dead: the other was killed. Upon hearing of this crime Caesar took care to secure the king, for he supposed that his name would have great authority with the people, and the war would be considered as originating with a few villains and not from the king's command.

Caesar does not say whether the king and his sister or either of them appeared before him when he was hearing their case, but as he had the opportunity of making a prisoner of the king, he may have been in the palace. The Roman consul has said nothing about Cleopatra, and we must use the evidence of Plutarch and others. As Plutarch tells the story (c. 49) Caesar secretly sent for Cleopatra from the country. The queen taking with her only Apollodorus a Sicilian got into a small boat, and when it was growing dark approached the royal palace, where Caesar had his quarters. To escape notice, she put herself into a piece of bed-sacking and laid herself out at full length; and Apollodorus tying the sack with a cord carried her through the doors to Caesar.⁶ Dion Cassius (42.

⁶ Plutarch says *ἡ μὲν ἐς στρατοῦδεσμον ἐνδύσα*. Casaubon (Animad. in

c. 34) seems to have followed different authorities, and perhaps he has used a little invention, which he was capable of doing. His story however is worth repeating. Cleopatra's cause was at first conducted before Caesar by others, but when she heard of Caesar's character, for he was, says the historian, of a most amorous disposition, which he indulged whenever he had the opportunity, she sent to tell him that she was betrayed by her friends, and she asked permission to conduct her own case. The historian describes her as the most beautiful of women, and her charms were in perfection. She was about twenty years of age. Her voice was most pleasing, and she had the art of making herself agreeable to any man. If she could gain access to Caesar, she trusted that her beauty would sustain her claims. Having obtained permission to appear before the consul she prepared herself in such manner as would best display her stately dignity and excite his compassion. She entered the city by night, for she had been staying outside, and made her way into the palace without the knowledge of her brother. When Caesar saw her and heard her speak, he was so captivated that on the following morning he sent for Ptolemaeus and attempted to reconcile the brother and sister; for he was now, says the historian, the advocate of her whose judge he had been before.⁷

The force which Achilles had under his command was not despicable either in numbers or in the character of the soldiers or their military experience. It was twenty thousand men composed of the following elements. There were the old soldiers of Gabinus, who were now accustomed to the way of

Athen, p. 15) explains it as "*stragulae vestis involucrum*," a kind of case or wrapper to hold the coverings of sofas or bed quilts. The Romans used skins for wrapping up clothes when they travelled and tied the bag with a leather thong. (Dig. 33. 10. 5, § 1, and the notes of D. Gothofredus.)

⁷ So far Dion's story may be substantially true; but part of what follows (c. 35) is probably fiction. We may accept the story of the conqueror being conquered. Lucan in his tedious fashion makes the most of it. Caesar was vanquished by the young queen, as Zeus was by Here when she appeared before him with the borrowed cestus of Aphrodite (*Iliad*, xiv. 215):

ἔνθα τέ οἱ θελκῆρια πάντα τέτυκτο
 ἐνθ' ἐνὶ μὲν φιλότῃς, ἐν δ' Ἰμερος, ἐν δ' Ὀδυσσεύς,
 πάρφασις, ἥ τ' ἔκλεψε νόον Πύκα περ φρονέοντων.

living in Alexandria and to the licence which prevailed there : they had forgotten that they were Romans, had lost the Roman discipline and taken Egyptian wives, by whom most of them had children. There were also a great many in the army who had been pirates and robbers in Syria and Cilicia and the adjoining regions ; and many condemned criminals and exiles, and runaway slaves. Alexandria was a place of refuge for all Roman escaped slaves, who were sure of being able to live there, if they were willing to enlist into the army. If any of these runaways was seized by his master, his comrades united to rescue him, for being in the same condition themselves, they repelled any violent seizure of others as if the danger were their own. These turbulent fellows had been accustomed, according to long established usage in the Alexandrine army, to demand the friends of their kings in order to put them to death, to plunder the rich, to besiege the royal residence for increased pay, to expel the kings, and to invite new rulers to Alexandria. Achilles had also two thousand horsemen, all of whom had been trained in the Alexandrine wars : they had brought back Ptolemaus Auletes to his throne, they had killed the two sons of Bibulus, proconsul of Syria, who were sent by their father to Alexandria (B.C. 50), and they had fought with the Egyptians.

Plutarch (Caesar, c. 49) states that at a feast which was celebrated on the occasion of the reconciliation of the young king and Cleopatra, Caesar's barber, who was a very inquisitive and timid man, found out that a plot was forming against Caesar by Achilles and Pothinus, and that Caesar being acquainted with the design placed a guard round the apartment and put Pothinus to death : Achilles escaped to the camp. This does not agree with Caesar's story of the execution of Pothinus.

Caesar's narrative proceeds thus. Achilles, who relied on his superior force and despised Caesar's inferior numbers, was in possession of all Alexandria except the part which Caesar occupied with his soldiers. This part was the eastern or Greek quarter of the city named Bruchium, which extended to the sea. Achilles attempted to break into the palace which Caesar occupied, but the cohorts placed along

the streets successfully resisted the assault. At the same time there was a fight at that part of the harbour which was near Caesar's quarters, and here the great battle took place. The forces being divided, the contest was carried on in several streets, and the enemy in great numbers attempted to seize the war vessels. There were here fifty ships which had been sent to aid Pompeius and had returned home after the battle of Pharsalia: all these ships were triremes or quinqueremes fully equipped for sea. There were also twenty-two ships, all decked, which were always stationed at Alexandria to protect the place. If the enemy had got possession of the fleet, they would have had in their power the harbour and the whole sea; and would have prevented Caesar from receiving supplies and fresh troops. The struggle was furious, for success promised a speedy victory to the Egyptian troops, and on his own success depended Caesar's safety. But Caesar gained the day, for he burnt all the Egyptian vessels, and also those in the dockyards, not being able with his small force to hold this part of the city.

Alexandria contained a magnificent library, which was founded by Ptolemaeus I. Soter and increased by his successors. The number of volumes has been estimated by some writers at nearly 700,000, but others make the number only 400,000.^s Ammianus Marcellinus (xxii. 17) speaks of these books as being contained in the Serapeium and burnt in the time of the Dictator Caesar. The library in the Serapeium however was not in the quarter of the city which Caesar held, but in the west or Egyptian quarter named Rhacotis. Dion Cassius states that the dockyard was burnt, and the corn warehouse, and the library which contained a very large number of excellent books. This library was that of the Museum, which was in the Brucheium. Caesar does not mention the destruction of the library. It was an accident of war. The ships which were fired, had been drawn up on shore and the flames spread to the adjoining houses and the Museum.

There was a small island named Pharos in front of Alexandria, and at the east end of the island a tower, named

^s Reimarus, Dion Cassius, 42. c. 38, notes.

also Pharos, of great height and a wonderful piece of architecture. The east end of the island approaches near to the extremity of a narrow peninsula, which projects in a northern direction from the site of the east quarter of Alexandria. This narrow peninsula was named Lochias, and between it and the eastern end of Pharos the entrance to the eastern or greater harbour was narrow; and also made more difficult by rocks, some of which were under water, and others rose above, and being beaten by the sea formed a surf. The tower, which was a lighthouse, was several stories high and built of white stone. The architect was Sostratus of Cnidos, and there was an inscription on it: "Sostratus of Cnidos, son of Dexiphanes, to the saving gods for the seamen."⁹ The narrow island of Pharos formed two ports, for the island was connected with the mainland by a narrow artificial dyke or causeway nine hundred Roman paces in length, and named by the Greeks Heptastadion. There were two openings in the causeway with bridges over them. This causeway formed the boundary between the eastern harbour and the western, named Eunostos, or "the harbour of happy return."

In this island, says Caesar, there were houses of the Egyptians and a number sufficient to make a large town (vicus). Whatever ships through carelessness or stress of weather deviated thither from their course, the people were accustomed to plunder after the fashion of pirates. Without the consent of those who occupy the Pharos no ships could come into the great harbour by reason of the narrow entrance. Caesar saw this, and while the enemy were engaged in fighting, he landed some of his soldiers, seized the Pharos, and placed a garrison there; by which he secured a safe passage for supplies and aid that might be brought to him. In the other parts of the town the contest was maintained with equal advantage on both sides, for neither party was driven from their ground owing to the narrowness of the streets, and only a few were killed on both sides. Caesar had secured the most important positions and he fortified them by night. In

⁹ This inscription has sometimes been misunderstood. The "saving gods" are the Dioscuri, the protectors of seamen. See the note in Grosekurd's translation of Strabo (iii. 343).

the quarter occupied by him there was a small part of the royal palace, in which he had lodged himself at first: there was also a theatre connected with the palace, which served as a citadel and gave access to the harbour and the other dock-yards. On the following days he strengthened these defences in order to make them serve as a wall and save him from the necessity of fighting against his will. In the meantime Arsinoe, the younger daughter of Ptolemaeus Auletes, expecting to get possession of the vacant throne as she considered it, escaped from the palace to Achillas and joined him in the conduct of the war. But a quarrel soon rose between them about the supreme command, and this led to both of them giving the soldiers more money with the view of gaining the men. While things were in this state in the enemy's camp, Pothinus the young king's governor and regent, who was with Caesar, was sending messages to Achillas and urging him not to desist from the enterprise nor to lose heart; but the messengers being betrayed and caught, Caesar ordered Pothinus to be put to death. Such, he says, were the first events in the Alexandrine War (B. C. iii. 112); and with this remark ends the third and last book of the Civil War written by Caesar. The subsequent wars were by another hand, or by different hands.

CHAPTER XX.

THE ALEXANDRINE WAR.

B.C. 48. 47.

SUETONIUS (Caesar, c. 56) states that it is uncertain who wrote the Alexandrine War, the African, and the Spanish War: some attribute them to Oppius and some to Hirtius, both of them friends of Caesar. Suetonius attributes to Hirtius the eighth and last book of the Gallic War (vol. iv. p. 369). The author of the Introduction to this eighth book says that he was not present either in the Alexandrine or the African war, but that he knew something of both wars from hearing Caesar talk about them; and he adds "but we listen to those things, which attract by their novelty or excite our admiration, in a different way from what we do when we are going to speak of events as writers." The conclusion from these words seems to be that either he did not write the Alexandrine and African Wars, or that he had no intention to write them when he composed this Introduction. But there are other parts of the Introduction which we must also examine.

We have no direct evidence about Hirtius having been with Caesar at Alexandria. Cicero (*Ad Attic.* xi. 20. 1), writing on the 15th of August B.C. 47, says that C. Trebonius, who arrived at Rome from Seleuceia Pieria on the 14th, informed him that he had seen Caesar at Antioch about four weeks before that date, and that Hirtius was with him. We cannot conclude from this fact that Hirtius was not with Caesar at Alexandria; but it seems more probable that he was not. For if Hirtius wrote the Introduction to the eighth book of the Gallic War, it is certain that he was not present either at the Alexandrine or the African war.

The author of this Introduction also says that he wrote something which comprised a period "up to the close, not of the civil dissension, of which we see no end, but to the close of Caesar's life." We do not know what these books were, unless they may have been the histories of the Alexandrine, African, and Spanish wars. The history of the Spanish War is incomplete, and it is possible that it may have extended to Caesar's death; but it is not probable that such an event would have been related in the last part of a book on the war in Spain. Caesar was murdered in B.C. 44, and Hirtius, who was consul in B.C. 43, fell in that year at the battle of Mutina. The author of this Introduction then wrote it after Caesar's death, and he speaks of the troublesome times which followed, as if he had seen a good deal of them. It is possible that the author, if he was Hirtius, wrote the eighth book of the Gallic War, before he wrote this Introduction to it; for it is very improbable that Hirtius could find time to write this book in the short and stormy period between Caesar's murder and his own death. If he wrote the Alexandrine War, he had time enough to do that before Caesar's death, and also to write the African and Spanish Wars. It is very difficult to understand this Introduction. There may be something corrupt in the first sentence, which is hardly intelligible.¹

Alexandria, the foundation of the great Macedonian Alexander in B.C. 332, stands on the coast of the Mediterranean on the west side of the Delta of the Nile, but not within the Delta. It is in 31° 10' N. Lat. and nearly 30° E. Long. from Greenwich. The narrow strip of land on which the ancient city was built lies between the sea and a large lake named Mareotis. Opposite to Alexandria on the north was the island Pharos, and also the ports formed by this island and the causeway which joined it to the mainland.² The city was built on a regular plan, and the streets were so arranged that they were well ventilated by the Etesian or northerly winds.

¹ Dodwell (*Dissertatio*, &c., Oudendorp's Caesar, vol. ii. 1007) concludes that Hirtius published after Caesar's death the books on the Alexandrine, African, and Spanish Wars at the same time with the Introduction to the eighth book of the Gallic War.

² The chief ancient authorities for the description of Alexandria are Caesar, B.C. iii. 112; Strabo, xvii. p. 791, &c.; Diodorus, xvii. c. 52, and Plinius N. H. 5. c. 10.

It was enclosed by a wall of great extent in circuit, for the two sides of the city, which were bounded by the water, were about thirty stadia in length, and the breadth of the city was from seven to eight stadia or about a Roman mile. There were only two narrow approaches to the city by land, one on the east and the other on the west, and both of them could be easily defended. The streets were wide enough for men on horseback and for vehicles: the two principal streets were a hundred feet in width, and crossed one another at right angles. Diodorus, who had visited the city, describes the length of the great street from east to west as forty stadia, which exceeds the length of the city as given by Strabo. Alexandria contained many public buildings, and a magnificent palace. It was a place of great commerce, and one of the finest, or as Diodorus states, in the opinion of many persons the finest city of the ancient world; and it was also the most populous. When Diodorus visited Alexandria in B.C. 60, or it may have been a little earlier, but it was certainly before B.C. 59 (Diod. i. 44, 83), he says that those who kept the registers of the inhabitants told him that the free population of the city exceeded three hundred thousand. He does not mention the number of slaves, nor does he estimate the probable number of strangers who visited and resided for a time in the place. The population was originally Greek and Egyptian. Many Jews also settled there, some probably at the foundation of the city, and more afterwards. Like all great trading towns Alexandria contained people from nearly all parts of the world.

Eunostos or the western harbour of Alexandria contained a basin, which was formed on the shore of the mainland opposite to the Pharos; and there was a ship canal from this basin through the western quarter of the city to the lake Mareotis. The lake was filled from the Nile by canals, on which more merchandize was brought into the city than by the maritime harbours. But more was exported from the maritime harbours than was imported into them. The exports from Egypt in the time of Caesar were principally grain. The Nile at the beginning of summer filled the lake Mareotis and prevented the formation of morasses or swamps, such as, Strabo observes, in other sea-coast towns send up pestilent vapours in the

summer heats. At the same time the Etesian winds blow from the north and make the summer season very agreeable at Alexandria.

The author of the Alexandrine War evidently intended to begin where Caesar ended (B. C. iii. 112). He says that after the war began, Caesar sent for all the fleet from Rhodes, Syria, and Cilicia; all the fleet or all the ships, we must suppose, which were in those parts and willing to obey his orders. He summoned archers from Crete, and horsemen from a king of the Nabathaei in Asia, who is named Malchus.³ He also ordered military engines to be got together from all quarters, corn to be sent to him and auxiliary forces to be brought. In the meantime his defences were daily improved, and all the parts of the town which were considered to be rather weak, were furnished with tortoises (*testudines*) and musculi (p. 105) to protect the men. Holes were bored in the walls between one house and the next, the rams were inserted into the holes, and whatever fresh ground was gained by battering down houses or by forcibly getting possession of them was added to Caesar's defences. It was his object to make open ground between the quarter which he occupied and the rest of the city, in order that he might defend himself better. He could not effect this purpose by burning the town, for Alexandria was nearly safe against fire, because the houses were built without wooden floorings and timber, and were formed of masonry with vaulted arches, and the roofs were made of rubble or paved. Caesar laboured chiefly to separate from the part which he held that part of the city where the width from north to south, from the harbour of Eunostos to lake Mareotis, was the least: and he attempted to accomplish this object by pushing forward his works and his vineae or covered defences.

His view was this: first, that when the city was divided into two parts, his army could be directed by one person; and second, that help could be sent from his side of the town to any of his men who were hard pressed. But his great object was to secure water and forage, for he had little water, and no

³ The word "Malchus" itself is the Hebrew word for king, with a Latin termination.

forage at all; and the lake could supply him with abundance of both.

The people of Alexandria showed no lack of vigour in defending their city. They sent to all parts of Egypt commissioners and men to enlist soldiers; and they had already brought into the place a great quantity of missiles and military engines, and a vast number of men. Large workshops were established for the manufacture of arms. They also armed the slaves who had attained the age of puberty; and those slave owners who were of the richer class supplied their slaves with daily food and pay. By a careful distribution of these forces the fortifications of the remoter parts were protected. The veteran cohorts were placed in the most public parts of the city, and relieved from all labour, in order that they might be ready to carry aid to any part of the city in which there might be a contest. All the streets and narrow passages were barricaded by a triple rampart built of squared stones, and forty feet high. The lower parts of the city were defended by very high towers of ten stories. They had also other towers of the same height, which were moveable, and being placed on wheels and drawn by ropes and beasts were taken into any part of the city along the straight streets.

. The city being very rich supplied materials for all purposes. The inhabitants were most ingenious and clever, and showed such skill in doing what they saw the Romans do, that the Romans seemed rather to have imitated them. The Egyptians had also many devices of their own invention; and at the same time they attacked Caesar's defences and protected their own. The chief men in their councils and in the public meetings used to speak to this effect: that the Roman people were gradually showing a design to take possession of the kingdom of Egypt: a few years past Gabinius was with an army in the country; Pompeius in his flight betook himself to Egypt; now Caesar was come with a force, and the death of Pompeius had not induced him to shorten his stay among them; that the kingdom would be made a province if they did not expel Caesar, and they must do it soon, because at present his communications were cut off in consequence of the

rough weather at this winter season and he could receive no aid from parts beyond the sea.

In the meantime there was a quarrel between Achilles, who commanded the veteran troops, and Arsinoe the younger daughter of Ptolemaeus Auletes, as it has been already stated (B. C. iii. 112). Each was trying to take off the other by treachery and to seize the supreme power; but Arsinoe by employing the eunuch Ganymedes, under whose care she was brought up, anticipated Achilles and murdered him. On his death Arsinoe without any associate or guardian exercised the royal authority. The command of the army was transferred to Ganymedes, who increased the largesses to the soldiers and diligently attended to the administration of affairs.

Almost the whole city of Alexandria was excavated and contained cellars which were connected with the Nile. By these means water was brought into private houses, and gradually in a certain time the water became clear and the mud subsided. The owners of houses and their slaves used this water, for that which was brought direct by a channel from the Nile was so muddy that it produced many kinds of disease; but the common sort, who were the majority used this water from necessity, because there was not a single spring in the city. The channel from the Nile was in that part of Alexandria which was in the possession of the citizens; and this circumstance suggested to Ganymedes the possibility of depriving the Romans of water, for as they were distributed in different parts for the purpose of protecting Caesar's defences, they used the water from the cellars and wells of the houses of the several quarters in which they were posted. Accordingly Ganymedes undertook a difficult work. He cut off all the cellar-tanks and the parts of the city, which he occupied himself, from those which Caesar held, and by means of wheels and other contrivances he raised a great quantity of water from the sea, and kept continually pouring it down from the higher parts of the city upon the part which was occupied by Caesar. The Roman soldiers now found that the water which they drew from the neighbouring tanks was brackish, and they were much surprised: indeed they could hardly

trust their own taste, when those of their comrades who occupied a lower position told them that their water had just the same taste as before. However by comparing and tasting they discovered that the waters were very different. But in a short time the water drawn from the higher position could not be drunk at all; and the water which was got in the lower parts began to turn brackish. There was now no doubt about the water being damaged, and perhaps the cause was discovered, though the author does not say so. Caesar's men now felt that they were in extreme danger. Some said that he was delaying too long the order for embarkation: others were afraid of still greater misfortune, if he did give the order, for they could not conceal from the Alexandrines the preparation for flight, nor was it possible to secure a retreat to the ships when the enemy would be pursuing. There was a great number of inhabitants in the quarter occupied by Caesar whom he had not removed from their houses, because they made a show of fidelity to the Romans, and it was supposed that they had separated from the party of their fellow-citizens. The author of the Alexandrine War, who is not a clear writer,⁴ seems to say that it would be a waste of words, if he attempted to prove that the Alexandrines were neither deceitful nor given to rash and hasty movements: he adds that when a man knows the nation and the character of the people, he cannot doubt that they are most ready to do treacherous acts.

Caesar endeavoured to raise the spirits of his soldiers by telling them that fresh water could be got by digging wells, for all sea shores contained sources of fresh water. If however the Egyptian shore was an exception, they were masters of the sea and the enemy had no vessels to prevent them from daily bringing water in their ships either from Paraetonium,⁵ which was on the left hand (the west) or from the island which was on the right; and the same wind could not hinder the ships from going to one of these places: there

⁴ In this passage perhaps all the words are not genuine; but the sense is not doubtful.

⁵ Paraetonium was a town and large haven about 1300 stadia west of Alexandria. Strabo, p. 799. The 'island' seems to be the Delta.

could be no thought about flight either among those who considered their honour before anything else, or even among those who thought of nothing except saving their lives: it was difficult enough to resist from their defences the attacks of the enemy in front, but if they left their entrenchments, they would lose the advantage of position and at the same time would have the disadvantage of inferiority in numbers: it would require much time and be very difficult to embark in the vessels out of boats, as they must do: the Alexandrines on the other hand were extremely active and were well acquainted with the localities and the buildings; that in the confidence resulting from their victory, for so they would view the Roman retreat, they would get in advance of the Romans and occupy the higher positions and thus the Romans would be prevented from reaching their ships; for these reasons they should think no more of flight, and only consider how they could vanquish their enemies.

After encouraging the men by this address Caesar ordered the centurions to set them to dig wells. The soldiers laboured hard, and in a single night a great quantity of fresh water was found; and thus all the efforts of the Alexandrines were frustrated. At the same time the thirty-seventh legion, composed of soldiers of Pompeius, who had surrendered, and been put on shipboard by Domitius Calvinus with corn, arms, missiles and engines of war, reached the African shore a little above (west of) Alexandria. In consequence of the east wind, which was blowing for many days in succession, these vessels could not reach the harbour, but there is good anchorage in all those parts. However as the vessels were detained a long time and the men were in want of water, a light vessel was sent to inform Caesar.

In order to determine what ought to be done, Caesar embarked in a vessel and ordered all the fleet to follow, but he put no soldiers on board, because he was going some distance and did not choose to leave his defences bare of men. When he had reached a place named Chersonesus⁶ or peninsula, and had

⁶ Is this the *Χερσόνησος ἄκρα* of Strabo, p. 838, and of Ptolemaeus, iv. 5. 2, about 23° 12' E. long., now Ras et Tin? It was called Great in opposition to the Chersonesus Parva about half a degree west of Alexandria. Ptolem. iv. 5. 9.

landed the rowers for the purpose of getting water, some of them who had gone too far from the ships with a view of plunder, and were caught by the enemy's cavalry, gave them information that Caesar was with the fleet and that he had no soldiers. The enemy thinking that fortune offered them a good opportunity of striking a great blow, put fighting men in all the ships⁷ which they had ready for sailing and met Caesar as he was returning with the fleet. Caesar did not choose to fight, and for two reasons: he had no soldiers, and it was now the tenth hour of the day, and night, which was coming on, would give greater confidence to the enemy, who relied on their knowledge of the localities, and he would be deprived of the advantage of encouraging his men by a speech. For these reasons he drew up to the land all the ships that he could, not supposing that the enemy would follow him.

There was one Rhodian ship on the right wing of Caesar and a long distance from the rest. As soon as the enemy saw it, four decked and many open vessels advanced upon it with great impetuosity. Caesar was obliged to go to the aid of the Rhodian ship lest he should sustain disgrace in his own presence, though he thought that if any misfortune befell the Rhodians, they would well deserve it. The Rhodians resisted the enemy vigorously, and as they always had displayed great skill and courage in sea fights, on this occasion they boldly maintained the battle against superior numbers. The result was most fortunate. One quadrireme of the enemy was taken, a second was sunk, the fighting men were driven from two others, and a great number were killed in the other ships: and if night had not put an end to the battle, Caesar would have seized all the enemy's fleet. The enemy were disheartened by this defeat, and as the contrary wind had abated, Caesar towed the transport ships with his victorious vessels and brought them to Alexandria.

The Alexandrines saw that they were now defeated not by the courage of the fighting men, but by the skill of the sailors. However⁸ they had the advantage of higher positions and

⁷ It appears then that the enemy had ships stationed at or near the place where Caesar's rowers landed.

⁸ Here the text is defective.

could defend themselves from the house-tops : and they used as a means of stopping the enemy all the material that they could find, for they were afraid of being attacked by the Roman fleet even close to the land. But Ganymedes by declaring that he would replace the ships which were lost and even increase the whole number, encouraged the Egyptians to repair the old vessels and to set to work vigorously ; and though they had lost above one hundred and ten ships of war in the port and the dockyards, they did not abandon the design of making a new fleet, for they saw that Caesar could neither receive aid nor supplies, if they were stronger at sea. Besides this, the Egyptians being a nautical people, and belonging to a maritime city and country, and trained from boyhood to the sea, were eager to avail themselves of this natural superiority. They knew also what advantage they had gained by their small vessels ;⁹ and for all these reasons they applied themselves diligently to the construction of a fleet (c. 12).

At all the outlets of the Nile there were ships stationed for the purpose of collecting the customs' duties ; and there were old ships in the inner dockyards¹ pertaining to the palace, which had not been at sea for many years, but the Egyptians now began to refit them, and recalled to Alexandria the vessels stationed to collect the customs. Oars were wanting, and they took off the roofs of the colonnades, gymnasia, and other public buildings, and made use of the timber. The natural cleverness of the people and the stores in the city supplied other materials. They were not preparing ships for long voyages, but only for their present necessities, for they saw that they must fight in the harbour. In a few days, contrary to general expectation, they had ready twenty-two quadriremes, and five quinqueremes, besides many smaller vessels which were not decked. They tried the rowers in the harbour to ascertain the powers of every vessel, placed on board good soldiers and made all preparation for a fight. Caesar had nine Rhodian ships, for of the ten which had been sent to him one had been lost on the shore of Egypt, eight from Pontus, five from Lycia and twelve from the province Asia. Five of these ships

⁹ I am not certain what the author means by these words.

¹ This seems to be explained by a passage in the Civil War, iii. 112.

were quinqueremes, and ten were quadriremes: the rest were smaller, and most of them not decked. Yet he trusted to the courage of his men, though he knew the strength of the enemy, and he prepared for battle. Caesar sailed round Pharos with the fleet and placed his ships right opposite to the enemy: on the right wing were the Rhodian and on the left the Pontic ships. Between the two wings there was an interval of four hundred feet which was considered sufficient for the manœuvres of the vessels. Behind them he distributed the rest of the ships in reserve and assigned to each of them the vessel in the front line which it should follow and support. The Alexandrines boldly brought forward their fleet and placed it in order of battle: in the front they put twenty-two ships, and the rest as a reserve in the second line. They also had a great number of smaller vessels and boats furnished with small firewood, in the expectation of terrifying the Romans by their numbers, their cries, and the flames. Between the two fleets there were shoals with only a narrow passage among them, and both sides waited some time to see which would cross first, for it was seen that those who first passed the shoals would have some difficulty in placing their ships in line and also in retiring, if any mishap befell them. The commander of the Rhodian vessels was Euphranor, a man of high spirit and courage, indeed more like a Roman than a Greek; and he had been selected by the Rhodians for his well-known skill and valour to command their fleet. Knowing Caesar's thoughts he said, "You seem to me, Caesar, to fear that, if you pass the shoals with the first line of vessels, you may be compelled to fight before you have had the opportunity of putting the rest of the ships in their places to support them: trust the matter to us; we will sustain the fight, and justify your decision, while the rest of the ships are following us: it is a great disgrace and pain to us that the enemy should so long insult us face to face." Caesar after exhorting him and praising his zeal gave the signal. Four Rhodian ships now crossed the shoals and were surrounded by the Alexandrines who fell upon them. The Rhodians resisted the attack, and manoeuvred so skilfully that in spite of the disparity of numbers not one of their vessels presented a broadside to the enemy, not a single ship had the

oars swept away, but as the enemy advanced, all the Rhodian vessels met them front to front. In the meantime the rest of the ships came up to support the Rhodians, and then of necessity for want of room it was no longer a contest of skill, but everything depended on courage. There was not a man in Alexandria, either belonging to Caesar's army or townsman, whether engaged in strengthening the Roman defences or in assaulting them, who did not mount to the house-tops to find a place from which he could view the battle and make his prayers and vows to the gods for the success of his countrymen. The struggle for the victory was unequal. If the Romans were defeated, there was no escape by land or by sea, and if they were victorious, the future would still be uncertain : if the enemy gained the victory, they would have everything in their power ; and if they lost it, they could still try their fortune. It was a weighty matter for the Romans and an unfortunate circumstance, that a very small number were fighting for the victory and for the safety of all ; and if any man failed in spirit or courage, such failure compromised the security of the rest who had not the opportunity of fighting in their own defence. Caesar on previous days had often explained to his men this risk in order to induce them to fight with the greater spirit when they saw that the safety of the army was in their hands. Every soldier also had adjured his comrade, friend and acquaintance not to disappoint his own expectation and the hopes of all, who had selected him for the hazard of the battle. Accordingly the Romans fought with such courage that neither their skill and tactics availed the enemy who were well practised in naval matters, nor the superior number of their vessels, nor was so large a body of men, though they fought courageously, a match for Caesar's soldiers.² In this battle the Romans took one quinquereme and a bireme with the fighting men and rowers : three vessels were sunk ; and not one was lost on Caesar's side. The rest of the enemy's vessels fled to the city, which was near, and were protected by those who fought from the moles and neighbouring buildings, which the Romans could not approach.

² "Flexi ad virtutem" is a strange expression. See the notes in Oudendorp

To prevent the same thing from happening again, Caesar determined to take the island and the causeway which connected it with the town, for as his defences in the town were nearly completed, he trusted that he could attack both the island and the town at the same time.³ Having formed his plan, he took ten cohorts, some select light-armed men, and such of the Gallic horsemen as he judged to be fit for the purpose, and put them in small vessels and boats to attack the island on one side. He then attacked with his decked vessels the opposite part of the island,⁴ for the purpose of distracting the enemy's attention, and offered great rewards to the man who should first land on the island. At first the enemy made a brave resistance: they defended the island from the roofs of the houses, and also the shores, which it was difficult for the Romans to approach on account of the roughness of the ground. The enemy also held the narrow entrance of the eastern harbour with boats and five ships of war which they managed with great skill. But as soon as the Romans found out the nature of the ground, and a few got a footing and were followed by others, they made a resolute attack on the men who lined the shore and put them to flight.

The enemy now abandoned the attempt to protect the harbour and flying to the shore and the town on the island hastily quitted their vessels to defend the buildings. But they could not make any great resistance from these defences, though the buildings were nearly like those in Alexandria, and the lofty towers which stood close together served as a wall, and Caesar's men had taken neither fascines nor ladders, nor anything else suitable for making an assault. But fear deprives men of presence of mind and judgment and weakens their strength; and so it happened now. For they who were bold enough to oppose the Romans on level ground, being now terrified at the flight of their countrymen and the slaughter of a small number, did not venture to resist the

³ There is something corrupt in the text.

⁴ "*Alteram insulae partem*:" the attack of the ten cohorts and of those who were with them seems to have been directed against one side of the island; and the attack of the decked ships against the opposite side.

Romans from the houses, which were thirty feet high, but plunged from the causeway into the sea and swam to the town, a distance of eight hundred paces, as the author says, which is nearly the same length as Caesar assigns to the causeway.⁵ Many of these men were caught and killed: the number of prisoners was six hundred (c. 18).

Caesar gave the booty to his soldiers, ordered the houses to be destroyed, strengthened a fort situated at that bridge, which was nearer to Pharos, and placed there a body of men. There were two bridges and passages through the causeway, from one port to the other: the bridge which the author mentions here, and another, which Caesar has described (B. C. iii. 112). The people of Pharos had fled from the bridge on their side of the causeway: the other bridge, which was stronger and nearer to Alexandria, was defended by the city people. On the next day Caesar attacked this bridge in the same way, for he saw that if he had possession of both, the enemy would be prevented from passing through them in boats and plundering as they often did. Those who occupied this bridge were soon dislodged by the military engines in the ships and by the archers, and driven back into the town. About three cohorts were landed, for the space was too contracted to contain more, and the rest of the forces remained in the vessels. Caesar then ordered the bridge to be fortified on the side opposite to the enemy, and the passage by which ships went backwards and forwards under the arch on which the bridge rested to be filled with stones and stopped up. When this was so far done that no vessel could pass, and the fortification of the bridge had been commenced, all the forces of the enemy hurried out of the city and took a position in a wider place opposite to the Roman defences; and at the same time the vessels which the Alexandrines had been accustomed to send by the bridges to burn the merchant ships, took their station at the causeway. The Romans fought from the bridge and the causeway, the enemy from the space opposite to the bridge and from the vessels against those on the causeway.

⁵ B. C. iii. 112. In this passage of the Alexandrine War one MS. has "nine hundred."

While Caesar was thus occupied and cheering his men, a great number of the Roman rowers and fighters threw themselves from the ships upon the causeway, some of them eager to see the combat and others to take part in it. At first they drove off from the causeway with stones and slings the vessels of the enemy; but when a few of the Alexandrines ventured to land from their vessels and to take them in flank, the Romans, who had inconsiderately gone forward without standards or any order, now began to hurry back to their ships in confusion. The flight of the Romans encouraged the Alexandrines, who left their ships in greater numbers and vigorously pursued them in their disorder. The Romans who had remained in the ships of war hastily drew up the ladders and attempted to move their vessels away from the land for fear that the enemy might seize them. The soldiers of the three cohorts who had taken their post at the bridge and at the fore-part of the causeway, hearing the shouts in the rear, seeing the flight of their comrades, and being exposed to showers of missiles in front, became afraid that they would be shut in from behind and be cut off from all hope of retreat by their vessels removing from the causeway. Accordingly they left the works at the bridge and hurried to the ships as fast as they could. Part of them, who reached the nearest ships, sunk the vessels by their numbers; some who maintained their ground and hesitated what they should do, were slaughtered by the enemy; and some more fortunate reached the ships at anchor and saved themselves. A few covering themselves with their shields made a desperate effort and swam to the nearest vessels. Caesar as long as he could exhorted his men to continue the fight at the bridge and shared the danger; but when he saw that all of them were giving way, he retired to his own vessel. As a great number followed him and forced their way into the vessel, which made it unmanageable, and impossible to push it out to sea, Caesar suspecting what would happen plunged into the water and swam to the vessels which were stationed further from the land.⁶

⁶ Plutarch (Caesar, c. 49) tells this story inaccurately, and he adds the following: "On this occasion it is said that Caesar had many papers in his hands, and that he did not let them go, though the enemy were throwing missiles at him and he had to dive under the water, but holding the papers above the water

He then sent boats to aid his men who were in danger and saved some of them; but the vessel which he had left, being weighed down by numbers, went to the bottom with the men in it. In this battle Cæsar lost about four hundred legionary soldiers, and still more rowers and fighting men. As the author describes it, the affair seems to have been badly managed, and the result was discreditable to the Romans. The Alexandrines strengthened the fort near the bridge with powerful defences and furnished it with military engines; and then taking up the stones from the water secured a free passage for boats through the bridge.

¹ By these losses the Roman soldiers were so far from being disheartened that they were excited to greater activity in attempting to storm the enemy's works. The Alexandrines also sallied out against them whenever they saw their opportunity. Caesar's exhortations, which were published to the men, were superfluous, for it was more necessary to restrain them than to urge them to fight.

² The Alexandrines seeing that the Romans were encouraged by victory, and only stimulated to greater efforts by defeat, and having no prospect of successfully prosecuting the war, sent commissioners to Caesar. They did this, as it may be conjectured, either on the advice of the king's friends who were within Caesar's defences, or it was their own suggestion which had been secretly conveyed to the king and approved by him. The commissioners urged Caesar to release the king and allow him to go to his people: they said that all were ready to obey the king, and were tired of the administration of a young woman, whose authority was delegated to Ganymedes, who exercised it most cruelly: if the king should advise them to put themselves under Caesar's protection and make him their friend, the people would not be afraid of submitting to Caesar. Though Caesar well knew the treachery of the Alexandrines, and that their true thoughts were always different from their

with one hand, he swam with the other." A very foolish story, which is told by Dion Cassius with variations (42. c. 40), and by others.

⁷ This chapter appears to be defective, and it is only the general sense that can be ascertained.

⁸ There are difficulties here (c. 23)

professions, yet he thought it prudent to assent to their request ; for if they really had the opinions which were expressed, he believed that the king after his release would be faithful to him ; but if it should turn out that they wished to have the king as their leader in continuing the war, a supposition more consistent with the character of the people, it would be more honourable for him to have a king as his adversary than a body of adventurers and runaway slaves. Accordingly he exhorted the king to look to the interests of the kingdom left him by his father, to spare the noble city which was disfigured by conflagrations and ruins, to bring back his people to a reasonable state of mind and to keep them in it ; and further to be faithful to the Roman people and to Caesar, who placed such confidence in the king as to send him to an enemy who were in arms. With these words holding the king's right hand in his own right hand Caesar was ready to let the youth depart. But the king, who had been trained in the arts of deceit, was faithful to the character of his nation and with tears entreated Caesar not to release him : he declared that he would rather be with Caesar than possess the royal power. The Roman dried the youth's tears, and with some emotion telling him that, if these were his real sentiments, they would soon meet again, he let him go. The king, like a horse let loose from the barrier to run the course, as the historian says, began to prosecute the war so vigorously that it was believed that the tears which he shed on parting with Caesar were tears of joy. Some of Caesar's legati and friends and also the centurions and soldiers were much pleased with this result, for they thought that Caesar in the excessive kindness of his disposition had been deceived by the tricks of a boy. But the writer of the Alexandrine War formed a more correct judgment, and he maintains that it was not good nature only which induced Caesar to set the king at liberty, but he did it for very sufficient reasons.

The Alexandrines discovered that the release of the king did not add to their strength nor weaken the Romans ; and they were much vexed when they saw that the soldiers viewed with contempt the youth and incapacity of the king, and found that they had gained nothing by having him at their head.

There were also rumours that great forces were coming by land to Caesar's aid from Syria and Cilicia, which reports induced the Alexandrines to attempt to intercept Caesar's supplies by sea. With this view the Alexandrines placed light vessels in convenient positions at Canopus near the great western arm of the Nile and lay in wait for the vessels which the Romans expected. When Caesar heard the news, he ordered his fleet to be made ready. He gave the command to Tiberius Nero, the man who was the first husband of Livia, and the father of him whom we name the Emperor Tiberius. In the fleet were the Rhodian ships and the successful commander Euphranor. But Fortune, who generally reserves for some hard fate those on whom she has bestowed most favours, now changed her mood. When the fleet arrived at Canopus and the ships on both sides were placed in battle order, and Euphranor according to his custom began the fight, he pierced and sunk a trireme of the enemy. But pursuing the next ship too far, and the rest of the vessels not following quick enough to support him, he was surrounded by the Alexandrine vessels. He was thus left without help either because his comrades thought that his own courage and good fortune would save him or because they were afraid. Euphranor was the only man who behaved well in the battle and the only man who perished with his victorious quadrireme (Comp. Dion, 42. c. 40).

Caesar was rescued from his difficult position by a generous friend. Mithridates of Pergamum was the son of Menodotus by a daughter of Adobogion, who belonged to the family of the tetrarchs of Galatia. It was said that the wife cohabited with King Mithridates the Great, and the woman at the persuasion of her kinsmen gave to her boy the name of his supposed father (Strabo, p. 626 : see Groskurd's translation and note). The king took the boy with him from Pergamum when he was young and kept him for many years, a circumstance which may have been the origin of the report that the king was his father. The author of the Alexandrine War, describes Mithridates as a man of high rank in his own country, of great military ability, of strict fidelity and as holding a high place among the friends of Caesar, who sent him at the commence-

ment of the Alexandrine war into Syria and Cilicia to collect fresh forces. Having soon raised a powerful army by his activity, and with the aid of the several cities which was most readily given, he led his soldiers by land to Pelusium, the border town of Egypt on the side of Syria. On his march towards Egypt Mithridates stopped at Ascalon, where Antipater the Idumaean, is said to have joined him with three thousand Jews, and also to have induced Arab chiefs and Syrians to assist him (Josephus, *Antiq.* xiv. 8. 1).⁹ Pelusium had been occupied by Achilles, who put a strong garrison in it to keep this position, for Egypt was secured against attack from sea by the island Pharos, and on the land side by Pelusium, and these two barriers were supposed to protect the approaches to the country. Mithridates quickly invested Pelusium and made a fierce attack on the town. His great numbers enabled him to bring up fresh men to take the place of those who were wounded and exhausted, and he persisted in the assault with such obstinacy that he took the place the same day and put in it a garrison of his own men. Mithridates now advanced towards Alexandria to join Caesar; and he reduced to submission all the country through which he passed by virtue of the authority which generally follows victory.

There is a part of that country, says the writer, which is the most famous of all, not very far from Alexandria: it is named the Delta from the resemblance in form to that letter of the Greek alphabet. A portion of the river Nile divides into two parts, which take different directions and gradually leave a space between them, and the two streams finally reach the sea where the interval between them is widest. This is something like the meaning of the author's clumsy attempt to describe the division of the Nile below Memphis into several channels, between the most eastern and western of which the Delta is included. Perhaps he intends to say that Mithridates on his march approached to the western or Canopic branch of the Nile; for after describing the Delta as a place (*locus*) not far from Alexandria he says, that when the king heard that Mithridates was approaching "that place" and knew that he

⁹ Josephus quotes Strabo's historical work, as evidence that the high priest Hyrcanus was with Antipater. Strabo's authority was Asinius Pollio.

must cross the river, he sent a large force to meet him, with the expectation that Mithridates would either be destroyed or at least stopped in his march. The troops which first crossed the river "from the Delta,"¹ as the historian inaccurately expresses it, and reached Mithridates, attacked him, for they wished to deprive the rest of the army of a share in the victory. But the Greek following Roman military usage had prudently made a fortified camp, which enabled him to resist the enemy's attack; and when he observed them approaching his entrenchments incautiously and confidently, he sallied out on all sides and slaughtered a great number. Indeed if the remainder had not hid themselves, being well acquainted with the country, and if part had not fled to the ships, in which they had crossed the river, all of them would have perished. However when they had recovered from their alarm and were joined by those who came up after them, they again prepared to attack Mithridates.²

Mithridates sent a messenger to inform Caesar of his great victory, and the king received the same intelligence from his people; and so it happened that at the same time the king advanced to fall upon Mithridates and Caesar to support him. The king shortened his route by embarking on the Nile, where he had a large fleet. Caesar did not choose to take the same road, for he wished to avoid a fight with the ships, but sailing round by the sea which is at the western side of the Delta he met the king before he could attack Mithridates, and he joined the victorious general with his army. The king had placed himself in a position naturally strong, for it was higher than the surrounding plain, and protected on three sides. One side was close to the Nile, another ran along very high ground which here formed a part of the camp, and a third side was bounded by a marsh. In front of the king's camp and crossing the road by which Caesar was coming there was a narrow canal with very high banks, which flowed into the Nile, and was distant about seven miles from the king's camp. When it was known that Caesar was coming in this direction,

¹ There is a reading, "ad Delta."

² Josephus ascribes the victory of Mithridates to Antipater. The Jewish historian's narrative is, as usual, confused, and perhaps we cannot trust it.

the king sent all his cavalry and select infantry unencumbered to the canal, to prevent Caesar from crossing, and to fight with missiles from the banks; which was an unequal kind of contest, for courage could do nothing, and cowardice was exposed to no danger. The Roman soldiers and the cavalry were indignant at being forced to fight with the Alexandrines on such terms; but some of the German cavalry crossed where they found a ford, and others swam across where the banks were lower. The legionary soldiers cut down trees long enough to bridge the canal and throwing earth over them passed over. The enemy were so terrified by the impetuosity of the Romans that they took to flight; but only a few escaped to the king: nearly all the rest were slaughtered.

Caesar thinking that a sudden advance would terrify the Alexandrines directed his march to the king's camp. But when he observed that it was defended by great works and the natural strength of the position, and that the ramparts were crowded with armed men, he would not allow his soldiers, who were exhausted by marching and fighting, to make the assault immediately, and he placed his own camp at a small distance from the enemy. There was a fort in the nearest village to the enemy's camp and at no great distance from it, which the king had connected by lines with the works of his own camp for the purpose of securing possession of the village. On the next day Caesar attacked this fort and took it with all his force, not because he thought that it was difficult to seize the place with a smaller number, but with the intention of immediately assaulting the king's camp while the enemy was struck with terror at the loss of the fort. While then Caesar's men were in pursuit of the flying Alexandrines, who were retreating from the fort to their camp, they came close up to the enemy's lines and vigorously assailed them with missiles. On two sides the camp was exposed to attack, by one of which the approach was open, and on the other side there was a small space between the camp and the Nile. The largest and best part of the Alexandrine army defended that side where the approach was easiest; but those who fought on the side next to the Nile were most successful in repelling and wounding the Roman soldiers, who were pierced by missiles coming in

two different directions, in front from the rampart of the camp and on the rear from the river, on which numerous vessels carrying archers and slingers assailed the Romans. Caesar observing that it was not possible for his men to fight more vigorously than they were doing and yet that they gained little advantage in consequence of the difficulty of the ground, seeing also that the highest part of the camp was deserted by the Alexandrines because it was naturally strong, and that the men had run down from it to the scene of action, some to take part in the fight and others to look on, ordered some cohorts to go round the enemy's camp at this the most elevated part and to attack it. These cohorts were under the command of Carfulenus, a man distinguished by great spirit and military skill. When the cohorts reached this elevated spot, which was protected by only a small number, who were fiercely attacked, the Alexandrines terrified by the shouts which came from different directions and by the contest which was going on at the same time, began to run about the camp in confusion. The disorder of the enemy gave such encouragement to the Romans that almost at the same time they got possession of all the camp, but the highest part first, from which they ran down and killed a great number of the enemy. To escape the danger most of the Alexandrines threw themselves in crowds from the rampart towards that part which was close to the river. Those who were foremost being crushed in the ditch made flight easier for those who followed. It was ascertained that the king escaped from the camp and got on board a vessel, but the great number of the fugitives who were attempting to swim to the nearest ships sunk the vessel in which the king was, and he was drowned. His body, it is said, was carried to the shore and recognized by the golden coat of mail upon it (Dion, 42. c. 43, Orosius, vi. 16).

After this victory Caesar with his cavalry returned to Alexandria by the nearest road and entered that part of the city which was occupied by the enemy. All the people throwing away their arms and leaving their defences put on the dress which suppliants wear when they pray to a conqueror for mercy, and brought forward all the ceremonial of religion by which they were used to deprecate the vengeance

of their kings. In this fashion they went to meet Caesar and made their surrender, which was accepted with words of comfort and consolation. He then passed through the defences of the enemy to the quarter which he occupied, where he was received with loud congratulation by his men, who rejoiced at the successful termination of the war and at Caesar's happy return. Being now master of Egypt Caesar established in the kingly power those who were named in the will of Ptolemaeus Auletes. The elder of the king's sons being dead, Caesar gave the royal power to the younger and to Cleopatra, who had been faithful to him and had remained in his quarters. Arsinoe, in whose name Ganymedes had long ruled tyrannically, he determined to remove from Egypt, that no new disturbance might be caused by turbulent men before the authority of the two royal personages was confirmed by time. Arsinoe afterwards appeared in Caesar's triumph at Rome (Dion Cassius, 43. c. 19). Caesar only carried back with him the sixth legion, which was composed of veteran soldiers. He left the other three legions in Egypt to maintain the royal authority, for the two new governors could neither secure the affection of their people because they had faithfully adhered to Caesar, nor could their authority have the weight which time gives to long possession. Caesar also thought that it would be consistent with the dignity and interests of the Roman republic, if the two royal persons continued faithful to Rome, to protect them with Roman troops; and if they should be ungrateful, the same force could keep them in restraint. Matters being thus settled Caesar set out from Egypt to Syria (Bell. Alex. c. 33).

This is the history of the Alexandrine War. The writer leaves on his reader the impression that he was an honest man who told the truth as well as he could, and tried to write as Caesar did, but he certainly does not write so well. Dion's history of the Alexandrine War is in his forty-second book (cc. 34—44).

Caesar was indebted to the Jews for their services during the time when he was blockaded in the city. The Jews, always a clever people, found in Caesar a man who would treat them with humanity and cared not for the religious

opinions and usages, which then, as they now do, embittered men against one another. The great founder had given the Jews of Alexandria certain honours and privileges, and Caesar did not take them away, but confirmed them, as Josephus says.³

The author of the *Alexandrine War* states that Caesar established Cleopatra and her younger brother as the governors of Egypt, but he does not add, as Dion does (42. c. 44), that the boy, according to the usage of the Greek royal family of Egypt, became his sister's husband, while she was still cohabiting with Caesar. He also says nothing of Cleopatra coming to Caesar, but he tells us that she stayed in his quarters till he returned to Alexandria from the defeat of her elder brother. Caesar had her in his power then while he was besieged in Alexandria, or rather the young queen had the Roman in her power. When he left Egypt, it is said that Cleopatra was with child by Caesar, and the boy who was born had the name of Caesarion (Plutarch, *Caesar*, c. 49). Appian states (B.C. ii. 90) that Caesar was nine months in Egypt and that after his victory he voyaged on the Nile with four hundred vessels, to see the wonders of the country, accompanied by the young queen. Appian promised a full account of these things in his books on Egypt; but they are lost. Suetonius (*Caesar*, c. 52) reports that Caesar and Cleopatra often prolonged their banquets to daybreak, though Caesar is said to have been indifferent about eating and extremely sparing in the use of wine. The queen's great powers of conversation and amusing her friends were probably the chief attractions at these festivities. Suetonius adds that Caesar with the queen sailed up the Nile in a large vessel almost to the limits of Egypt; and he seems to mean that he would have gone further, if his army had not refused to follow: but this can hardly be true, for Caesar would not have taken his army with him up the Nile.

It is said that Alexandria surrendered on the 27th of March, B.C. 47 according to the uncorrected Calendar.⁴ Cicero informed his wife Terentia on the 12th of August that he had

³ Josephus, "*Jewish War*," ii. c. 18, 7; and "*Antiquities*," xiv. c. 10, § 1, &c.

⁴ Drumann, *Geschichte Roms, Julii*, p. 549.

received from Caesar a letter which satisfied him, and Caesar was soon expected in Italy. Cicero had not yet determined whether he would go to meet him or wait for his arrival (*Ad Fam.* xiv. 23). If we allow twenty-eight days for the letter coming from Syria, as Drumann does, Caesar's letter was sent in July; and in this month, as it has been already stated, C. Trebonius met Caesar at Antioch.

If the date of the surrender of Alexandria is rightly given, and if Caesar did not reach Antioch before July, there is an interval of about three months between the surrender and the time when Caesar left Egypt. As far as we can judge, a few days or at most a few weeks, would have been sufficient for him to make all his arrangements for the preservation of order in Egypt and the security of Cleopatra. The conclusion appears to be that he was detained by the young queen, and for once in his life he was near sacrificing his ambition to passion for a woman. It is unfortunate that Appian's books on Egypt are lost, for no extant authority has supplied the deficient narrative. It was a great weakness in the conqueror to lose so much time while his enemies were strengthening themselves in Africa, as we shall see; but if Caesar was overpowered by the charms of a clever woman, he was not, as it has been remarked, so weak as M. Antonius, who was afterwards brought to his ruin by the cunning and voluptuous queen. Caesar's good sense and resolution, perhaps aided by some friend's advice, rescued him from the inglorious captivity which has often been the fate of men of ability, and he resumed his victorious career, which proved that his great talents were still unimpaired.

CHAPTER XXI.

ILLYRICUM AND SPAIN.

B.C. 48-47.

WHILE Caesar was in Egypt, other events were happening, which are described by the author of the Alexandrine War in the same book (c. 34, &c.).

King Deiotarus came to Domitius Calvinus, to whom Caesar had entrusted the administration of Asia and the adjoining provinces, to entreat him not to allow his kingdom of the Less Armenia, and Cappadocia the kingdom of Ariobarzanes III. to be seized and wasted by Pharnaces, the son and successor of Mithridates VI., the Great. On the death of Mithridates, Pharnaces received from Pompeius a grant of the kingdom of Bosphorus except the town of Phanagoria; but he lost the kingdom of Pontus. (Vol. iii. p. 192.) Pharnaces taking advantage of the Roman civil war resolved to recover his father's Asiatic possessions, and he came probably by land along the east side of the Black Sea to disturb Deiotarus and Ariobarzanes. Unless they were relieved from this powerful enemy, Deiotarus declared that he could not discharge the requisitions which had been imposed on him or pay to Caesar the money which he had promised. As Deiotarus was on the side of Pompeius at the battle of Pharsalia, it appears that he afterwards made his submission to Caesar, who had required him to pay a sum of money; but the submission was not personally made to Caesar, as we may infer from another passage (c. 67). Domitius, who knew that money was wanting for the necessary military expenses, and considered that it was disgraceful to the Roman people, to Caesar and to himself, to allow the kingdoms of friends and allies to be occupied by

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a foreign king, immediately sent to Pharnaces an order to quit Armenia and Cappadocia, and not to attack the authority and majesty of the Roman people while they were engaged in a civil war. Thinking that it would add weight to this notice if he advanced with his army towards those countries, he took one of his three legions, the thirty-sixth, and sent to Egypt two which Caesar had summoned. One of these legions, which was sent through Syria, did not arrive in time to take part in the Alexandrine war. Domitius added to the thirty-sixth legion two legions of Deiotarus, which the king had for some years disciplined and armed in Roman fashion. He took also a hundred horsemen and as many from Ariobarzanes. He sent P. Sestius to the quaestor C. Plaetorius with orders to bring a legion which had been hastily levied in Pontus, and Q. Patius or Patisius to Cilicia to collect auxiliaries. All these troops quickly assembled at Comana by the order of Domitius. This town was the Pontic Comana, now Gumenek on the Tocat-Su, the ancient Iris, about seven miles north-east of Tocat.

In the meantime ambassadors came with an answer from Pharnaces: that he had quitted Cappadocia, but had taken possession of Armenia, which he claimed by a title from his father: he asked that the dispute about this kingdom should be reserved for Caesar's decision, to which he was ready to submit. Domitius knew that Pharnaces had evacuated Cappadocia from necessity, because he could more easily defend Armenia, which lay close to his own kingdom, than Cappadocia which was more remote, and because he supposed that Domitius would bring his three legions; and he also knew that when Pharnaces heard that two legions had been sent to Caesar, he was emboldened to remain in possession of Armenia. For these reasons Domitius persisted in ordering the king to quit Armenia also, and he said that Pharnaces had no more right to Armenia than to Cappadocia; and that he could not fairly ask that the matter should remain as it then was till the arrival and decision of Caesar, for a thing remained as it was, when it remained as it had been before. After sending this answer Domitius advanced into Armenia by the higher road; for from Comana there extends a lofty mountain range

covered with forests to Armenia the Less, and this range forms the boundary between Cappadocia and Armenia. The advantage of the route was that the army could not be unexpectedly attacked by the enemy, and that Cappadocia, which lay below the mountains, would furnish abundant supplies. While Domitius was on his march, the king sent several messengers to him to treat of peace and to carry royal presents. Domitius constantly refused the presents, and told the messengers that he had no other object than to maintain the dignity of the Roman people and to recover the kingdoms of their allies. By long and uninterrupted marches he approached Nicopolis,¹ a town in the Less Armenia on level ground, but with high mountains on two sides, yet at a considerable distance from the town, and he made his camp about seven miles from Nicopolis. From this camp there was a narrow and difficult defile by which Domitius must pass, and here Pharnaces placed in ambuscade some picked infantry and almost all his cavalry; and he also ordered a great number of cattle to be dispersed through the defile and the country people and townsmen to place themselves in the way of Domitius; with this view, that if Domitius should come as a friend, he might not suspect an ambuscade when he saw both men and cattle in the country as if friends were expected; and, if he was coming as an enemy, that the soldiers when they were dispersed and busy with making booty might be cut to pieces. In the meantime Pharnaces was continually sending commissioners to propose peace, expecting that he could thus more easily deceive Domitius. But on the other hand the hope of peace led Domitius to rest in his camp.

Pharnaces having thus lost the recent opportunity, and being afraid that his design would be discovered, recalled his men. On the next day Domitius approached to Nicopolis and placed his camp near the town. While the Roman army was making their camp, Pharnaces drew up his forces in his own fashion.² Domitius completed his camp by placing

¹ There are some remarks on the site of Nicopolis in vol. iii. p. 151. I do not know whether any recent writer has cleared up the difficulty about the site.

² What follows (c. 37) is not clear.

part of his force in front of the rampart to protect the workers.

On the next night Pharnaces intercepted letter-carriers, who were bringing news to Domitius about the state of affairs in Alexandria, and he learned from the letters that Caesar was in great danger and required Domitius to send him relief as soon as possible, and to march through Syria himself to Alexandria. Upon gaining this information Pharnaces considered that it would be equivalent to a victory, if he could protract the war, for he supposed that Domitius must soon retreat to join Caesar. Accordingly he dug two ditches from that part of the town where he saw that the access was easiest to the troops of Domitius and most favourable as fighting ground for them: the ditches were made parallel in a straight line towards the Roman army with no great interval between them, and the ramparts were four feet high. The ditches were only dug so far as he had determined to put forward his troops, and in the space between these ditches he drew up his force from time to time. The purpose of these ditches was to protect the army of Pharnaces, which was between them; and it was intended that the cavalry should prevent the Romans from crossing the ditches and attacking the rear. The cavalry of Pharnaces were accordingly placed on the flanks and outside the ditches, for otherwise they could not be of any use, and in numbers they far surpassed the cavalry of Domitius. The Roman general was more troubled about Caesar's danger than his own, and he did not think that he could retreat in safety, if he should either ask for the terms which he had already rejected, or that he could retreat without some ground or reason.³ He therefore placed his little army in battle order: he put the thirty-sixth legion on the right wing, the Pontic legion on the left, and the legions of Deiotarus in the centre, but he left only very small intervals between the centre and the wings. The rest of the cohorts were placed as a reserve. The signal for battle was given

³ The narrative shows that Domitius received intelligence from Caesar, and yet the "tabellarii" or letter-carriers were intercepted; perhaps some escaped. The author has made the story incomplete. The words "*sine causa discederet*" also make some difficulty, and they may not be genuine.

at the same time on both sides. The thirty-sixth legion attacked the king's cavalry outside of the ditch and with such success that they came close to the walls of the town, crossed the ditch and fell on the rear of the enemy. The Pontic legion, which was on the other wing, gave way and made a movement for the purpose of turning to the ditch which was on their side, and taking the enemy in the rear; but they were overwhelmed with missiles in the attempt to cross the ditch.⁴ The legions of Deiotarus hardly stood the shock of the enemy. The king's troops being victorious on their right wing and in the centre turned round to oppose the thirty-sixth legion, which resisted bravely, and though surrounded by the large forces of the enemy fought with the greatest courage, and finally by placing themselves in the "orbis" or circular form secured a retreat to the base of the mountains, whither Pharnaces was deterred from following by the roughness of the ground. Almost the whole of the Pontic legion was destroyed, and a great part of the soldiers of Deiotarus were killed; but the thirty-sixth legion escaped to the higher places with the loss of not more than two hundred and fifty soldiers. Some men of rank, Roman equites, fell in the battle. After this defeat Domitius collected the remains of his scattered army, and by a safe road made his retreat through Cappadocia to the province Asia. Elated by this success and hoping that matters would turn out with Caesar according to his wishes, Pharnaces occupied Pontus with all his forces, and behaved with great cruelty, expecting to enjoy his father's good fortune. He stormed several towns, made booty of the property of Roman citizens and of the people of Pontus, and inflicted on those who were young and handsome tortures worse than death.⁵ He was now master of Pontus, and boasted that he had recovered his father's kingdom. The defeat of Domitius took place in B.C. 48, and in the latter

⁴ This sentence is probably corrupt.

⁵ As we learn from a subsequent chapter (c. 70), this ferocious Asiatic cut off the private parts of the males. The women, we assume, were ravished. Appian, B. C. ii. 91, who sometimes reports facts which are in no other extant authority, says that Pharnaces took Amisus (Samsun), a city in Pontus, which was on the Roman side, enslaved the people and castrated all the young males.

part of the year. Pharnaces did not push his conquests further in Asia. Some time in B.C. 48 after the defeat of Domitius or early in B.C. 47, Asander, the brother-in-law of Pharnaces, who had been left as guardian of the kingdom of Bosphorus, revolted.

The writer of the Alexandrine War (c. 42) now turns to speak of affairs in Illyricum to the time of the death of Gabinius, which I have already described in a previous chapter (xix.).

Vatinius (Bell. Alex. c. 44), who was at Brundisium when he heard of the events which had taken place in Illyricum, was summoned by frequent letters from Cornificius to come to the relief of the province. He also heard that M. Octavius had made treaties with the barbarians, and in several parts was attacking some of Caesar's posts with his fleet; and in others with the assistance of barbarian troops. Though Vatinius was in a bad state of health, and his strength was not equal to his spirit, yet by his energy he made up for the weakness caused by illness, the difficulties incident to a winter campaign and his hasty preparation. Having only few ships of war in the port he wrote to Q. Calenus, who was in Achaia, to send his fleet. As this help did not come in time for the troops of Cornificius, who could not resist Octavius, Vatinius fitted with beaks the vessels which the Romans named "*actuariae*," of which he had a great number, though they were not large enough to be used in a sea fight. These were added to the ships of war, and the strength of the fleet was increased by putting on board a great number of veteran soldiers from all the legions, who were left sick at Brundisium when Caesar's troops were carried over to Greece. With these forces he crossed to Illyricum, where he recovered some of the maritime towns which had surrendered to Octavius, sailed past others which still persisted in their revolt, and without delay or attending to anything else he kept to his purpose of reaching Octavius as soon as he could. Octavius was attacking by land and by sea the maritime town of Epidaurus (Ragusa Vecchia) a little south of the island Melita; but Vatinius compelled him to retire and saved the garrison. Octavius having discovered that the fleet of Vatinius consisted

chiefly of small vessels, and being confident in the strength of his own fleet took his station at Tauris, a small island on the Illyrian coast opposite to the mouth of the river Naro (Narona). Vatinius followed in this direction, not knowing that Octavius was at Tauris, but being resolved to pursue him wherever he had gone. When Vatinius was near Tauris, and his ships were scattered, for the weather was bad and he had no suspicion that the enemy were in these parts, all at once he saw a vessel advancing towards him with the yards at mid-mast and full of fighting men. He immediately ordered the sails to be hauled to, the yards to be lowered, the soldiers to take their arms, and the flag to be raised which was the signal for battle; and he also made a signal to the nearest ships which were following to do the same. The men of Vatinius, who were taken by surprise, made ready, and the men of Octavius came out of port. The order of battle was prepared on both sides: the line of Octavius was better arranged, but the men of Vatinius had more resolution. Vatinius, seeing that he was not a match for Octavius either in the size of his vessels or the number, would not entrust the decision to the risk⁶ of a fortuitous contest, and accordingly he attacked with his own quinquereme the quadrireme of Octavius, whose rowers drove his ship against that of Vatinius. The ships met with so violent a shock that the beak of Octavius' ship was broken.⁷ The fight now began vigorously between the other ships, most of which crowded to the place where the admirals were engaged, and as the ships on each side came to help the admirals, there was a great fight at close quarters in a narrow space. But the closer the fight became, the greater was the advantage on the side of Vatinius, whose men showed admirable courage in leaping from their own vessels into those of the enemy, and the fight being now on equal terms they gained the victory by their superior courage. The quadrireme of Octavius was sunk, and many vessels were

⁶ The text is supposed by some critics to be corrupt. The sense, if there is any, seems to be that Vatinius would not trust the issue or the event to such accidental encounters as might happen, but he attacked the admiral's (*ipseius Octavii*) ship in the expectation that if the attack was successful, it might decide the battle.

⁷ I am not certain what "*ligno contineretur*" means.

taken or pierced by the beaks and sunk: the soldiers of Octavius were either killed or pitched into the sea. Octavius threw himself into a boat, and many others having done the same, the boat sunk. Octavius though he was wounded swam to his own *myoparo*,^a and when darkness put an end to the fight, he fled in the midst of a tempest. He was followed by a few of his vessels which chanced to escape.

Vatinius now gave the signal to retire and with all his vessels safe entered victoriously the harbour from which Octavius had come out to fight. In this battle Vatinius took one *quinquereme* or *penteres*, as the author names it, two *triremes*, eight *dicrotae* and many of the rowers of Octavius. He spent the next day in repairing his own and the captured vessels, and on the following advanced to the island Issa (now Lissa), for he believed that Octavius had escaped thither from the battle. This island contained the finest town in those parts and it was much attached to Octavius; but the townsmen surrendered to Vatinius and informed him that Octavius with a few small vessels had sailed with a favourable wind towards Greece, with the intention of crossing to Sicily and then to Africa. After this success, by which the province was recovered and restored to Cornificius, and the enemy's fleet was driven from the Hadriatic, Vatinius returned to Brundisium with his victorious army and his fleet all safe.

This short campaign and sea fight prove that Vatinius was a brave and skilful commander, and he did great service to Caesar's cause. We know most of him through Cicero, who once in a speech abused him unmercifully (vol. iii. 127). Whatever his faults may have been, his conduct at this time is a contrast to the mean and pitiful behaviour of the orator who was skulking at Brundisium dishonoured and disgraced.

The author of the Alexandrine War, after describing the victory of Vatinius, speaks of the behaviour of Q. Cassius Longinus, Caesar's governor in Spain up to the time (Bell. Alex. 48—50) when he levied a fifth legion. These facts are stated in chapter xix., and the narrative of the affairs in Spain is now continued here.

^a A *myoparo* is described as a light kind of vessel, such as pirates used. They are mentioned by Plutarch (Antonius, c. 35), and by other writers.

Cassius (c. 51) received orders from Caesar to take his army over the sea and march through Mauritania into the territory of Numidia, because Juba had sent a large force to Pompeius, and it was supposed that he would send more aid. We may clearly infer from this narrative that Caesar's orders were sent to Cassius before the battle of Pharsalia, and this fact is proved by a subsequent chapter (c. 56). The receipt of these instructions filled Cassius with arrogance, and he was delighted with the opportunity of visiting new provinces and so rich a kingdom. He immediately went to Lusitania to bring his legions and auxiliary troops (p. 234) : he gave orders for the preparation of supplies of grain and a hundred ships, and requisitions for money to be made, in order that everything might be ready when he returned ; and he did return sooner than he was expected, for Cassius was always active, especially when he had any profitable object in view.

When his forces were collected and he had formed a camp near Corduba he addressed the soldiers and told them what instructions he had received from Caesar : he promised every man a hundred sestertii as soon as they had landed in Mauritania : the fifth legion would remain in Spain. After addressing his troops he entered Corduba in the afternoon, and while he was on the way to the Basilica, a certain Minucius Silo, a client of L. Racilius, presented to him something in writing, as if it were a petition, such as a soldier might present ; then placing himself behind Racilius, who was on one side of Cassius, as if he were waiting for an answer, he quickly seized the opportunity of slipping between them, and holding Cassius with his left hand struck him twice with the dagger which he held in his right hand. There was a great shout and all the conspirators fell on Cassius. Munatius Flaccus pierced with his sword the nearest lictor to Cassius, and then wounded Cassius himself. Two other conspirators came to the aid of their townsman Flaccus, for all of them belonged to Italica. (Vol. i. p. 9.) Another conspirator attacked Cassius as he was lying on the ground and wounded him slightly. The attendants of Cassius hurried to protect him, for he was always accompanied by men named Berones⁹ and armed veterans ;

⁹ See the note on this word in Oudendorp's edition.

and so the rest of the conspirators were kept off, and Cassius was carried away. The assassin Minucius Silo in attempting to escape stumbled over some stones which lay in the way, and was caught and brought to Cassius. Racilius escaped to the nearest house, which belonged to a friend, and waited there to learn whether Cassius was killed.

One L. Laterensis, believing Cassius to be dead, ran to the camp to congratulate the provincial soldiers and those of the second legion, who, as he knew, heartily detested Cassius. The men raised him to the tribunal and proclaimed him praetor. Every man who was a native of the province or by long residence there had acquired the feelings of a native, and among them was the second legion, hated Cassius. The thirtieth and twenty-first legions, which Caesar assigned to Cassius, had been raised in Italy only a few months before; and the fifth, as it has been stated, was recently raised in this Spanish province. Laterensis being informed that Cassius was alive, was more grieved than frightened, and immediately went to see him. The thirtieth and twenty-first legions hearing of the attempt to assassinate the governor marched to Corduba to protect him, and they were followed by the fifth legion. The other two legions remained in the camp, but the men of the second legion fearing that they should be left alone and that thus their sentiments would be known, followed the example of the three legions. The native legion remained firm, and could not be moved by fear from their purpose.

Cassius ordered the men to be seized who were named as conspirators. He sent the fifth legion back to their camp and retained with him thirty cohorts. By the evidence of Minucius he was informed that L. Racilius and L. Laterensis and Annius Scapula, a provincial of the highest rank and character and as intimate with him as Racilius and Laterensis, were in the conspiracy, and he soon satisfied his vengeance by ordering them to be put to death. He delivered Minucius to his freedmen to be tortured, and also Calpurnius Salvianus who offered to give evidence by which he added to the number of the conspirators; and he told the truth, as some supposed, but as others say, the evidence was extorted from him. Two

other men,¹ who were tortured, named more accomplices, and Cassius ordered them to be put to death, with the exception of those who bought their lives; for the governor openly bargained with Calpurnius and Q. Sestius for large sums of money.² If these men, who were fined, were really the most guilty, the transaction is a proof that the avarice of Cassius was as great as his cruelty, since he condoned for money the hazard to his life and the pain that he suffered from his wounds.

Some days later he received a letter from Caesar which informed him of the defeat and flight of Pompeius (c. 56). As the battle of Pharsalia was fought on the ninth of August B.C. 48 of the unreformed Calendar, Cassius may have received Caesar's letter not later than the end of the month, and so we are able to fix one date in the unfortunate administration of Spain by Caesar's governor. The news gave Cassius, as the author says, both pleasure and pain: he rejoiced at hearing of the victory, but the close of the war would be the termination of his arbitrary power. When his wounds were healed, he sent for all his creditors and ordered them to give receipts for their money as if it were paid; and from those on whom he thought that he had imposed too little, he made larger requisitions. He ordered also a levy of Roman citizens from all the circuits (*conventus*) and colonies, and as these men were frightened at the prospect of crossing the sea and serving in Africa, they purchased their release; and this bargain brought in a large sum of money, but it increased the hatred against Cassius. He now reviewed all his forces, and sent the legions which he was going to lead into Africa and the auxiliary troops to the Straits. He went to Hispalis (Sevilla) on the left bank of the Baetis to inspect the fleet which he was preparing, and he stayed there, because he had published an order all through the province, that those on whom he had laid money requisitions which were not paid, must come to him.

This summons caused general alarm. In the meantime L. Titius, who had been a tribune in the native legion, reported that these men had mutinied and killed some of their cen-

¹ Perhaps there is some error in the names.

² There may be some doubt about the numerals which express the amount.

turions who would not allow the standards to be moved.³ Q. Cassius, a legatus of the governor, was in command of this legion and the thirtieth near the town Leptis; but the mutinous legion left him and went to join the second legion which was marching to the Straits by a different road. On receiving this news the governor set out by night with five cohorts of the twenty-first legion and arrived at Leptis in the morning. He stayed there that day and then went to Carmo.⁴ The thirtieth and twenty-first legions and four cohorts of the fifth and all the cavalry being assembled at Carmo, he heard that four cohorts had been surprised at Obuculum by the native legion and had gone with it to the second legion, and that all these forces had chosen as their leader T. Thorius of Italica. After hasty deliberation the governor sent M. Marcellus⁵ to Corduba to secure that town, and his legatus Q. Cassius to Hispalis. In a few days news came to Cassius that Corduba had revolted, and that Marcellus either with his own consent or by compulsion, for both things were reported, had joined the people of Corduba: it was also reported that two cohorts of the fifth legion, which were in garrison at Corduba, had joined the rebels. Cassius irritated by the intelligence struck his camp and came the next day to Segovia⁶ and the river Sacilis, where he addressed his troops for the purpose of discovering their sentiments. He found that they were faithful, and would meet any danger for the purpose of recovering the province for Caesar; he also found that they were ready to do this not for his sake; but for the sake of Caesar.

³ The first part of this chapter is corrupt. Oudendorp's reading "*nunciat famam legionem xxx . . . discessisse*" is manifestly false, for the thirtieth legion, as we see shortly after, did not revolt. Nipperdey has "*nuntiat eam a legione xxx*," an emendation, but a good one.

There is no town Leptis in Spain, and the reading is corrupt. It has been suggested that "*Leptim*" should be "*Laepam*" (*Mela*, iii. 1); but this is impossible, for Q. Cassius marched from the place, indicated by the reading "*Lep-tim*" to Carmo, and Laepa is somewhere near the east side of the Guadiana on the coast.

⁴ Carmo or Carmona is now Carmona. (Vol. i. 19.) Obuculum or Obucula is said by some authorities to be represented by Monclova.

⁵ M. Marcellus Aeserninus, Quaestor as Dion says, 42. c. 15.

⁶ There is a Segovia in Hispania Tarraconensis still named Segovia: but this place, if the name is right, is somewhere between Carmo and Corduba. The texts have "*flumen Silicense*" and "*flumen Siciliense*." It has been conjectured that it is the "*Sacilis*" of Ptolemaeus. (ii. 4. § 11.)

In the meantime Thorius brought both his legions to Corduba; and that the revolt might not be attributed to the mutinous disposition of the troops or to his own, and that he might support himself with the authority of a name against Q. Cassius, who had the advantage of acting in Caesar's name, he gave notice that he wished to recover the province for Pompeius. It is possible, says the author, that he acted through hatred of Caesar and affection for Pompeius, whose name was powerful with these legions, which M. Varro had once commanded.⁷ The soldiers, it is said, had the name of Cn. Pompeius marked on their shields.⁸ A great crowd came out of the city to meet the legions, both men, married women, and youths, and prayed the soldiers not to treat them as enemies nor to sack Corduba, for they shared the general feeling against Cassius, and begged that they might not be compelled to act against Caesar. Moved by the prayers and tears of so many suppliants, and seeing that the name of Pompeius was not wanted to aid them in their resistance to Cassius, who was equally hated by the partisans of Caesar and Pompeius, and that neither M. Marcellus nor Corduba could be induced to act against Caesar, they erased the name of Pompeius from their shields, and as Marcellus declared that he would defend Caesar's interests, they chose him as their commander, saluted him with the title of praetor, and associating the "conventus" of Corduba with their cause encamped near the city. In the course of the two days in which these events happened Cassius made his camp about four miles from Corduba, east of the Guadalquivir, in sight of the city and in a lofty position. He wrote to Bogud king of Mauritania and to M. Lepidus proconsul of Hispania Citerior,⁹ to come to his aid as soon as they could; and he ravaged the territory of Corduba and set fire to the houses. The legions, which had chosen Marcellus for their commander, being

⁷ Varro had two legions, one of which, named *Vernacula*, was raised in this province. (Chapter vi. p. 78.)

⁸ It was the custom for soldiers to mark on their shields the name of the commander under whom they served. Lipsius, *Anal. ad Militiam Romanam*, iii. Dial. ii. p. 436, referred to by Davis. See the note of Reimar, *Dion Cassius*, 42. c. 15.

⁹ Chapter vi. end p. 79.

indignant at the behaviour of Cassius, entreated Marcellus to lead them out to battle and to give them the opportunity of fighting that the lands of the citizens of Corduba might not be wasted and their property burnt before their eyes. Marcellus considered that a battle would be a most unfortunate thing, for whether he gained or lost it, the result would be a disadvantage to Caesar, and further that it was not within his authority to fight; however he led his troops across the river and made ready for battle. Seeing that Cassius placed his forces in front of his camp on the higher ground and would not come down into the plain, Marcellus persuaded his soldiers to retire to their camp. While they were retreating, Cassius, who was superior in cavalry, attacked with them the army of Marcellus and killed many on the banks of the river. Marcellus who had found out by experience the difficulty of crossing the river, removed his camp to the same side of the Guadalquivir where Cassius was, and both commanders frequently placed their armies in order of battle, but the nature of the ground prevented them from fighting. Marcellus was much stronger in infantry, for his legions were composed of veterans who had often fought. Cassius relied more on the fidelity than on the courage of his men. The two camps were near to one another, and Marcellus seized a good position for making a fort, which would enable him to prevent the enemy from getting water. Cassius fearing that he would be blockaded in a country which was hostile to him, left his camp silently by night and by a quick march reached Ulia, a town which he believed to be faithful to him. He placed his camp so near the town, that the nature of the ground, for Ulia was on a lofty hill, and the defences of the city, made him safe against any attack. Ulia was about six miles south-east of Corduba. It is supposed to be the place now called Monte Mayor. Marcellus followed, and placed his camp as near as he could to the camp of Cassius and the town of Ulia. Having examined the ground, he found that he was compelled to do exactly what he wished, to avoid a battle, for if there had been an opportunity of fighting, he could not have resisted the ardour of his men; and it was necessary also to prevent Cassius from moving about the country and doing the same

damage as he had caused in his former position. Marcellus made forts in proper positions, and connecting his works shut up Ulia and Cassius within his lines; but before they were completed, Cassius sent off all his cavalry for the purpose of preventing Marcellus from getting forage and corn, and to save himself from the necessity of feeding horses which would be of no use to him when he was blockaded. King Bogud arrived in a few days, having added to the legion which he brought several auxiliary Spanish cohorts; for, as it is usual in civil dissensions, some of the Spanish towns were in favour of Cassius, but the greater number declared for Marcellus. Bogud approached the exterior lines of Marcellus: the attack and defence were vigorously made, and both sides had sometimes the advantage; but Marcellus was never driven from his works.

In the meantime Lepidus arrived at Ulia from Hispania Citerior with thirty-five legionary cohorts and a great number of cavalry and auxiliaries. His intention was to settle the quarrel between Cassius and Marcellus without siding with either. Marcellus met Lepidus and submitted himself to his pleasure; but Cassius kept within his defences, either because he thought that more respect was due to himself than to Marcellus, or because he supposed that Lepidus was prejudiced against him by the ready submission of Marcellus. Lepidus made his camp near Ulia and acted in concert with Marcellus. He would not allow any fighting; and he invited Cassius to leave his camp under a promise of protection. Cassius hesitated a long time what he should do and how far he could trust Lepidus, but not seeing what would be the result of persisting in his resolution he asked that the works of Marcellus should be broken down and he should be allowed a free passage. The truce was made, and already men were employed in levelling the works, from which the troops had been withdrawn, when the king's auxiliaries made an attack on the fort of Marcellus which was nearest to Bogud's camp, and surprised many soldiers; for the attack was made contrary to the expectation of all persons, unless, says the author, Cassius must not be included among all, for there were suspicions about his privity to the treachery. If Lepidus had not indignantly

and quickly stopped the fight, the loss of men would have been greater.

When a road had been cleared for Cassius, Marcellus and Lepidus joined their camps, and went to Corduba with their troops, and Cassius to Carmona. About the same time C. Trebonius arrived as proconsul to take the government of the Further province. Trebonius had been praetor urbanus at Rome in B.C. 48; and, as it has been stated (p. 248), he saw Caesar at Antioch in July B.C. 47, and he reached Rome on the 14th of August. If Caesar did not hear of the misgovernment of Cassius at Alexandria, we may suppose that he did at Antioch, and that he appointed Trebonius to supersede him. It was probably late in the year that Trebonius arrived in Spain. As soon as Cassius heard of his arrival, he placed in winter quarters the legions which were with him and the cavalry; and hastily packing up his property he travelled to Malaga (Malaga) on the south coast of the province and set sail with his vessels, though the weather was bad. The reason for this hasty retreat, as he said himself, was that he would not trust himself in the power of Lepidus, Trebonius, and Marcellus; but, as his friends declared, it was because he did not choose after he had ceased to be governor to pass through a province, a large part of which had abandoned him; as others supposed, he went by sea to prevent the money which he had collected by boundless rapacity from falling into any person's hands. Cassius had a favourable voyage for the winter season, and when he had reached the Iberus (Ebro), he entered the river to pass the night there. He probably took shelter behind the island Buda which lies in front of the estuary of the Ebro. Though the weather became more tempestuous, he thought that he could continue his voyage without any greater danger, but he met with a violent swell at the mouth of the river, and being unable either to turn the vessel round on account of the strong current of the river, or to keep his course against the waves which met him right in the narrow passage between the mainland and the island, he went down in the ship and perished with all his treasures.¹

¹ This seems to be the meaning of the author, who, if he did not know the

This story of the misgovernment of Cassius may be rather tedious. The author is not a good writer, and it is not easy to interpret his narrative, and it is impossible to abridge it. We learn however something of the dreadful condition of a Roman province under a bad governor, as we have already seen in the case of Verres in Sicily (vol. iii. chap. iv.) ; and the evil was aggravated in Spain during a civil war. Cassius did great damage to Caesar's cause in the peninsula and enabled his enemies to make head against him there after his victory seemed complete. It was Caesar's misfortune to have many bad and incapable men about him. He had used them as tools to help him to power and he was obliged to employ them even when he might not have wished. Lepidus had done some service by putting an end to the civil war in Spain, but he had no claim for a triumph. However he did triumph at the close of B.C. 47, though as Dion says (43. c. 1) he had no trophies to display except the money of which he had robbed the Spaniards ; a charge which Dion would not hesitate to make without evidence, if it only enabled him to give a better turn to his sentence.

place, has accurately described the difficulty of sailing out from the mouth of the river.

CHAPTER XXII.

CAESAR IN ASIA.

B.C. 47.

CAESAR sailed ¹ from Egypt to Seleucia Pieria near Suadeiah, a little north of the mouth of the Orontes, on which river stands Antioch. While he was in this city, he saw persons from Rome, who informed him of the state of affairs, and he learned also from letters that the administration was badly conducted. In consequence of the agitation of the tribunes of the plebs there was much disturbance; and the military tribunes and commanders of legions by seeking popularity and indulging the soldiers allowed the ancient and strict military discipline to be weakened. These abuses required his presence at Rome; but his first object was to settle the provinces which he intended to visit, to secure them against internal disorder, to make all necessary regulations and to release them from fear of external enemies. He expected to be able to accomplish this matter in Syria, Cilicia, and Asia in a short time, for there was no war in these parts. In Bithynia and Pontus he saw that he would have more trouble, for he heard that Pharnaces had not quitted Pontus, nor did he expect that he would, for the king was greatly elated by his victory over Domitius Calvinus. Caesar visited most of the chief towns in Syria, rewarded those who deserved it, both individuals and communities; and heard and decided old disputes. Kings, princes (tyranni), and rulers who were near

¹ The author has said (B. A. c. 33) that Caesar went to Syria by land, which is almost certainly a mistake. Josephus (Antiq. xiv. 8. 3) says that he went by sea. He had ships enough for his few men. See B. A. c. 69, and c. 65. The statement of Appian, B. C. ii. 91, is perhaps ambiguous, certainly careless.

the borders of the province came to meet him and made their submission, and after accepting the terms imposed of protecting the province, were sent off well satisfied with the dictator and the Roman people. The author of the Alexandrine War tells us all this in a few sentences and does not enter into any particulars. He adds that Caesar stayed only a few days in Syria; but if Caesar did all that the author mentions, he may have stayed a few weeks. Josephus (*Antiq. xiv. 8, § 3*) reports that when Caesar was in Syria he rewarded Antipater for his services, and confirmed Hyrcanus in the priesthood. Antigonus the son of Aristobulus came also to complain to Caesar that his father was poisoned by means of Antipater and his brother was beheaded by Scipio, and he claimed Caesar's protection. Antipater, who was present, defended himself before Caesar, and Antigonus gained nothing by his appearance. Caesar gave Hyrcanus leave to restore the walls of Jerusalem, which had been demolished by Pompeius, and he sent this permission says Josephus to the consuls to be engraved in the Capitol. Josephus then gives the decree, but by some strange blunder he quotes an older document, which was a league of friendship between the Jews and Romans. However he gives the decree, which he intended to give, in another place (*Antiq. xiv. 10. § 5*). Caesar appointed his kinsman Sextus Caesar (*B. C. ii. 20*) commander of the forces and governor of Syria, and sailed with his fleet to Tarsus, the chief place in the Level Cilicia, on the Cydnus, which river at that time was accessible to ships, but the entrance is now closed by a bar. The cities of Cilicia were summoned to meet Caesar at Tarsus, where he settled their affairs and those of other bordering communities. But he was eager to find Pharnaces, and he went by long marches over the Taurus through Cappadocia to Mazaca.

Mazaca was situated at the base of the great volcanic mountain Argæus (Argish) about 13,000 feet high, and, as Strabo says, always crowned with snow; but the geographer is probably mistaken when he states that from the summit both the Euxine and the Mediterranean are visible. The Roman emperor Tiberius changed the name of Mazaca to Caesareia and it is now Kaisariyeh on the Kara Su, a small

stream which flows into the Halys (Kizil Ermağ). Caesar's course from Tarsus to Mazaca was due north, and Strabo estimates the distance from the Pylae Ciliciae or Cilician pass at six days' journey. The Pylae Ciliciae is the ancient name of the pass which leads from Tarsus through that part of Taurus now named the Bhulgar Dagħ or mountain. It is the pass now named Gölek Bogħaz,² by which the Younger Cyrus and his army, and afterwards Alexander descended from the table-land of Cappadocia to Tarsus and the Cilician Plains. The narrow road in one part is cut out in the rock, and the sides are as steep as a wall: it would be difficult for an army to pass, if it were in the possession of an enemy.³ The author gives no reason why Caesar went to Mazaca. He stayed there only two days, and then went to Comana of Cappadocia, as the author says (c. 66).

This Comana was in the country named Cataonia, and on the river Sarus (Sihoon) in 37° 59' N. lat., 36° 12' E. long., now Al Bostan in a deep valley, and at least eighty miles direct distance south-east of Mazaca. Comana contained (Strabo, p. 535) a temple of Enyo, or of Bellona, as the author of the Alexandrine War names her, "who is so much venerated that the priest of the goddess in dignity, authority and power was considered next to the king by the unanimous consent of the people." The priest possessed large estates and on them six thousand slaves, when Strabo visited the place, men and women who were attached to the land. This valuable preferment was generally given to a member of the royal family. It is certain that the historian of the Alexandrine War means to say that Caesar visited the Comana of Cappadocia, though it lay entirely out of his way. He adds that Caesar gave the priesthood of this Comana to Lycomedes, a Bithynian, of the royal family of Cappadocia, who had a claim to the office.⁴ But Appian states (Mithridat. c. 121)

² Bogħáz or Bogáz is the Turkish name for a mountain pass, and the outlet of a river also.

³ Carsten Niebuhr passed it in winter with a caravan. (*Reisebeschreibung*, &c. p. 107, 1837). The road is older than the time of the Younger Cyrus, but it has doubtless been improved.

⁴ In the old texts of the Alexandrine War the name is Nicomedes, not Lycomedes.

that after the defeat of Pharnaces Caesar gave to Lycomedes the priesthood of Comana of which he deprived Archelaus, the son of the Archelaus who fell in Egypt; and it is certain that this Comana was the Pontic Comana (Strabo, p. 558). If we then assume that the author of the Alexandrine War ought to have said that Caesar marched from Mazaca to Comana in Pontus, we are relieved from the difficulty of explaining why he went so far out of his way to Comana in Cappadocia, when he was in such a hurry to find Pharnaces, who was in Pontus. But if Caesar marched direct to the Pontic Comana he entered Pontus sooner than the author of the Alexandrine War supposed (c. 67). There is some confusion in the writer which it is not easy to clear up. Ariobarzanes III., king of Cappadocia, had sent aid to Pompeius (B. C. iii. 4); and Caesar now appears to have forgiven him. The author remarks that the brothers Ariobarzanes and Ariarathes had both deserved well of the "republic," by which he means Rome, but Caesar gave the kingdom to Ariobarzanes and placed Ariarathes in some kind of subjection under him. Ariarathes succeeded his brother after Caesar's death.⁵

Caesar continuing his rapid march approached the borders of Pontus and Gallo-Graecia or Galatia. Deiotarus was at that time the Tetrarch of nearly all Gallo-Graecia, though the other Tetrarchs maintained that neither by the laws nor by the usages of the country he had a title to this authority. He had however received from the Roman Senate the title of king of the Less Armenia; but now laying aside the insignia of royalty he appeared before Caesar in the guise of a criminal on his trial and a suppliant. He prayed Caesar to pardon him, in that his country being in a part of the world where Caesar had no troops, he had been in the army of Pompeius (p. 203), for it was not his business to make himself a judge of the disputes of the Roman people, but to obey those who were possessed of the power. Caesar replied by mentioning the many services which he had rendered to Deiotarus when he was consul in B.C. 59, and told him that nothing could excuse his imprudence, for a man of so much judgment and so

⁵ This passage (c. 66) is not intelligible, and perhaps something has been lost. See Oudendorp's note.

careful might have known who was in possession of Rome and Italy, where the Senate and the Roman people were, and the seat of the commonwealth; and lastly who were consuls after L. Lentulus and C. Marcellus:⁶ still he was willing to pardon Deiotarus in consideration of his past services, old hospitality, and friendship, his rank and age, and the entreaties of numerous friends of Deiotarus who had come together to intercede for him: he said that he would settle the disputes among the Tetrarchs at a future time. He restored to Deiotarus his royal dress, and ordered him to bring his native legion, which he had armed and trained in Roman fashion, and all his cavalry.

Caesar's troops were few and they had little military experience, with the exception of the sixth legion, which he had brought from Alexandria, a legion composed of veterans which had suffered much hardship and in consequence of losses in marching by land and sea voyages and numerous battles was now so greatly reduced that it did not muster a thousand men. He had three other legions, one belonging to Deiotarus, and two which had been in the battle between Domitius and Pharnaces. When Caesar had entered Pontus and collected these forces in one place, ambassadors came from Pharnaces and earnestly entreated him not to come as an enemy, for Pharnaces would obey his orders; and the ambassadors particularly urged that Pharnaces had refused to aid Pompeius against Caesar, and that Deiotarus, who had assisted Pompeius, had been pardoned. Caesar answered that he would deal most equitably with Pharnaces if he would do what he promised to do; but he admonished the ambassadors mildly, as was his custom, not to urge what Caesar had done in the case of Deiotarus, nor to boast too much of the service which they had done to him by not sending aid to Pompeius; he never did anything with more pleasure than pardoning suppliants, but he could not condone the wrongs done to the people in the Roman provinces even by those who had done services to himself: further, that in not sending aid to Pompeius Pharnaces had done what was more advantageous to himself, for he had thus escaped a defeat, than to Caesar to whom the immortal gods had given the victory: he would

⁶ Caesar himself and P. Servilius.

pardon Pharnaces for the grievous wrongs inflicted by him on the Roman citizens who were engaged in commerce in Pontus, since he could not repair the injuries which he had done, for he could neither restore life to those who had been killed nor their virility to those whom he had mutilated, a punishment worse than death which some Roman citizens had endured: but Pharnaces must quit Pontus immediately, send back the slaves belonging to the Publicani and restore to the allies and to Roman citizens all that he had taken from them: when he had done this, then he might send to Caesar the presents and the gifts which successful commanders were accustomed to receive from friends. Pharnaces had in fact sent a golden crown. With this answer Caesar dismissed the king's ambassadors.

Pharnaces promised everything, for he hoped that, as Caesar was in a hurry to leave Pontus, he would the more readily trust him, because Caesar could then the sooner and with more credit set out to look after urgent business, for it was well known that his presence was required at Rome. For these reasons Pharnaces began to show less readiness about quitting Pontus, to ask for more time, to cause delay by proposing new terms, and finally to elude his engagements. Caesar, who discovered the king's tricks, was thus compelled to do what on other occasions his natural temperament generally led him to do: he resolved to fight a battle sooner than was expected. There was a town in Pontus named Zela (Zilleh), situated in a plain, but in a strong position, for a natural elevation, which had the appearance of being the work of man's hands and was surrounded by steep sides, supported the town wall. Round the town there were many lofty hills intersected by valleys. One of these hills higher than the rest was famous in those parts for the victory of Mithridates over C. Triarius and the defeat of a Roman army (vol. iii. p. 99); and it was nearly united to the hill on which the town stood by high ground where there was also a road. This hill was not more than three miles from Zela, and Pharnaces occupied it with all his force and repaired the works of his father's former camp. Caesar, who had placed his camp five miles from the position of Pharnaces, observed that the valleys which protected the

king's camp, would also protect his own if the enemy did not first occupy certain parts which were much nearer to the king's camp. Accordingly he ordered fascines and other material to be brought within his camp, which was soon done; and on the next night during the fourth watch taking his legions without encumbrance and leaving his baggage in the camp, at break of day and without being seen by the enemy he got possession of the same spot where Mithridates defeated Triarius. To this place he ordered the slaves to carry all the material which had been collected, that no soldier might be required to leave his work at the new camp, since only a valley not more than a mile wide separated the enemy's camp from the new works of Caesar.

At daybreak as soon as Pharnaces saw what was going on, he drew up all his troops in front of his camp. As the ground between the two camps was so unfavourable for an attack, Caesar supposed that Pharnaces rather brought out his troops in conformity with military custom than for the purpose of fighting, and that his purpose was either to retard Caesar's works by making him keep more men under arms, or to show the king's confidence and that he might not be supposed to trust to his defences more than to his men. Accordingly Caesar was not deterred from drawing up his first line in front of his works and keeping the rest of the army employed at them. It is uncertain what were the reasons which led Pharnaces to determine to fight; it may be that he was induced by the good fortune which had attended his father in this place, or by auspices and favourable religious signs, or because he had discovered the small number of Caesar's troops under arms, after supposing on former days that the great number of men who were carrying fascines were soldiers; or he may have been moved by confidence in his veteran army, which, as his legati boasted, had often conquered,⁷ and by contempt for Caesar's troops, which had been defeated under Domitius. Whatever were his motives, he began to descend the rugged valley. For some time Caesar smiled with contempt at the king's idle display, for he was crowding his troops into a position in which no man in his senses would have placed them.

⁷ There may be some corruption here in the text.

In the meantime Pharnaces continued to advance at the same pace with which he had descended into the valley, and began to march up the opposite ascent with his men in order of battle.

Caesar, who was surprised at this incredible rashness or confidence, being attacked thus unexpectedly before he was prepared, summoned his soldiers from their work, ordered them to arm, placed the legions before the enemy and formed his order of battle. The suddenness of the attack and the hurry of the preparation struck great terror into Caesar's men; and before they were placed in order the king's chariots armed with scythes threw them into confusion; but the chariots were soon checked by a shower of missiles. The ranks of the enemy followed close upon the chariots; and the battle began with loud cries. Caesar's men were aided by the nature of the ground for they were above the enemy; but they were assisted most, as the author observes, by the favour of the immortal gods, who are present and active in all the events of war, and particularly on those occasions when man's prudence or foresight could do nothing.*

The fight was fierce and hand to hand. The advantage was first gained on Caesar's right wing, where the sixth legion was posted, for there the enemy were pushed down the hill. It was some time before Caesar's left wing and the centre, though the gods still continued to assist, could rout the troops of the king which were opposed to them. They had made their way up the hill with ease, because they were not opposed, but when they were driven back, they soon felt the consequences of being on such ground. Many of them were killed and many were trampled down in the confusion: those who escaped by their activity and by throwing away their arms got safe across the valley, but though they thus gained the higher ground they could do nothing without their arms. Caesar's men elated with the victory mounted the slope of the hill and attacked the enemy's camp, where Pharnaces had left some cohorts to protect it, but the camp was soon taken. All his men being killed or captured Pharnaces fled with a

* The author in his pious reflection follows the example of Caesar in several passages of his history of the Gallic War.

few horsemen; and if the attack on his camp had not given him the opportunity of escaping, he would have fallen into Caesar's hands, as the author says. It would have been worth while to postpone the attack on the camp, in order to seize the king, if the author's statement is true; but in the confusion of a battle a general cannot be everywhere nor direct every thing.*

The battle was fought on the 2nd of August of the unreformed Calendar. The booty was given to Caesar's soldiers.¹ Caesar did not destroy the trophies of Mithridates, but he placed his own near them. Appian states (Mithrid. c. 120) that Pharnaces escaped with a thousand horsemen to Sinope (Sinub), and Caesar not having time to follow sent Cn. Domitius after him. The king it is said, surrendered Sinope to Domitius on condition of being allowed to depart with his cavalry; but he killed all the horses much against the will of the riders, and embarking sailed to the kingdom of the Bosporus, and with the aid of some Scythians and Sauromatae took Theodosia and Panticapaeum. The rebel Asander attacked Pharnaces, whose horsemen for want of horses were useless. Pharnaces lost his life in the battle at the age of fifty having been king of Bosporus fifteen years (Appian, Mithridat. c. 120).

Mithridates of Pergamum was rewarded for his services in Egypt by a part of Gallo-Graecia, the country of the Trocmi, which Caesar took from Deiotarus; and by the gift of the kingdom of Bosporus. But it was necessary for Mithridates to take the kingdom which was held by Asander. To raise money for the war Mithridates plundered the temple of Leucothea in Colchis, which Pharnaces had already robbed;

* Drumann (Geschichte Roms, Julii, p. 556) has some remarks on Caesar's strategy. The critic has often shown that he believes that he has some military skill. This is the battle which Caesar is said to have announced to a friend at Rome in three words, Veni, Vidi, Vici (Suetonius, Caesar, 35, 37). Davis (Caesar, Oudend. p. 992) has perhaps rightly explained these words. The battle was not very easily won, and it was gained by Caesar's superior military skill.

¹ Dion, 42. c. 49; Appian, B. C. ii. 91, whose description of the battle is entirely false. He did not find anything like his description in the author of the Alexandrine War.

but Mithridates lost his life in the attempt to take the kingdom of Bosphorus, and Asander remained in possession of it.

Caesar gave to Ariobarzanes the Less Armenia, which Deiotarus lost. The fidelity of Amisus was rewarded by the gift of freedom: it was made what the Romans called a *Libera civitas*.

Caesar left two legions in Pontus under Caelius Vinicianus, and sent the sixth legion to Italy to receive the rewards which they had well earned by their services. Domitius was commissioned to look after the general administration of the country. Caesar set out with some light cavalry, through Gallo-Graecia and Bithynia to the province Asia; and he heard and settled all matters of controversy in those parts (Bell. Alex. c. 78). It was at this time probably that Caesar, who claimed descent from Iulus and was therefore a kinsman of the people of Ilion, gave to them land, freedom (*Libertas*) and immunity from taxes, which privileges the place possessed at the time when Strabo wrote his thirteenth book (Strabo, p. 595).

Dion (42. c. 49) says that Caesar carried home with him a great deal of money. His demands were large, and made on all kinds of pretexts, according to his practice. He exacted all the money which had been promised to Pompeius; and we may assume that Ariobarzanes did not get the Less Armenia for nothing. Dion states that he took all the offerings in the temple of Hercules at Tyre, because the Tyrians had received the wife and child of Pompeius when they fled from Egypt. If this was so, it may have happened when Caesar was in Syria. The plundering of this temple may be true; but the reason, which Dion gives, is probably false. Caesar received also golden crowns for his victories from princes. Dion says that Caesar did not do all this through badness, which probably means "greediness," but his expenditure was great, and he still wanted money for his armies and his future triumph; "and to say all in a few words, Caesar was a money-making man, for it was his maxim that there were two things by which power was got and kept, men and money, and these two things supported one another; for armies were kept together by money and money was got by arms; and

that if either of them was deficient, the other would perish with it. About these two things he thought and spoke always to this intent." This is a just remark. Caesar always looked after money as the means of war, and men as the means of getting money.²

According to Dion, Caesar sailed from Bithynia to Greece and thence to Italy. Drumann observes that M. Brutus wrote that Caesar sailed past Lesbos, at which time M. Marcellus (consul, B.C. 51) was residing at Mitylene after the battle of Pharsalia (Seneca, *Consol. ad Helviam*, c. 9).

² Machiavelli, *Discorsi* ii. 10, has an essay entitled "I danari non sono il nervo della guerra, secondo che è la comune opinione."

CHAPTER XXIII.

CAESAR IN ROME.

B.C. 47.

No news of Caesar reached Italy from the 13th of December B.C. 48 to the middle of June in the next year. Cicero was living at Brundisium in anxious expectation. On the 4th of July (B.C. 47) he informs Atticus that there was a report that Caesar had left Alexandria; but he adds that he did not know whether he wished the news to be true or false, for it did not concern him at all. On the 12th of August Cicero informs his wife that he had received a satisfactory letter from Caesar, who was expected soon, and that he would let her know as soon as he had determined, whether he would go to meet him or wait for him. Near the end of the month he tells Atticus that Caesar was detained in Asia by Pharnaces, and it was expected that he would return by way of Patrae in the Peloponnesus, and pass over to Sicily for the purpose of sailing thence to Africa, where his enemies had rallied. Quintus, the son of Cicero's brother, had already seen Caesar at Antioch, and he and Hirtius had easily obtained the pardon of Quintus the father,¹ but nothing was said about Cicero himself (Ad Att. xi. 21. 3).

Dolabella, Cicero's son-in-law, who was a Tribune of the Plebs, a profligate man, loaded with debt, attempted to repeal Caesar's arrangements between debtors and creditors (p. 113), and he also proposed to relieve tenants from payment of a year's rent to their landlords, as M. Caelius had proposed the year before (Dion Cassius, 42. c. 32). Cicero was much disturbed by the behaviour of Dolabella (Ad Attic. xi. 12. 4,

¹ Quintus left Italy with his brother (p. 121) in B.C. 49.

and 23), and he corresponded with Atticus about Dolabella's misconduct in other matters also, and the propriety of his daughter Tullia being divorced from him. But in this as in all other things at this time he was irresolute: he wished to obtain Caesar's pardon, and did not venture to do anything that might displease the conqueror or his adherents. There is a letter extant from Cicero to his wife (*Ad Fam.* xiv. 13)² about the divorce of Tullia, in which he says that it will be better not to proceed in the matter, if it is likely to irritate Dolabella, and that perhaps Dolabella may do the thing himself. Dolabella's attempts were resisted by those, who would have been losers if he succeeded, and they secured the support of the tribune L. Trebellius. The opposite factions took up arms, and M. Antonius, the master of the horse (*magister equitum*) and Caesar's representative, was prevented by a mutiny of the legions in Campania from immediately stopping the tumults in the city.

Antonius had brought these legions from Pharsalia, and they now refused further service until they had received the lands and the money which had been promised to them. The twelfth legion was most active in the mutiny, and it was joined by the tenth, Caesar's favourite legion. The military tribunes through fear had neglected to stop the mutiny at first, and Antonius after appointing his uncle L. Caesar (consul B.C. 64) superintendent of Rome went to visit the legions. L. Caesar, now an old man, was treated with contempt by the factions in Rome and the tumults continued until it was reported that Caesar had settled the affairs of Egypt and was returning home; but when it was known that he had gone into Asia, the factions renewed their quarrels. Antonius could not pacify the legions; and it appears that Caesar, when he was at Antioch, heard of the mutiny, for he sent M. Gallius to conduct the men to Sicily (*Cicero ad Att.* xi. 20). In the meantime P. Sulla, the nephew of the Dictator Sulla and Valerius Messala went to the mutineers, but the twelfth legion pelted Sulla with stones, as it was said.

Antonius being unable to stop the factions in the city and

² P. Manutius has incorrectly referred this letter to the matter of Cicero's own divorce from his wife, which event belongs to a later time.

finding that he had lost his popularity with the common sort by opposing Dolabella, now took his side, and charged Trebellius with seducing the soldiers; for the senate had allowed Antonius to bring soldiers into Rome and in conjunction with the rest of the tribunes he was commissioned to protect the city. However Antonius soon discovered that Dolabella was the people's favourite and did not care for him, and that he was blamed by the senate for allowing the riots. He therefore pretended to remain neutral, but he permitted Trebellius to employ soldiers and looked on while the two factions fought. Blood was shed and houses were fired; and so great was the danger that the sacred things were carried out of Vesta's temple for safety.

At this time Antonius discovered or pretended to discover an intrigue between Dolabella and his wife Antonia whom he divorced. Antonia was the daughter of C. Antonius, Cicero's colleague in the consulship (B.C. 63), and the cousin of her husband.² Antonius now exercised his authority with vigour against Dolabella and he filled the city with soldiers with the consent of the senate. Dolabella still persisted in his resolution to carry his proposed measures and gave notice that he would take the popular vote on them. When the day came, his partisans closed the approaches to the Forum and in some parts built wooden towers, with the intention of attacking those who should resist the enactment of Dolabella's bill. At daybreak Antonius came down from the Capitol with a large body of soldiers, destroyed the wooden tablets on which Dolabella's bills were written, in conformity with the usual practice, and as some of Dolabella's party still continued the disturbance, he pitched them down from the Capitol, as Dion reports. Another authority (Livy, *Epit.* 113) states that eight hundred men lost their lives on this day in Rome. But the rioters were not deterred by this severe punishment, and Rome was still disturbed by the factions until the master returned before he was expected, and the disorders immediately ceased.

² Cicero (*Phil.* ii. 38) affirms that Antonia was innocent, but he also says that Antonius made the charge in a full senate and in the father's presence (Jan. 1, B.C. 44). It is safer to believe neither Cicero nor Antonius.

On the 1st of October (B.C. 47) Cicero, who had removed from Brundisium to Venusia, wrote to tell his wife that he would be at his Tusculan villa in a few days, and he asked her to make the place ready for him and some friends who might be with him. Perhaps he had seen Caesar before he wrote this short letter. Caesar landed at Tarentum and Cicero went from Brundisium to meet him, as Plutarch apparently means (Cicero, c. 39). He expected to be pardoned, but he felt ashamed to meet the conqueror in the presence of many witnesses. When Caesar saw Cicero coming at some distance before the rest, he got down and embraced him, and they walked together alone for some distance. Cicero has left no record of the conversation; but we may assume that Caesar forgave the past, and was as anxious to have Cicero's support now as he had been at the beginning of the Civil war. Before the end of the year Cicero returned to Rome.

Instead of proscriptions and bloodshed, as some expected or pretended to expect, Caesar did not trouble himself about what had taken place in his absence, nor make any particular inquiry into it. He was content to find that all was now quiet; and neither M. Antonius nor even Dolabella was censured. The dictator was not only a man of easy temper in many things, but exceedingly prudent. He had still many enemies to deal with, and he required the assistance of all his friends.

C. Sallustius Crispus was sent to the mutineers in Campania to confirm the promises which Caesar made after the battle of Pharsalia, and to promise more when the war in Africa should be ended, and an additional sum of one thousand denarii to every soldier. The men replied that they would have no more promises, and they demanded immediate payment. Sallustius with difficulty escaped from the mutineers, who pursued him towards Rome, and on the way committed great excesses. Two Senators, Cosconius and Galba, who fell into their hands were murdered. Caesar allowed the men to approach Rome, but he took the legion which Antonius had employed for the protection of the city and stationed it at the various outlets of Rome to prevent the mutineers from plundering. He

was advised not to expose himself to the fury of the exasperated soldiers, but he came among them in the Campus Martius without giving notice and ascended a tribunal.⁴ The men hurried together without their arms and saluted their general with the title of Imperator. He asked them what they wanted. They said nothing about the promised rewards, for they were confounded by Caesar's unexpected appearance, but they called out that they wished to be released from service: they thought that he would say something about the promised rewards, because he would require their services again. But contrary to their expectation and without hesitation Caesar replied, "I release you." The men were confounded by the answer contained in a single word (*dimitto*), and there was profound silence, till Caesar added, "I will give you all that I promised, when I shall have triumphed with other soldiers." This generous answer surprised them, and they began to be ashamed and to reflect with some feeling of jealousy that they were going to desert their general in the midst of such a war, that others instead of themselves would walk in the triumph, that they would lose the profits of the African campaign, and become hateful both to Caesar and those of the opposite party. But they still remained silent not knowing what to say, and hoping that Caesar would change his purpose when he had such heavy business on his hands. Caesar remained silent also, and when his friends urged him to say something more and not to leave his old soldiers with a few harsh words, he began again, but now he addressed them by the name of "Quirites," and not of soldiers,

⁴ The story of Caesar and the mutineers is told by Dion and by Appian, and it is a good example of the different manners of two late Greek compilers. Dion (42 c. 52, &c.) uses more words, and often gives an appearance of truth to his narrative by an enumeration of particulars. Appian (B.C. ii. 93) is shorter, more simple, and sometimes makes his narrative more striking by his simplicity. I am inclined to think that he followed his authorities more closely than Dion.

Dion says that when the soldiers were in the suburbs, Caesar sent to ask them what they had come for, and the answer was that they would tell nobody except himself, upon which he permitted them to enter the city with their swords only. The historian remarks that the soldiers were used to carry their swords in the city at other times, and that they would not have consented to enter Rome without them on the present occasion. It is very improbable that Caesar would allow the mutineers to enter the city, if he could keep them out.

which was an indication that they were released from military service and were only citizens. Unable to endure this treatment, the men called out that they were sorry for what they had done and prayed that they might join the expedition. But Caesar turned his back on them and descended from the tribunal, upon which the men still more earnestly prayed him to stay and punish the guilty. Still he did not move, but pretended to hesitate. At last he returned, and said that he would not punish any man, but he was grieved that the tenth legion, which he had always distinguished by his favour, should have been among the mutineers; "This," he said, "is the only legion that I shall dismiss, but still when I return from Africa I will give these men what I have promised: I will also give lands to all when the war is over; not by taking it from others, as Sulla did, but I will give them public land and my own too, and if this is not enough, I will buy what is wanting. This declaration was followed by clapping of hands and joyful acclamation; but the men of the tenth legion were greatly troubled that they were the only offenders whom Caesar would not pardon, and they entreated him to punish them by decimation. Caesar now saw that there was no advantage in further irritating men who sincerely repented, and he pardoned all.

This was a greater victory than Pharsalia, an evidence of Caesar's presence of mind, of his confidence in himself, his excellent judgment in knowing when it was prudent to yield, and in always subjecting passion and resentment to his interest. But he did not forget a wrong, as we see in the case of Dumnorix in the Gallic war, and he punished when the proper season came (vol. iv. 202). The ringleaders in the mutiny in Italy were punished during the African war (Bell. Afr. c. 54); and some of the soldiers at the final settlement lost a third of the promised reward (Suetonius, Caesar, c. 70).⁵

Caesar's annual dictatorship ended in September B.C. 47.

⁵ Dion Cassius (42. c. 55) speaks of a settlement being made with some of the men now; but it is certain that his narrative is false. Caesar had neither time nor means nor inclination for such business when he was preparing for the African War. Plutarch (Caesar, c. 51) has the same as Dion.

It was the first dictatorship which lasted a year. Caesar was again appointed dictator for another year and consul for B.C. 46, the third time. M. Aemilius Lepidus was his colleague, who had an unmerited triumph for what he had done in Spain (p. 289). Dion (43. c. 1) reckons Caesar's third dictatorship and his third consulship as being held together; from which it appears that he included the dictatorship of B.C. 49 which Caesar held only eleven days. The medal, which names Caesar Dictator ii. and Consul iii., evidently only reckons the annual dictatorships.

Caesar was now busy with raising money for the African war, and Dion has described in general and very loose terms how he did it. He borrowed money, as the historian states, both from individuals and cities; but the name of loan was given to forced contributions which would never be repaid. He did not however behave as Marius and Sulla had done, though he sold the property of some of his opponents, who were still in arms. The property of Cn. Pompeius was sold, and M. Antonius and P. Dolabella were purchasers. Dion (42. c. 50) states that some of the confiscated property was sold for more than it was worth, for the buyers expected that they would not pay for it; but Caesar made them all pay. Dolabella bought the villas of Pompeius at Formiae and Alba. It is difficult to understand how he could pay for them; and more difficult still to conceive that Caesar who wanted money, would let him take possession of the property without payment. Antonius bought the house of Cn. Pompeius at Rome, but, says Plutarch, "he was vexed when he was asked for the money; and he says himself that this was the reason why he did not join Caesar in his African expedition, having had no reward for his former successes." It appears however that Antonius was in possession of the house of Pompeius⁶ after Caesar's death, and of other property which had belonged to Pompeius, if we may trust Dion (45. c. 9). P. Sulla was also a purchaser of confiscated property. He had bought in the time of his kinsman the Dictator Sulla, and he bought again thirty-six years after at the more infamous sales of Caesar, as

⁶ Cic. Phil. ii. 25, 27 and xiii. 5.

Cicero (*De Offic.* ii. 8) names them. The author of the African War (e. 64) says that Caesar also made money requisitions at Rome, and upon his adversaries, as we may assume. Caesar steadily refused the demands of the people for the abolition of all claims for debt: he said that he was in debt himself, and of course he wished the people to understand that he would not rid himself of his obligations in this dishonest way. But he did something for the Romans. He relieved them, at the expense of the creditors, of all payments for interest of money which had become due since the commencement of the war with Pompeius; and he relieved tenants, at the expense of landlords, of one year's rent up to the amount of five hundred denarii⁷ (*Dion*, 42, c. 51). He also caused a new valuation of properties to be made at the present time, when property, as we may suppose, had fallen in value; and this was done with reference to the law which was passed for the purpose of making a settlement between debtors and creditors after his return from Spain (p. 113).

Caesar satisfied others in a cheaper way. Fufius Calenus, and Caesar's old friend P. Vatinius, who had served him well in the late war, were raised to the consulship during the last few days of the year 47, in which year there were no regular consuls.⁸ C. Sallustius, who had been ejected from the senate (B.C. 50) by the censor Appius Claudius (vol. iv. 400), regained admission to the senate by being made a praetor. As men are pleased now with titles, so they were in those days. For the year B.C. 46 ten praetors were appointed, or two more than the old number. The Dictator Sulla increased the number of members of the colleges of Pontifices, of the Augurs, and of the keepers of the Sibylline books to fifteen (vol. ii. 419); and Caesar now added one more member to each of these three colleges. *Dion* (43. c. 51) states that he afterwards added three members to the Septemviri Epulonum, and it has been conjectured that the addition was made in this year (B.C. 47), but it is impossible to determine from *Dion's* words, for he speaks (43. c. 51) of one member being

⁷ Compare *Sueton. Caesar*, c. 38, who assigns this event to B.C. 46, incorrectly as I think.

⁸ *Macrob. Sat.* ii. 3. Cicero's jokes on the short consulship of P. Vatinius.

also added to the Quindecemviri or keeper of the Sibylline books, though in the passage (42. c. 51) he speaks of this having been done already.

These changes were of small importance; but Caesar destroyed the character of the Senate, the governing body of Rome, which for centuries had maintained the dignity of the Roman State, though it was no longer what it had once been. Many of the senators had perished in the civil war, some were in exile, and others in arms against him. The vacant places were given to equites who had served Caesar, centurions, and even to soldiers of lower rank, as Dion says (42. c. 51).

Caesar dealt with the provinces in the same arbitrary manner. M. Brutus, whom Caesar had pardoned after the battle of Pharsalia, had the province of Gallia Cisalpina for the next year B.C. 46, and it is said that he administered it well. Decimus Brutus, who had served under Caesar in Gallia and later also, was again made governor of Transalpine Gallia, where he suppressed a rising of the Bellovaci. Alienus, who had been praetor in B.C. 49, had Sicily; and Servius Sulpicius, the great lawyer, and a friend of Cicero, was made governor of Achaia.* Syria was under the administration of Sextus Julius Caesar (p. 291), who was murdered in B.C. 46 by the intrigues of Caecilius Bassus.

* In a letter (Ad Fam. vi. 6, 10) in which Cicero speaks of the appointment of Sulpicius he also speaks of the "mild and merciful temper" of Caesar. He admires the dignity, justice, and wisdom of Caesar, who never mentions Pompeius, except in the most honourable terms; and, "if," he says, "personally he acted in many respects hardly towards Pompeius," I answer, "that this was the act of arms and of victory, not of Caesar."

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE AFRICAN WAR.

B.C. 48—46.

THE battle of Pharsalia dispersed the partisans of Pompeius. Labienus, and L. Afranius, whom Caesar had set free after his surrender in Spain, escaped to Dyrrhachium; where they were joined by Metellus Scipio, the father-in-law of Pompeius. The fugitives sailed from Dyrrhachium to the fleet at Corcyra, where most of the ships of Pompeius assembled, when the disaster at Pharsalia became known. They fled in terror and confusion, as if they expected that Caesar would surprise them: the corn was taken from the granaries and scattered over the streets of Dyrrhachium; and as they looked back from the sea in the darkness of night on the town, it was lighted by the flames of the burning store-ships which the soldiers had fired because the vessels would not follow. The Rhodian fleet deserted and went home (Cicero, *De Divin.* i. 32). D. Laelius also came to Corcyra with the fleet from Brundisium, and C. Cassius from the Straits of Sicily. Cn. Pompeius, the elder son of Pompeius Magnus, had been on the coast of Epirus with the Egyptian fleet, and had burnt Caesar's vessels at Oricum (p. 157). It is also said that he made an attempt on Brundisium; but when the news of his father's defeat arrived, and the Egyptian fleet sailed home, he joined Cato (Dion, 42. c. 12). M. Octavius also sailed to Corcyra from the Illyrian coast (p. 280). Appian's statement that Cato had been left by Pompeius at Corcyra with another army is not true, as we know; and we cannot accept his assertion that Cato had three hundred ships.

A council of war was held at Corcyra for the appointment

of a leader and for determining what should be done. It was proposed that Cato should take the command, but it is hardly credible, for he had no military ability and he disliked war. Cato, who had only praetorian rank, proposed a man more incompetent than himself, but he was of consular rank, M. Tullius Cicero, who had received the title of Imperator for his Cilician victories, and long after his return from his province had carried about with him his lictors and his withered bays. Finally he had joined Pompeius at Dyrrhachium, where he was useless and made himself disagreeable (Plutarch, Cicero, c. 38). But Cicero was too timid and too prudent to put himself at the head of a desperate cause, and he not only refused the honour, but declared that he would not join the armament.¹ We have only the authority of Plutarch (Cicero, c. 39) for the statement that Pompeius' son Cnaeus and his friends called Cicero a traitor, and would have killed him if Cato had not interposed. The fact is not improbable, for Cicero's conduct justified the charge of treason to the cause of Pompeius, and perhaps some passages in his letters may allude to this attempt on his life. Cicero found his way to Brundisium, where he passed a wretched time until September of the next year (B.C. 47) when the generous conqueror gave him a pardon which he did not deserve (p. 304).

The narratives of the compilers give a very imperfect account of the movements of the Pompeians after the meeting at Coreyra. Cassius sailed towards Pontus and submitted to Caesar (p. 238). Scipio sailed to the province Africa with the expectation of being supported by Attius Varus (p. 80) and King Juba. Cn. Pompeius, the elder son of Magnus, and Labienus went to Spain, as Appian states (B.C. ii. 87), and got together a force of Iberians and Celtiberians. But Labienus was afterwards engaged in the African war, and it is doubtful if he carried troops thither from Spain; for Plutarch (Cato, c. 56) says that Labienus sailed to Cyrene in Africa and that the citizens refused to receive him. Cato also sailed to Africa, and as he was coasting along fell in with Sextus, the younger son of Magnus, who informed him of his father's death.²

¹ Letter to Atticus, xi. 7. 3.

² According to Lucanus, *Pharsalia*, ix. 40, Cato sailed to Phycus, a port in

Cato continued his course to Cyrene, where he was received by the inhabitants. From Cyrene he marched west with his men to join Scipio in the province of Africa. The march was in the winter through the desert, seven days in succession, says Plutarch; but seven days would not bring Cato near to the province of Africa. Lucan says that he sailed from Cyrene as far as the coast near the lake Tritonis, where he was stopped by the bad weather; and he and his men marched the rest of the distance and ultimately reached Leptis the smaller (Lemta) on the coast.²

Some time early in B.C. 47 Cato joined his countrymen in the province Africa. Scipio and Varus could not agree, and were severally trying to gain the favour of King Juba, whose arrogance was increased when he saw two Romans of high rank courting himself who was a barbarian. Varus was propraetor of the province Africa, and Scipio probably claimed precedence as a proconsul. At the first interview between Juba and Cato, the king placed his seat between Cato and Scipio, but Cato set things right by moving his seat to the other side and thus leaving Scipio in the middle, in the place of honour. Cato, it is said, was invited by the troops to take the command, and Scipio and Varus were willing to give it up to him; but this is not probable. It is neither probable that Cato was invited to command, nor is it probable that Scipio would have consented to serve under him. The same story is told again of Cato refusing this proffered honour, because he was only a propraetor and Scipio was a proconsul. Whatever the facts may have been, Scipio got the command of the troops, and the great name which he bore encouraged most of his followers to expect that he would be as victorious in Africa as his great ancestors had been.

Cyrenaica and thence to Paliurus, east of Phycus. While Cato was at Paliurus, Cornelia and her son Sextus, as the poet says, arrived in the ship in which they had fled from Egypt (p. 119). See the note on Palinurus, ed. Oud.

² Lucan after conducting Cato's fleet as far as the lake Tritonis and sending him forward by land, invents a visit of Cato to the temple of Jupiter Ammon, which Labienus had earnestly advised. But Cato refused to consult the god (Lucan, ix. 565 &c.) and made a Catonic speech on the occasion. The poet's ignorance of African geography is only equalled by the tedious bombast of his poetry, which is past reading and sometimes past all understanding.

Plutarch reports that Scipio wished to please King Juba by putting to death all the people of Utica who were capable of bearing arms and destroying the city because it was favourable to Caesar. It is probable that Juba did wish to destroy Utica, which was the strongest position of the Romans in their province Africa, and the place from which Juba's kingdom could most easily be attacked; but it is difficult to believe that Scipio wished to destroy a town in which he had large stores and which would always be a safe place of retreat. We may admit that the people of Utica hated Juba, for they well knew the cruel character of the barbarian (p. 94), and that they did not like Scipio. Dion states (42. c. 57) that Utica was suspected of being in favour of Caesar, and he adds the vague words that for this reason it narrowly escaped destruction, but it was saved by Cato's intercession, and placed under his command. Cato furnished the place with corn, and strengthened the walls; he also made deep ditches and ramparts in front of the town and assigned this new quarter to those who were able to bear arms, but he made them give up their arms; from which it appears that his object was to secure himself against those who were of military age. He kept the rest of the citizens within the walls and took care that they suffered no harm from the Romans. He also got advances of money from the Roman citizens who were settled in Utica, and are named the three hundred by the author of the African War, who also gives them the name of senate.

Plutarch, who has taken great pains with his life of Cato, reports that he advised Scipio not to fight with Caesar, but to prolong the war as the only way of getting the advantage over such an enemy. But Scipio, who was an arrogant man, despised the advice, and even upbraided Cato with cowardice in that he, not content with being safe within the walls of Utica, would not let others boldly use their own judgment. Plutarch further states that Cato then declared that he was ready to take his troops to Italy and so make Caesar turn from Scipio to him. Scipio rejected the proposal contemptuously; he must indeed have seen that Caesar would not trouble himself, if Cato did invade Italy. Caesar could not fear the man

who had fled from Sicily before Curio (p. 36) : and he knew, as every man knew, that though Cato was not a coward, he was not a soldier.

In a letter written at Rome during the African campaign (Ad Fam. v. 21. 3) Cicero informs a friend that he is waiting for the result of the war ; and he pretends to be calm. There is a great difference, he says, between the cause of Caesar and his adversaries, but he thinks that it will make no great difference which gains the victory. He says this after he had seen the clemency of Caesar to himself and even to those who had been in arms against him, and after often declaring that the Pompeian party always threatened to make a cruel use of victory.

When Caesar was ready to set out to Africa, and a sacrifice was prepared, the victim fled from the altar ; and the chief Haruspex advised him not to depart before the shortest day. But no unlucky omens or superstitious belief ever deterred Caesar from his purpose. He marched without intermission from Rome to Rhegium, crossed the Straits to Messana, and arrived at Lilybaeum (Cape Boeo) on the 17th of December, B.C. 47 of the unreformed Calendar. It was his intention to embark immediately, though he had with him only one legion of new recruits and about six hundred horsemen. His tent was pitched on the shore close to the sea in order to show his men that they must be in readiness. It happened that the weather was unfavourable, but he kept the rowers and soldiers in the vessels and looked out for every opportunity to embark. It was reported to him that his opponents in Africa had a very numerous body of cavalry, four legions belonging to King Juba, a great force of light-armed troops, ten legions of Scipio, one hundred and twenty elephants, and a large fleet. In the meantime Caesar's vessels arrived daily, both ships of war and transports, with new recruits, the fifth legion of veterans and two thousand horsemen. He had now six legions, which as they arrived were put on board the ships of war, and the horsemen on board the transports. The greater part of the ships were sent to the island Aponiana, which is probably the island Aegusa, now Favignana, north-west of Cape Boeo. Caesar remained a few days at Lilybaeum, where

he sold some confiscated property, and then gave instructions to Alienus, praetor of Sicily, about matters in general and about the embarkation of the rest of the forces. Caesar embarked on the 25th of December and joined the fleet at Favignana. With a steady wind and in a fast sailing vessel he saw on the fourth day the African coast; but only a few ships of war kept him company, for the rest were dispersed by the wind and losing their course made for different places. Caesar sailed past Clupea (p. 80) and Neapolis (Nabal) on the east coast of Zeugitana, and past other towns situated near the sea. Continuing his course southward he came near to Adrumetum (Soussa),⁴ where his enemies had a garrison under the command of C. Considius, and he saw along the coast south of Clupea three thousand Moorish horsemen under Cn. Piso. Accordingly he waited a short time before the port of Adrumetum till the rest of the ships joined him, when he landed his troops in number three thousand and one hundred and fifty horsemen, pitched his camp before the town and kept his men from plundering. His design was evidently to make a favourable impression on the inhabitants. The townsmen of Adrumetum manned the walls, and a great number posted themselves before the town gate. But though the enemy had two legions, they did not attack the small force of Caesar, who after riding round the town to examine the place returned to his camp.

Some persons, says the author of the African War, blamed Caesar for carelessness in neither having fixed some point on the African coast for the pilots and commanders to sail to, nor having, according to his custom, delivered sealed orders which might be opened, if it should be necessary, and so all the fleet might direct their course to one place. But the author justly replies that Caesar had not acted through negligence: there was no port on the African coast where his ships might not expect to find the enemy, and he must either run the risk of landing where he could, or wait till the bad season was past, and so leave his enemies more time to strengthen themselves.

⁴ Adrumetum is placed by Pellissier, *Description de Tunis* (p. 257), at Soussa. Shaw (p. 105, 2nd ed.) placed it at Herkla; but this name more probably represents the position of the ancient Horrea Caelia.

He preferred the bolder measure of transporting himself and his forces to Africa at any risk ; and who can say that he did not do what was best ?⁴

L. Plancus, who had served in the Gallic war, and was now with Caesar as legatus, obtained permission to communicate with Considius in the hope of gaining him over to Caesar's cause. Accordingly he wrote a letter and gave it to a prisoner to carry into the town. As soon as the letter was presented to Considius, he asked the man, from whom the letter came, and on his replying "from the Emperor Caesar," Considius said "Scipio is now the only Emperor of the Roman people," and forthwith ordered the man to be killed. The letter was sent, just as it was, sealed to Scipio.

Caesar waited a day and a night without receiving any answer. The rest of his force did not arrive, and he was insufficiently provided with cavalry : he was not strong enough to attack the town, which was capable of making a good defence ; and it was also reported that a great number of cavalry was coming to relieve it, which might fall on Caesar's rear if he should hazard an assault. For these reasons he determined to leave his camp. As soon as he began to move, a multitude sallied forth from the town, and the enemy's cavalry came just in time to support them, having been sent by Juba to receive their pay. These horsemen occupied the camp which Caesar had left and began to harass his rear ; but they were driven back into the town, two thousand in number, by less than thirty of Caesar's Gallic horsemen, which, as the author very properly says, is incredible.⁵ Caesar again began his march

⁴ Napoleon remarks (*Précis, &c.*, p. 194, par Napoléon) "that the writer of the Civil War (he means the African War) states that Caesar had not named any place of rendezvous for his fleet, when it sailed from Sicily, and that he gives as a reason for this neglect that Caesar did not know what point of the African coast would be safe against the hostile fleets. This assertion is so absurd that it does not require refutation." He then adds that Scipio was at Utica and was master of the north coast of Africa as far as Juba's territory ; and that the rendezvous which Caesar appointed for his army was the coast south of Cape Bon as far as the Great (he means the Little) Syrtis. The writer knew this as well as the Emperor. Caesar's ships would avoid all the coast west of Cape Bon, and would find a landing wherever they could south of Cape Bon ; and this is what the writer means.

⁵ The texts have "xxx Galli," which is probably a copyist's error : but the author means some very small number.

to the south, and the enemy again harassed him and made repeated attacks : at last he placed a few of his veteran cohorts in the rear with part of the cavalry, and continuing his march gradually left his pursuers behind. While he was on the road, commissioners from the towns and forts came to him with promises of supplies and declarations of their readiness to obey his orders. At the close of the day on the 1st of January B.C. 46 he reached Ruspina (c. 6).

Shaw supposes Ruspina to be represented by Sahaleel about five miles south of Soussa and about a mile from the sea : but Pellissier places Ruspina at Monestir, five miles farther south than Sahaleel, and upon the extremity of a small cape. From Ruspina Caesar continued his march to Leptis, six miles farther south. Leptis was a free city, that is, a municipality, which had self-government and paid no taxes to the Romans. The name is preserved in Lemta, and there is no doubt about the position.⁷ Caesar was met by commissioners from the town, who professed their readiness to obey his orders. He placed centurions at the gates with piquets to prevent his men from entering or doing any harm to the townspeople, and he made his camp near the town along the shore. The transports and some of the ships of war now arrived at Leptis : the rest, as it was reported to him, not knowing where to go, had been seen sailing in the direction of Utica. In the mean time Caesar did not leave the coast, for he was uneasy about the ships which had not arrived, and he kept his cavalry in the transports, as the author supposes, to prevent them from foraging in the parts at a distance from the sea, so careful was he to avoid giving any offence to the people who were friendly to him.⁸ He ordered water to be carried to the ships, but the rowers, who had landed to get the water, were suddenly attacked by the Moorish cavalry, who wounded many and killed some. It was the practice of these men to hide

Shaw quotes Bochart, who says that Lept in the Punic language signifies a road or anchorage for ships. Lucan, ix. 951 :—

Proxima Leptis erat, cujus statione quæta

Exegere hiemem.

⁸ The author says, "as I suppose." Guischart thinks that Caesar must have had other reasons for keeping the horses in the ships, but that we cannot discover what the reasons were.

themselves with their horses in the valleys and suddenly to spring on an enemy.

In the mean time Caesar despatched letters and messengers to Sardinia and the adjacent provinces with orders to send auxiliary troops and supplies; and he sent C. Rabirius Postumus⁹ with part of the ships of war to Sicily to bring the second detachment. He also sent ten ships of war to look after the transports which had lost their way and to keep the sea clear of the enemy. C. Sallustius, the historian, was sent with part of the ships to the island Cercina (now Kerkennah), which is south of Leptis and near the coast of Byzacium on which Caesar now was. There are two islands named Kerkennah: they are very low, and separated by a narrow channel: they are fertile, well cultivated, and produce abundance of barley and very fine grapes.¹ These islands were in the possession of the enemy and it was reported that there was a great quantity of grain there. All these officers received strict instructions to execute Caesar's orders immediately without seeking any excuse or making any delay on the ground of impossibility. Caesar was informed by deserters, and by the inhabitants, of the hard treatment that the country had received from Scipio and his partisans, for Scipio supported Juba's cavalry by requisitions on the province. On the 3rd of January he moved his camp. He left at Leptis six cohorts with Saserna, and returned to Ruspina with the rest of his troops. He placed the portable baggage (*sarcinae*) of the men in Ruspina, and went with a force to forage about the farms: the townsmen were ordered to follow him with waggons and beasts. A large quantity of corn was found and carried to Ruspina. Caesar's object was to secure Ruspina and Leptis, which were only about six miles apart, and were also safe positions for his ships.

He left at Ruspina P. Saserna, the brother of the Saserna to whom he had entrusted Leptis, and gave orders that the legion should be employed in bringing into the town all the wood that could be collected, for he might require it for

⁹ This was Caesar's friend whom Cicero had defended in an oration which is extant. Vol. iv. 281.

¹ Pellissier, Tunisia, p. 106.

purposes of defence. He took himself seven veteran cohorts, which had served under Sulpicius and Vatinius in Illyricum (p. 278), and marching to the port of Ruspina, which was about two miles from the town, he embarked in his fleet at nightfall. The men, who were left behind and knew nothing of the general's intentions, were in great fear. They had landed in Africa with a small force, and were now exposed to attack from an enemy much superior in numbers and particularly in cavalry : their only consolation was in the general's happy countenance, his lively and wonderful cheerfulness, which were evidence of his bold and confident resolution. The men were animated by their general's spirit, and his wisdom and prudence gave them hope of success. Caesar spent one night on shipboard, and was just going to set sail at dawn of day, when part of the missing ships unexpectedly arrived. The men, whom Caesar had embarked, were immediately landed again and stood on the shore under arms to receive the new comers. As soon as the ships had entered the port, and the infantry and cavalry were landed, Caesar returned to Ruspina, established his camp there, and set out with thirty cohorts unencumbered to forage. Caesar's purpose in leaving Ruspina was now plain : he intended to go with the fleet in search of the missing ships without being seen by the enemy, and he did not wish those who were left in Ruspina to know what he was going to do.

Caesar had advanced about three miles from his camp when the scouts and the horsemen, who were sent ahead, reported that they had seen the enemy ; and this report was followed by the appearance of a great cloud of dust. Caesar immediately summoned all the cavalry and archers from his camp, and directed his men to follow slowly and in good order. He led the way with a small number, and as he spied the enemy at a distance, he commanded the soldiers to put on their helmets and to prepare for battle ; for it was the fashion of the Roman soldier to march bare head, with the helmet suspended. Besides the thirty cohorts Caesar had only four hundred horsemen and one hundred and fifty archers.²

² Guischartt (p. 197, b) gives good reasons for supposing that the reading in the text should be *xxxx* instead of *cccc*. Caesar had embarked two thousand

Caesar's landing in Africa was soon known to Scipio, and the force which now came in sight was part of the African army under the command of Labienus, and the two Pacidii. The force of Labienus was arranged on a very long front, composed of cavalry in compact bodies: between the intervals in the cavalry were placed the light-armed Numidian infantry and the archers; and the whole were so arranged that Caesar's men seeing the enemy from a distance thought that the line was composed of infantry. The right and left wings were strengthened with great bodies of cavalry. Caesar formed his men in one line³ as well as the small number allowed him: the archers were placed in front of the line, and the cavalry on the two wings, with orders to take care not to let the enemy's cavalry outflank his troops; for Caesar thought that he was going to fight with the enemy's infantry, who formed, as he supposed, the enemy's centre (c. 18).

When the two armies were opposite, and Caesar now discovered that he must rely on his skill in managing his troops against the superior numbers of the enemy, all at once the cavalry of Labienus began to extend their front and to approach close to the hills, which bounded the plain of Ruspina on the west. This movement made it necessary for Caesar's cavalry to do the same, for the enemy was beginning to outflank them, and to overpower them by numbers. When the centres of the two armies engaged, the light-armed Numidians and the cavalry springing forward from the compact masses discharged missiles against Caesar's men; when they were repulsed, the cavalry would retire, and the infantry would continue the fight until the enemy's cavalry rallied and again came to support their infantry.⁴ In this unusual manner of fighting Caesar observed that his ranks were thrown into disorder by his men advancing in pursuit of the cavalry, and

horsemen in Sicily, and all the ships had arrived except a few which contained only infantry.

³ "*Acies simplicem*" as opposed to "*duplicem*" and "*triplicem*," which have been explained. "*Acies simplex*" does not indicate the depth of the line, which might be nine or ten men.

⁴ The author, who often writes very badly, is sometimes almost unintelligible. Guischart supposes that "*ex condensis turnis*" does not mean the cavalry only, but the whole compact line formed of infantry and cavalry. P. 200.

their flank was exposed to the Numidian javelin-men, while the enemy's cavalry easily fled beyond the reach of the heavy Roman pilum. Accordingly he gave orders that no man should advance more than four feet from the standards. In the meantime the cavalry of Labienus were turning Caesar's flanks, whose cavalry being exhausted by the number of the enemy, and their horses wounded, slowly gave way, and the enemy pressed them still harder. In a short time the legionary soldiers were surrounded by the enemy's cavalry and compelled to fight within narrow limits. Labienus on horseback in the front ranks with his head bare (probably that he might be the better seen and so encourage his men), was taunting Caesar's soldiers with insulting words.⁴ The men were terror-struck and particularly the raw soldiers: all turned their eyes towards Caesar and only attempted to avoid the missiles of the enemy. The danger was great, and the safety of the army depended on the general's courage and presence of mind. He was in a like position with Crassus when he was surrounded by the Parthian cavalry (vol. iv. p. 262); but the result was very different. Caesar ordered his men to extend the line as much as possible, and every other cohort to face about and thus to present two fronts to the enemy, who having occupied so much ground in enveloping the Roman troops were consequently weakened at every point and less able to resist. The circle of the enemy was thus cut asunder by Caesar's right and left wing, and one-half was separated from the other. One division of Caesar's force aided by his cavalry, which had also been surrounded, discharged their heavy pila on the enemy and put them to flight; but as Caesar was afraid of an ambushade he did not pursue far and returned to his position. The second division of the cavalry and infantry attacked with the same success. The enemy fled to some distance and Caesar keeping the same arrangement of his troops retreated towards his camp. Thus the general's ability converted into a victory what

⁴ The author here reports an anecdote about Labienus being nearly killed by a soldier of the tenth legion, which however, as we know, was still in Sicily. I agree with Guischart that the story is incredible. Appian (B. C. ii. 95) tells it, but in a different and more probable way.

under an inferior commander would have been an ignominious defeat.*

Just as the enemy was put to flight, it happened that M. Petreius and Cn. Piso, with sixteen hundred picked Numidian horsemen and a large force of the best infantry, arrived to support their countrymen. The enemy encouraged by this reinforcement attacked Caesar's soldiers on the retreat and harassed their rear, upon which Caesar ordered his men to face about and the battle was renewed in the open plain. The enemy fought in their usual fashion and would not come to close quarters; and Caesar's cavalry was unable to pursue, as the horses were exhausted by the recent voyage and suffering from thirst and wounds. The day also was drawing to a close. Caesar exhorted the cavalry and infantry to make one more effort and not to stop till they had driven the enemy over the hills which bounded the plain, and got possession of the heights. The Numidians, who were also wearied with the day's work and now discharged their missiles feebly, being attacked suddenly both by the infantry and cavalry were routed in a moment and driven over the heights, which the Romans occupied. They remained there a short time and then retired in the same order leisurely to their camp. The enemy, who had been roughly handled, also retired to their defences. Labienus sent off his wounded, who were very numerous, in waggons to Adrumetum.

* Caesar's manoeuvre is described by the author in very few words, and the text in two passages is doubtful. Perhaps the author understood what Caesar did, but he has left the matter very obscure. Guischartt (*Mém.* ii. 204) has explained it at length: he remarks truly that many of the manoeuvres and evolutions which he has described are not mentioned by the historian, but he maintains that all which he has written "is contained in the meaning of the terms employed by the historian and is a necessary consequence of them, founded also on the combination of the facts." Guischartt was a soldier, and a man of ability, but some of the movements which he describes appear to be a pure invention, though they are possible. Caesar in some way put his thirty cohorts on two fronts, cut the enemy's circle in two, attacked them on both fronts and drove them away. Count Turpin de Crissé, also a distinguished writer on the art of war, accepts in general Guischartt's explanation, but he makes the matter more intelligible and assumes less than Guischartt. The Count wrote notes on Caesar's Commentaries: "*Commentaires de César avec des notes historiques, critiques, et militaires, 1785.*" I have only given the general meaning of Caesar's manoeuvre. The reader may consult Guischartt and Turpin for the details.

After the battle many deserters came over, and prisoners were taken, from whom Caesar learnt that the design of the enemy was to terrify the small force of the Romans by a new manner of fighting, and to surround and destroy them with their cavalry as Curio had been destroyed. Labienus had declared openly his confidence in obtaining a victory; for he had sixteen hundred Gallic and German horsemen, whom, as the historian states, he had originally carried over the sea from Brundisium to Epirus, and brought to Africa after the battle of Pharsalia: he had seven thousand Numidian horsemen who used no bridles, and the sixteen hundred horsemen of Petreius, who however came late on the field: he had also about four times as many infantry, and light troops, with archers and slingers, and many mounted bowmen.⁷ The battle was fought in a perfectly level plain on the 4th of January, on the sixth day after Caesar's landing, and was continued from the fifth hour after sunrise till the sun set. Petreius was severely wounded and compelled to retire from the fight.

Caesar now strengthened his defences. He formed one rampart from Ruspina to the sea, and another from his camp, which was close to the town, also to the sea, and thus he secured a safe communication both ways. The missiles and military engines were brought from the ships to the camp. Part of the rowers from the Gallic and Rhodian ships, and the fighting men also, were armed for the purpose of being employed as light troops among the cavalry, in the same way as such troops were employed by the enemy. Caesar also took the archers from the ships, Ityraeans,⁸ Syrians, and all kinds, and thus increased his force, for it was reported on the third day after the battle that Scipio was approaching to join Labienus and Petreius with eight legions and three thousand horsemen. Workshops were set up for making arrows and missiles, casting bullets and preparing stakes. Messengers and letters were sent to Sicily to procure hurdles and timber for the construction of rams, of which there was a deficiency

⁷ I have omitted part of this chapter, which only confuses the matter. Some translators have misunderstood the words "a Brundisio transportaverat."

⁸ Ityraeans from Ityraca a country on the east side of the lake Tiberias.

in Africa, and for a supply of lead and iron. Caesar was also under the necessity of importing corn for his army. In the preceding year the cultivators of Africa, who were of the class named *Stipendiarii*,⁹ had been summoned by Scipio's party to serve as soldiers and the harvest had been lost for want of reapers. The enemy had also ordered the corn from all parts of the province to be carried into a few well fortified towns and had emptied the country : the towns, with the exception of the few which could be defended by garrisons, were destroyed, the inhabitants were compelled to seek shelter within the strong places of the enemy, and the cultivated lands were made a desert. By kind words and persuasion Caesar had got a little corn, which was in the possession of private persons, and he used it very sparingly. Every day he visited the works on which the men were employed, and kept three cohorts on the watch against the enemy. In the meantime his transports were beating about on the sea, not knowing where Caesar was ; and many of them were severally attacked by the enemy's boats, and burnt or taken. Accordingly Caesar placed his ships about the islands on the coasts and the harbours to secure the safe arrival of his supplies. The islands were probably the two small islands of Kouriat about ten miles east of Monestir (Ruspina), on the larger of which there is a spring of good water.¹

Guischartt remarks that Caesar's position was one of the most extraordinary recorded in military history. All the ground that he occupied in Africa was contained within his intrenchments, which were a few miles in circuit. Leptis, the only other place that he held, was protected by a small garrison. He depended on his ships for supplies, but they ran the risk of being intercepted by the enemy's small craft which issued from the African ports. He was threatened by a more formidable force than that with which Labienus had attacked him ; for Scipio was coming with his legions. The only hope

⁹ They paid a fixed land-tax in money.

¹ Shaw (p. 110, 2nd ed.) names them the Jowries, which he supposes to be the *Tarichiae* of Strabo. Guischartt (p. 215) names them "*Souries*." Pellissier (p. 98) names them Kouriat, "which," he says, "Europeans name *Conilières*, because of the great number of rabbits found there."

of safety was in making his defences at Ruspina so strong that they could not be taken by assault, and in waiting for fresh troops and supplies from Sicily. The situation was certainly strange and difficult, but the courage and the genius of the man rose above the danger, and he saw the prospect of victory where other men would have despaired and perished.

Cn. Pompeius, the elder son of Magnus, does not appear in the African war. We learn from the historian (c. 22) that he was at Utica doing nothing. Cato endeavoured to rouse the young man to activity by reminding him of the great things which his father had done at an early age. Cneus was moved by the words of Cato, and taking thirty small vessels of all kinds, a few of which had beaks, sailed from Utica to Mauritania and the kingdom of Bogud, who was friendly to Caesar. He had with him two thousand men, free and slave, of whom only part were armed, and he marched with this wretched force to a town named Ascurus, where Bogud had a garrison. The people allowed Pompeius to advance close up to the wall and the gates, and then sallied out and drove the commander and his rabble to their ships. Pompeius sailed away towards the Balearic isles, and the historian says no more about him. Any man could have foreseen the failure of such an enterprise. Probably Pompeius only sought a decent excuse for leaving Utica, and did not choose to serve under Scipio, who now held the place which the father of Cneus held till the battle of Pharsalia.

CHAPTER XXV.

THE AFRICAN WAR.

B.C. 46.

Scipio leaving a strong garrison in Utica marched to Adrumetum, where he stayed a few days. From Adrumetum he advanced by night to join Labienus and Petreius; and the united forces formed one camp in the plain of Ruspina three miles from Caesar's position. The enemy's cavalry were continually moving about Caesar's lines, and cutting off those who went beyond the ramparts for forage and water. The object of Scipio, who did not venture to attack Caesar's lines, was to reduce him by famine, or to compel him to fight against superior numbers. Caesar's army was suffering from want of food: the supplies had not arrived from Sicily or Sardinia, and it was dangerous at this season of the year for ships to be on the sea. Caesar's troops, says the historian, were not masters of the country for more than six miles in all directions; nor indeed so much as that in some directions, if Scipio was only three miles distant. As there was scarcity of fodder, Caesar's veterans who had been in like difficulties before, collected the sea-weed from the shore and by washing it in fresh water made it fit for the beasts to eat.¹

Juba hearing of Caesar's difficulties and of the smallness of his force left his kingdom with a large body of cavalry and infantry to join Scipio. But as soon as he set out, P. Sittius

¹ The fucus saccharinus is still used by the inhabitants of the Kerkennah islands. The stems and leaves are given to cattle, and in time of scarcity men eat a kind of gall, which this marine plant produces in great abundance. This substance is very nourishing and is not at all disagreeable to the taste. In certain years all the coast is covered with this sea-weed. Pellissier, *Descript. de Tunis*, p. 107.

and King Bocchus² united their forces and entered Juba's territories. Sittius was an Italian, whose name has appeared as one of the adherents of Catilina (vol. iii. p. 231), and he was now an adventurer in Africa. Sittius and Bocchus took Cirta (Constantina) the richest of Juba's cities; and two Gaetulian towns, which refused to surrender on terms, were captured and all the inhabitants put to the sword. Juba had nearly reached Scipio's camp when he heard of his dominions being ravaged, and he resolved to return and protect his own country. He even drew off the troops which he had sent to Scipio, but he left with him thirty elephants. By this diversion Sittius did great service to Caesar. Dion states that Sittius had never received any favours from Caesar and was not known to him. But it is much more probable that Caesar knew Sittius before he left Italy and connected himself with the kings of western Africa; and that he had now contrived to secure his services.

As it was not generally known that Caesar had landed in the province, and it was supposed that one of his legati had come with some troops, Caesar sent letters round to inform all the African towns of his arrival. It is true that he was almost blockaded by the enemy, but still the roads south of Ruspina were open, and we must suppose that he found daring men, who were willing to carry his letters. The chief persons came from their towns to Caesar's camp and complained bitterly of the treatment which they had received from Scipio's party. Caesar was moved by their tears and sufferings, and determined to commence the campaign as soon as the fine weather began and he had collected all his forces. He wrote to Sicily to Alienus and Rabirius Postumus and sent his letters by a quick sailing vessel: his orders were that they must bring over the troops immediately without any regard to the weather: he told them that the province of Africa was entirely ruined by his enemies, and if help did not come soon, there would be nothing left save the bare soil, not even a house to take refuge in. Caesar was so impatient, that on the day after he had despatched his letters he was complaining of the delay in the arrival of the fleet and army and had his eyes continually

² It has been suggested that the name Bocchus should be Bogud. But Appian (B. C. ii. 96) mentions Bocchus as a king of the Maurusii, and Dion (48. c. 3) also.

directed to the sea. He saw the country houses burning, the lands wasted, the cattle driven off and killed, towns and forts destroyed and deserted, and the chief people massacred or loaded with chains, and their children under the name of hostages carried off into slavery, while his small force prevented him from assisting these wretched people. While all this was going on, he kept his men to their works, strengthened his camp, built towers and forts and pushed forward his defences even into the sea by constructing embankments.

Scipio during this time was training his elephants, for which purpose he formed two lines : one line of slingers representing an enemy attacked the elephants in front with small stones ; behind them he placed men in order of battle, who, as soon as the stones were directed against the elephants and the terrified animals turned round upon those in the rear, attempted to drive them back towards the slingers ; but this was done with great difficulty, for elephants can only be trained by long practice, and even then they are as dangerous to those who employ them as they are to the enemy.

C. Vergilius, who was at Thapsus (Demas) a seaport south of Leptis, and observed that some vessels which contained Caesar's soldiers were severally sailing about in ignorance of Caesar's position, took a ship of the class of "*actuariae*" and manning it with soldiers and archers, and sending also some boats to assist them, pursued the vessels. He attacked several of them unsuccessfully, but at last he fell in with one, in which there were two young men, named Titii, Spaniards and tribunes of the fifth legion, whose father had been put into the Roman senate by Caesar. There was in the same vessel Titus Salienus, a centurion of the same legion, who had besieged in Messana the legate M. Messala, and addressed mutinous language to him : he had also seized money and things which were intended to decorate Caesar's triumph, and he was now afraid of being punished. For this reason he persuaded the young men to make no resistance and to surrender to Vergilius. The Titii were taken to Scipio, who after putting them in prison for two days ordered them to be executed. The executioners allowed the elder brother at his request to die first. This is an example of the savage temper of Scipio.

The cavalry on both sides, who kept watch before the camps, were daily engaged in light skirmishes; and sometimes the Germans and Gauls of Labienus would make a truce with Caesar's horsemen, and the men would talk together. In the meantime Labienus, the most enterprising commander on Scipio's side, took a part of the cavalry and turning Caesar's position attempted to seize Leptis, which Saserna held; but the fortifications being strong and the town well provided with military engines, his assaults were easily repelled.³

While the two armies were face to face, it was Scipio's practice to draw up his men about three hundred paces in front of his lines, and to keep them there the greater part of the day. As Caesar did not stir, Scipio conceived great contempt for him, and bringing out all his force and the thirty elephants in front with towers on their backs, placed his infantry and cavalry in a long line, and on one occasion took a position not far from Caesar's camp. Caesar ordered his men, who had gone out from the lines for forage, wood, and whatever was required for his defences, to return slowly without disorder and to resume their places. The cavalry also, who were posted as picquets, were ordered to keep their ground until the enemy were near enough to reach them with missiles, and if they approached still nearer, to retire within the lines in good order. The remainder of the cavalry received instructions to keep their place and remain under arms. Caesar did not appear on the ramparts to give these orders, for such was his admirable military skill, says the author, that he remained in his tent and sent his instructions by others. Though the enemy now relied on their superior force, yet they knew that they had been often routed by Caesar, that he had spared and pardoned some of them; and Caesar was certain that the remembrance of these facts and the consciousness of their own feebleness would prevent them from attacking his camp, which was well fortified. The rampart was high, the ditches deep, and beyond the rampart the ground was so well planted with caltrops, such as were used at the blockade of Alesia (vol. iv. p. 340) that the enemy could not approach his works, even if

³ See Guischartt's remark (p. 220, note b) on this story of an assault made on a fortified place by cavalry.

they were undefended. He had also a great supply of scorpions, catapults, and missiles used for the defence of fortified places. All this preparation had been made on account of the smallness of his numbers and the want of experience in his men, and not because of the strength of the enemy and because he was afraid of them: he was well content that they should think that he was frightened. He did not refuse to fight because he had no confidence in his troops: he thought it would not be creditable to him after his great deeds in arms, and the defeat of so many enemies, to gain a bloody victory over the remnant of his opponents who had rallied after being dispersed. He bore therefore their insolence and their self-confidence till some part of the veteran legions should arrive by the second convoy. The author evidently intends to excuse Caesar's inaction, and to explain his reasons for not accepting battle; as if it was not reason enough for a general to refuse to fight, when he could safely refuse and expected every day to be stronger. The contempt, which Caesar is here said to have had for his enemies, often appears in his own history of the Civil War; and it is possible that the author may have had some journal or memoranda of Caesar made during the African war. The general, according to his fashion, was always busy about something, and when he sat in his tent and sent out his orders on this occasion, we may be certain that he was reading or writing, and possibly putting down something which the historian used for his narrative.

Scipio stayed a short time in his position, and taking back his men to their camp boasted of the terror which he had struck into Caesar's men and promised his troops a sure and speedy victory. Caesar sent his men again to their work and kept the young soldiers constantly employed on the defences. At this time Numidians and Gaetulians were daily leaving Scipio: some went home, and others came in great numbers to Caesar, for they heard that he was connected by the marriage of his aunt Julia with C. Marius, to whom they and their ancestors owed great obligations. Caesar gave letters to the more distinguished of these deserters to deliver to their fellow-citizens, whom he exhorted to arm and no longer to submit to his enemies.

At this time commissioners arrived at Caesar's camp from Acilla,⁴ a free town, who declared that the people were ready to obey his orders, but they entreated him to send a force to protect them, and they would supply him with corn and any thing that they had. Caesar sent C. Messius with some troops. When the news of the defection of Acilla reached Adrumetum, where Considius Longus commanded with two legions and seven hundred horsemen, he immediately marched towards Acilla with eight cohorts; but Messius arrived before him, and Considius returned to Adrumetum. A few days later Labienus brought or sent some cavalry, and Considius came again and made a camp before Acilla for the purpose of besieging the place. The position of this town is determined only by conjecture. The narrative, as Guischartt says, shows that the place was not south of Ruspina. It probably lay between Ruspina and Adrumetum, and in the interior.

Caesar's great difficulties were now coming to an end. When Sallustius arrived at the Kerkennah islands, C. Decimius, who had charge of them with a large body of slaves, made his escape in a boat: the islanders received Sallustius, who found a great quantity of corn, loaded the merchant ships which were lying there, and sent it to Caesar. Alienus, the proconsul of Sicily, in obedience to Caesar's orders embarked in transports at Lilybaeum the thirteenth and fourteenth legions, eight hundred Gallic horsemen, and a thousand slingers and archers. This second convoy reached Ruspina on the fourth day. Thus Caesar at the same time received supplies, and the reinforcements which he had anxiously expected. The soldiers and the horsemen, after being allowed a little time to recover from their fatigue and the effects of sickness, were distributed among the forts and the various parts of the lines. The ships were sent back to Lilybaeum to bring the remainder of the army.⁵

⁴ It is doubtful what the name is, Acilla, Achilla or Acholla. It is mentioned by Livy, 83. c. 48.

⁵ The text of the African War (c. 35) contains a story of Scipio sending two Gaetulians to Caesar under pretence of deserting, but in fact to act as spies. The narrative is rejected by Guischartt, and for good reasons, I think. If the story is true, the final result of the mission was that the Gaetulians betrayed Scipio, and many soldiers from the fourth and sixth legions deserted to Caesar.

Cato was not idle in the meantime at Utica. He was continually enrolling freedmen, native Africans, slaves, all indeed who were old enough to carry arms, and sending off his rabble to Scipio. The improved prospects of Caesar, or some other cause, brought to him commissioners from Thisdra or Thisdrus,⁶ in which town the Italian merchants and the cultivators had stored three hundred thousand modii of wheat: they informed Caesar of this great supply and entreated him to send a force to protect it and their property. At the present Caesar could only thank the people of Thisdrus: he promised that he would soon despatch some troops, and sent the commissioners off with words of comfort. Caesar's ally Sittius was doing more for him than Cato did for Scipio. He entered the kingdom of Numidia, where he took by assault a strong hill fort, in which Juba had placed corn and other material of war.

⁶ Guischart assumes that Thisdrus was near Acilla, but he is mistaken. The place is now El Jem. Thisdrus was south of Ruspina in the interior and too distant for Caesar to send troops there. If it had been near Acilla, Caesar might have sent troops to Thisdrus as easily as to Acilla: but he had none to spare. See further remarks on Thisdrus below.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE AFRICAN WAR.

B.C. 46.

ON the 25th of January about the first watch Caesar ordered the scouts to be ready and all who¹ were necessary for the purpose which he had in view. Nobody knew his design. At the beginning of the third watch he ordered all the legions to leave the camp and to follow him towards Ruspina, in which town he had a garrison. He then descended a gentle slope and following the left part of the plain led his legions along the sea. This plain, which was about twelve miles in extent, was surrounded by a ridge of hills, not very high, which began at the coast and formed a kind of theatre. On this ridge were a few lofty eminences, on which stood several towers and ancient watch-posts, and in the furthest of them Scipio had placed a force. Caesar's object was to occupy part of the hills which surrounded the plain, for he was not yet strong enough to meet Scipio on level ground. After ascending the ridge Caesar began to form earth-works on every eminence and at every tower. When he had advanced nearly as far as the furthest hill and tower, which was nearest to the enemy's camp, which position, as it has been said, was occupied by the enemy, he halted awhile and after examining the ground and placing his cavalry to protect the legions, he ordered a ditch to be made on the plateau of the ridge, from the point to which he had advanced, to that from which he had set out.

As soon as the enemy saw what he was doing, all their

¹ "Apparitores." I do not know who they were.

cavalry was brought out of the camp about a mile from the lines and arranged in fighting order : the infantry was placed in the rear about four hundred paces from the camp. Caesar commanded his men to continue their work ; but when the enemy had approached within a mile and a half and he saw that their purpose was to drive his men away, and that it was necessary to withdraw them, he ordered a troop of Spanish cavalry to hurry to the nearest hill and dislodge the enemy, and a few light-armed men were sent to support them. The Numidians, who occupied the hill, were driven off ; some were made prisoners, others were wounded and the hill was taken by Caesar's men. Observing what had happened, Labienus took almost all the right wing of his cavalry from the position which they occupied, and hastened to protect the flying Numidians. Caesar immediately seized the opportunity and sent the left wing of his cavalry to cut off Labienus from the main body of the enemy's cavalry.

In the plain there was a large country house defended by four towers, which prevented Labienus from seeing that he was intercepted by Caesar's horsemen ; and in fact he only saw them when they began to fall on the rear of his troops. The Numidian cavalry turned round and fled in terror towards the camp ; but the Gauls and Germans maintained their ground till being attacked from a higher position and surrounded they were all cut to pieces. The legions of Scipio bewildered at what they saw ran back to their camp and crowded into it by all the gates. When the hills and plain were cleared of Scipio's troops, Caesar gave the signal for retreat and placed all the cavalry within his lines on the ridge. Some of these Gauls and Germans had followed Labienus from Gallia through the great reputation which he had, and others were induced by money and promises : there were also some who had been taken at the defeat of Curio, and being spared were ready to prove their gratitude by their fidelity. The bodies of these horsemen, remarkable for their beauty and size, lay scattered over the plain. Labienus on this day learned by experience that he was no match for his old general, and he saved himself by precipitate flight.

Guischartt remarks that Caesar by his new position covered

the towns of Ruspina, Leptis and others from which he drew supplies: he could watch the enemy closely and look out for opportunities of fighting with advantage. Caesar does not say how his lines to the sea from Ruspina and his camp were protected, but we have been told that they were so strong as hardly to require protection; and Scipio could not attack them without risk of being taken in the flank and rear by Caesar from his new lines.

On the next day Caesar led his troops from their position and drew them up in the plain, but Scipio did not leave his camp. Caesar then advanced slowly along the foot of the hills, and approached nearer to Scipio's camp. The legions were now less than a mile from the town of Uzita, which was in the possession of Scipio, whence he got water and other supplies; and as he was afraid of losing the place he came out of his camp, and formed his troops in four lines: the first line was composed of companies of cavalry with intervals between them, which were filled up by the elephants which carried towers and armed men. Caesar thought that Scipio intended to fight, but he halted before the town and covered his centre by it: his right and left wings, where the elephants were placed, stood in full sight of his opponents. Caesar waited till near sunset, but Scipio did not leave his ground, and it was clear that he intended to defend himself in this position, if it should be necessary, and not to fight in the open plain. Caesar therefore did not think it prudent to approach nearer to Uzita, for he knew that there was a large body of Numidians in the town and that it covered the enemy's centre; it would therefore be difficult at the same time to assault Uzita, and to fight on the right and left wings in an unfavourable position with his men, who had eaten nothing all day. Accordingly Caesar led back his troops, and on the next day he began to extend his lines further towards the enemy.

During this time Considius was besieging Acilla where Messius commanded. Considius brought his works up to the place several times, but they were burnt by the townsmen. When he heard of the defeat of Scipio's cavalry, he destroyed all the corn, of which he had a great store in the

camp, wasted the wine, oil, and other supplies, raised the siege, sent back part of the troops to Scipio and retired by a circuitous road through Juba's kingdom to Adrumetum.

The author (c. 44) gives another example of Scipio's savage character. A ship, which belonged to the second convoy and contained two Roman equites, was carried by the wind to Thapsus and taken by Vergilius. Another vessel was taken by the fleet of Varus and M. Octavius at the island Aegimurus, Zavamoore, in the gulf of Carthage. It contained some veterans with a centurion and some recruits, all of whom Varus sent to Scipio. The general offered them their lives and rewards, if they would join him; but the centurion, who belonged to the fourteenth legion, refused the offer: he would not fight against his old commander, but he was ready to give Scipio evidence of the kind of men who served Caesar. He proposed that Scipio should select his bravest cohort and allow him to take ten of his comrades who were now in Scipio's power, and they would show by their courage what he ought to expect from his own men. The story is rather strange, but if the centurion expected that he should certainly lose his life, we may suppose that he preferred being killed in the unequal contest to dying by the hands of the executioner. Scipio maddened by the taunt made a sign to his centurions, and the bold Roman was massacred in his presence. The rest of the veterans were put to death outside of the camp in a cruel manner, and the recruits were distributed among the legions. The two equites, who had been taken by Vergilius, were not allowed to appear before Scipio, from which we conclude that they were sent to him, but we are not told why they escaped death. Caesar was vexed at the negligence of those who were stationed off Thapsus in the ships of war to protect his transports: they were ignominiously dismissed from the army and he issued a general order in which they were severely censured.

During this time Caesar's army experienced one of those horrible storms which are common in this part of Africa. At the setting of the Pleiades, about the second watch of the night, there came a violent hurricane accompanied with hail as large as stones. The men were not in winter-quarters according to

custom, and it was now the third or fourth day² that they were pushing their works forward towards the enemy, and as they were thus constantly employed on their entrenchments, they had no time to look after themselves. When they were brought over from Sicily, Caesar would not allow anything to be put on board the vessels except the soldier and his arms; and since their arrival in Africa they had not been able to furnish themselves with anything, and in consequence of the high price of food they had expended all the money that they had, and were reduced to such a condition that only a few had tents of skins to shelter them. The rest protected themselves under huts made of their own clothing and of reeds and thin branches interwoven. The rain and hail threw down the wretched coverings, the fires were extinguished, and all the food in the camp was spoiled. The men rambled about in confusion and could only protect their heads with their shields. The points of the pila of the fifth legion appeared to be in a blaze (c. 47).

The news of the defeat of Scipio's cavalry had reached Juba, who now left Saburra with part of his army to oppose Sittius, and came at Scipio's request to join him. He brought three legions, eight hundred horsemen who had bridles, a great number of Numidian horsemen who used no bridles and of light-armed troops, and thirty elephants. He made his camp near that of Scipio. The soldiers of Caesar had looked forward with alarm to the arrival of Juba, but when he came and they saw what kind of troops he had, their fears were dispelled. However it appeared that the king's troops gave Scipio confidence, for on the next day he brought out all his men with those of the king and the sixty elephants, and formed them in battle order in such way as to make the greatest possible display. He advanced from his entrenchments a little further than usual, but he soon returned to his camp.

Caesar knowing that nearly all the troops which Scipio expected had arrived and that there would soon be a battle, advanced with his forces along the plateau, and began to

² "In tertio quartoque die." The text may not be quite correct.

extend his lines and make his forts, in order to prevent the enemy who relied on their numbers from seizing the nearest hill and stopping Caesar's progress. But Labienus had formed the design of seizing the same hill, and as he was nearer to it, he got possession. There was a depression of considerable extent and with steep sides, which contained many holes resembling caverns, and Caesar must cross this depression before he could reach the hill which he designed to take: beyond the depression there was an old olive plantation thick planted. Labienus saw this, and being well acquainted with the ground he placed himself in the depression and in the olive plantation with part of his cavalry and light-armed troops, and also put cavalry behind the hill in ambuscade, with this purpose that as soon as he had fallen on Caesar's legions, the cavalry should show themselves on the hill, and Caesar's men being terrified by the attack in front and in rear and unable either to advance or to retreat should be cut to pieces. Caesar knew nothing of the ambuscade, but with his usual caution he had sent forward his cavalry, and when he reached the place, the men of Labienus, either forgetting their orders or being afraid of being surprised, came out of their hiding places, a few at a time, and made their way to the top of the hill, pursued by Caesar's horsemen, who killed some of them, made the rest prisoners, and then mounted the hill and driving away the cavalry of Labienus got possession of it. Labienus with part of the cavalry escaped with difficulty (c. 50).

Caesar now distributed the work among his legions and made a camp on the hill of which he had got possession. Then beginning at his principal camp he ordered two trenches to be dug through the middle of the plain opposite to Uzitta, which was in the plain between his camp and Scipio's and in the possession of Scipio: these two trenches were formed in such a direction as to meet severally at the right and left angles of the town. Caesar's design was, when he should have brought his forces nearer to the town and have commenced the attack, that his flanks should be protected by the lines, and he might not be surrounded by the enemy's numerous cavalry and hindered in the assault. He also wished

to facilitate communication with the townsmen, so that if any were willing to desert to him, they might do so easily, instead of coming over to him with great risk, which had been the case before. He also wished by approaching nearer to the enemy to learn whether he had the intention of fighting. Further, the ground in these parts formed a hollow in which wells could be made, and at present he was compelled to seek at a distance a scanty supply of water. While the legions were at work, a part of them drawn up in order of battle in front of the trenches stood close to the enemy, whose cavalry and light-armed troops were constantly skirmishing. One evening when Caesar was leading his troops back to the camp from the works, Juba, Scipio and Labienus with all the cavalry and light-armed force made a violent attack on the legionary soldiers. Caesar's horsemen were driven back a little by this unexpected attack, but he immediately ordered the legions to turn round from their march to the camp, and to support his cavalry, who being thus encouraged fell quickly upon the Numidians who were pursuing eagerly and in disorder, drove them back to Juba's camp and killed a great number. If the fight had not happened at nightfall, and the dust raised by the wind had not prevented everything from being seen, Juba and Labienus might have been taken and the cavalry and light troops been entirely destroyed. In the meantime a wonderful number of men of the fourth and sixth legions of Scipio fled, some to the camp of Caesar, and others in whatever direction they could escape; and also many of the horsemen, who had served under Curio and now had no confidence in Scipio and his forces did the same.

During these movements about Uzitta, two legions from Sicily, the ninth and tenth, which had been embarked in transports, arrived near the African coast not far from Rus-pina; but as the men could see Caesar's vessels which were stationed at Thapsus, and supposed them to belong to the enemy, and to be looking for the transports from Sicily, they stood out from the land, and after being tossed about for some days and suffering from want of water and food at last they reached Caesar. When the legions were landed, Caesar,

who did not forget the mutinous behaviour of these soldiers in Italy, and the pillage committed by certain persons, had an opportunity of punishing C. Avienus, a tribune of the tenth legion, who had filled a vessel with provisions, and his own slaves and beasts of burden, but had not carried a single soldier. He called together the tribunes and centurions of all the legions and told them that he wished that certain men had put a stop to their disorderly behaviour and had not abused his kindness and patience; but as these men fixed no limits to their misconduct, he would himself give a lesson in military fashion that others might be taught to behave differently. "You C. Avienus," he said, "excited the soldiers in Italy against the commonwealth and plundered the towns; you have been useless to me and to the commonwealth; you have embarked your slaves and beasts in place of soldiers, and by this your conduct at this critical time the commonwealth is deprived of men; for these reasons I expel you ignominiously from my army and order you to leave Africa immediately." He dismissed the tribune Aulus Fonteius as a bad citizen. Three centurions, who are named, were also dismissed as good for nothing either in war or in peace. All these men with a single slave each were put in separate vessels, and as we suppose, sent off somewhere (c. 54).

The Gaetulian deserters, whom Caesar had sent off with letters and instructions, easily persuaded their countrymen to revolt from Juba and to arm against him. Juba, who had now three enemies to oppose, Caesar, Sittius and the Gaetulians, was compelled by this unexpected revolt to send off against the rebels six of the cohorts which he had brought to Scipio.

Caesar's lines to Uzitta being now finished and brought up to the town just out of reach of missiles, he made a camp and placed numerous ballistae and scorpions in front of it and continually harassed the men who defended the walls. We must assume that Caesar's camp occupied the interval between the two lines, and that he had pushed forward earthworks from that side of his camp which was opposite to Uzitta.³ He also

³ Guischart (p. 244) has here a useful note: "En réfléchissant que César employa la plus grande partie de son armée pour protéger tous ces travaux, on

brought five legions from his large camp on the hills. By bringing his men so near to the enemy Caesar gained the advantage which he expected. The officers and men of higher rank on both sides were brought near to one another, and had the opportunity of talking together. On the side of Scipio the Gaetulians of rank in the king's cavalry and the commanders of horse were men whose fathers had served under C. Marius, and had received lands from him, and after Sulla had obtained the supreme power had been placed under king Hiempsal the father of Juba (vol. ii. p. 373). These Gaetulians seizing an opportunity when the night fires had been lighted, went off with their horses and servants about one thousand in number to Caesar's camp at Uzitta. This defection troubled Scipio and his officers, and the more as they saw shortly afterwards M. Aquinus talking with C. Saserna. Such a breach of discipline was unavoidable in a civil war, in which citizens, friends and relations were in hostile camps, and we have had an example of it in the Spanish war (p. 64). Scipio sent a messenger to tell Aquinus that he ought not to speak with the enemy, and Aquinus answered that he should stay where he was till he had finished the conference; upon which Juba sent one of his own officers, who in the presence of Saserna forbade Aquinus to talk any longer. Aquinus obeyed the king's order and withdrew. The historian expresses his indignation that a Roman citizen who had enjoyed the honours conferred by the Roman people, should have obeyed the barbarian Juba and not the messenger of Scipio. But the king was not content with this treatment of Aquinus "a new man," and an obscure senator: he behaved more insolently to Scipio, who belonged to a great family, and was a man of high rank. Before the king's arrival Scipio wore a purple cloak, but the

croirait qu'il a dû laisser à découvert tout le terrain à sa droite et surtout ses retranchemens sur les montagnes jusqu'au bord de la mer. Mais, les Romains en sortant hors de leur camp, ne le dégarnirent pas entièrement et César, n'ayant rien à craindre pour les quartiers qu'il couvrait, était le maître de jeter toutes les troupes, destinées à la garde du camp, dans l'autre partie de ses retranchemens. D'ailleurs comme tous les mouvemens de l'ennemi pour l'attaquer de ce côté, auraient dû se faire dans la plaine, et ainsi à sa vue, il se conserva toujours les moyens et le temps d'y détacher autant de troupes qu'il fallait, en se réglant sur le nombre et la force des corps que l'ennemi y aurait employés."

king is said to have told him that he ought not to wear the same dress as himself; and Scipio then put on a white dress in obedience to the command "of this proud and incompetent barbarian," as the historian names Juba.

On the next day Scipio brought out all the troops, and, having taken possession of an eminence not far from Caesar's camp, he placed them in order of battle. Caesar also brought out his troops and quickly arranged them in front of his lines in the plain, for he expected that the enemy trusting to numbers and the reinforcements of Juba would attack him. Riding round and encouraging his men he gave the signal and waited for the enemy. He had good reasons for not advancing far from his lines: Uzitta, which was in the possession of Scipio, contained some of the enemy's cohorts; and as Caesar's right was opposite to the town, he was afraid that if he advanced beyond the town, the enemy would make a sally, and attack him in flank. Besides this, there was some difficult ground in front of Scipio's line of battle, and this would have been an obstacle to Caesar's men in attacking the enemy.

The historian observes that the way in which each army was arranged for battle, was worthy of notice. Scipio placed in front all his legions with those of Juba; and behind them he placed the Numidian infantry as a reserve, but so few in depth and on so long a line⁴ that from a distance the centre seemed to be only a single line. On the right and left wings he placed the elephants with equal intervals between them, and behind the elephants the Numidian light-armed troops and the auxiliaries. He placed on the right wing all the cavalry who used bridles: his left wing was protected by the town of Uzitta, and there was no room for cavalry in that part. He placed the rest of the Numidian cavalry and a great number of light-armed men about one mile to the right of the line, and near the foot of the hills: this force was pushed forward at a distance from the enemy and from his own troops with this purpose, that when the two armies should engage, this cavalry

⁴ Guischartt has correctly explained the text "ut procul . . . videretur:" "L'historien dit ici que la ligne des Numides était de si peu de hauteur, que les soldats de César ne s'apercevaient pas de loin qu'il y en eût une seconde, si ce n'est aux ailes."

should take a circuit, envelope Caesar's army, and pierce the men with their missiles.

The order of Caesar's battle was this, from the left wing to the right. He had nine legions in the field. On the left wing he had two legions; in the centre four, and two on the right wing. The cohorts of the legions were usually arranged in three lines, one behind the other; four cohorts in the first line, three in the second, and three in the third. The four centre legions and the two on the right wing were joined together to strengthen the centre, for Caesar's right was protected by his own lines. However he still formed a new right wing out of some of the cohorts of the second line and some recruits. He removed the third line to his left wing and extended it as far as the legion which was in the centre of his line of battle; and this left consisted of three lines, behind one another. His design was this: his right flank, as already observed, was protected by his fortifications, but it was necessary to make the left strong enough to resist the enemy's numerous cavalry, and therefore Caesar placed also all his own cavalry on the left flank, and as he had not complete confidence in it, he sent the fifth legion to support the cavalry, and distributed light-armed troops among them. The archers were placed in various parts of the army and chiefly on the wings* (c. 59).

In this order and at the distance of not more than three hundred paces from one another the two armies remained from morning to the tenth hour of the day; a thing without example, as the historian says. When Caesar had begun to withdraw his troops to his lines, the whole Numidian and Gaetulian unbridled cavalry on the right of the enemy moved towards Caesar's camp on the hill, while the bridled cavalry of Labienus kept their ground and held the legions in check. Part of Caesar's cavalry with the light-armed troops, without having received orders, rashly went against the Gaetulians and crossed a marsh, but they were too few to resist the enemy, and being deserted by the light-armed troops they were

* This chapter is difficult, and the text in parts is uncertain. Guischart has a useful note on it. Perhaps I have given the true meaning of what the historian intended to say.

repulsed. One horseman was killed, many horses wounded, and seven and twenty of the light-armed men perished. The rest made their escape. Scipio retired to his camp delighted with this trifling success, which was soon followed by a reverse. On the following day some of Caesar's cavalry, who were sent to Leptis, fell in with about a hundred Numidian and Gaetulian foragers, part of whom were killed and part were taken prisoners. In the meantime Caesar daily brought his legions into the plain and continued his works: he formed a rampart and ditch across the plain to prevent the enemy from making excursions. Scipio also worked at his entrenchments and laboured to prevent Caesar from cutting him off from the heights. Cavalry skirmishes took place daily.

While Caesar and Scipio were thus occupied, Varus who was at Utica, had heard of the arrival of Caesar's thirteenth and fourteenth legions from Sicily. Immediately he brought down his ships, which had been hauled up during the winter, manned them with Gaetulian rowers and fighting men, and with the view of intercepting further supplies to Caesar sailed to Adrumetum with fifty-five vessels. Caesar, who knew nothing of his movements, sent L. Cispus with twenty-seven ships towards Thapsus, which was occupied by the enemy, for the purpose of protecting his convoys; and on the other side he despatched Q. Aquila with thirteen vessels northwards to Adrumetum for the same purpose. Cispus soon arrived at the station assigned to him. Aquila met with head-winds and was unable to double a certain promontory, but he found a safe bay in which he sheltered himself out of sight of an enemy. The rest of Caesar's fleet was at sea close to Leptis, and the rowers had quitted their ships and were dispersed along the shore; some of them had gone into the town to buy provisions, and the fleet was left in a defenceless state. Varus being informed by some deserters of this opportunity left the harbour of Adrumetum during the second watch, passed the fleet of Aquila without seeing him, and reached Leptis at daybreak, where he found the transports some distance from the port, set fire to some of them and seized two quinqueremes which were unprotected. Caesar was examining his works when he heard of what was going on at

Leptis, which was six miles distant. He mounted his horse, rode at full speed to Leptis, and ordered all the vessels to follow him: he himself embarked in a small ship. As he sailed north he found Aquila, who was much alarmed by the number of the enemy's vessels, which he had at last discovered. Caesar pursued Varus, who was struck with terror by Caesar's rapid movements and his audacity, and turning his vessels round attempted to return to Adrumetum. After a pursuit of four miles Caesar overtook Varus and recovered one of the quinqueremes with all the crew and one hundred and thirty of the enemy's men who had been put on board to secure it: he also took with all the crew one of the enemy's triremes which had made resistance. The rest of the ships of Varus got round the promontory and sought refuge in the port of Adrumetum.* Caesar not being able to double the promontory passed the night at anchor, but at dawn he came up to Adrumetum, and fired the transports which were outside the port, for all the other vessels had either been hauled up or had got into the port. He stayed a short time to see if the enemy would fight a naval battle, and then returned to his camp. The activity and daring of Caesar on this occasion were admirable, and we may excuse him for not choosing to entrust so hazardous an enterprise to any of his officers. His works were well defended against the enemy, who probably did not know that he had left them, his absence was short, and his success justified this attempt to secure a safe passage for the rest of the convoys from Sicily.

The vessel which Caesar took contained P. Vestrius, a Roman eques, and P. Ligarius, one of the army of Afranius. Caesar had set Ligarius free in Spain with others, and he then joined Pompeius, and after the battle of Pharsalia he escaped to Varus in Africa. Caesar punished the man for his perfidy and perjury by putting him to death. P. Vestrius was pardoned: his brother had paid at Rome a certain requisition of money which had been imposed on him, and Vestrius justified himself before Caesar by proving that he had been captured by the fleet of Nasidius and was saved by Varus at the moment

* See Guischart, p. 254 (note v.) on the position of Lempta and of Hercla, now Adrumetum, as he wrongly supposed, I think.

when he was being led to execution. These were the sufficient reasons for which Caesar spared Vestrius, and we cannot blame him for not sparing P. Ligarius (c. 64).

Caesar still wanted supplies, and he got some. It was the custom of the people in the country parts and in most of the farms to have concealed cellars under ground for their grain, principally to secure their stocks in time of war and against sudden visits from an enemy, as the historian says; but it was probably the usual way of keeping the grain in this dry country (p. 162). This fact became known to Caesar, and during the third watch he sent two legions with cavalry from his camp to a distance of ten miles: the men returned with a great quantity of corn. These hungry foragers pillaged the poor African farmers' stores, who would suffer from both sides alike.

Labienus hearing of this successful foraging of Caesar, advanced seven miles from Scipio's camp along the ridge by which Caesar's men had gone the day before and made a camp for two legions. He expected that Caesar would often go in the same direction to forage, and he formed an ambuscade in convenient positions with a large force of cavalry and light-armed troops. But Caesar was informed of this design by some deserters, who were continually coming to him, and he waited for a few days that the enemy might relax in their vigilance. One morning he ordered eight⁷ veteran legions to march out by the Decuman gate, the farthest removed from the enemy, as we may suppose, and part of the cavalry, who were sent on ahead. The men in ambuscade were surprised, about five hundred of these light-armed troops were killed and the rest fled. Labienus, with all his cavalry hurried to protect the fugitives, and as the few horsemen could not resist such a large force, Caesar brought up his legions. The sight of these invincible veterans stopped Labienus, and Caesar's horsemen retired in safety. On the next day Juba crucified all the Numidians, who had deserted the place of ambuscade and escaped to their camp.

Caesar was still in want of supplies, and he must either

⁷ There is perhaps some mistake in "eight." See Guisch. p. 256.

attack the enemy at a disadvantage, or leave his position and seek food for his army by marching further south. A less skilful and prudent general might have run the risk of a battle, but the course of this campaign shows that Caesar was always looking out for an opportunity of gaining a decisive victory and ending the war. He placed garrisons in Leptis, Ruspina, and Acilla (or Acholla) : the ships under Cispus and Aquila were sent to blockade Adrumetum and Thapsus : he set fire to his camp, and during the fourth watch he marched off with his army in fighting order, probably in the form which the Romans named "agmen quadratum;" or in one column as Guischartt supposes. The baggage was all placed on the left between the troops and the sea, where they would be safe against the enemy. Caesar arrived at the town of Aggar, which had often been unsuccessfully attacked by the Gætulians. Pellissier places Aggar at the Arab village of Keneis, where he found some ruins; but Shaw with more probability fixed the site at Boohadjar, the stony city, west of Leptis, and sixteen miles from Thapsus (Demas). Aggar is in the plain, which is bounded on the west by hills. Caesar made his camp here and went out to forage among the farms with part of the army. He found abundance of barley, oil, wine, and figs, but only a small quantity of wheat, and he returned to his camp.

When Scipio heard of Caesar's departure, he followed with all his force along the heights which bound the plain of Ruspina, and formed three camps six miles from Caesar's camp. There was a town named Zeta ten miles from Scipio's camp, but so situated that it was fourteen miles from Caesar's camp. Scipio sent two legions to Zeta to get corn. Caesar heard of this from a deserter, and he formed a bold design to seize the place and supply his own wants. He removed his camp from the plain to a hill where it would be in a safer position, and leaving there a sufficient force he set out during the fourth watch, passed Scipio's camp and got possession of Zeta. He found that Scipio's legions had gone some distance to forage, but as he was preparing to go after them, he saw the forces of the enemy advancing to the aid of the two legions, and so he gave up his purpose. He captured at Zeta

C. Minucius Reginus, a Roman eques, a very intimate friend of Scipio, and the commandant of Zeta, P. Atrius, a Roman eques, who belonged to the conventus of Utica, and he carried off twenty-two camels belonging to Juba. Caesar left a garrison at Zeta with Oppius and began the retreat towards his camp. In this narrative we observe that Caesar left his own camp exposed to the attack of the enemy in his absence, and perhaps in full confidence if the camp was attacked, which was very unusual in Roman warfare, that it could hold out till his return. It was possible that the enemy might recapture Zeta; but we must allow that Caesar understood his business better than we can, and he expected to keep his enemy employed.

Caesar in his retreat must pass Scipio's camp, and when he was not far from it, Labienus and Afranius with all the cavalry and light-armed troops sprung from an ambuscade upon Caesar's rear just where they were going to ascend the hills. The cavalry were ordered to oppose the attack of the enemy, and the legionary soldiers to place in a heap the bundles^s which they were carrying, and to face the enemy. At the first assault the enemy's cavalry and light troops were put to flight and driven down the hills; but as soon as Caesar began to move, the enemy again attacked him from the nearest heights with their cavalry and light-armed infantry, who were wonderfully active and accustomed to accompany the cavalry in an attack and to retire with it. As they continued thus to harass Caesar's men, he saw that their design was to compel him to make his camp on this ground where there was no water, where his men, who had tasted nothing since the fourth watch to the tenth hour of the day, and the beasts must die of thirst. It was now near sunset and Caesar moved on very slowly. Accordingly he withdrew the cavalry, who had lost many horses, from the rear and put the legions there, who checked the enemy and enabled the army to advance. The Numidians still hung about Caesar's troops and harassed the rear till during the first hour of the night Caesar brought back to the camp all his force without the

^s "Sarcinas" are no doubt the provisions which had been taken at Zeta. Guischardt's note.

loss of a man, and with only ten wounded. Labienus lost about three hundred men, and had many wounded, and all his troops were exhausted by the day's work. Scipio had brought out his legions with the elephants and placed them in order of battle before the camp to terrify Caesar's men, and now he led them back to the camp. If Scipio had been a bold and skilful commander, he might, as it appears to us from the narrative, have attacked Caesar with advantage on his retreat from Zeta, but it is evident that he was afraid to meet his formidable enemy in a fair fight⁹ (c. 70).

In order to prepare his troops to meet such enemies, Caesar was obliged to train his men, as a master trained his gladiators: to show how they should withdraw from the enemy, how they should oppose him, and how they should advance, then retreat and threaten an attack. He even went "almost so far" as to teach them where and how they should discharge their missiles. In fact the enemy's light troops kept Caesar's men in a state of great anxiety, for the cavalry were afraid of the Numidian infantry destroying the horses by their missiles, and the legionary soldiers were exhausted in pursuing these active men. In every encounter Caesar found that his cavalry without the legionary soldiers was not a match for the enemy's cavalry and light infantry. He had not yet had any experience of the enemy's legionary soldiers, nor had he discovered how he should be able to resist their cavalry and excellent light infantry when they were supported by the legions. He was also troubled about the elephants, of which his men were afraid; but he had attempted to remove this difficulty by ordering elephants to be brought from Italy, a fact which is also stated by Dion (43. c. 4). The soldiers thus

⁹ Guischartt remarks that the history of this expedition to Zeta is surely not by Hirtius, and that it bears all the marks of being invented or altered. So much is true: Caesar seized Zeta by a bold stroke and suffered much on his return.

This narrative contains some statements which are absurd; and it also contains one apparent contradiction. The writer says that Caesar saw the enemy coming up to support his two legions: and he also says at the end of chap. 70 that Scipio brought out his legions and placed them in front of his camp. We may perhaps by a little supposition reconcile these statements.

learned to be familiar with the appearance and character of these animals, what part of the body was vulnerable, and what part was exposed when they were harnessed for battle. The horses also were made familiar with the smell and cries of the animal and his appearance; and the men handled the beasts, and found out how clumsy they were in their movements; and the cavalry exercised themselves in throwing blunted missiles at them.

The behaviour of Scipio made Caesar more circumspect, and he abandoned his ancient method of carrying on a campaign and his former rapidity of action. His legions had been accustomed to fight in Gaul on level ground, and against the Gauls, who were men of a simple character, unacquainted with military stratagems, and trusted only to their courage; but now he was compelled to train his soldiers to observe the tricks, ambuscades, and artifices of the enemy, and what they should attempt and what they should avoid. To accustom them to this new kind of warfare he did not keep his men in one spot, but hurried them from place to place for the purpose of foraging, being certain that the enemy would follow him. On the third day Caesar placed his troops in order of battle, marched past Scipio's camp and gave him the opportunity of fighting on fair ground; for the time was now come, when, as a prudent commander, it was necessary to bring his adversaries to a decisive contest and to free himself from the difficulties caused by insufficient supplies. But the enemy refused the challenge and Caesar at the approach of evening led back his legions to their camp.

During this time commissioners came from Vaga,¹ a town near to Zeta. They asked Caesar to send them a garrison, and promised him supplies. It was through the favour of the gods to Caesar, as the historian tells us, that a deserter came and informed the commissioners that before the arrival of the troops which it seems that Caesar had sent, Juba with his forces had reached Vacca, surprised it, massacred all the inhabitants to a man and given up the place to his soldiers to plunder. Caesar now reviewed his army on the 21st of March,

¹ This town has the same name, Vacca or Vaga, as a town in the north of Zeugitana: but this Vacca or Vaga was near Zeta.

and the next day advancing five miles from his camp placed his troops about two miles from Scipio, and again offered him battle; but as the enemy would not fight, he led his men back, and on the next day advanced towards Sarsura, where Scipio had a garrison of Numidians and had collected stores of grain. Sarsura is probably Surseff or Ksoursef, as Pellissier writes the name, south of Thapsus, not far from the coast and below a range of hills. Labienus, who was watching Caesar's movements, began to harass his rear with the cavalry and light-armed infantry, and being encouraged by his success in seizing some of the waggons of the vivandiers and merchants who accompanied Caesar's army, he came close up to the legions, as he supposed that they could not fight under their burdens. But Caesar was prepared for him: he had taken from each legion three hundred men, who were unencumbered, and he sent them against Labienus to support his cavalry. Labienus turned round at the sight of the legionary soldiers and made a disgraceful flight: many of his men were killed and still more were wounded. The soldiers of Caesar rejoined the main body, and the march was resumed, while Labienus still followed at a distance, but prudently kept to the summit of the hills on Caesar's right. Caesar took Sarsura in the presence of the enemy, who did not venture to disturb him, massacred Scipio's garrison, and distributed among his army the supplies which he found in the town.

On the next day Caesar still went southwards and came to Thysdrus or Thisdra, now El Jem, which Shaw places six leagues S.S.W. of Sarsura. This position is proved by an inscription, which contains the ancient name twice. At El Jem there is a magnificent amphitheatre, probably built in the time of M. Aurelius, only inferior to the Coliseum at Rome in magnitude and splendour.¹

Considius, who commanded in Thisdra, had a strong garrison and a company of his own gladiators. Caesar after examining the place was deterred from assaulting it by the

¹ The inscription contains the words THYSDRV̄M and THYSDRITANAE COL. The remains of Thysdrus are described by Shaw, p. 117, 2nd ed., and by Pellissier, *Tunis*, p. 266. There is a drawing of the amphitheatre at El Jem by Sir Grenville Temple in Pellé's "*Il Mediterraneo illustrato*," Firenze, 1841.

want of water, and after marching four miles to a place where he found water, he encamped. Leaving this place on the fourth day he returned to his camp at Aggar, and Scipio also returned to his former camp (c. 76).

There was a town named Thabena, which was under King Juba and situated in the extreme maritime part of his dominions. It was therefore in that part of Juba's kingdom which extended to the sea on the south of the Roman province of Africa; and Pellissier conjectures that it may have been Sfax, opposite to the Kerkennah islands. The people of Thabena surprised and destroyed Juba's garrison, and then sent a deputation to tell Caesar what they had done, and to ask for aid in consideration of this service. Caesar sent to Thabena a tribune Marcius Crispus with three cohorts, some archers, and military engines. At the same time soldiers of all the legions, who in consequence of sickness or having had leave of absence had hitherto not been able to cross to Africa with their comrades, arrived in one body at Caesar's camp, to the number of four thousand, with four hundred horsemen, and a thousand slingers and archers. Caesar with all his forces now advanced towards Scipio and occupied a position in the plain five miles from his own camp, and two miles from Scipio's. Below Scipio's camp there was a town named Tegea, where Scipio had kept two thousand horsemen, whom he now placed on the right and on the left of this town, and bringing his legions out of the camp he drew them up in order on a lower eminence about a mile from his entrenchments. As Scipio remained in his position and the day was wasting, Caesar ordered his cavalry to attack the enemy's horsemen who were posted at Tegea; and he sent also his light-armed troops, archers and slingers, to support the cavalry, who made the attack with impetuosity. Pacidius, who commanded the enemy's cavalry, deployed his force with the view of outflanking Caesar's horse and at the same time made a vigorous resistance. Caesar then ordered three hundred soldiers of that active body which he had formed out of his legions, to advance from the legion which stood nearest to the fight and to support his cavalry. Labienus on his side sent up fresh horsemen to relieve those who were wounded and exhausted. The cavalry of Caesar, who were

only four hundred, could not sustain the four thousands of the enemy and the missiles discharged by the Numidian light-armed troops, until Caesar sent up the cavalry from the other wing to support those who were giving way. Being thus encouraged Caesar's men fell with all their force on the enemy and put them to flight: in the pursuit, which was followed up for three miles to the hills, they killed and wounded many, and then retired to the main body. Caesar waited under arms till the tenth hour, when he returned to his camp without the loss of a man. In this fight Pacidius received a severe wound from a pilum in his head through the helmet, and many of his officers and some of his bravest soldiers were killed or wounded. Scipio looked on while his cavalry was pursued and massacred, but he did not move even to make a show of helping them. His behaviour confirmed what had been already proved, that he did not dare to meet with his legions the formidable general whom he could only hope to wear out by famine (c. 78).

CHAPTER XXVII.

THAPSUS.

B.C. 46.

CAESAR seeing that the enemy would not fight on fair ground, and that he could not place his camp nearer to him on account of the want of water, determined to seize Thapsus, which was in possession of Scipio's commander Vergilius. If Caesar succeeded, he would be master of all the coast from Ruspina to Thapsus, and the country south of this place would be open to him. Thapsus was sixteen miles from Aggar on a low neck of land, and the great extent of the ruins, as Shaw observes, show that it was the largest city on this coast south of Carthage. A great part of the Cothon, or artificial port remains, but it is now sanded up: the sea walls were built in frames, and the material was composed of small pebbles and mortar, "so well cemented and knit together that a solid rock cannot be more hard and durable" (Shaw).¹ The position of Thapsus is determined by the modern name (Demas) and by the salt lake, mentioned by the historian, between which and the sea there

¹ See also Shaw's description of the walls of Tlem-san (p. 23, 2nd edn.), where he says that "the several stages and removes of these frames are still observable." He also refers to Pliny (35. c. 14), who says that this method of building was used by the Africans and Spaniards in his time. See the notes in Harduin's Pliny; and Vitruvius, ii. 6, "De Pulvere Puteolano." Pliny names these walls "formacei," made in a "forma" or frame. Such walls are constructed at Brighton to resist the sea. Pellissier describes a clever contrivance in the concrete pier of Demas, which is about 478 yards long and 33 wide. All the part which is above the level of the water is pierced by two rows of holes placed in horizontal lines, which were made for the purpose of allowing the sea, when it was tempestuous, to run through the pier and thus to diminish the force of the waves. There are the remains of an amphitheatre at Demas, and of large and fine water cisterns, the construction of which was usual in Africa.

was a neck of land not more than fifteen hundred paces wide. This is the modern salt lake (Sebkah) Sidi-Ben-Nour, which is also mentioned by Strabo (Bell. Afr. c. 80).

On the 4th of April during the third watch of the night Caesar advanced towards Thapsus, which was held by a strong garrison. He made his camp, and began to form his lines round the town: he also occupied with troops several convenient positions to prevent the enemy approaching near Thapsus and coming between him and the town. Scipio now saw that he must fight or let Caesar take Thapsus, and he quickly followed his enemy along the high ground, and made two camps about eight miles from Thapsus. Scipio's design was to pass between the salt lake and the sea and to relieve Thapsus, but he came too late. The day before his arrival Caesar occupied the passage with a fort, and left a force in it: with the rest of his men he invested Thapsus with his lines which extended in a crescent from sea to sea round the town. Scipio finding the passage closed passed the next day and night above the salt lake on the north side: at day-break he halted not far from Caesar's camp and the fort mentioned above, and about a mile from the coast, and here he began to make his camp. When Scipio's arrival was reported to Caesar, he drew his men from the works, left Asprenas with two legions to protect the camp, and he himself advanced rapidly with some troops unencumbered towards the enemy. He left part of the fleet before Thapsus, and ordered the rest of the ships to move forwards to the rear of the enemy, to keep as close to the shore as they could, and to look out for his signal: when this should be given, they were instructed to raise a loud shout for the purpose of alarming the enemy and making them look behind them.

When Scipio had failed in his object of relieving Thapsus, he did not retire, but, as it seems, resolved to fight a battle, even before he had made his camp secure. We can only guess at his designs by seeing what he did. If he had still no intention to fight, he had put himself in a place where he gave Caesar the opportunity of attacking him at an advantage.

As soon as Caesar came near the enemy, he saw Scipio's army drawn up in front of the vallum with the elephants on the right and left wing, while part of the men were

still working vigorously at the construction of the camp. Caesar formed his troops in three lines: he placed the tenth and thirteenth legions on the right wing, and the fourteenth and ninth on the left. Caesar also formed a fourth line, as he had done at Pharsalia, of five cohorts placed at each of the wings to oppose the elephants: the archers, and slingers were placed on each wing and the light-armed infantry were interposed among the cavalry.² Caesar on foot went along the lines: he reminded the veterans of their merits and their former battles, and by kind words excited their courage. It was the first battle of the fresh recruits, and Caesar exhorted them to emulate the bravery of the veterans and by gaining a victory to acquire the same reputation, rank, and name as their older comrades. As Caesar was going round his troops, signs of confusion appeared about the enemy's vallum: the soldiers in alarm were hurrying backwards and forwards, at one time passing within the gates of the camp, and then again coming out in a disorderly manner. The historian does not explain what was the cause of this commotion on the side of the enemy, but Guischartd explains it in a passage which is a sample of the many conjectures and inventions which he has introduced into his Analysis of the African Campaign (p. 271). "While Caesar was still engaged in arranging his troops and encouraging the soldiers, an ominous uneasiness seized the enemy's commander, who thought that he perceived great defects in his order of battle. He was imprudent enough to attempt to remedy the matter at the critical moment when the soldier was attentively watching the movements of his enemy. He commanded then the different corps of the second and third line to enter within his lines, apparently to cover the retreat in case of disaster; he replaced them by others who came out of the lines. This movement of troops produced a bad effect on the soldiers, who seeing the irresolution of their general began to be afraid: those who were passing behind the lines hurried to reach them in the hope of avoiding the battle; and the others, who were coming out, communicated the alarm to all."

The confusion among the enemy, which Caesar had observed,

² It is not said how Caesar's centre was formed. Compare Oudendorp and Nipperdey, c. 80.

was seen by many of his men, and immediately the Legati and Evocati entreated him to give the signal, for the immortal gods promised a sure victory. Caesar hesitated and resisted their ardour: he said that he did not like making an attack on a camp, and he kept the line in check until suddenly on the right wing a trumpeter, who was forced by the soldiers, gave the signal for battle. Then the whole line moved forward against the enemy, though the centurions put themselves in the way and endeavoured to prevent the men from advancing without the orders of the general. Caesar now seeing that it was impossible to oppose the impetuosity of his troops, gave as the signal word Good Fortune, and putting his horse to his speed rode towards the enemy. On the right wing the slingers and archers showered their missiles on the elephants, who being terrified by the noise of the flying stones turned round, crushed under their feet the close ranks behind and struggled to reach the gates of the camp which were not yet finished. The Moorish horsemen, who were placed to support the elephants, being abandoned by them were the first to fly. The soldiers of Caesar quickly surrounded the elephants and got possession of the enemy's vallum, where a few men made a stout resistance and were killed, but the rest fled as fast as they could and took refuge in the camp which they had left the day before.

During the fight the garrison of Thapsus attempted to sally from the town by the sea-gate, either to assist their friends or to secure their own safety, and they advanced into the water up to the middle in the hope of passing beyond Caesar's lines of contravallation; but the slaves and boys of the camp drove them off with stones and pila and compelled them to return into the town. Scipio's forces were finally overpowered and scattered in disorder through the plain, pursued by Caesar's legions, who allowed them no time to rally. They fled to their old camp in the hope of being able to repair it and make a stand there, and of finding some officer to take the command; but they found none. Their commanders, following the example of the great Pompeius at Pharsalia, had deserted the army to save their own lives. The unfortunate soldiers now yielded to despair by throwing away their arms, the last senseless act of men whose heads are bewildered by fear, and

fled towards Juba's camp. But Caesar's men were already there. At last the fugitives halted on a hill, and made the usual military signals of surrender.³ But the veteran soldiers who were infuriated by passion would not spare their enemies: they wounded or killed even some of their own men, "illustrious men of the city,"⁴ as the historian terms them, whom the soldiers were used to call by a name, which implied that they were traitors. Tullius Rufus a man of quaestorian rank was transfixed by a soldier's pilum, and Pompeius Rufus was wounded in the arm and would have been killed if he had not run up to Caesar. Many Roman equites and Senators, seeing the ungovernable licence of the soldiers, withdrew from the battle for fear of being killed by their own men. All these soldiers of Scipio though they implored Caesar for mercy were massacred to a man in Caesar's presence in spite of his earnest entreaty to spare them. Caesar got possession of three camps. Ten⁵ thousand of the enemy perished, but Caesar is said to have lost only fifty men, and the number of wounded was small. Returning to his camp Caesar presented himself before Thapsus, and placed in sight of the garrison sixty captured elephants harnessed and carrying turrets on their backs, with the expectation that this evidence of the defeat of Scipio might subdue the obstinacy of Vergilius and his soldiers. He also called out to Vergilius and urged him to surrender and trust to Caesar's well-known clemency. But Vergilius made no answer, and Caesar left the place. On the following day there was a religious celebration to which the army was summoned, while all the townsmen shut up in Thapsus were looking on. The victorious general from his elevated seat thanked the soldiers for their services and gave rewards to all his veteran troops: the bravest received particular distinctions. He left Rebilus as proconsul before Thapsus with three legions, and Cn. Domitius with two legions

³ The author says "armis demissis." He has already said that they had thrown away their arms; perhaps he meant their "shields" and that they had kept their swords. But the author is a bungling writer. Compare Lucan iv. 173, "tantum nutu motoque salutant Ense suos."

⁴ "Illustres urbanos, quos auctores appellabant" (c. 85).

⁵ Plutarch, Caesar, 58, states the killed at the extravagant number of fifty thousand, which one editor of the B. A. has. See Oudendorp.

at Thidra to besiege these towns. M. Messala with the cavalry was sent forward to Utica and Caesar immediately followed in the same direction.

The description of the battle of Thapsus is very incomplete. The author of the *African War*, as Guischart justly observes, amuses himself with relating small facts of little importance,⁶ and neglects the circumstances which are essential to enable us to understand this memorable battle; and there is nothing of any value on this matter in the later compilers. Plutarch (Caesar, c. 53) mentions a circumstance which is quite inconsistent with the narrative of the *African War*. He says that some writers affirm that Caesar "was not in the action himself, but that as he was marshalling and arranging his forces, he was attacked by his usual complaint,"⁷ and that perceiving it as soon as it came on and before his senses were completely confounded and overpowered by the malady, just as he was beginning to be convulsed, he was carried to one of the neighbouring towers and stayed there quietly." The battle of Thapsus was fought on the 6th of April.

The cavalry of Scipio who had escaped took the road to Utica and arrived at a town named Parada, or Phara by Strabo. The inhabitants having heard of Caesar's victory refused to receive them, but the horsemen forced their way in, made a pile in the market-place of wood and all the furniture, and setting fire to the heap threw into it alive and with their limbs fast bound every man, woman, and child. After this abominable act they went on to Utica. Cato, as it has been said, had disarmed the people of Utica who were suspected of favouring Caesar, and lodged them before the gate named Bellica (p. 82) in a camp. The *sebate*, as the historian names it, remained in the town. Scipio's horsemen assaulted this camp, because they believed that those who were in it were partisans of Caesar, and they were eager to satisfy their vengeance by destroying them. But the men being encouraged by Caesar's success repelled the horsemen with stones and sticks. Failing in this attempt the horsemen got into Utica, killed many of the inhabitants,

⁶ As, for example, the story about the elephant, c. 84.

⁷ It was epilepsy, as it is said, or perhaps only fainting fits. See Plutarch Caesar, c. 17, Dion, 43. c. 82, and Suetonius, Caesar, 45.

and broke into the houses and plundered them. As Cato could not prevail on these men to assist him in the defence of the town and to desist from murder and pillage, and he knew what they wanted, he gave each man a hundred *sesterces* to satisfy their demands. Faustus Sulla also gave them the same sum at his own cost, and led them from Utica towards the kingdom of Juba. It is probable that these brutal horse-men were Gaetulians and Numidians.

In the meantime numerous fugitives from Thapsus arrived at Utica. Cato summoned them to a meeting and also the three hundred, who had contributed money to Scipio for the war: he exhorted them all to manumit their slaves and to defend the town. Some of them assented to his proposal, but as others were struck with terror and resolved to make their escape, he did not persist in his purpose, and he assigned them ships to carry them wherever they chose to go. Having arranged everything with the greatest care and recommended his children to Lucius Caesar,^a who was then acting as his quaestor, all the time preserving his serenity of countenance and conversing in his usual manner, Cato retired to his bedchamber with a sword concealed, and after a time stabbed himself. The noise of his fall was heard outside, and his physician and friends, who suspected what he had done, broke open the door: they found him still alive, and attempted to hold his hands and bind up the wound, but he tore it open and resolutely ended his life. The people of Utica, though they disliked Cato as one of the partisans of Scipio, esteemed him for his singular integrity and for his behaviour, which was very different from that of the other commanders of his party. He had also strengthened the town by the great works which he constructed, and by the addition of towers. For these reasons the citizens interred him in an honourable manner. Cato was in his forty-ninth year. The only writing that he has left is a letter to Cicero (*Ad Div.* xv. 5), who after his death wrote a panegyric intitled Cato, to which Caesar replied (*Dion*, 43, c. 13, and the notes of Reimar; *Ad Att.* xii. 4, 40, 41, 44).

Plutarch in his life of the younger Cato has thirteen chapters

^a L. Caesar, a kinsman of the Dictator, see p. 14.

on the events which took place in Utica from the arrival of the news of the battle of Thapsus to the death of Cato. The biographer must have found materials for this minute narrative, and he has certainly embellished them a little after his fashion. Confusion prevailed in Utica, and we cannot wonder if the narrative is also confused; but it shows Plutarch's sympathy with the Roman Stoic, who had resolved to die, and it is marked by characteristic touches such as Plutarch more than any biographer knew how to give to his portraits. Before killing himself Cato read in his chamber, and read twice, as Plutarch says, the *Phaedon* of Plato, the dialogue on the immortality of the soul, which contains the last conversation of Socrates. A modern critic cannot understand how Cato could read so long a dialogue twice in so short a time; but Plutarch tells us that Cato did not kill himself until the birds began their morning song. It is difficult to understand how any person could know that Cato even read the *Phaedon* once. We must assume that the book was found in the room or on the bed, and that is all.* After Cato's death L. Caesar summoned the people of Utica to a public meeting and advised them to open the city gates, for he had great hopes that Caesar would deal leniently with them. The citizens followed his recommendation, and L. Caesar went to meet the conqueror. Messala in obedience to Caesar's orders arrived at Utica and took possession of all the gates (c. 88).

After leaving Thapsus Caesar came to Usseta,¹ where Scipio had stored a great quantity of corn, arms, missiles and other things under the care of a small garrison. Caesar took possession of the town, and then advanced to Adrumetum, which he entered, and seized all the provisions and money in the place. He pardoned Q. Ligarius, and the son of C. Considius

* Appian (B. C. ii. 98) may have read Plutarch's description of Cato's death; but he either had other authorities also, for he differs from Plutarch in several particulars, or he chose to invent something new. His narrative is a poor attempt to tell a pathetic story. Dion Cassius (43, c. 11) has nearly the same as Appian. Addison wrote a tragedy named Cato, which was once read and perhaps admired, and even within our time boys have recited the hero's reflections on death after reading Plato.

¹ This is, I think, the place which has been named Uzitta. The MS. readings, c. 89, are Usceta, Uzeta, Usseta, Useta.

who were in the town. He set out from Adrumetum the same day, left Livineius Regulus there with a legion and marched towards Utica. On his road he was met by L. Caesar² who threw himself on his knees, and prayed for his life without asking for anything more. Caesar granted his petition and pardoned many others: among them was M. Cato, the son, who was in Utica when his father died. Caesar arrived at Utica in the evening about the time of lighting the lamps and he remained outside the town that night. He entered Utica on the morning of the following day, and summoning the inhabitants to a meeting thanked them for their fidelity. As to the Roman merchants in the place and those of the three hundred who had supplied Varus and Scipio with money, he charged them in a long speech with criminal conduct, and ended by telling them that they might show themselves without any fear for their safety; he would spare their lives, but he would sell all their property; however, if any of them should purchase his own property, he would cancel the sale and take the purchase money as a fine. The men, who were struck with terror, seeing that their lives were spared gladly accepted Caesar's terms and entreated him to impose a penalty on all the three hundred jointly. This proposal was accepted by Caesar and the sum was fixed at a hundred millions of sesterces (milies sestertio, above 800,000*l.*), or two millions, according to some readings, which the merchants were required to pay to the Roman state in three years by six instalments. All the men eagerly assented to these conditions and they thanked Caesar for such favourable terms. Appian's statement that Caesar killed all the three hundred whom he found is very improbable, and in direct contradiction to the historian of the African War.

Juba fled from Thapsus with Petreius. During the day they concealed themselves in the farm-houses, and travelled by night until they reached the kingdom of Juba and the town of Zama, which was the residence of Juba and contained

² L. Caesar was afterwards put to death (Dion, 43. c. 12, and the notes of Reimarus), but under what circumstances, we do not know. Cicero in a letter to M. Varro (*Ad Fam.* ix. 7) speaks of hearing of the death of L. Caesar before the Dictator's return from Africa.

his wives and children. Juba had brought all his money to this place and all his most valuable property, and at the commencement of the war he had strengthened it. The site of this city, in the neighbourhood of which Scipio defeated Hannibal, is fixed by Pellissier* at a place now named Zouam near the right bank of the Mejerda, about $36\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ N. lat. The townsmen, who had joyfully received the news of Caesar's victory, would not allow the detested king to enter the place; for it was said that after declaring war against the Roman people he had constructed in the public place of Zama an enormous pile of wood, with the intention, if he should be defeated, of putting on it everything that was in the town, massacring the inhabitants, throwing their bodies on the pile, and after setting fire to it, killing himself on the blazing heap and perishing with his children, wives, and all the royal treasures. Juba stayed a long time before the gates of Zama, first using threats to obtain admission, and then entreaties, when he found that threats were useless; but as the townsmen persisted in their resolution, he finally prayed that they would give up his wives and children that he might carry them away. Even this request was refused, and the king retired with M. Petreius and a few horsemen to his country-house in the neighbourhood. The people of Zama sent a message to Caesar, who was now at Utica, to inform him of the state of affairs and to ask him to bring them help before the king should have time to collect a force and attack them: they declared their intention, as long as they had life, to preserve themselves and their town for his service. Caesar commended the people of Zama, and told the messengers to return and announce that he was coming. He set out the next day from Utica with some cavalry. On the road he met with many officers in King Juba's service, who begged for pardon, which was granted. Before his arrival at Zama the fame of Caesar's lenity was spread abroad, and almost all the horsemen of Juba's kingdom came to see him, and were relieved from fear by his prudent and generous reception.

During this time Considius, who commanded in Thisdra with

* Description de Tunis, p. 227. Other geographers have assigned a different position to Zama.

his slaves, a band of gladiators, and some Gaetulians, heard of the defeat at Thapsus. Fearing the arrival of Domitius and his legions, and seeing no hope of safety he left the town secretly with a great amount of money and accompanied by a few barbarians, with the intention of escaping into Juba's kingdom; but his Gaetolian attendants murdered him on the road in order to seize the money, and then took to flight in different directions. Vergilius, who was shut up in Thapsus, saw that he could make no resistance: he heard of the death of Cato, that Juba was a wretched fugitive, that Sittius had destroyed Saburra and his troops, that Caesar was in possession of Utica, and that Scipio's mighty force was totally dispersed. Under these circumstances he surrendered the town to Caninius Rebilus, who promised to protect both him and his children. Juba and Petreius now reduced to desperation determined to die like soldiers. After eating their last supper the African king and the Roman general drew their swords and attacked one another. The king, who was young and strong, easily despatched Petreius; but as he did not succeed in the attempt to drive his sword through his own body, he entreated a slave to do this last service for him. Other writers state that Juba and Petreius killed one another, an instance of variation which is common in all such stories.

About this time Sittius defeated the army of Saburra, Juba's commander, and Saburra fell in the battle. On his march through Mauretania to join Caesar with a small force Sittius fell in with Faustus Sulla and Afranius, who were conducting to Spain the men who had plundered Utica, about fifteen hundred in number. During the night Sittius laid an ambushade and at break of day with the exception of a few horsemen, who were ahead of the rest and made their escape, he killed or took prisoners all of them. Afranius was taken, and Faustus Sulla, who had with him his wife Pompeia and her two children. Pompeia was the only daughter of Pompeius Magnus by his divorced wife Mucia. It is probable that these chief prisoners were sent to Caesar, but the author of the African War does not say so distinctly. Faustus and Afranius were murdered after a few days by the soldiers, who

after their great victory were difficult to control ;⁴ but Caesar set Pompeia and her children free and left her property untouched. When Florus and Orosius tell us that Caesar put them to death, we have another instance of the diversity of reports about the events of the African war. We cannot believe that Caesar could be guilty of such an act : he was generous and merciful to Romans, and if it is true that he had been the lover of Pompeia's mother Mucia, this fact makes the story of these two compilers absolutely improbable.

Scipio with Licinius Damasippus, Torquatus, and Plaetorius Rustianus had taken refuge in some ships of war after the battle of Thapsus with the intention of escaping to Spain. After being long tossed about by the waves they reached Hippo Regius (Bona) on the north coast of Africa and west of Utica, where the fleet of Sittius happened to be stationed. The vessels were surrounded and sunk by the numerous ships of Sittius. Scipio and his companions perished. Scipio himself, as Appian says, to avoid being taken stabbed himself and leapt into the sea. Africa was now cleared of Caesar's enemies; but three of them, Cn. Pompeius the elder son of Magnus, his brother Sextus, and Labienus were safe in Spain. Cicero in a letter to L. Papirius Paetus (*Ad Fam.* ix. 18) says that Pompeius, Lentulus, Scipio, and Afranius had come to a miserable end : Cato nobly died, and he can do the same when he chooses ; but he adds, " Let me only take care that it shall not be as necessary for me as for him, and that is what I am looking after." He told the truth for once at least.

While Caesar was at Zama, he sold by auction Juba's property and also the property of those Romans who had borne arms against him. He rewarded the people of Zama, who had excluded the king from the town, out of the royal revenue.⁵ Juba's kingdom was included in a new *Provincia Africa*, with extended boundaries, and Sallustius the historian was appointed governor with the title of *proconsul*. Western Nu-

⁴ We may perhaps conclude from the historian of the African War, who is a very confused writer, that Caesar was not present when Afranius and Faustus were murdered ; but we cannot suppose that he would have spared Afranius. *Dion*, 43. c. 12.

⁵ If this is the meaning. In Oudendorp the reading is "*abrogatis*." But there is a reading "*erogatis*."

midia, which had been held by Massinissa a friend of Juba, was given by Caesar to King Bocchus and Sittius for their services. Sittius had for his share the best part of this country, and distributed it among his men. Cirta (Constantina) was within the limits of the grant to Sittius, whence it was named Colonia Sittianorum (Appian, B. C. iv. 54). On his return to Utica Caesar sold the property of those officers who had served under Juba and Petreius. He imposed on Thapsus a requisition of two millions of sesterces, and on the Roman citizens of this Conventus three millions; on the town of Adrumetum three millions, and on the Conventus of Adrumetum a fine of five millions; but he protected these places and all the property of the people. The inhabitants of Leptis had been plundered by Juba some time before the African war, and on complaining to the Roman Senate, who sent commissioners to inquire into the charges made against the king, they had obtained restitution. They were now required to furnish annually three million pounds of oil, because in the beginning of the African war through the want of unanimity among the chief citizens they had leagued themselves with Juba and aided him with arms, soldiers and money. The soil about Leptis is light and stony, and only adapted to the cultivation of the olive, which is abundant. Thisdra, which was a poor town, was required to furnish a small amount of corn. The conqueror laid these heavy contributions on some of the African towns after the country had been exhausted by the demands of Scipio and the ravages of the war. It is said that Caesar dismissed his older soldiers before sailing for Italy in order that they might not have the opportunity of mutinying again (Dion, 43. c. 14), a statement which may be true, but some confirmation of it would make it more probable. Caesar must have provided for these veterans by grants of land or in some way.

On the 18th of June of the unreformed Calendar he embarked at Utica and on the third day arrived at Calaris (Cagliari) in Sardinia. The town of Sulci in this island had received Nasidius (B. C. ii. 7) with his fleet, and furnished him with supplies: the people were now fined ten millions of sesterces, and the payment of the usual tenths was changed into

a payment of eighths. The property of a few persons was sold. From Sardinia he sent off part of the fleet under Didius to Spain, to look after Cn. Pompeius. On the 27th of June he sailed from Caralis along the coast, and being delayed by putting into the ports in the bad weather he reached Rome on the twenty-eighth day.

The African Campaign lasted from the beginning of January B.C. 46 to the middle of June; or if we compute the time to the battle of Thapsus, it lasted to the 6th of April. The war was confined to a small tract of country between Ruspina and Thapsus, but circumstances made it to Caesar one of the most difficult and dangerous of all his military enterprises, and gave him the opportunity of displaying his great abilities and his generous temper. The historian of the war admired the general and attempted to set forth his merits, but he is a poor writer, often confused, and the text of his book, as we now have it, is very corrupt. If a competent soldier should examine the ground on which this war was conducted, he might produce a narrative of the campaign nearly free from all difficulty and very instructive.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE TRIUMPH.

B.C. 46.

BEFORE Caesar arrived at Rome the Senate showed their readiness to receive him as master. They decreed a thanksgiving (*supplicatio*) of forty days for the victory of Thapsus and the overthrow of the Senatorian party: this was twice the number of days which had been voted after Caesar's capture of Alesia. It was also decreed that his triumphal car should be drawn by white horses, and that he should be attended by seventy-two lictors, which would represent his three dictatorships. He was also declared to be Praefect of morals for three years, as if the name of Censor was not honourable enough, and dictator for ten years in succession. A curule seat, or seat of office was assigned to him in the senate, where he would sit with the consuls, and give his opinion first. By making him Censor in fact, though not in name, and giving him no colleague, and by allowing him to declare his opinion first, the Senate put the supreme power into his hands. At the games in the circus it was declared that he should give the signal for the beginning of the ceremony, as a consul used to do when a consul was present. It was also decreed that his car should be placed in the Capitol opposite to that of Jupiter used in the games of the Circus, and that a bronze statue of Caesar should be set on a figure of the earth with the inscription, "He is a demigod." We know that Octavianus after Caesar's death put this inscription on the basis of a statue, but it is hardly credible that Caesar received this vile adulation in his lifetime. Dion states (43. c. 21) that Caesar after-

wards erased the word demigod. It was also decreed, it is said, that the name of Caesar should be inscribed on the Capitol in place of that of Catulus, as if Caesar had completed the building, though the fact is that in his praetorship he attempted to raise suspicion about the honesty of Catulus, who had superintended the work, and he proposed that the name of Pompeius should be inscribed on the temple (vol. iii. p. 361). "I have reported," says Dion, "only so much as this, not because other things were not voted, but because Caesar did not accept more than I have mentioned"¹ (Dion Cassius, 43. c. 14, and 42. c. 20).

Cicero was expecting Caesar's arrival with some uneasiness. It was not certain where he would land or when. Cicero wrote to his friend M. Varro (*Ad Fam.* ix. 7) a short letter, in which his meaning is only half expressed, but he says enough to show that he was very anxious to secure his safety; and he says that he continues to sup with those who are now in power, Caesar's friends. Perhaps Caesar landed at Ostia, as Hirtius, Balbus, and Oppius advised, in order to avoid meeting a great crowd. On his arrival he addressed the Senate and then the people, of course outside of the city. Dion has reported what he said (43. c. 15—18), but we conclude that the speech is Dion's own work, though it is possible that he found some record of Caesar's address. The object of Caesar's speech was to remove all fear about his intentions and to assure both the Senate and the people of his wish to do all that he could for the interest of the State.

In the month of August of the unreformed Calendar Caesar celebrated his four triumphs on four different days, for his conquest of Gallia, Egypt, Pontus, and Africa. In name they were triumphs over barbarous nations, but in fact triumphs over his own people. The Gallic triumph was the first and greatest, for it commemorated the conquest of a powerful nation which had often threatened Italy. The day of a triumph was a day of licence for the Roman soldiers; and Caesar heard the jokes and songs of his men about the imputed scandal of his residence with the Bithynian king Nicomedes

¹ It seems however that Dion is mistaken about the erasure of the name of Catulus. *Tacit. Hist.* iii. 72.

(vol. ii. p. 380) when he was a young man, and his amours with Cleopatra and other women. Dion reports (43. c. 20) that the whole body of soldiers ended with singing, "If you shall do right, you will suffer: if you shall do wrong, you will be a king;" which he explains as signifying, "If you restore to the people the power which you have usurped, you will be punished for your illegal acts: if you keep it, you will be king." In the Gallic triumph there appeared a representation of Massilia, the old friend and ally of Rome. The figures of the Rhine, the Rhone, and a golden image of the Ocean reminded the spectators of the Gallic and German victories and of the invasion of Britain. But the great glory of the triumph and the shame of Caesar was the Gallic chief Vercingetorix, the man who was Caesar's noblest opponent in Gallia and had been his prisoner since the year 52 B.C. After the triumph he was put to death.² Cicero observes (In Verrem, v. 30) on this barbarous custom: "But those who triumph, and for this occasion keep hostile leaders alive that the Roman people may enjoy the noblest spectacle and the reward of victory by seeing their enemies in the procession, when the cars begin to turn from the Forum to the Capitol, order the men to be led to prison, and the same day brings to the conquerors the termination of their military power and to the vanquished the end of their life." When the procession reached the place named the Velabrum, there was an unfavourable omen: Caesar's car broke down near the Temple of Fortune erected by L. Lucullus, and he was nearly thrown from his seat, and obliged to mount another car. When he had ascended the Capitol, he crept on his knees from the Capitoline area up the steps of Jupiter's temple, as the Emperor Claudius afterwards did on a like occasion. In the Egyptian triumph there appeared in chains a woman and a princess, Arsinoe, the sister of Cleopatra, and to Caesar a great disgrace. A statue of the Nile and a figure of the burning Pharos or lighthouse of Alexandria were symbols of the war in Egypt. The deaths of Achilles and Pothinus were also represented. In the Pontic triumph there was a picture of Pharnaces flying from the

² Pompeius, on the occasion of his great triumph did not order a single person to be put to death (vol. iii. 387).

battle, and on a tablet were written the words, *Veni, Vidi, Vici*. In the African triumph there appeared a young boy, a son of King Juba. This youth, also named Juba, was afterwards a king himself, and a most laborious and learned writer.

Appian (B. C. ii. 101) states that Caesar did not profess to triumph over his fellow-citizens, because it would have been unbecoming to himself and an insult to the Roman people; but there appeared in the processions representations of all the events of the civil wars and portraits of his enemies except Pompeius. The people saw with sorrow the picture of the commander L. Scipio stabbing himself and jumping into the sea, Petreius killing himself after his last banquet, and Cato like a wild beast tearing out his own bowels. It is difficult to believe that Caesar allowed such pictures to appear in his triumph; and Appian's statement is not confirmed by any other authority.

Gold and silver, the richest booty of war, was the most attractive part of a triumph, for it was a promise of prize-money to the soldier. Sixty thousand talents of metal, and one half-talent, says Appian, and 2822 golden crowns, weighing 20,414 pounds were exhibited. This enormous amount of the precious metal may be an exaggeration; but Suetonius charges Caesar with having been a money collector from the commencement of his career and having plundered Gallia most unmercifully; and Dion says the same.

After the four triumphs came the feast, when the people were richly entertained at 22,000 triclinia or couches and drank the best wines.³ It was after the feast, as Dion states, that Caesar was conducted to his home by elephants which carried lighted torches.⁴ Next, came the distribution of money. At the commencement of the civil war Caesar had promised seventy-five denarii to every citizen who was entitled to an allowance of corn: he now paid the money, and twenty-five additional denarii to indemnify these worthy citizens for

³ A triclinium is a sofa which would hold three persons at table.

⁴ See Drumann (Juli, p. 615, note 49), and his remarks on Sueton., Caesar, c. 37, who places the torchlight procession of the elephants on the day of the Gallic triumph.

the delay. Every man, who was on this list of paupers, received also ten measures (modii) of wheat and ten pounds (librae) of oil.⁶

Every soldier received 5000 denarii; a centurion received 10,000; a tribune and praefect of cavalry 20,000 denarii.⁶ Suetonius also speaks of lands being assigned to veterans, which may have been done some time in this year, for Cicero speaks of some land measurement being made at this time (*Ad Fam.* ix. 17). The soldiers were dissatisfied with the cost of the triumph, because they wished to have the money themselves, and they made a disturbance, but Caesar seized one of them with his own hands and ordered him to be put to death.⁷

In B.C. 54 Caesar had bought by his agents at Rome ground for erecting a new Forum (*vol. iv. p. 270*). The work was interrupted during the Civil Wars, but it was now finished, and there was added to the original design a temple of Venus Genetrix, from whom Caesar claimed his descent; and he had vowed this temple before the battle of Pharsalia. The Forum and temple were dedicated in September. The statue of the goddess was not yet ready, but the model made by Arcesilaus was placed in the temple,⁸ which was also adorned with pictures, two of them by the Byzantine painter Timomachus, Ajax and Medea, for which Caesar gave eighty talents.

The dedication was followed by the games in memory of Caesar's daughter Julia. A wooden theatre was built, which was named an amphitheatre because it was surrounded by seats and had no stage (*scena*) like a theatre.⁹ Dion remarks (43.

⁶ Suetonius adds that Caesar remitted the annual rents (*habitationem*) payable at Rome up to the amount of two thousand sesterces, and in Italy those rents which were not above five hundred sesterces (see p. 308, note 6).

⁶ Appian, B. C. ii. 102, Dion, 43, c. 21; and compare the passage of Suetonius, c. 37.

⁷ Dion (43. c. 24) states that two other men were put to death in a manner of religious ceremony, but he does not know, as he says, the reason of the sacrifice. They were sacrificed in the Campus Martius by the Pontifices and the Flamen Martialis, and their heads were placed on the Basileion (comp. Appian, B. C. 148). See the note of Reimarus on this passage.

⁸ As to the statue of Cleopatra being also placed in this temple, see Appian B. C. ii. 102, Dion 51. c. 22, and the note of Reimarus, and Plutarch, Antonius, c. 86.

⁹ Dion does not say where the wooden amphitheatre was built. Lipsius

c. 22) that if a man should tell all the particulars of the exhibition, the narrative might be tedious and perhaps not true, for all such things are magnified, and he therefore only mentions what seemed to him necessary to mention.

The Forum Romanum and the Via Sacra from Caesar's house to the Clivus Capitolinus were covered with an awning to screen the people from the sun (Pliny, H. N. 19. c. 1. s. 6). But Dion merely says that this awning was used to protect the spectators in the amphitheatre. The awning was named *Seric*, a product of barbarian luxury, which was afterwards used for the dress of rich women.¹ A Euripus or canal of water was made round the Circus Maximus, to protect the spectators from the wild beasts. For the representation of a *Naumachia* on this occasion a lake was made in a place which Suetonius names the smaller *Codeta*, and here a sea-fight was acted. The concourse of people was great from all parts of Italy, and as sufficient lodgings could not be found, many lived under tents in the streets and roads, and a great number lost their lives by the pressure of the crowds.

The gladiators fought man to man in the Forum Romanum according to custom. Suetonius (Caesar, c. 26) says that Caesar gave orders that the distinguished gladiators, if the spectators showed a hostile disposition towards them, should be forcibly taken from the arena, in order to save their lives. The young gladiators were trained for this exhibition at Caesar's particular request by Roman Equites and even by senators who were skilled in the use of arms; a fact which Suetonius affirms on the evidence of Caesar's letters to these noble trainers. The athletes exhibited for three days in a temporary stadium erected in the Campus Martius. In the Circus there were mock fights between horsemen and foot soldiers, matched against one another in equal numbers, with twenty elephants on each side. The men who fought in these mock battles were prisoners and criminals who had been condemned

assumes that it was in the Campus Martius; Drumann says that it was built "in the Forum," by which he means Caesar's Forum, I think; but if he does, he is mistaken, as I believe.

¹ Pliny, H. N. vi. 17. It is silk collected from the leaves of trees by the *Seres*. See the passage in Dion, 43. c. 24.

to death ; but some of the equestrian order, and even the son of a man who had been praetor, took part in the fights. Caesar was blamed, says Dion, for the number of men who were slaughtered at these games, and yet it was said that he was not satisfied with blood. If we invert the historian's rhetoric and say that Caesar himself would have been satisfied with little blood, and that the people had not enough, we shall perhaps be nearer the truth.

There were also the hunts (*venationes*) in the Circus during five days, in which it is said that four hundred lions appeared ; and there were also the *Ludi Trojani*, and the chariot races. But we may follow Dion's example and say, this is enough. Caesar exhibited on this occasion an animal unknown to the Romans, the *Camelopardalis* or giraffe, which Dion and Pliny describe accurately enough.² He heard of it no doubt when he was in Egypt, and if he did not then see the living animal, he may have seen the representation of it on the monuments in his progress up the Nile.

After spending so freely Caesar thought of saving. Rome was the place to which the poor flocked from all parts of Italy to get a share of the monthly gratuitous allowance of corn established by P. Clodius (vol. iii. p. 446). By means of the owners of the "*insulae*" or large blocks of buildings, in which the poor lodged, Caesar ascertained the number of those who received the allowance, and it was 320,000 persons ; of whom 170,000 were deprived of their allowance, and 150,000 retained it. But it was provided, in order to render unnecessary a new revision of the pauper list, that the places of those on the list who died should be annually filled up by the praetor out of those who were excluded from it. This is the statement of Suetonius (Caesar, c. 41) from which it appears that Caesar did not make a regular census, as some writers both ancient and modern have supposed. We know that there was no census from B.C. 70 (vol. iii. p. 49) to B.C. 28, the first census of Augustus. There were only seventy-five *Lustra* in the long period from the time of Servius Tullius to the last, which was made by Vespasian.³

² *Camelopardalis*, Dion (43. c. 23) and the note of Reimar. Plin. viii. 18.

³ Censorinus, c. 18. This subject of Caesar's supposed census requires a

Caesar likewise, says Suetonius (Caesar, 42), abolished all the guilds or companies except those of ancient origin. Some of these guilds had been abolished before and afterwards revived by the tribune P. Clodius to serve his purpose (vol. iii. pp. 215, 447). By this measure Caesar stopped all meetings which might lead to rioting and disturbance; but he allowed the Jews in Rome to celebrate their festivals and to meet according to the customs of their forefathers, as Josephus says (*Antiq.* 14. 10. § 8). He also gave the *Judicia* or power of acting as jurymen on certain occasions to men of the equestrian and senatorian rank only, and excluded the *tribuni aerarii*, or representatives of the plebeian class, who had been admitted among the jurymen by the *Lex Aurelia* (vol. iii. p. 52; *Dion.* 43. c. 25).

Caesar also caused a sumptuary law to be enacted as Sulla had done and others (vol. ii. 431; i. 434), though both he and Sulla were great spenders. Cicero alludes to these new regulations for the limitation of luxury (*Ad Att.* xiii. 7, xii. 35; *Ad Fam.* ix. 26). Perhaps it was by this sumptuary law that Caesar again established the customs' duties on foreign goods, most of which would be articles of luxury. The use of *lecticae* (palanquins), costly dyed vestments, and pearls was also limited to certain persons and ages and to certain days. A limit was also fixed to the cost of sepulchral monuments.⁴ He attempted to execute this absurd law in a still more absurd manner as Suetonius reports (Caesar, c. 42). Inspectors were stationed at the market to stop all provisions which were not allowed to be sold and to bring them to him; and sometimes lictors and soldiers were employed to carry off

separate examination. See Drumann, *Julii*, p. 620, note 87. Dureau de la Malle, *Économie Politique des Romains*, i. 314 maintains that Caesar made a regular census in B.C. 46, and cites Appian (*B. C.* ii. 102), which is no evidence at all, and also other authorities. In vol. ii. 222, he supposes the number 320,000 to represent the number of citizens, who received the allowance for the poor, and by adding to this number the assumed number of women and children of these citizens he makes the whole number who were gratuitously fed to be 960,000; which he must suppose, though he does not say so, to have been spread over Italy. But Caesar's list was evidently a list of the paupers in Rome, and I suppose that it included all who were maintained out of the allowance.

⁴ See Mongault's note on Cicero *ad Att.* xii. 35.

what was served up at table, if anything forbidden had escaped the vigilance of the inspector.

Dion observes (43. c. 25) that Caesar learned from his own experience the danger to the state of prolonging the authority of provincial governors. He had been proconsul of Gallia for many years, and the possession of great military power and resources perhaps gave him the design, as it certainly gave him the means of making himself master of the Roman State. A law was therefore enacted that no praetorian should hold a provincial government longer than one year nor a consular more than two years. Cicero commends this regulation as most useful to the state, and with good reason, for, as Machiavelli says (*Discorsi*, iii. 24), the prolongation of military power was the cause of the enslavement of Rome.

These facts have been collected chiefly from Dion and from Suetonius, whose fashion it is to put things together with no regard to chronological order. Instead of making long reflections on these facts and on the state of Rome at this time, when the people had received a master, I leave the reader to draw his own conclusions on the condition of this ancient commonwealth after the civil wars and the long turbulent period from the reforms of the Gracchi to the ten years' dictatorship of Caesar. It was a wretched but necessary termination of a long political existence. After Caesar's death there was a short and turbulent time of civil strife, which finally ended in the establishment of an Imperial power under Caesar's great nephew Augustus. Nothing could be worse than the condition of Rome when Caesar had completed his usurpation, and a radical reform seems to us impossible. Even if Caesar had the will and the capacity to make such a reform, we cannot see how it could have been effected.

Notwithstanding the miserable state of Rome and the suffering in Italy and in the provinces by bad administration and civil war, we should not forget, as modern history teaches, that we ought to distinguish between a few who rule or contend for political power and the body of the nation. Men still plough and sow in the hope of reaping and living to enjoy; and the industry of the poor keeps a nation alive and

even supplies the material for those who abuse their power and are fed by the men whom they plunder. The laborious agriculturists and the artisans of Italy and the provinces would continue their toil amidst the din of arms, as we have seen in our times, and by their industry would save from total destruction both themselves and those who were the cause of all the misery which they suffered.

Caesar in this year effected the reformation of the Roman Calendar, which was in great confusion. The college of the Pontifices, who had the regulation of the Calendar, made the intercalations at their pleasure (vol. iv. 400, and the note from Censorinus, *de die Natali*, c. 20). It seems therefore that the Roman year and the true year did not always differ by the same amount, and that it is impossible to say in any given year what the error was. In consequence of the arbitrary intercalations, the festivals, which belonged to certain months, did not fall in the proper seasons; and so, Suetonius says, neither the festivals of harvest occurred in the summer nor those of the vintage in the autumn. The old system of correcting the Roman lunar year of 354 days was by intercalating 22 or 23 days in alternate years. Consequently in eight years the addition of ninety days would be equivalent to the addition of eleven days and a quarter to each year, which would have brought the civil year in fact to Caesar's subsequent correction by making the average civil year 365 days and a quarter. But the intercalation was added to a year of 355 days, and so the civil year contained 366 days and a quarter. Great error in the Calendar would result in a few years from this misreckoning only; and if the arbitrary intercalations of the Pontifices were such as they are described, the confusion must have been greatly increased.

Caesar, who was Pontifex Maximus in B.C. 46 and had held this high office for many years, undertook the reformation of the Calendar with the assistance of Sosigenes, an Alexandrine Greek and the Roman Scriba M. Flavius. Caesar himself knew something of astronomy, and wrote on the subject (Macrobius, *Sat. i.* 14, 16). His purpose was to bring back the beginning of the year nearer to the winter solstice and by a proper intercalation to prevent the occurrence of confusion

again. The existing error was corrected by lengthening the year B.C. 46 to 445 days, which made it fifteen months. The month of February had already received in B.C. 46 the regular intercalary month of 23 days, named, as it had been before, Mercedonius; and two months of 67 days were intercalated between November and December. Caesar in his reformed Calendar, which began with the first of January B.C. 45, omitted the old intercalary month and regulated the year according to the sun's apparent course: by adding ten days to the 355 days of Numa's supposed year he made the Calendar contain 365 days. These ten days were distributed among seven of the twelve existing months. January, Sextilis (August), and December, which hitherto had 29 days severally, each received two days more. April, June, September, and November, which had severally 29 days, received each one day more. February retained the 28 days; and March, May, Quintilis (July), and October retained their 31 days each. These additional days were placed at the end of the several months which received them. As the solar year was supposed to be 365 days and a quarter, it was arranged that one day should be intercalated every fourth year, which would thus contain 366 days. The intercalary day was inserted between the twenty-third and twenty-fourth of February. The twenty-third of February in the intercalated year of the Roman Calendar was represented by A.D. VII Kal. Mart.; and the 24th and 25th were each designated by A.D. VI Kal. Mart.; and as these days were reckoned twice, the intercalary day was named "bissexturn" or "dies bissextus." The solar year is really shorter than Caesar supposed it to be by 11 minutes and 12 seconds, and consequently there arose in the course of time a considerable error in Caesar's Calendar, commonly called the Julian Calendar. The error was corrected in 1582 by Pope Gregory the Thirteenth; and it is this corrected Julian Calendar which we now use.⁵

A mistake was soon made by the priests in the matter of

⁵ The great authority on Caesar's reformation of the Calendar is Ideler, *Lehrbuch der Chronologie*. The change is also explained by Drumann, *Julii*, p. 624; and in the *Dictionary of Antiquities*, art. *Calendarium*, by Professor Key.

intercalation, which Caesar had ordered to be made every fourth year (*quarto quoque anno*), as both Suetonius (Caesar, c. 40) and Macrobius state (*Sat. i. 14*). The priests, as Macrobius observes, ought to have intercalated the day, which was composed of the four quarter days, after the completion of each fourth year before the fifth year began; but instead of doing this, they intercalated, not on the completion of the fourth year, but at the beginning of it. This error continued six and thirty years, during which twelve days had been intercalated instead of nine (*Solinus, c. 3*). Augustus Caesar corrected the mistake in B.C. 8.⁶

⁶ Savigny, *System des heutigen Römischen Rechts*, vol. iv. Beylage xi., explains that "*tertius quisque dies*," "*quartus quisque annus*" and such ordinal numbers were not used by the Romans always in one sense. Sometimes they reckoned both the first day, or the first year, and the last also; and sometimes they did not. He proves both uses by examples. Caesar by his words "*quarto quoque anno*" intended that there should be one intercalation in four years; but the Pontifices, who reckoned the first year of intercalation as one year, made another intercalation in the fourth year, and consequently there was only a period of two years between each intercalation.

See Dion 48. c. 26 and his remark that Caesar's Calendar would only require a correction of the intercalation of one day in 1461 years, and the notes in Reimarus.

CHAPTER XXIX.

CAESAR AND CICERO.

B.C. 46—45.

CICERO, as far as we know, took no part in the extraordinary honours which the servile Senate conferred on Caesar before his return from Africa. He was however prepared to submit to the conqueror, and glad to be reconciled to him. He encouraged his friends who were in exile to hope for pardon. He informed Q. Ligarius that Caesar would not treat him harshly : the circumstances of the time, public opinion, and, as Cicero said, Caesar's own temper inclined him to mild measures (Ad Fam. vi. 13). He wrote to Caecina that Caesar's disposition was gentle and merciful : his dignity, justice and wisdom were admirable : he never spoke of Pompeius except in the most honourable terms. M. Claudius Marcellus, consul B.C. 51, had been one of Caesar's bitterest enemies, and after the battle of Pharsalia, in which perhaps he was not present, he retired to Mitylene in Lesbos. He took no part in the African War, nor yet did he trust, like Cicero, to the magnanimity of Caesar. Cicero wrote several letters to Marcellus in which he urged him to return to Rome, where he might expect a pardon ; but Marcellus was obstinate. On one occasion, when there was a meeting of the Senate, L. Piso, Caesar's father-in-law, brought forward the case of M. Marcellus, C. Marcellus, the cousin of Marcus, threw himself at Caesar's feet, and all the Senate arose and approached Caesar as suppliants. After blaming the peevish temper of Marcellus and speaking highly of the behaviour of Servius Sulpicius, who had been the colleague of Marcellus in the consulship (B.C. 51), Caesar said that he could not refuse the request of the

Senate, and he gave Marcellus permission to return to Rome. Cicero, who had resolved to speak no more in the Senate, as he tells us, was overpowered by Caesar's unexpected generosity, and thanked him at some length. He describes the affair in a letter to his friend Servius Sulpicius, who was then governor of Achaia (Ad Fam. iv. 4). Marcellus thanked Cicero for his services in a dignified letter, but he did not return immediately, and he never saw Rome again. He arrived at the Piraeus in B.C. 45 on his way to Rome, where he met Servius Sulpicius. A few days after he was assassinated by a man, whom Servius calls one of his intimate friends (Ad Fam. iv. 12).

There is extant a speech of Cicero in which he thanks Caesar for pardoning Marcellus. F. A. Wolf declared this oration to be spurious, but most critics have believed it to be genuine.¹ It is certainly a poor composition, and it is possible that it may have been patched up by some Declamator, who used the genuine speech. If we may trust the extant oration, it was delivered after Caesar's triumphs (c. 9).

Cicero wrote a second letter to Q. Ligarius (Ad Fam. vi. 14) in which he informed him that at the request of his brothers he had visited Caesar at his house one morning, where he was obliged to submit to the indignity of waiting till the master had time to see him.² Cicero elsewhere admits that Caesar had so much business to do that it was difficult to obtain access to him; but Cicero's vanity was offended by being compelled to sit in the antechamber till it was his turn to be called. At this visit to Caesar the brothers and kinsmen of Ligarius lay at the Dictator's feet, and Cicero spoke. He tells Ligarius in his letter that he concludes from Caesar's words and behaviour that he will be pardoned. A difficulty was however interposed by Q. Aelius Tubero, to whose father Lucius in the beginning of the Civil War the province of Africa had been assigned by the Senate; but Lucius had been

¹ See Drumann's long note, Tullii, vi. p. 266.

² This visit was made "a. d. v (or II) Kal. intercalares priores," a mode of reckoning made necessary by the intercalation of the two months in B.C. 46 between November and December. The real time therefore was at the close of the month which preceded the first, as some suppose, of the intercalary months of this year of reformation. See Ed. Var.

prevented from landing in Africa by Attius Varus, or by Q. Ligarius who acted under his orders (p. 37). Both of the Tuberones, father and son, were opposed to Caesar; and when they were driven from Africa by Varus, who belonged to their own party, they went to Pompeius in Macedonia. The reason of Q. Tubero's opposition to the recall of Ligarius from exile was only personal hostility. Both he and Ligarius had fought against Caesar: Tubero at Pharsalia, and Ligarius in Africa; but Ligarius in conjunction with the Numidians and the barbarian king Juba.

The case of Ligarius was not a prosecution. The question simply was whether Caesar, who had the power, would allow Q. Ligarius to return to Rome; and Q. Tubero, who was himself a pardoned man, opposed the restoration. The case was heard before the Dictator in the Forum, and Cicero spoke for Q. Ligarius. This was Cicero's first speech in the Forum since B.C. 52.

The orator states (c. 1) that Q. Ligarius was the legatus of C. Considius, the governor of Africa, and that when Considius quitted the province, at the close of B.C. 50 or the beginning of B.C. 49, he left Ligarius in charge of it. When Attius Varus, a former governor of the province, fled from Auximum in B.C. 49, he went to Africa, and at the invitation of the Provincials, accepted the command of the province. Ligarius acted under Varus, and remained in Africa till Caesar took him in Adrumetum and spared his life, but ordered him, as we may assume, to keep away from Italy (p. 361). Cicero admitted all the facts charged by Tubero, for he could not deny them; but he contended that as Ligarius was in Africa when the war broke out, he was compelled to stay, though it was reasonable to suppose that he would have preferred being at Rome with his brothers, whom he loved, than with Varus at Utica. This is the substance of Cicero's defence of Ligarius. He dexterously covered that part of the conduct of Ligarius which offended Caesar most, his resistance to Caesar to the end of the African War.

The rest of the speech is an artful panegyric on Caesar for his clemency to Cicero himself and others who had been in arms against Caesar. He affirms that the case of Ligarius is better

than that of Tubero, or even as Tubero states it, quite as good, for Tubero wished to land in Africa, where he would have been an enemy to Caesar, and Ligarius, who was in Africa when the Civil War began, could not get away. Cicero often reminds Caesar of his merciful behaviour to his enemies: he says that if the causes of both the leaders in the Civil War might be considered equally good at first, that must now be considered the better cause which had received the aid of the gods; "and" he adds "since we have experienced your clemency, who would not be satisfied with a victory in which no man perished except those who died with arms in their hands?" He reminds Caesar that he used to say that the Pompeian party considered all persons to be their enemies who were not on their side; Caesar considered all to be his friends who were not opposed to him. Suetonius (Caesar, 75) makes the same statement, and it is confirmed by Cicero's letters, for he says that Pompeius, if he had been victorious, would have proscribed and massacred all who did not join him.

Cicero handles Tubero with much delicacy, for Tubero's father Lucius was Cicero's schoolfellow and comrade in the Marsic War, and was connected, perhaps by marriage, with Cicero's family. He allows Tubero the merit of consistency in adhering to the Pompeian party, but he blames him now for attempting to prevent Caesar from exercising his usual clemency. At the close of his speech Cicero tells Caesar, and he tells the truth, though it was flattery, that Caesar forgot nothing except the wrongs done to him.

This is, as Pomponius says, an excellent speech; and it is one of Cicero's best. Caesar pardoned Ligarius, who repaid him by afterwards being one of his assassins. The Dictator Sulla got rid of his enemies and died a natural death. Caesar was not inferior to Sulla in sagacity, and he must have known that no generosity could win a man of a malignant temper; but he was fearless, and he preferred the risk of pardoning his enemies to shedding Roman blood. This is his great glory, and the eternal opprobrium of his enemies, and of Cicero among the rest. We know that Caesar knew that Cicero did not like him, but Caesar still used him for his own

purposes, and Cicero did not forget or forgive. In a letter of this year to Papirius Paetus (*Ad Fam.* ix. 15) he says, "I, who used to sit in the vessel of state and hold the rudder, can now hardly find a place where the bilge-water lies: do you think that there would be fewer *Senatus consulta* made at Rome, if I should be living at Naples? I am at Rome and constantly visit the Forum, and yet *Senatus consulta* are drawn up in the house of your dear friend (Caesar), my intimate acquaintance; and when he is inclined to do it, I am set down as having been present when they were reduced to writing, and I hear of a *senatus consultum* said to have been made pursuant to my proposal, arriving in Armenia and Syria, before it has been spoken of at Rome: you must not suppose that I am joking, for I must inform you that letters come to me from kings in the most remote parts, who thank me for proposing that they should receive the royal title, and yet so far from knowing that they had received it, I did not even know that such kings existed." If this is true, it was a most impudent thing for Caesar to make this use of Cicero's name; but it is one of many instances which show how useful he considered it to have the man's real or even supposed support.

The literary history of the speech for Ligarius is curious. It was published by Atticus in B.C. 45 (*Ad Att.* xiii. 12. 19 and 20). Balbus and Oppius were pleased with it and sent a copy to Spain to Caesar. Cicero would not add anything about Tubero to the oration, for fear of offending a man, who was very ready to take offence. There is a strange mistake in the oration: Cicero speaks of one L. Corfidius being present when the speech was delivered, but he was afterwards reminded that it was a mistake, a slip of the memory as Cicero names it. "I knew," he says, "that Corfidius was very intimate with the Ligarii, but I see that he was already dead." Cicero often made mistakes about facts. He asked Atticus to order his workmen to erase the name "from all the copies," but the mistake remains (*Ad Att.* xiii. 44). It is impossible, or hardly possible, that Cicero, when he delivered the speech, spoke of and pointed to Corfidius among others as present (*hosce*), when he must have seen that he was not

present. The conclusion is that the speech, as it was written out for publication, differed from the speech delivered, at least in the name of Corfidius.

Cleopatra came to Rome before Caesar went to Spain. She brought with her the boy Ptolemaeus, her younger brother and now her husband; and probably she also brought the young Caesarion, to whom she gave birth soon after Caesar's departure from Egypt in B.C. 47 (Ad Att. xiv. 20). The queen said that the child was Caesar's, and the evidence that Caesarion was his son is stronger than the assertions of Oppius and others that Caesar was not the father. Cleopatra was well received by her lover and lodged in his garden on the other side of the Tiber. Dion (43. c. 27) says that Caesar's amours with her in Egypt were yet only known by report, but he was now blamed for renewing the intimacy at Rome. However he cared not for the people's talk, and he admitted the strangers to the honourable title of friends and allies of the Roman people. It is not said what was the purpose of the queen's visit. She could hardly expect to carry off Caesar with her to Egypt³ at a time when a formidable enemy in Spain threatened his power. The evidence of Suetonius (Caesar, c. 52) that Caesar invited Cleopatra to Rome and allowed the child to be named after him is weakened by his statements that Caesar sent her back with presents, for we know that Cleopatra was in Rome when Caesar was assassinated and that she fled in haste. We can give no more credit to the statement of the same biographer when he says that the tribune Helvius Cinna admitted that he had a law prepared, which Caesar ordered him to propose, when he should have left Rome, by which Caesar should be allowed to marry any women, and as many as he pleased, that he might leave children. It is a usurper's weakness to wish to have a son to succeed him; and it would have been great folly in Caesar, for there is reason for thinking that he was not in good health now, and could not expect that a child born after this year would be able to maintain his father's power. The proposal was also so inconsistent with all notions of a Roman marriage

³ Compare the slavery of M. Antonius. Dion, 50. c. 5.

that we may reject the story as untrue and wonder that it was ever invented.

Cicero saw Cleopatra at her residence in Caesar's garden. He writes to Atticus (xv. 15), "I hate the queen, and Ammonius⁴ knows that I have good reason for it: he undertook to see that I should have what she promised me, things appropriate for a learned man and to one of my rank, things which I could venture to mention even before a public meeting. Besides knowing Sara to be a bad man, I found that he was insolent to me. I only saw him once at my house. When I politely asked him what was the purpose of his visit, he replied that he was looking for Atticus. The haughtiness of the queen when she was residing in the garden on the other side of Tiber, I cannot speak of without great vexation. I will then have nothing to do with such people: they think that I have no spirit, and even no feeling." Cicero does not say why he paid the queen a visit. It was curiosity perhaps to see Caesar's mistress; possibly to please Caesar too. The queen promised, and perhaps Cicero asked for something, books or works of Egyptian art, as it has been conjectured, and the queen did not keep her promise. There is not a meaner or more spiteful letter among the hundreds that have been preserved of Cicero's correspondence. His vanity was hurt by the proud queen's reception of Marcus Tullius Cicero, who had once saved his country and had gained the name of Imperator for his military exploits. As to Sara, one of the queen's attendants, he only came to Cicero's house to look for Atticus, and not to see Marcus Tullius; but this was an offence past forgiveness. Sara gave a plain answer to Cicero's question, and only a foolish, vain man would have taken it as an insult.

⁴ Ammonius had been at Rome before in the service of Ptolemæus Auletes, Cleopatra's father. Cicero ad Fam. i. 1 and 5.

CHAPTER XXX.

SPAIN.

B.C. 46—45.

CAESAR had unfortunately in B.C. 49 appointed Q. Cassius governor of Spain (p. 79) ; and at the end of B.C. 47 Cassius was succeeded by C. Trebonius (p. 288). There was a strong Pompeian party in Spain ; and it is stated by Dion (43. c. 29) that the malcontents sent to Scipio, who was then in Africa, for aid, and that he despatched Cn. Pompeius to support them : the author of the African War states that Pompeius went at the suggestion of M. Cato and during the African War (p. 325). But according to Dion (42. c. 56) Cn. Pompeius was sent to Spain in B.C. 47, in the hope that the son of Pompeius Magnus would be well received by the Spaniards, and after settling the affairs of that country would go to Rome, while Scipio and his friends would sail to Italy. Livy (Epitome 113) also places in B.C. 47 the mission of Cn. Pompeius to Spain.

Pompeius, according to Dion, took the Balearic islands, Majorca and Minorca without resistance ; but he had some difficulty in getting possession of Ebusus (Yvica). He then fell sick, and stayed some time in the islands with his men. In the mean time C. Trebonius was compelled to retire from Spain, and the Spanish insurgents placed themselves under T. Quintius Scapula and Q. Aponius, who roused all Baetica or Southern Spain to arms. Pompeius now landed on the east coast of Spain, where he received the submission of several places ; but New Carthage (Carthagera) refused to join him, and Pompeius began the siege of this city. While he was thus employed, Scapula and his partisans came to him and

chose him their commander-in-chief. Pompeius had soon thirteen legions (B. H. c. 7), but many of them were a disorderly rabble. He was joined by fugitives from Africa, among whom were his brother Sextus, Attius Varus, Labienus, and Arabio, the son of Massinissa. Thus a new war began under a leader of a savage temper: the father was not a generous or merciful man, but the son was cruel, and nothing good could be expected from him. Cicero foresaw, as he says, that if Pompeius were victorious, there would be blood shed at Rome; and if Caesar were the conqueror, slavery would be the result. C. Cassius (*Ad Fam.* xv. 19) in a letter to Cicero, in which he inquires about the news from Spain, says, "I prefer an old and merciful master to a new and cruel one: you know what a fool Cn. Pompeius is; you know that he considers cruelty to be a virtue; you know that he thinks that we always laughed at him: I am afraid that he would repay us for our sneers with the sword in his rough fashion."

Caesar was informed of the state of affairs in Spain by his legati Q. Fabius Maximus and Q. Pedius, who were not strong enough to resist the enemy. C. Didius however defeated the fleet of Varus at a place named Crantia, which may be a corrupt name for Carteia. Varus fled to the land and stopped up the entrance to the port by chaining anchors together, on which the enemy's ships struck, and so the fleet of Varus escaped destruction. Pompeius, who was now expecting Caesar's arrival, withdrew from the east coast into Baetica, where he was received by the towns, except Ulia, of which he formed the siege. Lepidus, the colleague of Caesar, held the Comitia this year, in which Caesar was elected sole consul for the next year B.C. 45; and Appian is mistaken when he says that Caesar set out for Spain in his fourth consulship. At the end of B.C. 46 commenced Caesar's third dictatorship, if we do not include the short dictatorship of B.C. 49. His new dictatorship was for ten years. Caesar left Lepidus with eight, or as some authorities said, six Praefects to take care of the city. Caesar's election was probably after he left Rome (*Dion*, 43, c. 33).

It is not said when Caesar set out for Spain, but it was of course after Cicero delivered the speech for Ligarius. As

usual, he advanced with great rapidity and reached Obulco, three hundred stadia from Corduba in seven and twenty days, for which fact Strabo (p. 160) quotes "the historians;" but the author of the Spanish War is not one of them. Caesar came so quick that the legati Q. Pedius and Q. Fabius Maximus, who had been instructed to send forward cavalry to meet him, were anticipated by the Dictator's arrival. Sextus Pompeius held Corduba with a garrison, and Cnaeus was still besieging Ulia. The citizens of Ulia contrived to send a message to Caesar to ask for aid, and he despatched about midnight six cohorts and an equal number of horsemen under L. Junius Paciaecus, a man of ability who was of the province. It happened that the weather was bad and stormy, and it was so dark that a man could hardly recognize another who was near him. Under these favourable circumstances and by the help of a stratagem Paciaecus carried his men through the enemy's lines safe into Ulia (p. 286).

In order to draw Cnaeus from the siege of Ulia, Caesar advanced towards Corduba, and on the road he sent forward a body of stout men in mailed armour with some cavalry. As soon as the force came in sight of Corduba, the men in mail were taken up behind the horsemen, but the townsmen could not see that the horses carried double. A great number came out of Corduba to attack the cavalry, when the men in mail got down from the horses and made such slaughter of the enemy that few escaped to the town. Cnaeus Pompeius now left the siege of Ulia and came at his brother's request to Corduba (B. H. c. 4).

When Caesar arrived at the Baetis (Guadalquivir), he found the river too deep to ford, and he made the foundations of a temporary bridge by letting down into the stream baskets full of stones. After crossing the river Caesar formed his camp opposite the town; and Cnaeus on his arrival made his camp over against Caesar, who, in order to exclude him from the town and from supplies, began to form an entrenchment to the town bridge.¹ There was now a struggle for the possession

¹ Clarke has correctly explained that the bridge here mentioned (B. H. c. 5) is not Caesar's bridge, but the bridge of Corduba. See also B. H. c. 33. The narrative proves that Ulia was east of the Baetis.

of this bridge and daily skirmishes. On one occasion there was a hard fight in which the men were crowded together near the bridge and the banks of the river, and many of the combatants were forced into the stream. It was Caesar's wish to draw the enemy upon fair ground and at once to decide the issue of the campaign. Seeing that the enemy would not give him this opportunity, Caesar recrossed the river by night after ordering large fires to be made, and turned towards Ategua, the strongest place in the possession of Cnaeus, which, as he was informed, contained a great store of provisions. Caesar's march was south to Ategua, supposed to be Teba between Osuña and Antequera (formerly Antiquaria), and about two miles from the river Salsus, a branch of the Singulis (Xenil), which flows into the Guadalquivir between Corduba and Sevilla. As soon as Pompeius heard that Caesar had begun the siege of Ategua, he left Corduba for Ategua, either accompanied by Labienus, or he was afterwards joined by Labienus. Caesar had made several forts, in some of which cavalry and in others infantry were stationed to keep a look out for the enemy and to protect his camp. It happened that Pompeius reached Caesar's outposts in the morning and taking advantage of a thick fog, he surrounded with some cohorts and cavalry a division of the cavalry of Caesar and destroyed most of them. By a bold stratagem L. Munatius Flaccus introduced a force into Ategua, a fact recorded by Dion and Frontinus (iii. 14. 1), but omitted by the author of the Spanish War. On the following night Pompeius burnt his camp, crossed the Salsus, and made a new camp on a hill between Ategua and Ucubis. Caesar in the mean time was employed on his works, bringing up the vineae and making an embankment (*agger*) before the town. The campaign was now in the winter season and in the hill country on the north side of the Sierras which separate the streams which belong to the basin of the Guadalquivir from those which flow south into the Mediterranean. Pompeius was in sight of both towns with his thirteen legions, but he did not attempt to relieve Ategua. He relied most on the two legions which had deserted from Trebonius, on one raised in the colonies of Baetica, and a fourth legion, once belonging to Afranius, which Pompeius, as the

author of the Spanish War says, had brought with him from Africa (c. 7).

Caesar had occupied as a fort an old camp, *Castra Postumiana*, beyond the *Salsus*, and Pompeius hoped to be able to surprise it by an attack just before daybreak, but the men in the fort made a bold resistance, and Caesar arriving with three legions dispersed the assailants. Here the author remarks that he had forgotten to mention in the proper place that *Asprenas* (B. Afr. c. 80) had joined Caesar with some cavalry from Italy.

In the following night Pompeius burnt his camp and marched in the direction of Corduba. On the next day Caesar's cavalry, who followed some distance on the road to Corduba, met those who were bringing supplies to Pompeius from that town, and took some prisoners and the beasts of burden. *Ategua* still resisted bravely and the people attempted to burn Caesar's works. The passions of Caesar's soldiers were now excited to a savage temper. Two prisoners of a native legion, who were taken by them, pretended to be slaves, but they were recognized as deserters from *Trebonius* and put to death. Some messengers from Corduba to Pompeius were also taken and turned loose with their hands cut off. The townsmen again during the night attempted to burn Caesar's works and wounded many of his men with missiles. This night attack was followed by a sally on the quarters of the sixth legion, but the assailants were driven back into the town.

Pompeius, who appears to have now formed another camp, began to make an entrenchment up to the *Salsus*, apparently with the view of cutting off Caesar from the water.² A leaden bullet at this time was thrown into Caesar's camp with an inscription which fixed a day on which the besiegers should attempt to surprise the town: the signal would be the raising of a shield. Some of Caesar's soldiers expecting that they could get into the place without danger, began to work close up to the town and a large part of the old wall was undermined and fell. Some of the men were taken prisoners by the townsmen, but their lives were spared. It seems

² The interpretation of c. 18 is partly conjectural.

that a deputation now came from the town to propose to Caesar terms of surrender, but his answer was that he was used to grant terms, not to receive them. When Caesar's answer was brought back to the town, missiles were again thrown from the walls on the besiegers, and there was a fierce contest. Caesar's men worked a ballista, with which they destroyed a tower with five men in it and a boy whose business it was to watch the ballista. Skirmishes with the enemy outside of Caesar's lines and fights before the town-wall often occurred. The commander in Ategua suspecting, as it seems, the fidelity of the townsmen massacred some of them and threw the bodies from the wall, which the author justly calls an abominable crime, such as had never been recorded. Valerius Maximus (ix. 2. 4), who also reports the story, states that all the townsmen, who were inclined to Caesar's side, were massacred and pitched over the wall; women even were murdered with the children at their breasts, and infants dashed on the ground in the sight of their parents or thrown up and, as they fell, received on the points of spears. This was done by the order of the Roman commandant, and the executioners were his Lusitanian soldiers. A deserter from the enemy about this time reported that Pompeius and Labienus were much displeased with the massacre; and with good reason, for they could not hope for the support of the Spaniards after this barbarous cruelty (c. 15, 19).

Pompeius sent a message again to the defenders of Ategua with orders to make a night sally from the town. A gate was opened which was opposite to the position of Pompeius, and all the forces came out with materials to fill up the ditches, and poles with hooks at the end to pull down and burn the straw huts, which sheltered Caesar's men in this winter season. They brought also vestments and silver to excite the cupidity of Caesar's soldiers, in the hope that while they were engaged about the plunder, they themselves might slaughter their enemies and escape to Pompeius, who was under arms all night beyond the Salsus waiting for the result. But the attempt failed; the assailants were driven back into the town; Caesar's men got the booty and took some prisoners, who were put to death the next day.

The events of the siege are recorded by the historian very obscurely, and with many minute and trifling particulars. Two Lusitanian deserters reported that it was now the intention of Pompeius to withdraw towards the sea, as he could not relieve Ategua. A tablet also was throw down from the wall on which was written : " L. Munatius to Caesar : If you will grant me my life, since I am deserted by Cn. Pompeius, I will show myself as brave and faithful on your side, as I have done on the side of Pompeius." Some of the townsmen, who had come out on the former occasion, also went to Caesar and proposed to surrender the place on the next day, if he would spare their lives. The answer was that he was Caesar and would keep his promise. The town was given up on the 19th of February B.C. 45, and Caesar was saluted as Imperator by his soldiers. Caesar was Caesar, as he said; and we may assume that the villain Munatius Flaccus saved his life.

The siege of Ategua is one of those bloody struggles which have often taken place on Spanish soil both in ancient and modern times. The Spaniard is a brave and enduring man, but he has distinguished himself more by desperate resistance in strong places than by success in the open field. It is unfortunate that we have not a better history of the siege of Ategua. The narrative of the author of the Spanish War is much corrupted, and parts of it are completely unintelligible. After the surrender of Ategua a slave was found concealed in one of the mines which the defenders had made in the town. The slave's master, who had gone to Caesar's camp, before the surrender and had left his wife and children in Ategua, was murdered by the slave who accompanied him. The man made his escape from Caesar's lines to the camp of Pompeius, and again after informing Caesar, as it is said, by an inscription on a leaden ball of the townsmen's preparation for the defence, he had the audacity to re-enter the place. The murderer and traitor was burnt alive.

Pompeius now moved towards Ucubis, made several forts and shut himself up within his lines. Caesar placed his camp near Pompeius, who summoned the people of Ucubis to inquire diligently who were on his side and who were friendly to

Caesar. Seventy-three men of Ucubis, said to be partisans of Caesar, were executed by the orders of Pompeius.

Some citizens of Urso (Osuña) north-west of Ategua, who had been captured in Ategua, went with some of Caesar's party to report to the people of Urso the fall of Ategua, and to tell them that they could expect nothing from Pompeius after the atrocities committed there. When the deputation reached Urso, the citizens only ventured into the town: the senators and Roman equites, who accompanied them, remained outside. The information was given to the people of Urso and an answer returned. As the deputation was returning, some of the citizens of Urso fell on them and murdered all except two, who escaped and informed Caesar of what had happened. The people of Urso then sent scouts to Ategua, who brought back a report which confirmed what they had heard. The citizens in their rage attempted to stone the man who had incited them to murder the members of the deputation and exclaimed that he had caused their ruin. However at his entreaty he obtained permission to go to Caesar, saying that he would satisfy him. Instead of doing this the fellow having got a large force together slipped into the town during the night by stratagem, massacred many of the citizens and the chief men who were his enemies, and made himself master of the place. While Caesar was still engaged on his works and attempting to cut off the enemy from the Salsus, there were skirmishes without any important result. Both armies now moved to a place named Sorica: Pompeius was retreating, and Caesar followed him. Caesar again began to use the spade and pick-axe to cut off the enemy; and here also there was a skirmish for the possession of a certain eminence, which Caesar succeeded in seizing, and the enemy suffered some loss. Pompeius still persisted in refusing to meet Caesar on fair ground except with cavalry; and Caesar continued to work at his entrenchments. Here there was a single combat like that of Achilles and Memnon, as the author says, between Antistius Turpio on the side of Pompeius and Q. Pompeius Niger, a Roman eques of Italica, while the two armies looked on: but the author's confused narrative and corrupt text do not inform us of the result of this Homeric

fight. He states however that Caesar's cavalry on the return to their camp was eagerly pursued by the enemy, who were well punished for their audacity and driven back with much loss. Caesar rewarded a company of cavalry, named Cassiana, with a present of money: he gave the commander five golden chains (torques), and money also to the light-armed troops (c. 26).

On this day three Roman equites of Asta, with their horses and perhaps themselves too, almost covered with silver, as the author writes, deserted to Caesar: they reported that all the Roman equites had conspired to desert Pompeius, that on the information of a slave they were put in confinement, and they alone gained an opportunity of making their escape. A letter of Pompeius to the people of Urso was also intercepted, in which he told them that "if the enemy had been ready to fight on fair terms, he would have ended the war sooner than they expected; but Caesar did not dare to present his raw soldiers in a fair field." He added that Caesar "had placed his troops about the Spanish towns, whence he got supplies; but he would end the war as soon as he could: he intended," he said, "to send some cohorts to Urso, and the enemy would be compelled to fight, when they could no longer find supplies." He wrote this lying letter while he was retreating before Caesar. Some slaves however, who escaped from the camp of Pompeius reported that after the fight at Sorica, which took place on the 4th of March, there was great alarm in the enemy's camp. Pompeius now gave orders to burn Ucubis, where he had left a force to watch the town, and the troops were then commanded to join him. Pompeius still retreated and took a position in an olive plantation opposite to Hispalis (Sevilla), but he was still on the left side of the Guadalquivir, if we rightly understand the author. It is however impossible to discover whether Pompeius or Caesar now assailed a town named Ventipo, for the author often forgets to write the nominative of a verb. But perhaps it was Caesar who attacked and received the surrender of Ventipo, and then marched to Carruca and encamped opposite to Pompeius, who burnt this town also because the gates were closed against him. Caesar still followed till he came to the plain of Munda and

made his camp opposite to Pompeius, as the author says : but it is only from this fact that we know that Pompeius was now at Munda, for the author has not told us, or said anything directly about the situation of this plain (c. 27).

"On the following day when Caesar was preparing to march with his troops, the scouts announced that the men of Pompeius had been under arms since the beginning of the third watch" (B. H. c. 28). This is the author's foolish way of writing : the statement is absurd, that men should have been kept under arms from midnight. On receiving this intelligence Caesar hung out the signal for battle (*vexillum*). Pompeius had the advantage of an elevated position which sloped down to a plain, and a strong town behind his camp. This plain which lay between the two camps was about five miles wide, and at the foot of the declivity a stream flowed through swampy ground, which made the approach to the enemy difficult. When Caesar saw the enemy drawn up in order of battle, he expected, says the author, that he would come down to fight on the level plain. Now it is certain that Caesar did not expect the enemy to give up the advantage of position, and the author informs us that he did not give it up. The remark shows the writer to be a very foolish man, a soldier perhaps, but ignorant of the art of war. The enemy, we may assume, had determined to fight, for the Spaniards were falling off from Pompeius, he must have found it difficult to feed his men, and Caesar would follow him whatever way he turned. Desperation drove the enemy to face the terrible Dictator, and the Roman followers of Pompeius knew that they had no hope except in the hazard of a fight.

The sun rose bright on the morning of the 17th of March, which was a feast-day at Rome, the *Liberalia*, but a day of horrid butchery for the combatants at Munda. Caesar's men advanced with firm step towards the stream, when the enemy at last came down to defend the passage. Pompeius had thirteen legions, and cavalry on each wing with six thousand light-armed troops, and almost an equal number of native troops. Dion says (43. c. 36) that the African king Bocchus had sent his sons to aid Pompeius ; and the Mauritanian Bogud was with Caesar, who had eighty cohorts or eight legions and eight

thousand horsemen. When Caesar's men had reached the extremity of the plain, the enemy on higher ground was ready to meet them and there was great risk in advancing. Caesar looked out for a fit place to cross the stream, which made his men murmur, for they were eager to begin the fight; and the enemy encouraged by the delay, which they attributed to fear, put themselves on more unfavourable ground, but still it was not easy to approach them. Caesar's tenth legion held the position, which they always claimed, on the right; the third and fifth legions were on the left; "and also the auxiliaries and the cavalry," as the author writes; but I know not exactly what his meaning is.

The battle began with a shout, and the enemy from the higher ground made so obstinate a resistance, that Caesar's men almost doubted about the victory. On both sides the courage was equal, but Caesar's veterans with their pila strewed the ground with the bodies of their opponents. Both commanders watched the fight on horseback, and at last both Pompeius and Caesar got down and took part in it (Dion, 43. c. 37). Frontinus, a military writer (Strat. ii. 8. 13), simply says that seeing his men give way, Caesar ordered his horse to be taken to the rear and hurried on foot to the front, upon which the men who would have been ashamed to desert their general, restored the battle. But the foolish exaggeration of Appian (B. C. ii. 104) about Caesar running in front of his men bareheaded within ten feet of the enemy, and two hundred missiles being thrown at him, some of which he received on his shield and others he avoided, and the silly romance of Florus are still repeated. Caesar's tenth legion pressed the men of Pompeius so hard on their left and threatened their flank that a legion was brought up from the enemy's right; but as soon as this legion began to change its place Caesar's cavalry on the left wing attacked the enemy there.² This is all that the author tells us about the battle.

Dion states that Caesar's ally Bogud, who had not yet engaged in the battle, attacked the camp of Pompeius, which was in the enemy's rear, and that Labienus turned round to

² The rest of this sentence (c. 31) is unintelligible.

oppose him. The Pompeians at first believing that Labienus was flying lost spirit, and though they afterwards discovered the purpose of Labienus, it was too late to recover themselves, and the victory was decided against them. Some escaped to the town of Munda and the rest fled. It is said that thirty thousand or more of the enemy perished, but the greater part must have been destroyed in the flight by Caesar's numerous cavalry. Caesar lost a thousand men cavalry and infantry. The thirteen eagles of the enemy were captured, and both Attius Varus and Labienus were killed.

Caesar's troops after the battle began to form a line of contravallation about Munda. The enemy's arms, says the author of the African War, their shields and pila, were used to make a vallum, and the bodies served in place of the earth and turf for a rampart (agger); men's heads were fixed on the points of swords and turned towards the town. Dion, Appian, and Florus contain part of this same absurd story. The contemporary writers and the compilers were equally deficient in common sense (c. 32).

A young man, named Valerius, who escaped with a few horsemen to Corduba, informed Sextus Pompeius of his brother's defeat. Sextus distributed what money he had among his cavalry, told the townsmen that he was going to Caesar to treat of peace, and left the place during the second watch. Cnaeus fled from the battle-field as his father had done from Pharsalia, and took the road to Carteia where his fleet was. The historian states the distance to be 170 Roman miles from Corduba to Carteia: it is about 120 miles direct distance. When he was about eight miles from Carteia, a message was despatched to ask the townsmen to forward a litter, for Pompeius was not well: in fact he was wounded. When he arrived at Carteia, Pompeius implored the protection of the people.

The author of the Spanish War has not enabled us to fix the site of Munda. Dion gives no name to the battle-field; and Appian places it near Corduba, to which city, as he says, some of the fugitives escaped after their defeat. Strabo (p. 141) enumerates among the towns of Turdetania "in which the sons of Pompeius were defeated, Munda, Ategua, Urson,

Tuceis, Ulia and Aigua, all not far from Corduba: Munda is in a manner the chief place of this district, and 1460 stadia from Carteia."⁴ The province of Baetica contained four Juridical Conventus or Circuits, those of Gades, Corduba, Astigis, and Hispalis. On the Singulis (Xenil), Pliny places the Colonia Astigitana, named Augusta Firma, now Ecija, between Sevilla and Corduba. He enumerates (N. H. 3. 1. 3) among the towns in the Conventus Astigitanus, Urso (Osuña) and Munda. The conclusion is that Munda was east of the Guadalquivir, and probably not far from Cordova; and this is all that we can affirm. If it is true that Cnaeus retreated from Ucubis towards Sevilla, and encamped opposite to this city, it appears that he moved about to escape from Caesar, and was at last overtaken at Munda and compelled to fight.

After the battle Caesar completed his works round Munda⁵ and advanced towards Corduba, where some of those who had escaped from the bloody field occupied the town-bridge. He crossed the river and made a camp. Scapula, whom the author names the leader of the rising in Spain, was one of the fugitives from Munda and now in Corduba. He summoned his slaves and freedmen, ordered them to build a funeral pile, a rich banquet to be prepared, and the most costly coverings to be used for his last repast. He gave his money and plate to his slaves, and sat down to the feast, perfumed with unguents. When the time was come, he ordered a slave to

⁴ On the site of Carteia, see vol. i. p. 31. It is 460 stadia in Groskurd's German translation of Strabo. Groskurd observes that Xylander altered the 6400 stadia of the oldest edition of Strabo into 1460, and that the MSS. are divided between these numbers; and he adds that Palmerius altered the number to 460, which Groskurd has injudiciously adopted in his version. The correction of Palmerius was probably founded on the distance between Carteia and Monda, west of Malaga, which was supposed to be the site of the battle. But it is certain that Monda does not represent Munda. This error existed in my Atlas, but I have corrected it. The author of the Spanish War makes the distance from Corduba to Carteia 170 Roman miles; and it appears by what I have said in the text that the distance from Munda to Carteia was at least as much. Consequently the right reading in Strabo is 1460 stadia or 182½ Roman miles.

⁵ Clarke reads "Munda munitione circumdata" in c. 33, and the sense requires the addition of Munda. •

kill him, and a freedman, with whom he had scandalous commerce, to set fire to the pile; and we may add to the author's story, to place his body on it, if he was not already there when the slave killed him.

As soon as Caesar made his camp opposite to the town, the citizens began to quarrel among themselves, and the shouts of the partisans of Caesar and Pompeius were loud enough to be heard outside the city. There were legions inside composed of deserters, and of slaves of citizens who had been manumitted by Sextus Pompeius. The thirteenth legion occupied part of the towers and the wall with the intention of defending the place. Finally commissioners were sent by Caesar's partisans, as we may assume, to ask him to send in his legions to support them, and at the same time the slaves who had run away from their masters attempted to burn the town. But they were overpowered, and twenty-two thousand men were destroyed by Caesar's troops, besides those who perished outside the walls. Corduba was a large city and a great number of soldiers and fugitives were crowded in it; and it is very probable that Caesar's men made as dreadful a slaughter as they did at the capture of Avaricum (vol. iv. p. 304).

In the meantime the besieged made a sally from Munda, but they were driven back into the town. Caesar now moved towards Hispalis, and a deputation from the town met him to pray for pardon. He placed Caninius Rebilus in Hispalis with a garrison, but stayed himself in the camp outside. There was a large party of Pompeians in the town, who were indignant that Caesar's garrison had been admitted. A certain Philo, a most active partisan of Pompeius, and well known in all Lusitania, made his escape out of Hispalis, and met with Caecilius Niger, a barbarian, as the author names him, who had a large force of Lusitanians. These men being admitted into Hispalis in the night massacred the garrison and the soldiers who were on the watch, closed the gates and prepared to defend the place. Caesar knowing that if he attempted to take the town, these desperate fellows would burn it, allowed the Lusitanians to make a night sally, for they did not know that this was what Caesar wished. They set fire to the vessels which were in the river, and while Caesar's men were engaged, as we

suppose, in attempting to save them, they made their escape, but they were followed by the cavalry and destroyed. Caesar having recovered possession of Hispalis marched to Asta, which surrendered. Those who had taken refuge in Munda after the battle had now been shut up for some time, and a large part of them came out of the town, surrendered to Caesar, and were formed into a legion. But they conspired with the men who remained in Munda, who, it was agreed, should sally out at night on a signal being given, while they should attack the besiegers. The design was discovered, and on the next night during the third watch, a time when men are generally in deepest sleep, the besieging troops having received the signal killed all the traitors who had surrendered.

Commissioners from Carteia had already reported to Caesar that Cn. Pompeius was in their power, by giving which information they expected to be pardoned for having formerly closed their gates against Caesar. While he was busy with reducing other places, the people of Carteia were quarrelling about Pompeius: one party had sent the message to Caesar; the other party supported Pompeius. The two factions came to blows, attempted to get possession of the city gates, and many were killed in the affray. Pompeius, who had been wounded in the shoulder at the battle of Munda, attempted to escape by sea, but in the confusion his foot was entangled in a rope and his ankle was strained; and according to Appian, a man who attempted to cut the rope with his sword, wounded him in the foot. However he put to sea at last with twenty ships of war. Didius, the commander of Caesar's fleet at Gades, immediately pursued him, and some troops also went in the same direction by land. On the fourth day of the voyage, Pompeius put in at some place, for his vessels had left Carteia without a supply of water. While they were employed in procuring it, Didius came up, fired some of the ships, and took others. The troops, which had gone by land, were informed by scouts of the success of Didius, and they hurried onwards with all speed. Pompeius with a few horsemen got possession of a place which was naturally strong; but in consequence of his wounds he was carried in a litter. His Lusitanian guard, as soon as the troops of Didius came in sight of them, were surrounded.

After an unsuccessful attempt to take the place, which was difficult of access, the pursuers began to blockade it by forming works along a ridge, that they might fight with the enemy on fair terms. The enemy now fled, but Pompeius suffered so much that he could neither ride nor bear the jolting of a carriage, and we cannot tell how he moved, unless he was carried. The author attempts to give a very particular story, and it seems probable that he knew the facts, but it is impossible to understand his narrative completely. In some way Pompeius escaped to a valley and hid himself in a natural cave, where it would not have been easy to find him, if he had not been betrayed by some prisoners. At last he was caught and killed; or, as Appian reports, the pursuers discovered him sitting under a tree, where he resisted until he was killed. His head was carried to Hispalis and set up in public. Sextus Pompeius after leaving Corduba went northwards to the country of the Lacetani, where he was well received by the people, who still remembered his father. Pompeius Magnus had gained the good will of the Spanish population during the war with Sertorius, and the memory of the father was the chief support of the sons (Dion 45. c. 10). The future history of Sextus belongs to a later time.

After the death of Cnaeus, Didius hauled up some of his vessels to repair them. Some Lusitanians, who had escaped when Cnaeus was killed, came together again in strong force and advanced upon Didius, who had occupied a fort and was carefully protecting his ships. He was sometimes induced to come out of his strong place by the attacks of the Lusitanians, and he had almost daily skirmishes with them. The enemy finally laid an ambuscade, and divided their forces into three parts, one of which was appointed to set fire to the ships. When Didius left the fort to repel the enemy, one division of them fired the ships, and while Didius was pursuing some of the flying enemy, he was attacked by others in the rear. Didius fell fighting bravely and many of his men with him: some of them seized boats which were on the shore and escaped to the vessels which were afloat; others reached them by swimming. The men raised the anchors, took to the oars, and made for the open sea to escape from the Lusitanians, who got all that the fugitives left behind.

Fabius Maximus, who had been left to blockade Munda, finally took the town. The historian's narrative is not intelligible; but he means, as I understand, that the town was captured with fourteen thousand in it: whether fourteen thousand soldiers or fourteen thousand persons, the author does not say. Urso was next attacked: it was naturally strong, and also defended by the walls. There was no water near, and no timber within six miles, for Pompeius had cut down all the trees and carried them into the town, so that the besiegers were under the necessity of bringing timber from Munda; if there was any there.

Caesar was at Gades during the sieges of Munda and Urso. Dion charges him with exacting a great deal of money from Southern Spain and especially with robbing the temple of Hercules at Gades of the valuable things which were dedicated in it. When Caesar returned to Hispalis, he addressed the people: he said "that in his quaestorship he had particularly favoured the province; in his praetorship he had relieved it of the taxes imposed by Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius,* introduced to the Roman Senate deputations from the province, and also had made himself many enemies in Rome by defending the interests of the province and of individuals; in his consulship also, though he was not then in Spain, he had done for the people all that he could: they had however forgotten these services and shown themselves ungrateful to him and to the Roman people." The historian then reports the rest of Caesar's speech in direct words: "Though you know the common usages of nations and of the Romans (*jure gentium* etc.), you have acted like barbarians and you have done violence more than once to the sacrosanct magistrates of Rome, and in open day in the middle of the Forum you wickedly attempted to kill Cassius (p. 281). You have been such foes to peace, that it has always been necessary to keep Roman legions in the province. You look on benefits as if they were wrongs, and on wrongs as benefits: and so you have never been able in time of peace to maintain concord nor in time of war to act like brave men. When Cn. Pompeius the son, a fugitive and

* Metellus was in the south of Spain, probably in B.C. 74. Vol. ii. p. 472, and vol. iii. p. 392.

merely a private person came among you, seized the fasces and assumed command, he put to death many citizens and got together a force to resist the Roman people; at your instigation he wasted the fields and the province. And what did you expect to gain by this? If I was destroyed, did you not know that the Roman people had legions enough not only to resist you, but even to pull down the heavens." Here the historian abruptly ends: the rest of his work is lost.⁷ Caesar never uttered such words as those with which the speech terminates. Drumann conjectures that as in other like cases Caesar concluded with imposing a fine and rewarding those who had been faithful (Dion, 43. c. 39). Caesar left Spain without troubling himself about Sextus Pompeius, but as Sextus soon collected a great force and was joined by those who had served under his father and brother, Caesar sent C. Carrinas against him, and as Carrinas was not successful, he was superseded by Asinius Pollio, shortly before Caesar's death (Appian, B. C. iv. 83).

The Spanish War contains the fourteenth and the last of Caesar's campaigns after his consulship. Ten books of campaigns were written by himself. The eighth of the Gallic War is generally attributed to Hirtius. Suetonius (Caesar, c. 56) says that it is uncertain who wrote the Alexandrine, African, and Spanish Wars: some think Oppius, others suppose Hirtius, who also wrote the last book of the Gallic War, which is incomplete, as a supplement to the seven books; if that is the meaning of Suetonius. Hirtius certainly did not write the Spanish War. Though he was not a good writer, he could not have written so bad a book. Parts of it look like extracts from some hard-fisted centurion's journal, who recorded small events of the day, and was unable to describe military operations. But the author, or he who revised the work, whoever he was, if he used contemporary evidence, or a soldier's journal, was a man who affected to be a writer with some education. He twice quotes Ennius; and he had a little taste for rhetorical ornamentation, for he compares a single combat to the meeting of Achilles and Memnon (c. 25). The

⁷ The last words are, "*Quarum laudibus et virtute. . .*" "*Desunt reliqua,*" Oudendorp adds. See his note.

author often writes barbarous Latin. The text is most corrupt; and sometimes it is not intelligible even where it may not be corrupt. The editors have worked hard to mend the text and to explain it, but with little success. The best of them were Davis and S. Clarke.

Hirtius (*Ad Attic.* xii. 37, 4) wrote to Cicero on the 18th of April from Narbo, and informed him that Sextus Pompeius had escaped from Corduba into Hispania Citerior, and that Cnaeus had fled nobody knew where; "nor do I care," Cicero adds. Cicero corresponded with Caesar during the Spanish War (*Ad Fam.* vi. 18). He gave to Apollonius, a freedman of Caesar's friend and legatus P. Crassus, a letter of recommendation to Caesar which Apollonius carried to Spain. The Greek wished to write the history of Caesar's campaigns, and Cicero thinks that he can do it. (*Ad Fam.* xiii. 16.)^a Cicero received from Caesar, who was then at Hispalis, a letter dated the 30th of April, in which he consoled Cicero on the death of his daughter Tullia (*Ad Attic.* xiii. 20). This letter is not extant, but one written for the same purpose by Cicero's friend Servius Sulpicius is preserved (*Ad Fam.* iv. 5). Tullia was already divorced from her third and unworthy husband P. Dolabella when she gave birth to a child, and she died soon after (B.C. 45).

^a There is another letter written to Caesar in Spain (*Ad Fam.* xiii. 15), also a letter of recommendation, stuffed with quotations from Homer and one from Euripides. Cicero says to Caesar that the father of the young man, whom he recommends, "was one of those who used to ridicule and blame me for not uniting myself to you, especially when you most honourably invited me." Cicero's nephew Quintus was with Caesar in Spain, where he behaved very foolishly, and abused his uncle and his father; but the only thing that he said, which might be believed, was that his uncle and his father were most hostile to Caesar, that they ought not to be trusted, and that his uncle was a man against whom Caesar should be on his guard: "this," says Cicero, "might alarm me, if I did not see that the King (Caesar) knows that I have no spirit" (*Ad Attic.* xiii. 37).

CHAPTER XXXI.

ROME.

B.C. 46, 45.

THERE is no contemporary evidence for the events which took place at Rome after the battle of Munda to Caesar's death, except in the collection of Cicero's letters. The Greek compilers Dion Cassius and Appian have treated of this short period at some length; and with their assistance, and what is found in Plutarch and other writers the story may be made sufficiently complete.

There was quiet at Rome during the Spanish War. The sales of confiscated property went on, but Cicero in his joking fashion expressed a fear that the death of P. Sulla, whom he had once defended, might cause the business to become slack; for Sulla was a great purchaser. The *Latinae Ferae* or annual festival on the Alban hills was superintended by the *Praefects* of the city, and also the *Apollinares Ludi* in July, though the care of these games belonged to the *Praetors*; but none had been elected for the year 45. The people in the city heard the news of the battle of Munda on the evening of the day before the festival of the *Palilia*, which was the 21st of April, the birthday of Rome, and the day was dedicated to the celebration of Caesar's victory. The Senate ordered a "*supplicatio*" or thanksgiving for fifty days, which was more than ever had been done before. This servile body conferred this extraordinary honour on a Roman for a victory not over a foreign enemy, but over Roman citizens, who were supposed to be fighting for the liberties of Rome against a usurper.

But the adulation of the previous year was carried further: Caesar was now made the equal of the gods. It was decreed

that Caesar's ivory statue, and afterwards his chariot also, should appear in the *Ludi Circenses* in company with the statues of the gods. Another statue with the inscription "to the unconquered god," if we may believe Dion, was placed in the temple of Quirinus;¹ and a third in the Capitol by the side of the statues of the seven kings, among which was a bronze statue of Brutus with a drawn sword, the man who assisted in expelling the Tarquinii. Dion (43. c. 45) expresses his wonder at the strange circumstance of Caesar's statue being placed by the side of this Brutus; and he affirms that it was this fact particularly which moved M. Brutus to be one of Caesar's assassins, which we may refuse to believe.²

We may conjecture how odious such honours would appear to Caesar's enemies and to the party which he had crushed, but we know little about these men, except one who was never at rest, and has left his own thoughts and feelings recorded. Cicero spent the greater part of the year 45 in the country, for, as he tells Atticus, at Rome he would see men whom he could not bear. He was indeed in a wretched condition. He had divorced his wife Terentia, with whom he was dissatisfied for her alleged mismanagement of his affairs during his exile; but as he returned to Rome in B.C. 57, and did not divorce her until B.C. 46, there may have been other reasons. We must suppose that Cicero, who passionately loved his daughter, had lost all affection for the mother; but we have no evidence for saying whether the husband or the wife was blamable in the matter of the divorce. According to Roman usage Cicero was compelled to restore the marriage portion (*dos*) of Terentia, and this business caused much trouble

¹ Cicero ad Atticum (xii. 45): "I had written to you about your neighbour Caesar, because I had heard of the matter by your letter. I would rather see him the sharer of the Temple of Quirinus than of the Temple of Salus." The house of Atticus was on the Quirinalis, where the Temple of Salus also stood. "Salus" contains the same element as "Salvus" (*salvus*), and means "sound health," "security," "life." The placing of Caesar's statue in the Temple of Quirinus might be interpreted as an honour paid to the second founder of Rome. It might also in Cicero's mind be considered as a reference to the violent death of Romulus, as Montgault supposes. The joke had a meaning, and Cicero's subsequent conduct explains it.

² Cicero pro Deiotaro, c. 12, speaks of Caesar's statue being placed among the statues of the kings, but he does not mention the statue of the Liberator Brutus.

to a man who was often in want of money. It is probable that Terentia never recovered all her property. In B.C. 45, as we have seen, Cicero lost his daughter Tullia, but before her death, as it seems probable, he had already taken another wife, a rich young woman named Publilia, whose fortune would be useful to him in his difficulties. The old man and the young woman did not agree, or it may be that the fault was the husband's only; for after his daughter's death Cicero stayed a long time in the country to indulge his grief, and also to escape from the company of his new wife. He says to Atticus (xii. 32) that Publilia had written to tell him that her mother and brother would pay him a visit, and she would accompany them, if he would allow it; she entreated Cicero earnestly and humbly to give his permission and to answer her letter. Cicero replied that he was at that time more troubled than at the time when he told her that he wished to be alone, and that he would not allow her to come. He informs Atticus that if he had not answered the letter, he thought that his wife would come with her mother; but after this answer, he does not think that they will pay him a visit.³ Cicero afterwards divorced Publilia in the same year B.C. 45, and he had then the trouble of settling with her also about her property, though the settlement with Terentia was not completed. The story in Dion (57. c. 15) about Vibius Rufus in the reign of Tiberius marrying Cicero's wife is supposed by Drumann to refer to Publilia, though others think that Rufus married Terentia. She was then a very old woman, but she had money, and she lived to the age of one hundred and three, as it is said (Pliny, N. H. 7. c. 48).

All this time Cicero was reading and writing. He wrote in B.C. 45 his work entitled *Orator* (c. 10) after finishing his *Cato*; and he finished his *Academica* and the treatise *De Finibus*. The *Orator* and the treatise *De Finibus* were addressed to M. Brutus. Cicero's thoughts were also occupied about erecting a monument to his daughter, a temple, as he calls it, and he often wrote to Atticus about the matter. But his connexion with Caesar at this time is the fact which mainly concerns us

³ The meaning of part of that which follows is not quite clear. Compare ad Attic. xii. 34.

here. Caesar was always Caesar, as he had said in Spain (p. 393); and Cicero continued to be Cicero. In B.C. 45 he admits that Caesar was well disposed towards him, and Caesar's friends treated him with great respect; but nothing could remove his fears or his pretended fears of the danger which threatened him. He seems (Ad Attic. xiii. 10) even to have feared, as Atticus did, that the murder of Marcellus at Athens (p. 381) would be followed by other calamities; and it appears from the same letter that Caesar was suspected of having instigated the assassination. M. Brutus indeed in a letter to Cicero, as he says, clears Caesar of the imputation, for even if Marcellus had been murdered insidiously, no suspicion could fall on Caesar; and it was now certain that Magius committed the murder in a fit of passion. We may excuse Cicero for expressing his discontent and disgust with the state of public affairs in his confidential letters, for lamenting the loss of his station and influence, which was followed by the death of his beloved daughter (Ad Fam. iv. 6); but we cannot excuse him for his behaviour towards the new master, whom he hated and feared; nor for the indifference towards Terentia, which he expresses in his letters, nor for his behaviour towards the rich young woman whom he had married, and whom he ought to have treated like a daughter, if he could not love her as a wife.

Cicero, apparently at the suggestion of Atticus,⁴ began a letter to Caesar, a letter of advice about public affairs (*συμβουλευτικόν*, as he terms it). He had by him the like works of Aristotle and Theopompus addressed to Alexander; but there was no resemblance between the two cases, as Cicero said, and he declared that he could not write any thing. It was not, he said, the meanness of the act, which deterred him, though it ought to do; for flattery was base, and it was base even for him to be still alive: he wished that the baseness of flattering Caesar did deter him, for he should then be what he ought to be; but the real difficulty was that he did not know what to say. However he did find something to say, and he sent the letter to Atticus for his opinion. Atticus approved of the

⁴ Ad Attic. xii. 40, 2. 40, 51; xiii. 27, 28, 31.

letter and advised that it should be sent to Caesar. Cicero agreed with him; for there was nothing in the letter which was unworthy of a good citizen, good at least according to circumstances, to which all writers on public affairs recommend a man to conform. However both Atticus and Cicero thought it better to send the letter first to Caesar's friends Oppius and Balbus, and to abide by their opinion. Caesar's friends suggested so much alteration in the letter, that Cicero was glad to have this excuse for not writing it over again. He said something in the letter about Caesar's supposed intention of undertaking a Parthian War; and he asks Atticus, "as to this matter, what was it my business to consider except the fact that I supposed him to intend such a war; and what else was the object of my letter except to flatter him? if I had wished to give him the best advice, should I not have been able to find words for it? It is better then not to write at all." It was reported that Caesar had written a letter to his friends and told them that he would not undertake a Parthian War before he had settled affairs at Rome; the very thing, says Cicero, which I advised in my letter; "but I said that he would have my approbation, whether he did the one or the other." "Caesar, I suppose," he added, "waits for my advice, and will do nothing without it.—Away with this idle talk, my friend, and let us be at least half-free which we may be, if we say nothing and keep out of the way." But still after all he did write another letter to Caesar, and it happened thus.

Cicero's panegyric on Cato seems to have been suggested by Atticus (xii. 4); and it was eagerly read. Hirtius first answered it, and sent Cicero a copy of his work, in which he had collected all that could be said against Cato, but at the same time he highly praised Cicero, who sent Hirtius' book to Atticus to be copied and published. Cicero saw from the work of Hirtius what Caesar's discourse on Cato would be. The generous conqueror did not answer as dictator; he wrote as Caesar, and he thought that he ought to reply to a panegyric, which was a condemnation of himself: he modestly "deprecated all comparison between the composition of a soldier and the eloquence of an accomplished orator who had plenty of

leisure to prosecute his studies" (Plutarch, Caesar, c. 3). Caesar's answer was written or finished during the turmoil of the Spanish War, and it consisted of two large books, or perhaps chapters, as we should call them. Balbus showed Cicero a letter from Caesar in which the Dictator said that he would be in Rome before the celebration of the *Ludi Romani* (B.C. 45: the letter contained a good deal about Cicero's Cato, by the frequent reading of which Caesar said that his own style was much improved; and that after reading the Cato of M. Brutus, for he also had written a panegyric on Cato, Caesar thought that he might consider himself eloquent (*Ad Attic.* xiii. 46). Caesar did not spare Cato in his reply, and in truth there were many things in Cato's life, which merited censure. The Dictator did not forget Cato's behaviour about his wife Marcia (*vol. iv. Appendix ii.*), and he charged him with drunkenness (*Plin. Epp.* iii. 12), perhaps even with incestuous commerce with his half-sister Servilia, the divorced wife of L. Lucullus and the sister of Servilia, the mother of M. Brutus, with whom Caesar himself was supposed to have committed adultery (Plutarch, Cato, c. 54). Caesar here followed the bad example of Cicero, whose tongue was befouled with scandal, of which we have many examples, and a signal specimen in the fragments of the oration *In Toga Candida* (*vol. iii. p. 233*). Cicero was now advised by Atticus to write more freely to Caesar, and he was informed by Balbus that himself and Oppius had written to tell Caesar that Cicero had read the *Anticatores* and greatly praised them. Thereupon Cicero wrote to Caesar a letter which he directed to be forwarded to Dolabella; but he also sent a copy to Oppius and Balbus and told them to deliver the letter to Dolabella, if they approved of the copy which they had received. He was informed by Caesar's two friends that they had never read anything better, and they forwarded the original letter to Dolabella for Caesar. This took place before Caesar arrived at Rome. Cicero wrote to Atticus that he forgot to send him a copy of this letter to Caesar: it was not, as Atticus suspected, because Cicero was ashamed to show it to him, for he wrote as to one who was only his equal, and he admired Caesar's *Anticatores*, as he had told Atticus when he saw him: accordingly he wrote to Caesar

without any flattery, and yet in such a way that Caesar would read the letter with much pleasure (*Ad Att.* xiii. 50, 51). But Cicero did not even now propose to send Atticus a copy of the letter to Caesar, and we conclude that his friend never saw it. If he had received a copy, we might have seen it.

How could Cicero fear that Caesar would molest him in any way, when he knew the man so well and had experienced his kindness? There is only one explanation of Cicero's behaviour. He knew that the Dictator did not fear him, and he may have suspected that Caesar did not even esteem him, and yet thought that he might make Cicero useful or at least keep him quiet. Cicero's vanity was hurt by the insignificance to which he was reduced, and being conscious of his own insincerity, he could not trust in the sincerity of Caesar, and was always employed in securing the favour of those who were in Caesar's intimacy. He continued on good terms with Dolabella after he was divorced from Tullia: after his daughter's death he wrote to him when he was in Spain, and wished for his presence, his consolation, and his love. There was one Tigellius, a flute-player, and a tolerable singer, who had some pretended cause of complaint against Cicero, and he was now the only man among Caesar's most intimate friends, who paid Cicero no respect. Cicero could not bear the fellow, but one of Cicero's friends, Fadius Gallus, was uneasy about the hostility of Tigellius to Cicero; for Tigellius was a favourite with Caesar. Cicero now wrote several times to Atticus about Tigellius, and though he cared nothing about the man, as he said, he asked Atticus to set right this misunderstanding between him and the singing man, the friend of Caesar (*Ad Fam.* vii. 24; *Ad Attic.* xiii. 49, 50, 51).

It has been said that M. Brutus and Cicero were not on very good terms after Cicero's Cilician proconsulship, when Brutus employed him to maintain his exorbitant demands upon his debtors in Asia (*vol. iv.* p. 423). But perhaps this is a mistake, as we shall see. Brutus in the Civil War joined the party of Cn. Pompeius, who had murdered his father (*vol. ii.* p. 439), but he forgot his private enmity in his zeal for the cause of Pompeius, or he thought that it was the safer side to take. He was in the battle of Pharsalia, but escaped

by flight, and was pardoned by Caesar, who in B.C. 46 made him governor of Gallia Cisalpina, and so prevented Brutus from joining his uncle M. Cato in Africa (B.C. 46), if he was inclined to do so. But he had already attached himself to Caesar's party. In B.C. 46 Cicero made M. Brutus one of the speakers in his dialogue entitled "*de claris oratoribus*" or "*Brutus*." Cicero here represents himself and Brutus (c. 3) as on terms of great intimacy after Cicero's return from Cilicia, and he speaks of a letter of consolation on the state of public affairs, which Brutus addressed to him from Asia in B.C. 47, when he went to that country to meet Caesar after the death of Pompeius and the defeat of Pharnaces. On Tullia's death Brutus wrote a letter of consolation to Cicero which brought tears to his eyes, and he wrote a reply, but first sent a copy together with the original to Atticus for his opinion, and told him not to forward his letter to Brutus, if he did not approve of it. Cicero was not pleased with the panegyric of Brutus (vol. iii. p. 329) on Cato, for it contained great mistakes and did not do justice to Cicero's services in the matter of Catilina's conspiracy. At this time Cicero seems to have been very cautious in his dealings with Brutus, perhaps because he was not quite certain what were the feelings of Brutus towards Caesar, and the apparent disparagement of his services may have offended Cicero, if Brutus' Cato came to his hands after the letter of consolation. However subsequently during this year Cicero showed an inclination to be on greater intimacy with Brutus, as his letters to Atticus (Lib. xii. xiii.) prove. Some of these letters are written in a mysterious style: Atticus would understand them, but we can hardly discover the meaning. Cicero heard that Brutus had gone to meet Caesar on his return from Spain, and that he brought back an assurance that Caesar would connect himself with the honest party (*boni viri*): "But where will he find them?" says Cicero, "unless he hangs himself;" which means unless Caesar seeks them in the other world, to which he had sent them. Cicero adds "where then is your favourite work of art which I saw in the Parthenon, Ahala and Brutus?" This is an allusion to the Brutus who expelled the Tarquinii, of whom M. Brutus claimed to be a descendant, and to Servilius Ahala, who killed

Spurius Maelius, who was charged with aspiring to royal power, and Brutus on his mother's side was descended from Ahala (Ad Attic. xiii. 39. 40).⁵ Every man may interpret Cicero's allusions as he pleases. The simplest explanation is that he here shows his real feelings towards Caesar: the thought that Caesar's career might terminate in a violent death had crossed his mind, and his wish was "father to the thought."

Caesar's partisans were eagerly expecting his return, and particularly those who hoped to be rewarded for their services. A usurper must employ many unscrupulous men and they must be paid in some way. Cicero himself (Ad Fam. xii. 18) makes a kind of apology for Caesar, when he says, that things were done which did not please Caesar; "for such are always the results of civil wars, that not only the conqueror does what he likes, but he must also satisfy those who have assisted him in winning the victory." The Cappadocian Ariarathes, whom Caesar (p. 293) had placed under his brother Ariobarzanes, now came to Rome, "to purchase some kingdom from Caesar, I suppose: for at present he has not a bit of land to set his foot on" (Ad Attic. xiii. 2). Cicero wrote to invite the pauper prince to lodge with him. It is difficult to make conclusions from Cicero's letters to Atticus at this time, and perhaps hardly safe to affirm that some of the candidates for offices went to Spain to see Caesar (Ad Attic. xii. 8); but Cicero wishes to know whether the elections will be made in Spain or in the Campus Martius. At last Caesar came (Ad Fam. vii. 25): "The master is here," says Cicero, "sooner than we expected." Between his return and his triumph the master stayed at his villa of Lavinium near Rome, where he made his will on the 13th of September and entrusted it to the chief vestal virgin. Caesar had his fifth triumph early in October, a triumph over the sons of Pompeius and over the Republic. In the scenic exhibitions which followed the triumph, Decimus Laberius, a Roman Eques and a man of a rough temper, was invited by Caesar, and received 500,000 sesterces to act the mimi which he had written himself. In

⁵ The Parthenon is not the Athenian Parthenon, but some apartment decorated with portraits and statues.

the Prologue of Laberius, which Macrobius (Sat. ii. c. 7) has preserved, the old man complains that he was compelled to yield to the request of one to whom the gods themselves could deny nothing. When Laberius uttered the words,

"Necesse est multos timeat quem multi timent,"

all the spectators turned their eyes on Caesar. Cicero says "I am now so hardened that I was present at the games of our friend Caesar and was quite content to see T. Plancus and hear the poems of Laberius and Publius (Syrus)." T. Plancus Bursa was the man who was punished for acts of violence after the death of Clodius, but he had been restored by Caesar, and he now appeared in public in Caesar's games. On the 13th of October Caesar's legatus in Spain Q. Fabius Maximus had a Spanish triumph, and the other legatus Q. Pedius on the 13th of December. Neither of them had done any thing to merit a triumph, and there was a poor display on the occasion; but the vanity of the two generals was gratified and Caesar paid them at no cost to himself (Dion, 43. c. 42).

New and extravagant honours were conferred on Caesar in the last five months of his life: they added nothing to his real glory, but they were proofs of the degradation of the Senate and the Roman people. A successful usurper always finds men mean enough to humble themselves in the dust, to flatter, and to kiss the rod which chastises them. The nation which conquered the world showed more than Asiatic servility to the new master; and in recent times we have seen the warlike people, who have carried their victorious arms over Europe, crouch before two usurpers and prostrate themselves to men far inferior to Caesar. Dion has enumerated some of the honours conferred on Caesar after his return, and it will be sufficient to mention a few of them, without attempting to determine the order in which they were conferred in the short period between his return and his death (Dion, 43. c. 43—51; and 44. c. 1—11).

A decree of the Senate permitted Caesar to wear his triumphal robe on public festivals, and always to wear the crown of bay; to dedicate *Spolia Opima*, like a second Romulus, in the temple of Jupiter Feretrius; and on the occasion of the *Feriae Latinae* and the return from the Alban Hills to enter Rome

on horseback. He received the title of *Imperator* as a *praefix* (*praenomen*), a flattering deviation from former usage, and so far, says Dion, if he says truly, did flattery go, that the Senate made a resolution that his sons and grandsons should have the title, though Caesar had no son. He received also the title of *Pater Patriae* or *Parens Patriae*, which was placed on his medals. This title had been conferred before on Cicero (Plutarch, Cic. 23), though perhaps not in a formal manner.⁶ He also received the title of *Liberator*, which was entered in the *Fasti*, and it was determined to erect a temple to Liberty at the public cost. Many of the honours conferred on Caesar, says Dion (43. c. 45), might be consistent with the existence of a Republican constitution; but he received powers which placed him in the condition of a monarch, in the strict sense of the word. All the magistrates were subordinate to him, and even the elections at the *Comitia Tributa* were under his control (Dion, 43. c. 45). The expression of Suetonius (Caesar, c. 41) is that Caesar shared the *Comitia* with the people on these terms: with the exception of the candidates for the consulship, the people should elect one half of the candidates, and he should name the other half. Accordingly he sent a written notice to the tribes to this effect: Caesar Dictator to the tribe —; I recommend to your votes such and such a candidate. Dion in another passage (43. c. 51) speaks of this as being done under a certain statute. It has been conjectured that this is the enactment to which Cicero (*Phil.* vii. 6) alludes, as proposed by L. Antonius the brother of Marcus, who entered on the office of tribune on the 10th of December B.C. 45, though Dion refers the enactment to B.C. 46. The fact may be that the enactment of L. Antonius empowered the appointment of magistrates for some years to come, in view of Caesar's departure for the Parthian War. Caesar had the army at his command and the treasury also. No ruler, ancient or modern, has either seized or exercised more absolute power than the founder of the dynasty of the Caesars. It was a small matter to add to

⁶ On the titles of Caesar see the notes of Reimarus on Dion Cassius (44. c. 4), and A. Agostini, *Dialoghi*. I doubt if Cicero received the title of *Parens Patriae* by a resolution of the Senate. Camillus is said to have received it from his soldiers (Livy, v. 49). See Drumann, *Julii*, p. 662.

his power the consulship for ten years and the Dictatorship for life. The first and last year of Caesar's perpetual Dictatorship was B.C. 44, and the first year of his decennial consulship. He had also been made Praefect of Morals (*Praefectus Morum*), not Censor, as Dion says. Rome wanted such an officer, if he could be of any use; but the choice of Caesar was the grossest flattery or the sharpest irony. He was a sober man, almost abstemious; but the praefect, according to all the testimony that we have, was more licentious than any of his new subjects in his dealings with women. It would be tedious to tell minutely all the honours conferred on Caesar: he had the power of an absolute king and that was enough. Still there are honours which are significant of power, for his head was placed on medals.⁷ In B.C. 44 on the proposal of M. Antonius, who was Caesar's colleague in the consulship, the name of the month Quintilis, in which Caesar was born, was changed to Julius and the new name has existed to the present time. His birth-day was also made an annual festival.

When the Senate resolved to erect a new Temple of Concord to commemorate the restoration of peace by Caesar, and to celebrate an annual festival in this temple, they acted soberly. Nor was it extravagant to protect him, who had given Rome security by investing him with the sacrosanct authority originally conferred on the tribunes (*Liv. iii. 55*). But flattery knows not where to stop: a decree was made that Caesar's son, if he should beget one, or if he should adopt a son, should be Pontifex Maximus, or the head of religion in Rome.⁸ All the powers and honours of the State were conferred on Caesar: the odious name of king was not yet mentioned, but the vote of a gilded seat and robe, such as the kings once used, and a guard of equites and senators, were the characteristic marks of royalty. It seems, if we understand Dion right, that

⁷ Dion (44. c. 4) expresses himself rather ambiguously here; but the true conclusion seems to be that his head was placed on medals in B.C. 45. See Agostini, p. 59, and Drumann's note, *Julii*, p. 663.

⁸ Dion (44. c. 5). In 44. c. 7 he mentions that some went so far as to propose to allow Caesar as many women as he pleased. But he had them already, for the historian says, that Caesar, though he was past fifty, cohabited with many women. Dion perhaps means that any son, whoever the mother might be, if he was reputed to be Caesar's son, should be his lawful son (see p. 385).

Caesar refused this body-guard, and afterwards even dismissed the guards which he had; though, as we shall soon see, he kept them at least to the 18th of December, B.C. 45. Dion states that the senators began with offering him honours such as they supposed would satisfy him; and when it was observed that he was pleased with them, for he accepted all except a few, they vied with one another in offering him still more, some from pure flattery, but others for the purpose of making him more odious and hastening his ruin. This may be true; but we care less about the motives of flatterers or enemies under the guise of friends than we do about the man whose merit raised him above all honours. It is impossible to discover by the aid of compilers of a late period whether success and flattery turned Caesar's head, or whether he still retained the singular good sense which he showed all through his previous life. It is more consistent to believe that he well understood the character of those who were about him, and knew his own dangerous position; that he cared little or nothing for the honours that he received except as expressive of the power which he had acquired, a power which he resolved to keep, and to transmit, if he could, to a successor who should bear his own name.

The absurdity and inconsistency of the Senate were shown by two other decrees. They gave Caesar the title of Jupiter Julius, and voted a joint temple to him and to his clemency: the priest of the new god was M. Antonius, a kind of Flamen Dialis (Phil. ii. c. 43; Dion, 44. c. 6, and note of Reimarus). It was fit that a god should reside in a temple, and Caesar's residence was decorated with a pediment, as a temple was. After providing all honours for the new deity, the Senate also provided for his interment within the Pomoerium; and in this matter we may assume that many of the senators were quite sincere and hoped that the time would come soon.

It is a remark frequently made by Caesar himself in his Commentaries, that small things often produce great consequences; and perhaps it was so with respect to the honours conferred upon him. Some of the Senate's decrees, it is not clearly said which, were fixed on slabs of silver in letters of gold and placed beneath the feet of Jupiter in the Capitol, to

show Caesar, says Dion, that he was still a mortal. If the fact is true, we care not for the historian's explanation: Caesar knew that he was mortal as well as the Senate knew it. One day the Senate came to announce to him the chief honours which they had bestowed, for they were conferred when he was not present, in order that the resolutions might seem to be voluntary. All the Senators concurred in these decrees, except Cassius and a few others, whose absence however Caesar took no notice of. Caesar, who was seated in the vestibule of his temple of Venus Genetrix, did not rise to receive the Senate; which the historian Dion, who is always seeking to find out every man's motives, attributes either to the malignant purpose of the gods, who according to the ancient theology deprive a man of his understanding when they intend to lead him to his ruin, or he was so delighted with his honours that he forgot what he was doing. No man now will accept the first explanation; and the second is certainly not true, for Caesar must have known what the Senate came for; and even if he did not, he was of all men least liable to lose his presence of mind. Whatever his reason was for treating the Senate in this manner, they and everybody else were so indignant, that Caesar's behaviour on this day, says Dion, was the chief cause of the conspiracy against his life and of the hatred against him for his pride, which the Senators themselves had nourished by their extravagant flattery. Every man, as he pleases, may accept or reject the historian's explanation.⁹

In October B.C. 45 Caesar abdicated the consulship that he might have the opportunity of rewarding Q. Fabius Maximus and C. Trebonius by elevating them to this high office. This was the first example of the kind. Fabius died on the 31st of December, and C. Caninius Rebilus, one of Caesar's legati, was elected in his stead at the seventh hour in the Comitia Centuriata, and he held the consulship till the midnight of the last day of the year, or about five hours. This was a fine opportunity for Cicero's jokes, who remarked that no man breakfasted during the consulship of Caninius; but no harm happened either, for the consul was so vigilant that he

⁹ He mentions another explanation, which may appear to be ridiculous, and yet it may be true. Dion, 44. c. 8; Suetonius, Caesar, c. 78.

did not sleep during his consulship (*Ad Fam.* vii. 30).¹ Ten men of praetorian rank were honoured with the title of *Consulares* (*Sueton. Caesar*, c. 76). The Senate was increased, and by Caesar's own act, as we must assume, to the number of nine hundred: some of the new members were common soldiers, freedmen, and semi-barbarian Galli. This was a greater insult to the Senate than the reception which they had in the Temple of Venus; and the folly of thus degrading the rank of Senator certainly may justify a doubt about Caesar's prudence. Jokes and pasquinades were common at Rome. Upon this admission of foreigners into the Senate, a placard appeared with the usual official heading, "*Bonum Factum*," "In the interest of the public: it is forbidden to show any new Senator the way to the Senate-house (*Curia*)."²

Many persons whom the Dictator wished to please were exalted to Patrician rank, to fill the places of some ancient families which were extinct. Caesar paid some of his friends with money, part of which he got or was suspected of getting by granting pardons to those who had been convicted of bribery at elections. He raised money also (*Dion*, 43. c. 47) by the sale of public land, and even of land consecrated to religious purposes; but all this is doubtful matter. Some of his friends were enriched by purchasing forfeited property at a low price; and among them Caesar's favourite *Servilia*, the mother of *M. Brutus*, who was as greedy as her favourite son.

In B.C. 45 there was a commission appointed for distributing lands among Caesar's soldiers. The three commissioners, if there were only three, are named in *Cicero's* letters (*Ad Fam.* xiii. 4. 5. 7. 8), *Valerius Orca*, *Cluvius*, and *M. Rutilius*. The execution of Caesar's Agrarian law of B.C. 59 (vol. iii. 421) had not been completed, and new settlers were now sent into the fertile region of *Campania*, who began to build their houses out of the materials of the ancient sepulchres of those

¹ *Macrobius* (*Sat.* ii. 3), who has a chapter on *Cicero's* jokes, reports one that is still better: "people asked under what consuls *Rebilus* was consul."

² There were songs also made for the occasion:—

"Caesar led the Gauls in triumph, led them to the *Curia* too:
There the Galli doffed their trowsers, and put on the laticlave."

Such things as these would do Caesar more harm than his alleged arrogance. A ruler who is made ridiculous is near his fall.

who had occupied these lands. Cicero wrote to Valerius Orca to recommend to him the interests of the municipium of Volaterrae in Etruria, a town whose lands had been excepted from Caesar's Agrarian law (B.C. 59) and declared by him to be secured for all time. Cicero urged Orca, as one of the commissioners, to follow Caesar's example, or at least to reserve the case of Volaterrae for Caesar's decision. We do not know what powers were given to the commission, nor on what grounds or pretexts old possessions were disturbed. Cicero also wrote to Orca in favour of his friend C. Curtius, who had suffered in the times of Sulla. Curtius had a possession, as Cicero names it, in the territory of Volaterrae, in which he had invested the wreck of his fortune: Caesar had just made him a senator, and if he should lose this "possession," he would hardly be able to support his new dignity; and it was not consistent for a man who had been made a senator by Caesar to be ejected from land in order that it might be distributed among soldiers by Caesar's order. It appears then, that whatever was Curtius' title to his land, he was liable to be ejected under Caesar's land distribution. Cicero also wrote to Cluvius about some land in Cisalpine Gallia, which belonged to the municipium of Atella in Campania, and brought in a rent, on which Atella depended for discharging the town expenses; and at this time the municipium was loaded with very heavy charges. Cicero requested Cluvius to reserve this matter also for Caesar's decision. He was the more encouraged to hope that Cluvius would listen to his request, because he had heard that the favour for which he asked had been granted by Cluvius to the people of Regium in Cisalpine Gaul (Reggio). Cicero wrote also to the commissioner M. Rutilius about the interests of C. Albinus, whose daughter had married P. Sestius, the man who was useful to Cicero at the time of his restoration. A person named Laberius had bought of Caesar, as Cicero expresses it, an estate which was part of the property of Plotius and was confiscated land, as it seems. Albinus took the estate from Laberius in satisfaction of a debt. Caesar had declared that he would confirm the title to lands which had been sold or assigned to settlers by Sulla, and this was done with the view of securing the titles of the lands which Caesar should sell or distribute: now

says Cicero, if land which Caesar himself has sold should be liable to be distributed among soldiers, what security of title can there be for any lands sold by him ?

We see from these examples how insecure must have been the title to a great part of the land of Italy ; and this insecurity existed at least from the time of the attempts of Ti. Gracchus to establish the rights of the State in the public land (vol. i. p. 182, &c.). All the Agrarian laws of Rome affected to deal only with the public land, first in the interests of the poor, and at a later time for the purpose of giving grants of land to old soldiers for their services. We cannot suppose that Caesar, and the Triumviri, who came after him, dared to disturb men whose title to their land was undoubted ; and we must assume that there was land in Italy, which had never belonged to the Roman State. But the difficulty was in determining what was or had been at some time public land ; and it is hardly possible that Caesar at this time could attempt to evict towns from their town lands or individuals from the lands which they occupied except on some ground of defective title. Many causes have been alleged in explanation of the fact of the decay of agriculture in Italy from the time of Tiberius Gracchus and even earlier, for the fact itself cannot be doubted. The increase of slave cultivation, the unsettled state of the peninsula, and the wars by which Italy was devastated, were the chief causes. But we may add to these the uncertainty of the tenure of land, whether a man held it as proprietor or as a tenant of the Roman state. He might now be turned out of his home to make room for a soldier, who would probably be ill fitted to take the place of a laborious cultivator. We know nothing of what Caesar did for the revival of Italian industry. He certainly would not improve it simply by making land change hands ; nor by such trivial regulations as one which is mentioned by Suetonius (Caesar, c. 42) ; that those who carried on the business of sheep and cattle feeding must have among their shepherds and herdsmen not less than one third who were freeborn men.³

After Caesar's triumph in B.C. 45 Cicero made his speech in

³ There was something like this in one of the provisions of the Licinian Law about the employment of free labourers. Vol. i. p. 166.

defence of king Deiotarus, who had given Caesar assistance in the war against Pharnaces (p. 298). Deiotarus was now an old man. His name had long been familiar to the Romans during the wars with Mithridates, and at the end of these wars Pompeius granted him additional territory in Asia with the title of king, which was confirmed by the Roman Senate (vol. iii. p. 192). In the civil war Deiotarus joined Pompeius, as we have seen, and escaped with him in his flight after the battle of Pharsalia. Though Deiotarus brought aid to Caesar against Pharnaces, Caesar after the battle of Zela took from Deiotarus Armenia the Less and the country of the Galatian Trocmi. Caesar was not satisfied with the behaviour of Deiotarus, and he knew or suspected that he was now on his side only because he was victorious. M. Brutus made a speech on behalf of Deiotarus before Caesar at Nicaea in Bithynia, for the purpose of inducing Caesar, as we suppose, not to deprive Deiotarus of part of his territories. Caesar, we are told (Cic. ad Attic. xiv. 1) used to say of M. Brutus, "What this man wills, is no indifferent matter; for what he does will, he wills with all his might;" and Caesar observed this temper of Brutus in his speech at Nicaea, in which Brutus spoke with great vehemence and freedom.

A daughter of Deiotarus married a man of mean birth, as Cicero says. His name was Castor and he had a son named Castor. The old king and his family were not on good terms; and after Caesar's return from Spain, the grandson Castor charged his grandfather with the design of assassinating Caesar while he was the guest of Deiotarus in Galatia. Deiotarus was now at home, but he sent some friends to defend him, and among them his slave and physician Pheidippus; but Pheidippus was bribed by Castor, as Cicero says, to give evidence against his master. Cicero defended Deiotarus before Caesar, who heard the case in his own house. The speech is extant, the last that Cicero delivered in Caesar's lifetime. Cicero sent a copy of this speech to Dolabella, with the remark that the matter was not worth a carefully written oration; however he wished to send his old friend a little present, slight and of coarse material as it was, like the king's own presents (Ad Fam. ix. 12).

The charge of the intention to assassinate Caesar was probably false. The evidence of the physician contained nothing about a design of poisoning Caesar, which, as Cicero contends, would have been the easiest and surest way of killing him (c. 6). The charge was that Deiotarus intended to employ armed men to assassinate Caesar, while he was the king's guest. It is hardly possible that a man in his senses would think of murdering the victorious Roman general at such a time. Cicero also argues that such a design was quite inconsistent with the many and great virtues of the Galatian king; but other authorities make it very doubtful if the virtues of Deiotarus were so great as the orator proclaims. Cicero is less successful in answering the charge of Deiotarus being hostile to Caesar and showing it during the African war, at a time when he may have had some hopes that Caesar would perish. The speech contains some of the most extravagant flattery that Cicero ever employed. Caesar made no decision; and Cicero states that when Deiotarus heard of Caesar's death, he forcibly took possession of the territories of which he had been deprived.

The intimacy between Caesar and Cicero since the year B.C. 55 has made us better acquainted with Caesar. There is one letter which brings us nearer to him than any evidence that remains, and presents the Dictator to us in his hours of relaxation (*Ad Attic.* xiii. 52). It is as good authority for the facts which it contains as any letter written in our own times about contemporary matters. In the middle of December B.C. 45 Caesar was visiting the coast of Campania. On the second day of the Saturnalia in the evening he arrived at the villa of L. Marcius Philippus the second husband of Atia, the mother of C. Octavius, who was afterwards named Augustus. The villa was so filled with soldiers that there was hardly room for Caesar to dine: there were two thousand of them. Cicero, who lived near and expected the Dictator to dinner next day was in great trouble; but one of Caesar's officers came to his relief and set a guard at his villa: the soldiers encamped on the land, and the villa was protected. On the third day of the Saturnalia Caesar was with Philippus to the seventh hour and no person was admitted. Cicero sup-

poses that Caesar was looking over his accounts with Balbus, for he was very exact in keeping his books. He then walked on the seashore. At the eighth hour he took his bath apparently at Cicero's villa, and listened to something that was spoken or written about Mamurra, said to have been chief of engineers under Caesar in Gallia: it was a satire or something against Mamurra, and perhaps Caesar, for it is said that the Dictator did not change his countenance. He was then oiled and rubbed, and he sat down to dinner. He was at this time under a course of emetics, and so he ate and drank without restraint; the dinner was abundant and well served.⁴ This was not all; but, as Lucilius says, the entertainment was seasoned with good discourse, which made it pass pleasantly. Besides Caesar's table, his immediate friends were supplied at three tables. His freedmen of the "inferior class and the slaves wanted nothing: those of a higher class were treated sumptuously." "I think that I managed the business very well," says Cicero, "but the guest was not one to whom a man would say, I entreat you to call again when you shall return. Once is enough. We talked of no serious matters, and a good deal on literature. Caesar was much pleased and enjoyed himself. He said that he would spend one day at Puteoli, and the next at Baiae." I suppose that the commentators have inferred from what Caesar said that he visited Cicero at his villa at or near Puteoli, and it may be so. Cicero remarks at the end of his letter that Nicias told him that when Caesar was passing the villa of Dolabella, his armed attendants marched in two columns on the right and left of the horse which Caesar rode, and nowhere else.

⁴ "ἐμετικὴν ἀγεbat." Some commentators explain these words to mean that Caesar intended to take an emetic after dinner, and so he could eat and drink freely. Mongault thinks that he had taken his emetic in the morning and he refers to Celsus (i. c. 3, 25); but the passage does not determine this weighty matter. Celsus says, "If a man has taken his emetic in the morning, he must walk, then be rubbed, and then dine: if he has taken it after dinner, he must bathe next day and sweat in the bath-room." I understand the words "ἐμετικὴν ἀγεbat" to mean that Caesar was under an emetic régime. Heberden, who was a physician, simply translates "he was anointed and sat down to table, following an emetic course," which is hardly sense. In a note he says "a course prescribed to such as were using vomits."

CHAPTER XXXII.

CAESAR'S ACTS.

B.C. 44.

IN the year B.C. 44 Caesar was consul for the fifth time, and M. Antonius was his colleague. In the previous year Caesar had entered on his fifth Dictatorship,¹ and M. Lepidus was named his *Magister Equitum*, which office he held also in B.C. 44. Caesar had promised Dolabella the consulship, though the man had never been praetor, and was far below the legal age required for the consulship. But Caesar took the consulship himself and Dolabella was greatly offended. Antonius, who was active in this business, preferred Caesar as a colleague to Dolabella, for Caesar was intending to leave Rome for the Parthian war, and Antonius would then have all the power in his hands. However on the 1st of January B.C. 44 Caesar stated in the Senate that Dolabella should be appointed consul before he set out for the Parthian war; but Antonius, who was an augur, declared that he would prevent the election of Dolabella, and when the day came, he did stop the election. The question of the validity of the interposition of Antonius was reserved for the Ides of March. Cicero has told this story about Antonius (*Phil.* ii. 32-35).

For this year there were appointed forty quaestors as in the year before, and six aediles, two of them out of the patrician and four out of the plebeian body. Two of the plebeian aediles had the duty of looking after the supply of corn and were

¹ Or the fourth, if the first short dictatorship is not reckoned. Drumann, *Julii*, p. 656, note 60.

named Cereales (Dion, 43. c. 51). Sixteen praetors were appointed.

For the purpose of easing Rome of her useless citizens and perhaps also giving them the means of living, the Dictator established a settlement at Pharos near Alexandria; and settlers were also sent to Narbo and Arelate in Gallia under Tiberius Nero, the father of the emperor Tiberius. Carthage and Corinth were also restored. A settlement, named Junonia, had been made at Carthage by C. Gracchus (vol. i. p. 276), and it appears that the city of Gracchus still existed. Caesar restored the old name, and as Strabo (p. 833) says, rebuilt the place: many Romans who preferred Carthage to Rome were sent there, and some soldiers; and it is now, adds Strabo, more populous than any town in Libya. Caesar sent to Corinth a large number of freedmen, and other settlers were afterwards sent by Augustus; but it is certain that many Greeks came to live in the new Corinth, for it became a Greek town. Corinth was a mass of ruins when the new settlers came, and while they were removing the rubbish, they grubbed up the burial-places where they found a great number of earthen figures and bronze urns, which they sold at a high price and filled Rome with them (Strabo, p. 382). Caesar also, it is said, had the design of cutting a canal through the isthmus of Corinth.

Suetonius reports that eighty thousand citizens went to Caesar's transmarine colonies. Of course he does not tell us what means or capital these emigrants had. Some absurd regulations however were made with the view, as it is reported, of keeping up the population of Italy: no man between the ages of twenty and forty, except those in military service, was permitted to be absent from Italy more than three years in succession; and no son of a senator was allowed to go abroad except on the staff of a magistrate. A new master must do something to please the common sort in a great capital, and building is the readiest thing to his hand. Caesar designed to build a temple to Mars, such as had never been seen, and to erect it on the site of the lake Codetanus, where he had exhibited the spectacle of a Naumachia in B.C. 46. He also planned a theatre of enormous size near the Tarpeian rock,

and laid the foundations. Dion states that it was finished by Augustus and named after his sister's son M. Marcellus.² Caesar demolished houses and temples to make room for his theatre, and burnt the statues which were all of wood except a few. There was found in making the excavations a large sum of money, which Dion charges the Dictator with appropriating to himself (Dion, 43. c. 49). It is not easy to conceive what else he should have done with it: he was the master. The design of draining the Pomptine marshes was more useful than temple building, but there is no evidence that even a beginning was made. It was also intended to carry off part of the water of the lake Fucinus in the country of the Marsi; but this work was executed by the Emperor Claudius. A direct road across the Apennines from the Adriatic to the Tiber was also planned. Plutarch (Caesar, c. 58) speaks of a design for turning the course of the Tiber below Rome towards Circaëum and carrying it into the sea near Tarracina; and for making a safe port at Ostia, which also Claudius accomplished. We can believe that the Dictator had many great schemes in his head, and more than have been reported.

Suetonius (Caesar, c. 44) states that Caesar intended to reduce the Roman Law (*Jus Civile*) into a certain form, and to comprise in very few books the immense number of statutes (*leges*) by selecting the best and most useful. It is plain from these words that he contemplated something very useful; but it is not certain what his design was. Aulus Gellius (i. 22) refers to a work by Cicero entitled "On the reducing of the Roman Law to an art," from which it appears that Cicero had some notion of the elements of Roman Law being put into a shape for practical use: we cannot conclude that he attempted to do it himself, for though ready to undertake almost anything, he would hardly have ventured to expose his ignorance to such a man as Servius Sulpicius and other Roman lawyers. Caesar, who had undoubtedly greater practical capacity than Cicero, may have had the conception of an elementary treatise on Roman Law; and the collecting and sifting of the enor-

² Dion states that Caesar did build part of the theatre. The theatre of Marcellus was, as we know, in the Forum Olitorium. The notice of the site by Suetonius is not very exact.

mous mass of Roman statutes was certainly a useful project. He also contemplated the formation of libraries of Greek and Latin books, which should be for the use of the public, and he entrusted the work of getting the books and arranging them to the learned M. Varro, who was an incompetent commander in the first Spanish war, but well able to look after books. The Dictator's death prevented the execution of this useful scheme of public libraries. L. Lucullus, who formed a good library, used to allow his friends the use of his books; but Caesar designed a public library and C. Asinius Pollio one of Caesar's legati was the first who established such a library in Rome (Plinius, 35. c. 2). Those who practised medicine in the city and the teachers of the liberal arts were invited to settle in Rome by the offer of the Roman citizenship.

The war with the Parthians from whom the arms of Rome had suffered humiliation in the defeat of Crassus was popular, and it is probable that Caesar himself thought that his power might be secured and his fame increased by avenging the blood shed on the plains of Mesopotamia. Appian (B. C. ii. 110) states that Caesar's expedition was designed also against the Getae, by whom he intends apparently the nations on the Lower Danube, who had often disturbed the northern frontiers of Macedonia and Thrace. Plutarch (Caesar, c. 58) affirms that Caesar's "designs were to march against the Parthians and after subduing them and marching through Hyrcania and along the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus and so encompassing the Euxine to invade Scythia, and after having overrun the countries bordering on the Germans and Germany itself to return through Gaul to Italy and so to complete his circle of the empire which would be bounded on all sides by the ocean." We cannot give credit to Plutarch's story of such a foolish and impracticable design; and yet it is possible that Caesar did cherish some extravagant schemes. He had long been accustomed to an active life, which agreed better with his health than a state of repose; and he might be ambitious to lead his men to the shores of the Caspian, which Pompeius had approached, but had not seen (vol. iii. p. 164). The intention of returning to Italy through Scythia and the Germanic nations is probably a fiction.

However preparation was made for the Parthian war, and Caesar was now sending sixteen legions across the Hadriatic and ten thousand horsemen (Appian, B.C. ii. 110). After the murder of Sextus Julius Caesar in Syria and the usurpation of the government by Caecilius Bassus (B.C. 46), the affairs of Syria were in a disturbed state. C. Antistius Vetus in B.C. 45 attacked Bassus and shut him up in Apamea, but the Parthian Pacorus came with a large force to the relief of Bassus, and Vetus was compelled to retreat at the end of December (B.C. 45, Cic. ad Attic. xiv. 9). Thus we see that in the beginning of B.C. 44 the Parthian was in Syria, and a conflict between Rome and Parthia could hardly be avoided. Before his death Caesar sent Statius Murcus with three legions to oppose Bassus and his partisans, but Murcus was repulsed, and Marcius Crispus came from Bithynia to support him with three legions more (Appian, B.C. iii. 77). Under these circumstances the first object of Caesar in a Parthian war would be to secure Syria, where so large a force was collected. Caesar could also draw from Egypt the legions which he had left there (p. 270). About the end of B.C. 45, Acilius, the successor of Ser. Sulpicius, was sent to Achaia with a force (legions, as Cicero names them, Ad Fam. vii. 30). There was a large force also in Macedonia. C. Octavius, Caesar's great nephew, was residing at Apollonia in Illyricum, where he was prosecuting his studies and waiting to accompany the Dictator to the Parthian war.

In order to secure tranquillity at Rome during his absence and to repay the services of his partisans, Caesar named the magistrates for several years to come. Appian (B. C. ii. 128) states that the nominations were made for five years, Dion for three. Cicero speaks of consuls and plebeian tribunes having been named by Caesar for two years (Ad Att. xiv. 6); and the words of Hirtius (Ad Att. xv. 6) (*quoniam praesidia sunt in tot annos provisae*) are supposed to refer to Caesar's nominations. The consuls appointed for B.C. 43 were Hirtius and Pansa, and for B.C. 42 Decimus Brutus and L. Munatius Plancus; but there is no evidence in Cicero or elsewhere of consuls being named for B.C. 41. When Dion says that the magistrates were named for three years, he appears to have

included B.C. 44, for Caesar intended to make Dolabella the colleague of M. Antonius for the remainder of that year, as soon as he should leave Rome for the Parthian war. Dion also states that for the year B.C. 42 only consuls and tribunes were appointed, and no other magistrates, which does not seem probable. When Cicero speaks only of consuls and tribunes being elected for two years, we may understand him as speaking of the two kinds of magistrates who were most active in the management of public business, and not as excluding the appointment of other magistrates for the two years.

It was necessary to provide also for the safety of the provinces, and Caesar's partisans were repaid by receiving these offices, in which money could be made, though the period of a provincial government was now shortened (p. 376). C. Asinius Pollio, as it had been stated, was appointed governor of Further Spain; Lepidus would receive the government of Nearer Spain and the adjacent Provincia of Gallia. Northern Gallia or the country of the Belgæ was assigned to Hirtius; and the rest of Gallia to L. Munatius Plancus. Decimus Brutus had the North of Italy, named Cisalpine Gallia. Q. Cornificius a friend of Cicero had the province Africa. P. Vatinius was already in possession of Illyricum, and Q. Hortensius, the son of the orator Hortensius, had Macedonia. M. Acilius was in Achaia, and the province Asia was assigned to C. Trebonius. Q. Marcius Crispus, who had Bithynia, and went to support Murcus in Syria (p. 430), was succeeded in Bithynia after Caesar's death by Tillius Cimber. The state of affairs in Syria has been mentioned. It does not appear who had the government of Sicily and Sardinia.

The statues of Pompeius and the Dictator Sulla, which had been thrown down (p. 235), were now restored; and Caesar was praised for his generosity in this matter and also in allowing the name of M. Antonius to be inscribed as the restorer. By this act, said Cicero, Caesar secured his own statues. It does not appear at what time Caesar dismissed his guard, but it must have been after his visit to Cicero in December B.C. 45, and this circumstance may have encouraged the conspirators who were now plotting against his life.

It is difficult to determine whether Caesar wished to have

the title of king. Perhaps he did; and if he did wish for it, was he moved by a vulgar ambition, as a usurper of a meaner sort might have been, or did he see that the Roman Republic had perished, and that the State could only exist under another form? Dion (44. c. 9), who mixes facts and conjectures, states that his enemies, with the view of making Caesar odious even to his best friends, spread many false reports about him, and called him king, and generally among themselves spoke of him as such. He seems to mean that the men addressed him as king; for he says that Caesar refused the title and rebuked in a manner those who addressed him thus; but he did nothing by which they could be assured that he was really displeased with their flattery, and accordingly they went about the matter in another way. His enemies crowned with a diadem Caesar's statue on the Rostra, but the tribunes Marullus and Caesetius Flavus removed it.* The Dictator, according to Dion, was vexed at what the tribunes did, but he remained quiet. The same writer, who is more circumstantial than any other about the events of the first three months of B.C. 44, tells us that when Caesar was entering the city on his return from celebrating the Latin festival on the Alban hills, some of the people saluted him as king, and he replied that he was not king, but Caesar. Marullus and Flavus instituted proceedings against the man, who set the example of addressing Caesar as king, and thereupon Caesar was greatly irritated for he supposed that the two tribunes themselves were the instigators of the popular cry. Still he did nothing; but when these tribunes put forth a public notice or declaration of some kind that they had no freedom of action nor liberty of speech on public affairs, Caesar brought them before the Senate, charged them with their offence and put the matter to a vote. Some of the senators, it is said, proposed the penalty of death, which is not credible, and it is not mentioned by Nicolaus; but with the assistance of Helvius Cinna, one of the tribunes, Marullus and Flavus were deposed from their office and ejected from the Senate. This and the deposition of his colleague

* The fragment of the life of Caesar Augustus by Nicolaus of Damascus (Firmin Didot, Paris, 1850) contains some particulars of this affair, and an account of the plot against the Dictator Caesar and his murder (p. 17-57).

Octavius by the tribune Ti. Gracchus are, I believe, the only instances of this illegal act in the long history of the tribunician power (vol. i. p. 186). Nicolaus affirms that the tribunes were banished, but were allowed by Caesar to return to Rome, though not to resume their office.

On the 15th of February was the festival named Luper-
calia, in honour of Lupercus, to whose priestly ministers an addition had lately been made of members named Juliani from the new god and master of Rome ; M. Antonius, now consul, was the priest of the Juliani. It was a rude ancient festival which had been retained notwithstanding the coarseness of the ceremonies. Caesar appeared on the Rostra, in a royal dress, or a triumphal robe, according to Plutarch, wearing a crown (of bay), and seated on a golden (gilded) chair to see the sacred race, in which, as Plutarch says, "many of the young nobles and magistrates run through the city without their toga, and for sport and to make laughter strike those whom they meet with strips of hide that have the hair on." Antonius was there, stripped according to the usage, but with a girdle of skins round his loins. When he entered the Forum, the crowd made way for him. Cicero (Phil. ii. 34) describes what followed. Antonius ascended the Rostra, advanced towards Caesar, and displayed a diadem ; upon which there was a groan through the Forum. When Antonius attempted to set the diadem on Caesar's head, the spectators loudly showed their dissatisfaction ; and they had the more reason to do so, if Antonius, as Dion reports, said to Caesar, "The Roman people through me present you with this." But the impudent lie is probably Dion's invention. When Caesar refused the proffered diadem, the people clapped their hands. In Plutarch's narrative there are some variations of the story, and also in Nicolaus. Cicero, whose invective against Antonius, is loose and perhaps not altogether true, describes the consul as making a speech to the people in his Luperalian breeches. Caesar replied to the offer of the diadem that Jupiter alone was king of the Romans, and he, the new Jupiter, sent the diadem to Jupiter of the Capitol. An entry was made in the Fasti at the day of the Lupercalia that M. Antonius acting under the authority of the Roman people offered to C. Caesar

perpetual dictator the royal power: and that Caesar refused it.

Caesar's partisans had failed in the attempt to draw from the people their assent to the assumption of the royal title. The Romans knew that Caesar was master, and had the power, but the name of king was odious. The title might secure the establishment of a royal dynasty, whereas after Caesar's death, who only ruled under names which belonged to the Roman constitution, things might return to their old state, as it had happened after Sulla's death. The common sort would not consider whether it was better to retain the name of a republic under a greedy oligarchy or to have a king who should supplant them. In such a case passion and not reason would govern. In the United States of America, where a President for four years or eight, if he is re-elected, exercises through patronage a power greater than that of a constitutional king, it is impossible to conceive that the citizens of any class would ever consent to put in the President's place a king with even the most limited prerogatives.

Rome was full of rumours at this time. It was reported that Caesar would remove his residence to Alexandria in Egypt or to Ilium, the supposed original seat of the progenitors of the Roman people, and would transfer thither the resources of Rome, exhaust Italy of her manhood by the raising of troops, and would entrust the administration of Rome to his friends. It was also reported that the Quindecimviri, for they were still so named, though Caesar had added one more member to the body, had discovered in the restored Sibylline books (vol. iii. p. 2) that the Parthians could only be conquered by a king; and it was said that at the next meeting of the Senate L. Cotta would propose that Caesar should receive the royal title. Cicero in his treatise on Divination (ii. 54) written in B.C. 44, after Caesar's death, says that it was supposed that the interpreters of these holy books would declare in the Senate that he who was really king ought also to be called so, if the Romans would save their State from ruin. Cicero remarks that he who put together the oracular predictions contained in these volumes was a cunning fellow, who by omitting to mention times and names

contrived that anything which happened might be considered as predicted: and he advises the keepers of the sacred books to produce out of them anything rather than a king, "whom henceforth neither gods nor men will tolerate at Rome."

CHAPTER XXXIII.

CAESAR'S DEATH.

B. C. 44.

It is not known when the conspiracy was formed against Caesar's life, but it was probably not long before the 15th of March, the day on which he was murdered; for the number of conspirators was said to be more than sixty or even eighty, and it is not probable that a combination of so many men could have been kept secret, if the execution of the design had been deferred. The conspiracy of the Pazzi at Florence against Lorenzo and Giuliano de' Medici was kept secret a long time, though the conspirators were more than fifty; but this was considered very wonderful, as Machiavelli¹ observes. Cicero affirms (Phil. ii. 11) that the names of all the conspirators against Caesar were well known, and he would rather say that some persons boasted of being in the conspiracy, though they were not, than that any man who was in it wished his name concealed. Most of them were senators, but some were obscure men and others were young men.

Dion (44. c. 1. 2) condemns the assassins, who in his opinion murdered Caesar through envy and hatred of a man who was exalted above themselves, and thus caused the renewal of the Civil Wars: they affected to be the destroyers of a tyrant and

¹ His chapter on conspiracies (*Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio*, iii. capit. 6) is worth reading. It will appear to be a strange essay to those who know nothing of Machiavelli; but it is the work of a wise man and of a practical politician. It shows the great risk of those who form conspiracies, exposes the dangers of such enterprises, and gives good advice to men who would successfully accomplish their object.

the liberators of the people, when in fact they committed a wicked murder and threw into confusion a State which was now comparatively well administered. Dion wrote under the late empire, and we cannot therefore wonder that he expresses his preference of a monarchy to a democracy, though Rome long before Caesar's time was a democracy only in name, and was governed by an oligarchy. But some of Dion's remarks are true; and his conclusion is just, that the extensive dominion of Rome could no longer be wisely administered by a democracy, and that without a good administration there could not be peace and concord. If Marcus Brutus and C. Cassius, he says, had reflected on these things, they would never have killed the head and guardian of the State, nor would they have been the cause of infinite calamities to themselves and others.

Among the chief causes, observes Machiavelli, of men forming conspiracies against a prince is the purpose of delivering their country from usurpation, and this was the motive of Brutus and Cassius conspiring against Caesar. Machiavelli has treated very briefly of Caesar's death, and his view of the matter is very superficial and not true. The Greek historian has formed a more correct judgment; but the false opinion still remains fixed in the minds of the vulgar.

It is agreed that the chief conspirators were C. Cassius, Marcus Brutus, and Decimus Brutus, though Decimus was not one of the first members of the plot. He had served under Caesar as legatus in the Gallic and Civil Wars and been rewarded with the governorship of Gallia Transalpina; and in B.C. 44 he was named governor of Gallia Cisalpina, and designated as consul for B.C. 42. The formers of the conspiracy, whoever they were, wished to gain Decimus, for he had in readiness a number of gladiators, who had been trained for a spectacle, and these fighters might be useful. It would also be a great advantage to secure a man who had the confidence and friendship of Caesar. It was the Dictator's misfortune to be assailed both by those whom he considered his friends and by those whom he attempted to reconcile by his liberality. L. Minucius Basilus, who had served in the Gallic War, was one of the assassins. Perhaps he is the man

named L. Bacilus by Dion,² to whom Caesar refused a governorship, though he was praetor in B.C. 45, and instead of a province gave him a large sum of money. Dion reports that Bacilus was so annoyed that he starved himself to death; but this statement of course is not true, if Basilus or Bacilus was one of the conspirators. There were others in the conspiracy who were supposed to be Caesar's friends. P. Servilius Casca, as Cicero says, became a murderer through love of his country. L. Tillius Cimber had been appointed governor of Bithynia for B.C. 43; but a brother of Cimber was still an exile. C. Trebonius in his tribunate B.C. 55 proposed the enactment about the provinces of Caesar and Pompeius, and afterwards conducted the siege of Massilia. In B.C. 45 Caesar named him for the consulship. In Cicero's judgment Trebonius preferred the liberty of Rome to the friendship of one man, and the overthrow of Caesar's power to sharing it: he was a most excellent citizen and a most moderate man. Servius Sulpicius Galba, a descendant of the Lusitanian butcher (vol. i. p. 20), who was also a great orator and an ancestor of the Emperor Galba, had served under Caesar in the early part of the Gallic war. He attained the office of praetor, but he failed when he was a candidate for the consulship in B.C. 49, and Caesar after he became master was either unwilling to give it to Galba in prospect, or could not, because so many wished for the honour. The conclusion of Galba was that the man should be murdered.

Of the original Pompeian party was M. Brutus, whose hatred of Pompeius, his father's murderer, was forgotten in his zeal for the better cause; and for the same reason he became one of the assassins of the man who had pardoned him and loaded him with favours. He was praetor urbanus in B.C. 44, a high magistrate and a murderer of a higher. He was designated governor of Macedonia for B.C. 43. He was the husband of Porcia, the daughter of his uncle M. Cato, and the brother-in-law of C. Cassius Longinus, who married Junia, a sister of Brutus. The natural disposition of Brutus, says Plutarch (Brutus, c. 1), who has written a very partial life of

² In Appian B. C. ii. 113 the MSS. have *Μινούκιον καὶ Βάσιλλον*, but perhaps *καὶ* ought to be erased.

the liberator, was tempered by discipline and philosophy, and considered to have been most aptly fashioned to virtue. Plutarch has said nothing of his greediness for money, though he might have found evidence of it in Cicero's letters (vol. iv. p. 423). Few persons will affirm that a merciless moneylender and extortioner can be a good man or a philosopher. Perhaps Brutus was a philosophical fanatic, who could reconcile contradictories, like those men whose profession of piety does not secure them against excessive love of money and other vices.

C. Cassius Longinus had done some service to the state by saving a small remnant of Crassus' army (vol. iv. p. 266). After the battle of Pharsalia he surrendered his ships to Caesar as he was crossing the Hellespont. Caesar made Cassius one of his legati, but Cassius did not serve either in the African or the Spanish War (B.C. 45). Dion (44. c. 8) declares that Cassius and some other senators took no part in the extravagant honours which were conferred on Caesar, who however gave Cassius a praetorship for B.C. 44 and appointed him governor of Syria for B.C. 43. We may conclude that Caesar repaid Cassius for some service, and if it was for the surrender of the ships at the Hellespont, he also repaid the traitor by not recording this treachery to the Pompeian party (p. 238). The correspondence of Cassius and Cicero in B.C. 45 (*Ad Fam.* xv. 16—19) shows in what mood both of them were. Cassius was discontented: he wished to have the *Praetura Urbana* and it was given to M. Brutus a younger man who had seen little military service. Cassius hated Caesar, and it is said that Caesar suspected the pale lean Epicurean. Q. Ligarius, the man for whom Cicero made a speech before Caesar (p. 383) and obtained his pardon, also joined the conspirators. There were many others in the plot, some of the Pompeian, and others perhaps of no party, but they were "slight unmeritable" men, not worth remembrance.

There is no direct evidence that Cicero was one of the conspirators, and no evidence that he even knew that there was a conspiracy: but all the circumstances and his intimacy with M. Brutus and Cassius raise a suspicion that he knew or believed that there was such a design; and we have seen that

the thought of Caesar's violent death had crossed his mind. But he was not bold enough to dip his hands in the blood of his "friend Caesar;" and the assassins were too cautious to invite a man to take part in the sacrifice who might have betrayed them, if the plot failed, and would certainly be on their side if it succeeded. When M. Antonius after Caesar's death charged Cicero with being a conspirator, he disclaimed the honour of having been a participator "in this most glorious deed;" if, he said, it was a crime to wish for Caesar's assassination, it was also a crime to have rejoiced over his death; he asked what was the difference between being an accomplice in the act and approving of it, between wishing it to be done and rejoicing when it was done. None at all in the moral judgment of mankind; and let M. Tullius Cicero for all time to come be condemned by his own admission, and by his own statement that he was in the Senate House on the 15th of March and was delighted at the sight of the tyrant's just destruction (Phil. ii. 11, 12; ad Attic. xiv. 14, 4).

The thought of Caesar's assassination may have entered the minds of several of the conspirators about the same time. Plutarch (Antonius, c. 13) reports that in the autumn of B.C. 45 Antonius travelled in company with C. Trebonius as far as Narbo to meet Caesar on his return from Spain, and that Trebonius cautiously tried the disposition of Antonius with respect to a plot against Caesar, but Antonius did not respond to the proposal, nor yet did he inform Caesar. We cannot place any reliance on this story, which may be taken from Cicero's statement (Phil. ii. c. 14) that it was most notorious that Antonius with Trebonius formed a design against Caesar's life when they were together at Narbo. The only foundation for a fact which Cicero names "most notorious" may have been the misunderstanding between Caesar and Antonius about the purchase-money of Pompeius' house, which Antonius had bought and was unwilling to pay for.

Perhaps the first mover in the conspiracy was Cassius, who opened his mind to some of his friends; but they would do nothing unless the virtuous M. Brutus took the lead, for it was thought that the character of such a man would sanctify the deed. It was therefore necessary for Cassius to be recon-

ciled to a patriot who could kill his benefactor for his country's good. Some persons, it is not said who, but Cassius may have known, used to place by night on the tribunal of Brutus, where he sat when he held his court, writings to this purport, "You are asleep, Brutus," and "You are not Brutus," and others to a like effect; and Cassius, it is said, who saw that Brutus' ambition was stirred by these words pricked him on. If Plutarch's anecdotes were evidence, we might conclude that Cassius knew the man well, and saw that his vanity could be turned to use, for he told Brutus, that it was not the weavers and tavern-keepers who had written on his tribunal, but the first and best in Rome. If we can trust our authorities, M. Brutus was a foolish vain man, not a man who would gain Cassius over, as Dion states (44. c. 14), but a man who might be led by others. He knew that his mother Servilia, once one of Caesar's women, and still a favourite, had received magnificent presents from him, and after the Civil Wars had bought forfeited estates at a low price, which made people wonder, but Cicero in a joke explained the matter.³ A man is not answerable for his mother's vices, but when he has the same greediness of money, we think that it is a family failing, and we do not expect him to trouble himself about the honour of a mother or even a sister.

It is hardly necessary to suggest the real motives of the conspirators. A single man, or two or even three of the common sort may form the design of killing a tyrant who is generally hated; but a conspiracy of a great number against a successful soldier and a generous ruler is the work of a different set of men. It is the work of those who are nearer to the ruler, who envy him and fear for their own interests, and have the opportunity of accomplishing their design. The title of king would not add to the conspirators' hatred of Caesar: he had the power and that was enough for them. Caesar was not the head of a party now: he was the head of the State, and he wished and was resolved to destroy both factions by reconciling them. But the dullest of the nobles.

³ The joke is in Suetonius, Caesar, c. 50, and in Macrobius, Sat. ii. 2. To a Roman the joke was intelligible and not bad; but it contained an imputation both on Servilia and one of her daughters, named Tertia.

could see that their interests would perish, and the Roman State would no longer be administered for the benefit of a few families, who enriched themselves by the spoil of the provinces and spent their ill-gotten wealth in the luxury and licence of Rome. The conspirators had no plan for the future: they seem to have thought that if Caesar was removed, things would settle down to their former state, the rival factions would renew their contests, and if a quarrel should arise, which they must have thought of as a possibility, the sword would again decide the matter, one or the other party would be victorious, and proscription and exile would fall on the vanquished. They did not reflect that the vulgar, even if they disliked Caesar, which is not certain, could not despise him, and that after his death they might turn against the mean men who had destroyed the greatest and noblest of the sons of Rome. They did not see also, or they did not believe, that an avenger might arise after Caesar's death; and so they neglected one of the most necessary precautions in a conspiracy, to remove out of the way all those who from interest or affection might support the cause of the murdered man. The youth C. Octavius, who was residing at Apollonia, might not enter into their thoughts: he was too young, and too little known to excite their fears. It is said indeed that the conspirators at first intended to kill Antonius and Lepidus also, but they were dissuaded by M. Brutus, who said that if they killed others besides Caesar the people might think that they were not moved by a love of freedom, but by the desire of power. One man at least was wise after the event: Cicero (Phil. ii. c. 14) has left on record his testimony, that if he had been in the conspiracy, he would have removed not only the king, but the kingly power from the State: and if his sword had been employed, he would have made not one act only in the tragedy, but would have played it out complete. He said the same to C. Trebonius (Ad Fam. x. 28). We can believe that his thoughts were bloody, his revenge insatiable, and his temper now most cruel; but we cannot believe that the bragging coward would have dared to draw his treacherous sword on the man whom he hated and feared, while he named him friend. What was the Dictator doing while his friends

and enemies were plotting against him? As far as we know, he was tranquil and even careless. He had no precautions, for he had no fear; and perhaps even death was indifferent to him. The evidence of Suetonius (Caesar, c. 86) may be accepted as proof of what was said and believed, without being taken as proof of the truth. Some of Caesar's friends suspected that he did not wish to live long nor cared about it, for his health was not good; and accordingly he did not trouble himself about omens, and paid no attention to the reports brought him by friends. It is very natural that a man who had lived so active a life and had acquired the great objects of his ambition, should set little value on it, when he found that old age was prematurely coming, and that his energy was impaired. Nor is such a feeling inconsistent with still entertaining great projects, as it is said that Caesar did, for his mind was ever active and restless. Some persons thought that he trusted so much to that famous last resolution of the Senate and to their oath, that he discharged the Spanish guard which formerly accompanied him. The allusion is to the resolution of the Senate by which all human and divine honours had been conferred on Caesar, and to the oath by which all the senators had bound themselves to secure his safety. Others again said that Caesar declared that it was better to endure all that treachery could do than to be continually on the watch against his enemies. He used to say that his life was of more value to his country than to himself, that he had long since acquired power and glory enough, that if he died, the State would not be tranquil and would again fall into worse civil wars. When we read the opinions and thoughts attributed to the Dictator, perhaps we know as much as any of his contemporaries knew. It was universally agreed that he died a death almost such as he desired. On the day before the 15th of March he went to sup with Lepidus and took with him his dear friend Decimus Brutus. Over their wine the question of the best kind of death was discussed: some were of one opinion, and others had other opinions; but Caesar said that the quickest death was the best.⁴ He could not be ignorant that he had

⁴ Appian, B. C. ii. 115. The same story is told in a somewhat different way in Plutarch's *Life of Caesar*, c. 63.

few true friends. He knew that Cicero hated him, for he had said so (*Ad Attic.* xiv. 1); and he might, as a man of sense and great perspicacity, believe that even M. Antonius and others of his party only adhered to him for their own interest. He must have known that enemies are never reconciled by favours, and that malignant tempers only become more malignant the more they receive. He must have also known that love is never bought by gold; that political partisans, who hang about a superior for what they can get are never faithful friends, whether they attach themselves to a prince or under any form of government make a show of serving him who for the time holds the power. If men in high places wish for a true friend, they must find him, if anywhere, among those who neither expect nor want anything from them. One such friend at least Caesar found in Matius, an obscure man and almost unknown to fame except by a letter preserved in Cicero's correspondence (*Ad Fam.* xi. 28) and addressed to Cicero after Caesar's death.⁵ Matius loved Caesar while he was living, he cherished his memory when he was dead, and expressed his detestation of the murderers. This honest, sensible, well written letter, worthy of a Roman of the best days, is addressed to an old friend, who was on intimate terms with the leaders of the conspiracy, and gloried in the murder after it was done. The letter has been saved by Tiro or another, and it shows that Rome contained one good man. Cicero's anticipation that posterity would approve of the murder has not been verified; for few men have justified the deed, and some have condemned it as an act of the basest treachery and unequalled folly.⁶

⁵ This letter of Matius is written in answer to a letter of Cicero (*Ad Fam.* xi. 27), from which it seems that their intimacy had been somewhat interrupted after Caesar's death. In a letter to Atticus (xv. 2) Cicero says that he was not pleased with Matius and Postumius being named as managers of the games celebrated after Caesar's death, which games Caesar had vowed after the victory of Pharsalia. There is another letter of much earlier date (*Ad Att.* ix. 15), a joint letter of Matius and Trebatius, which shows the intimacy of Matius and Cicero at a critical time.

⁶ Montesquieu (*Grandeur*, etc. c. xi.) in a manner justifies the murder. He admits that the conspirators had no plan except to kill Caesar, and no plan in respect to the events which might follow; but this is their great condemnation.

It was time for the conspirators to act. They might be betrayed; Caesar would soon leave Rome for the Parthian war, and they would lose the opportunity. They deliberated about the place for the murder, whether it should be in the Campus Martius during some voting, or in the Sacra Via where Caesar resided, or at the entrance of the theatre; but when notice was given that the Senate would meet on the Ides of March in the Curia of Pompeius, they chose this place. It was in the Campus Martius, an exhedra or hall in the Porticus of Pompeius, which adjoined his theatre, and it contained a statue of Pompeius. The reason for selecting this place is explained by Dion (44. c. 16). Caesar would have no suspicion that he would be attacked there, and he would be the more easily surprised: they could conceal daggers in the cases in which the Romans used to carry their sharp-pointed metal writing-styles, and the senators, who were not in the conspiracy, being unarmed would not be able to defend Caesar; and if any of them should venture to protect him, there were the gladiators of Decimus Brutus close by in the theatre of Pompeius. Caesar could not expect to be attacked among a body of senators, the greater part of whom he had named himself, before the eyes of many centurions who had served under him, and attacked by the noblest citizens, part of whom had received the greatest favours at his hands (Cicero, *de Divin.* ii. 9).

There were always signs at Rome when great things were going to happen, or they were imagined by superstitious fears, or devised after the events. The sacred shields of Mars, the Ancilia, which were kept in Caesar's house, for he was Pontifex Maximus, rattled loud in the night. As Caesar was sleeping as usual with his wife Calpurnia, the doors and windows of the house flew open, and Caesar, startled by the noise and the brightness of the moon, observed that Calpurnia

Cicero himself condemns the murderers on these grounds: "I confess that the conspirators, if they are not the liberators of the Roman people and the saviours of the common weal, are more than assassins, more than murderers, more than parricides, if it is a more atrocious act to kill the father of the country than a man's own father" (*Phil.* ii. 13). Caesar had received the title of Father of the country (*Patriae parens*, p. 416).

in her deep slumber was uttering indistinct words and groans ; for she was dreaming that she held in her arms her murdered husband and was weeping over him. Livy, quoted by Plutarch, says that she dreamed that the acroterium, which had been added to the house, tumbled down (p. 418). When day came, Calpurnia entreated Caesar to put off the meeting of the Senate, and if he had no regard to her dream, to consult the victims. Caesar knew his wife to be free from womanish superstitions, and he saw that she was much disturbed. Many victims were sacrificed, and as the seers reported the omens to be unfavourable, Caesar resolved to send Antonius to dismiss the Senate. His health also was impaired at this time, and his physicians were uneasy about the fits of giddiness which often seized him, and from one of which he had just suffered.⁷

The murderers, who were anxiously waiting at the Curia, sent Decimus Brutus to inquire into the cause of the delay and to urge Caesar to come. Decimus ridiculed the seers and chided his friend for giving to the Senate cause for blame : it would be an insult to the Senate not to come when they had met at his command and were ready to decree that he should have the title of king of the provinces, though not of Italy ; and what would not be said, if they should be told to be gone and to come again when Calpurnia should have better dreams ? If he should still think that the day was inauspicious, it would be better to go to the Curia himself and adjourn the meeting. With these words he took Caesar by the hand and led him towards the door. It was now near noon, when the Dictator stepped into a litter, and was carried through the crowded streets of Rome to the entrance of the Curia.⁸

There is a story, which is always repeated, that an augur named Spurinna had warned Caesar to beware of the Ides of March, and that as Caesar was going to the Senate, he saw and jeered the man saying, " Well, the Ides of March are come," and Spurinna replied, " Yes, but they are not yet over." If Caesar was carried to the Senate in a litter, as Plutarch and Appian state, it is probable that the curtains

⁷ Nicolaus, p. 39 ; and compare p. 359 of this volume, and Plutarch, Caesar, c. 60.

⁸ Compare the narrative of Nicolaus, p. 39, &c.

were drawn, and even if he walked, which is not probable and contrary to the evidence, we cannot readily believe that the short dialogue was held amidst a crowd of people. The story about Artemidorus, a Cnidian Greek, and a friend of Caesar, is more probable. He brought a small roll which contained information which he wished to communicate; but as he observed that Caesar gave each roll as he received it to the attendants about him, he came very near and said "This you alone should read, Caesar, and read it soon, for it is about weighty matters which concern you." Caesar took the roll, but was prevented from reading it by the throng, though he attempted to read it, and he entered the Curia with the roll in his hand. Here also there is the same difficulty about any person approaching Caesar, if he was in a litter, unless we suppose that Artemidorus was near him, when he entered the litter or when he stepped out. Some said that it was another person who gave the roll, and not Artemidorus, who was prevented by the crowd from approaching. Another report was that Artemidorus hastened into the Senate House and found Caesar already dead. The most trivial circumstances about such an event as Caesar's death are generally recorded; but we know that stories always differ in some respects, that all the truth about facts can hardly ever be ascertained, and yet we wish to hear even what we may not believe.*

While the unsuspecting victim was led to death by his false friend, the conspirators endured the anguish of uncertainty and fear. A man came up to one of the Cascae and taking his hand said, "You have concealed the secret from us, but Brutus has told me all." Casca was startled, but the man smiled and continued, "How have you grown so rich all at once as to become a candidate for the aedileship?" A senator, named Popilius Laenas, saluted Brutus and Cassius, and whispered, "You have my wishes for success in your design, and I urge you not to tarry, for the matter is no secret." He then withdrew leaving the men in great perplexity, for they thought that their design was betrayed. As soon as Caesar stepped out of the litter, Laenas hurried up to him and talked

* Compare the narratives in Plutarch's *Caesar* and *Brutus*, and that of Appian.

with him some time as he was standing. The conspirators now felt certain that the conversation was about the plot; and either according to previous agreement or from one common impulse they were making ready to die by their own hands before they were seized. But Brutus observed in the attitude of Laenas the earnestness of a man who was asking a favour, and Laenas withdrew after kissing Caesar's right hand, by which it manifestly appeared that he had been speaking about his own affairs.

It seems probable that the conspirators had come to the door of the chamber to meet Caesar and to accompany him within; but C. Trebonius stayed behind and entered into conversation with the consul Antonius for the purpose of detaining him some time. Though the conspirators were so many, they feared Antonius, who was young, strong, and a man of well-known courage. As soon as Caesar took his seat, the conspirators came round him, and Tillius Cimber advanced to pray for the pardon of his exiled brother, while the rest joined their entreaties, laid hold of Caesar's hands and kissed his head and breast. As Caesar resisted their importunity and suddenly attempted to rise, Cimber with both hands pulled Caesar's garment down from the shoulders, and one of the Cascae who had placed himself behind the chair stabbed him in the neck. Turning round Caesar seized the dagger and held it fast. "What are you doing, villain?" he cried, and the villain called out to his brother for help. The first blow was struck, and the whole pack fell upon their noble victim: wherever he turned, he met only bare daggers and was driven about like a wild beast caught by his enemies, some of whom in their terror wounded one another. Cassius stabbed him in the face and M. Brutus in the groin. He made no more resistance, but wrapped his gown over his head and the lower part of his body, and fell mortally wounded at the base of Pompeius' statue, which was drenched with blood.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

THE FUNERAL.

B.C. 44.

WHEN the Dictator¹ was weltering in his blood, disfigured by more than twenty wounds, M. Brutus attempted to address the Senate. But the senators fled with horror from the ghastly spectacle, and ran out of the Curia bewildered with fear. The alarm quickly spread through the city. Houses were shut, shops were closed, every man thought only of protecting himself, for nobody knew what was going to happen, and yet there was no sign of an enemy. The consul Antonius fled to his house and prepared to defend himself. The murderers, leaving behind them the Dictator's body, which they intended to throw into the Tiber, issued from the Curia with their bloody daggers, one of them bearing on a spear the pileum or cap, the symbol of freedom.² They called the people to liberty, but the people were too much frightened to listen; and the conspirators, who had expected a different result, retired to the Capitol with the gladiators of Decimus Brutus, who were waiting in the theatre of Pompeius near the Curia. They were afraid of Caesar's veterans, many of whom were in the city, of M. Lepidus, the master of the

¹ The authorities for the events between Caesar's death and his funeral are Cicero, *Dion Cassius* (44. cc. 20—51), *Appian* (B.C. ii. 118—149), and *Suetonius* (Caesar, 82—85). Cicero's evidence enables us to fix the order of the events with some certainty. The narrative of Appian is very complete and certainly founded on contemporary evidence.

² There is a medal with the name BRVT IMP on one side and EID. MAR on the other with a cap of liberty and a dagger on each side of the cap. *Agostini*, *Dialoghi*, p. 11. See note at the end of this chapter.

horse, who had a large force under his command, and of Antonius the consul, when he should have discovered how few they were.

The murder had been done so quick that the friends of Caesar could not assist him; and indeed all the senators were unarmed except those who were privy to the conspiracy. Two friends,⁸ it is said, did make some attempt to protect the Dictator, and remained by him when he fell, but they fled before the assassins. When the Curia was deserted, three slaves put the body in a litter and carried it home through the Forum. Caesar's arms were hanging outside, and the curtains being drawn, just as they would be when he stepped out of the litter, the bloody gashes in the face were seen. The people who were on the roofs of houses, at the vestibules, and in the crowded streets, looked on the piteous sight with groans and tears. When the litter approached Caesar's house, Calpurnia rushed out with all her women and slaves, and passionately calling her husband by name lamented her fruitless efforts to keep him at home that day.

On the evening of the Ides of March, the murderers were joined in the Capitol by some men of little note, whom the conspirators themselves did not value, though these men wished to be considered as their associates and to share in the honour and profit which they anticipated as the reward of the crime. Cicero came too, and he showed more prudence and foresight than any of the party. He states in his second Philippic (c. 12) that Antonius charged him with being one of the conspirators, and alleged as proof of the charge that when Caesar fell, Brutus raised his bloody dagger and calling on Cicero congratulated him on the restoration of liberty. Cicero does not deny the fact: indeed he admits it, but he dexterously explains the words as meaning that Brutus intended to say that he had done a service to his country as great as Cicero had done in his consulship. In the deliberation on the Capitol Cicero advised that the Senate should be summoned thither by the Praetors, and he said afterwards (*Ad Att.* xiv. 10), what great things might have been done at a moment

⁸ Nicolaus Damascenus, p. 47. The physician Antistius reported that only one of the numerous wounds on the body was fatal, a wound in the chest.

when all good men were rejoicing, even those who hardly deserved the name, and the robbers, as he named the partisans of Caesar, were struck with terror. But Brutus, we may conclude, opposed this assumption of authority by the Praetors. He had originally opposed the proposal to kill Antonius, and he had now some hopes that the surviving consul, after his colleague was removed, might join them in restoring liberty to the State. The liberators wished Cicero to go to Antonius and urge him to defend the Commonwealth, but Cicero said that Antonius would promise anything as long as he was afraid, and that as soon as he ceased to fear, he would be what he always had been.⁴ While other men of consular rank were going with a message to Antonius and returning, Cicero persisted in his resolution: he did not see Antonius either on the 15th or the 16th of March: he did not believe that any agreement could be made on any terms between upright citizens and a man who was their worst enemy. On the 17th of March Cicero came to the Senate house (Phil. ii. c. 35).

While Brutus and the conspirators spent the night of the 15th of March on the Capitol, Antonius was more profitably employed. Caesar's widow Calpurnia entrusted to him the money which was in the house, a large sum, and she also delivered to him all the Dictator's writings and memoranda, which Antonius employed, it is said, to further his own views. Caesar had placed an immense sum of public money in the temple of Ops, which Antonius is charged (Phil. xii. 5) by Cicero with removing; and if he did carry it off or part of it, we must suppose that he employed it in bribery. Cicero (Phil. ii. c. 37) suggested that he paid his debts with part of it before the 1st of April; but Antonius would be in no hurry about satisfying his creditors so soon, unless it was his interest to do so. This affair of the money in the temple of Ops is very obscure.

⁴ Cicero says that he said this on the 16th. After that day in an answer to a letter of Antonius, Cicero tells Antonius that he had always loved him. The two letters are preserved (Ad Att. xiv. 13), and are very amusing. No modern diplomatists ever managed a correspondence with more tact and more insincerity than these two hypocrites.

M. Lepidus, the master of the horse, brought his troops into Rome probably on the night of the 15th. Dion supposes that Lepidus had the design of seizing the supreme power; but we know that he was hardly capable of such a bold attempt, and certainly not capable of executing it. Whatever he intended, Antonius soon gained him over, and Lepidus and the consul acted together. On the morning of the 16th the men in the Capitol thought it time to discover the feelings of the people, and they sent hired men into the Forum to address the common sort, and the veterans, who were still in Rome, lodging within the precincts of the temples, and waiting to go in a body to take possession of lands which had been assigned to them. These hirelings recommended peace, the restoration of order, and as a first step towards it, an amnesty of all that had passed. The Praetor Cinna, who was present, and by marriage connected with Caesar, threw off his praetorian dress as if he spurned what the tyrant had given him, abused Caesar and praised his murderers: he said that the men should be invited down from the Capitol and treated with honour. But the hirelings saw that the decent part of the meeting were silent, and nothing was done.

Dolabella now appeared on the stage; perhaps he had been hiding. Caesar had named him as consul for the remainder of the year after he should have set out for the Parthian war; and this dissolute young fellow now put on the ensigns of consular dignity and, it is said, had the impudence to abuse his benefactor and to declare that he was privy to the conspiracy and only prevented by an accident from sharing in the murder. Dolabella seems to have reckoned that the party of the assassins might ultimately prevail, and as Antonius was his enemy and did not wish to have him as a colleague, he may have thought it the best way of securing the consulship to join the party of Brutus and Cassius. Dolabella went up to the men on the Capitol, and again came down with M. Brutus and Cassius alone, as Appian says. Brutus and Cassius addressed the people, or perhaps Brutus only. He made no apology for Caesar's murder: he even gloried in the deed, and exhorted the people to behave like their ancestors who had expelled the kings. If he recommended, as Appian

reports, that Sextus Pompeius, the surviving son of his father, should be recalled, he made a mistake, for Antonius who had the property of Pompeius, would look on such a proposal as a declaration of war. We know little about the meeting, but the result was that the conspirators returned to their stronghold on the Capitol.

The friends and kinsmen of the conspirators now ventured to visit them on the Capitol, and commissioners were selected to negotiate with Antonius and Lepidus about the restoration of concord. The commissioners did not defend the murder of Caesar: they said that the conspirators had not killed him through personal enmity, but for their country's good, and they prayed that Rome, which had suffered so much from the civil war, might be saved from further calamities. Antonius answered that they would deliberate in the Senate about the state of affairs, and that he and his friends would accept the decision of the senators. The conspirators were satisfied with the answer, for they relied on having the support of the Senate.

Antonius fixed the meeting for the next day, the 17th of March. The magistrates were instructed to keep watch during the night, and to occupy their several tribunals just as in the day. Fires were lighted all through the city. The kinsmen of the murderers went round to visit the houses of the senators and to entreat their votes in favour of the conspirators and of the Commonwealth. On the other side, the leaders of the veterans were abroad uttering threats, if the soldiers should be deprived of the lands which had already been granted and if those which had been promised should be refused. The better part of the citizens had recovered from their fear when they discovered how few the conspirators were: they began to think of Caesar and all that he had done, but they were divided in opinion.

Early on the 17th of March, the anniversary of the battle of Munda, the Senate assembled in the temple of Tellus, which was close to the house of Antonius, who now occupied the residence of Cn. Pompeius. The consul named this place in preference to one nearer to the Capitol, because he was afraid of the gladiators who were with the conspirators,

and he wished to avoid disturbing the city by bringing in soldiers. However Lepidus introduced soldiers into Rome, as Appian states; but he had probably done this the day before. The praetor Cornelius Cinna showed himself early in his praetorian dress, which he had thrown off the day before. Some of the citizens, who had not been bribed by the conspirators, and some of Caesar's veterans pelted Cinna with stones for his behaviour on the previous day, and they would have burnt him and the house in which he took refuge, if Lepidus and his men had not saved him. Cicero came, unwillingly as he says (*Phil. ii. c. 35*), because all the approaches to the temple were occupied by soldiers. Dolabella was present with the insignia of consul, and Antonius made no opposition, though he had raised objections to the election of Dolabella in Caesar's lifetime. Most of the senators were favourable to the conspirators, and demanded that they should be invited to the meeting on the promise of security, to which Antonius made no objection, for he knew that they would not come; and they did not come. Some of the senators proposed that the murderers should be thanked for what they had done, and Tiberius Nero, who had served under Caesar in the Alexandrine war (*p. 265*) even proposed that they should be rewarded. Others thought that it would be enough to give them immunity in the matter of the murder. The members who were most impartial, though they thought that a great crime had been committed, were ready to excuse the murderers out of respect to the powerful families to which they belonged, but they would not consent to their being honoured as benefactors to the State. Antonius observing this difference of opinion dexterously used the opportunity. Many of the senators had been appointed to offices by Caesar for several years to come, in anticipation of his long absence during the Parthian war; and Antonius said that those who demanded that a vote should be taken about Caesar, must remember that, if they had made him their ruler and head, all that he had done must be ratified; but if they should resolve that he was a usurper, his body would be cast into the Tiber, and all his acts annulled; and these acts extended to the whole empire, and many of them could not be revoked. He reminded

the Senate that most of them had held offices under Caesar, or were still holding them, and some of them had been appointed to offices by anticipation. The first question then to settle would be for them to declare whether they would divest themselves of their offices present and future; and when this was done, he would propose the remaining matters for their decision.

The argument was unanswerable, and the senators were driven to think of their own interests before they could come to any resolution about Caesar. All declared that they would not submit themselves to another election and put themselves in the power of the people: they would keep what they had got. Some of them knew that they could not be elected, and the consul Dolabella was one of them. He was only twenty-five years old, and therefore he was not eligible. The shameless fellow now retracted what he had said the day before about his participation in the conspiracy, and abused those who were ready to deprive the magistrates of their offices in order to justify the conspirators. Others advised Dolabella and those who were in the same condition, to trust to the popular election, which would be only a form, but a legal form, and it would be honourable for them to be elected by their fellow-citizens, as they had been appointed by one who held the supreme power. Some of the praetors professed their readiness to divest themselves of their offices and to receive them again in legal form; but it was only a trick or suspected to be such, and the other magistrates refused to follow their example.

While things were in this state, Antonius and Lepidus were summoned from the house by a crowd which had collected. As soon as the consuls appeared, a man called out, "Take care that you have not Caesar's fate," to which Antonius replied by opening part of his dress and showing that he was armed. Appian does not determine whether the man merely expressed his own thoughts or had been hired to utter these words. Some of the people called out for vengeance on the murderers; but the majority asked for peace and quiet, and Antonius first directed his answer to them. He said that his object was to secure a lasting peace, but it was not easy to do it, for oaths

had not protected even Caesar. He commended those who called for vengeance and said that he would have been the first to do the same, if he had not been consul; but it was his duty as consul to look after what was best under the circumstances rather than to consider what was just; and this, he said, was the opinion of the Senate; and yet it had been the ruin of Caesar, who for the interest of the State spared the citizens whom he had defeated, and then died by their hands.

The meeting were not satisfied with Antonius, and they called on Lepidus to avenge Caesar. Lepidus mounted the Rostra, and wept for some time. At last he recovered sufficiently to say, "On this place I lately stood with Caesar, and now on the same spot I am compelled to ask what you wish to be done with respect to his death." "Avenge Caesar," was the answer of some: "Peace for the city" was the cry of the opposite party. To those who called for peace he said "We wish for peace; but what peace? and what oath can secure it? We swore by every oath that we have to protect Caesar, and we have trampled on the oaths, we who are named the noblest of those who swore." To those who called for vengeance he said, "Caesar is dead, a sacred and an honoured man, but we are unwilling to cause any harm to the State, and the Senate are deliberating on this subject." The people cried, "Take the matter in hand yourself." Lepidus answered, "I wish to do so, and it would be consistent with my oath; but it is not fit that you and I alone should attempt this, nor should we place ourselves in opposition to all the rest." While Lepidus was playing this part, those who were hired to manage matters, knowing that he was ambitious, proposed to elect him Pontifex Maximus in place of Caesar; and he was in fact afterwards elected, but in an irregular manner by the Pontifices, and by the influence of M. Antonius (Dion, 44. c. 53). Lepidus replied, "Think of me hereafter in this matter, if you shall judge me worthy of the office." The hirelings now the more pressed him to secure peace, and he replied: "This is contrary to the oaths that have been taken and contrary to law; but still I will do what you wish." He then returned to the Senate house where Dolabella was still talking about his consulship, and Antonius was waiting to address the Senate.

Antonius began by observing that he had said nothing when they were debating about the conspirators, but when they came to speak of Caesar, he had proposed one thing for consideration which had raised a great discussion, the question of resigning the offices which they held; which indeed would be a kind of confession that they were not worthy of them. If Caesar's acts should be rescinded, he reminded them again that it would be beyond their power to enforce such a resolution, for Caesar's acts extended to all parts of the Roman empire. But they could not do this even in Italy, where the soldiers who had received the rewards of victory were still under arms, in the very ranks in which they fought under Caesar, and many thousands of them in the city; and what might not be expected if they should attempt to take from these men the lands and the towns which had been granted to them or they were expecting to receive? As to dragging Caesar's dead body through the streets and leaving it unburied, how could they expect that Caesar's veterans would tolerate such treatment of the great soldier who had extended the empire to the shores of the Ocean; and how could they at the same time reward the men who had murdered a Roman consul in a consecrated place? He concluded by proposing that Caesar's acts should be maintained, and that the murderers should be simply pardoned.

L. Munatius Plancus supported the proposal, and Cicero also in a speech to which he alludes (Phil. i. 1). Cicero followed the example of the Athenians, as he said, and recommended an amnesty (*ἀμνηστία*), a Greek word which he used on this occasion. Cicero's speech on the amnesty is not preserved, but Dion (44. c. 23—33) has written one for him. A *senatus consultum* was accordingly made to the effect, That there should be no inquiry into Caesar's murder, and that all that he had done or resolved on doing should be confirmed, since it was for the interest of the State. The friends of the conspirators urged the addition of the last words, which might be understood to mean that the acts of Caesar were not maintained so much because they were just as because it was better for the State that they should be maintained. The veterans by their leaders demanded another *Senatus consultum* to

secure to them their grants of lands; and this was done also. Another still was made to the same effect in favour of those who were already settled on their grants. Antonius had gained his end. Caesar's acts were confirmed, and Antonius, who possessed the Dictator's books and papers was now the master.

After the Senate broke up, some persons entreated L. Piso not to produce Caesar's will nor to make a public funeral for the Dictator. Appian states that the will was deposited with Piso, Caesar's father-in-law, whereas it was deposited with one of the Vestal Virgins, and no reason can be given why it should have been delivered to Piso. However, Appian's story is that Piso asked the consuls to call the Senate together, for the senators had not yet dispersed; and he then complained that some persons were trying to prevent the burial of the Pontifex Maximus, and the production of his will, and wished to confiscate his property as if he were a tyrant. The Senate, he said, must decide about the funeral; but he would take care of the will. The senators expressed indignation at the attempt which Piso complained of, and those particularly who expected a legacy from Caesar. The Senate declared that the will should be produced and that Caesar should have a public funeral. Whether the Senate made such a resolution or not, is a matter of no importance. The will was produced and Caesar had a public funeral, the very thing, which, as Atticus had said, would ruin the cause of the conspirators (Cic. ad Att. xiv. 10).

On this same day the conspirators invited the people to the Capitol, and Brutus made to them a speech, which was a defence of his party. Appian (ii. 137 &c.) has reported this speech, and perhaps truly, for it was published. Brutus said that they had submitted to Caesar, after the final overthrow of the party of Pompeius, and had sworn to abide by all that he had so far done; but they did not swear to be his slaves for the future. If Caesar had done nothing further to establish the slavery of Rome, then, he admitted that they were perjured men. But Caesar had usurped all the power in the State, and had even anticipated for five years (so Appian states) all the Comitia in view of leaving Rome for the Par-

thian war, and thus all hope of liberty was taken from them. He spoke of the illegal deposition of the tribunes Caesetius and Marullus, of Caesar's appropriation of the public money, and his plunder of the reserved money in the Roman treasury before the first Spanish war (p. 43). He said that the conspirators might have safely enjoyed their honours under Caesar, but they preferred the liberty of their country. Their enemies were now spreading false reports about the intentions of the liberators with respect to Caesar's grants of lands to the veterans, and for the purpose of irritating the soldiers against them. If any of these veterans were present, he asked them to signify the fact; and many who were present did so. Brutus then said that they had done well in coming to the meeting: the State had given them to Caesar to lead against the Gauls and Britons, and they were worthy of reward for these services; but Caesar had led them unwillingly against Rome and also against the noblest of Rome's citizens in Africa; and if this had been their only service, they would be ashamed to seek a reward for it. But their other services merited reward, and they ought to have such rewards as were given in old times to victorious soldiers, who were settled on lands without any wrong being done to Roman citizens. But Sulla and Caesar did not disband their men severally to their homes and purchase for them lands or distribute lands which were confiscated, nor indemnify those who were turned out of their property, but they robbed the Italians of their estates and houses to give them to the soldiers, whom they planted together in great numbers and under a military system in order that they might support these usurpers in their wrongful power. Brutus promised that the soldiers should be secured in their grants, and that those who were turned out of their property should be indemnified as soon as possible out of the public treasury.

Brutus sent a copy of his speech to Cicero, and asked him to correct it before it was published. Cicero says that it was excellent both in the matter and the expression, but that if he had been the speaker, he should have written with more warmth. He did not correct it (*Ad Attic.* xv. 1, B—4) and Atticus suggested that Cicero should write another oration on

the matter under the name of Brutus, but Cicero replied that he hardly understood what Atticus meant by such a suggestion, and he did not follow it.

On this day, the 17th, there was a meeting of the people: the resolutions of the Senate were read, and Cicero loudly recommended the amnesty which he had promoted. The people had been pleased with the speech of Brutus. They were now satisfied that the liberators were honest men, who meant well to the State, and they invited them to come down from the Capitol. The liberators asked for hostages, and Antonius and Lepidus each gave a son as a hostage. When the men appeared, the people called out that they must all be reconciled, and then there were, says Plutarch, "salutations and pressings of hands." Antonius gave a dinner to Cassius, and Lepidus entertained Brutus; or Brutus entertained Lepidus, for Plutarch tells the story both ways. The rest were entertained by others. All disputes seemed to be settled and peace to be secured.

On the 18th the liberators appeared in the Senate for the first time since the 15th of March. Caesar's acts had been already confirmed, and now the arrangements about the provinces were confirmed also, for the liberators could not consider themselves safe unless they secured the provinces which had been designed for them; and thus without receiving any direct reward for their glorious deed, they received a substantial acknowledgment by retaining what had been given to them by the man whom they had murdered.

It does not appear on what day Caesar's funeral took place. Antonius demanded that Caesar's will should be read, and that the body should be carried forth with due honours. Cassius strongly opposed it, but Brutus gave way. Caesar had appointed three grandsons of his sisters his testamentary successors (*heredes*). The will was opened and read in the house of Antonius. To C. Octavius, the son of Atia, a daughter of Caesar's younger sister Julia, three-fourths of the succession were given by the will; and the remainder to Q. Pedius and L. Pinarius, the grandchildren of his elder sister Julia. Octavius was adopted by the will and from this time his name was C. Julius Caesar Octavianus, to which was afterwards

added the name of Augustus. Dion (44. c. 35) states that M. Antonius and Decimus Brutus were appointed the tutors (tutores) of Octavius; but this is a mistake, for the young man was then eighteen years of age, and according to the Roman law he required no tutor. Conformably to the practice at Rome, Caesar's will provided for the possible case of those named as successors failing from any cause to take the succession; and others were substituted, second successors (secundi heredes) as the Romans named them. Among these second successors were Decimus Brutus, the man who led Caesar to his death, and M. Antonius. Caesar gave legacies, which would be payable from the estate and diminish the amount of that which came to the successors. He gave to the people for their use his gardens beyond the Tiber, and seventy-five denarii to every Roman citizen in Rome.⁵

Public notice was given that the body of Caesar would be burnt in the Campus Martius, and a funeral pile was erected there near the mound of his daughter Julia. Every person who wished to make any offering was permitted to carry it there by any road that he chose, for the number of those who desired to show their affection was so great that the day would not have been long enough, it was supposed, if the people went in regular procession. But it was the fashion to pronounce the funeral oration in the Forum. On this occasion there was placed before the Rostra on a scaffolding a small gilded temple after the model of the temple of Venus Genetrix: within the temple was an ivory couch with purple and gold embroidered coverlids to receive the body, and at the head of the bed there was a trophy and the robe in which Caesar had been murdered. The Dictator's father-in-law L. Piso, conducted the funeral procession. The body was carried by magistrates of the present and previous years. An immense concourse of armed men accompanied the procession, and with loud cries and pomp the body of the Dictator was placed on the bed prepared for it. There were groans and lamenta-

⁵ In the Monumentum Ancyranum (Tabula Tertia a laeva) Augustus states that he paid to every Roman citizen 300 sestertii (75 denarii) according to Caesar's will. Dion (44. c. 35) states the amount to be 120 sestertii (30 denarii) according to the evidence of Augustus himself. See the note of Reimarus.

tion; there were the clash and the clatter of arms, and the amnesty was nearly forgotten. The consul Antonius seized the favourable opportunity to deliver the funeral oration.

He said that it was not fit that the acts of so great⁶ a man should be commemorated by himself, a single person, and he would therefore recite the honours which the country had conferred on Caesar. With a solemn and sad countenance he then read the list of these great distinctions; and he laid particular emphasis on that part of the decrees which declared his person to be sacred and inviolate, and gave him the title of father of the country. As he read, he turned to Caesar's body and contrasted the words and the deeds. "Father of the country," he said, "and here is the evidence to his clemency." "Sacred and inviolate, and a protection to all who sought safety from him; here he lies murdered, the inviolate and the sacred; he who did not tyrannically wrest from us these glorious names, who did not even ask for them; and most shameful to us, if we conferred them on one who neither deserved them nor wished for them. But you, faithful citizens, clear us of this charge by this noble testimony to the dead and your presence at his funeral."

He then read the oath which had been taken by the Senate to protect Caesar, and the curse denounced against those who should not defend him against conspirators. Here he raised his voice and stretching out his hands to the Capitol he said, "Jupiter, guardian of Rome, and ye gods, I am ready to avenge him as I swore to do: but as the Senate think that the recent decree of an amnesty is for the interest of the State, I pray you to bear with it." A murmur of dissatisfaction came from the Senators at these words which were plainly directed against them; and Antonius attempted to pacify them by giving a new turn to his speech. "Citizens," he said, "what

⁶ These were the very words of Antonius quoted by Cicero (*Ad Att.* xv. 20. xiv. 11). Cicero heard them and read them in the published speech of Antonius. Appian's report of Antonius' speech proves that he was a great actor and had ability. Cicero in the second Philippic would make us believe that he was a stupid man; but his behaviour after Caesar's death proved him to be more clever and cunning than Cicero and any of Cicero's friends. Shakspeare in his tragedy of Julius Caesar has seized the spirit of Antonius' speech; but his materials were taken from North's translation of Plutarch's Lives.

has been done appears to be the work of no man, but of a supernatural power: we must look to the present rather than to the past: there is danger of our old quarrels returning and of the best part of the citizens perishing. Let us then conduct this consecrated hero to the abodes of the blest, singing over him our national hymn and lamentations."

Here Antonius assuming a frenzied air, wrapped his garments round him that his hands might be more free, and like an actor on the stage he approached the couch where Caesar lay. He bent his head down, then he rose erect, addressed him as a god, and, to confirm the belief in his glorious deification, with uplifted hands and in rapid speech he enumerated his wars and victories, the nations which he had conquered, and the spoils which he had brought to the city; "he the only man who never was defeated by an enemy, the only man who avenged his country after the insult of three hundred years and struck down the savage barbarians who alone had attacked and burnt Rome." His voice changed: it had been loud and triumphant: it was now a voice of sorrow. He wept for his friend and lamented his unjust fate: he was ready to give his own life for Caesar. Moved by his passion he seized the robe of Caesar and waved it before the people, rent by the daggers of the murderers and stained with the Dictator's blood.

The spectators responded to the vehemence and the tears of the actor, and pity was followed by indignation. The music began: it breathed sorrow and compassion for the fate of him who had fallen a victim to treachery, who, in the words of the tragic poet Pacuvius, complained that he had pardoned his enemies only to make them his assassins.⁷

The multitude were ready for violence, and it was now the time to perform the last act of the play. There was hoisted above the bier a wax figure of Caesar: the body itself was not visible. The wax figure was worked by some machinery which turned it in all directions to the spectators. Three and twenty cruel wounds were observed on different parts of the body and on the face. The fury of the people now broke loose

⁷ Here Appian agrees with Suetonius (Caesar, c. 84) and expresses in Greek the verse of Pacuvius—

"Men' me servasse ut essent qui me perderent."

like a tempest : they tightened their dresses round their bodies and set to work. The murderers had seen the rising storm, and fled for their lives. While the savage mob were looking for conspirators, they met with the tribune Helvius Cinna, a friend of Caesar, who unfortunately bore the same name as the detested and detestable praetor Cinna. The name alone was enough, and the maddened rioters without listening to any explanation tore the unfortunate man to pieces and carried about the head on a spear. Torches were brought to fire the houses of the conspirators, and the house of one Bellienus a senator was destroyed ; but the houses were defended by slaves or others, and the neighbours, who would have suffered by the conflagration, persuaded the rabble to retire.

Some of the crowd proposed to burn Caesar's body in the Curia, where he was murdered ; and Appian incorrectly states that the Curia was burnt in the first outbreak. He also states that the crowd took Caesar's body to the Capitol with the intention of burning him there as a consecrated person near the statues of the gods, but being prevented by the priests from accomplishing this act of profanation, they carried the body back to the Forum, and placed it where the ancient palace of the kings was (p. 372, note 7). All at once two armed men set fire to the couch on which the body lay, and the crowd threw upon it dry sticks, the wood from the courts, the benches, and everything which came to hand. The pipers and stage actors, who had put on for the funeral their triumphal dresses, tore them off and pitched them into the flames ; the veteran soldiers threw in their arms and military decorations ; women and children their ornaments. The people watched all night by the burning pile, "where first," says Appian, "an altar was erected, and now there is a temple of Caesar, who is honoured as a god." Many strangers joined in the general sorrow, but chief of all the Jews, who on several successive nights crowded round the spot where the body of their benefactor was burnt. The ashes were collected by the Dictator's freedmen, and buried, as Tacitus seems to say, in the Campus Martius.

The murder of Caesar was a desperate attempt of a faction to recover the power which they had lost ; and if the conspi-

rators had been led by a man of ability, perhaps they might have succeeded. But Cicero soon saw that though "the tyrant" had fallen, "tyranny," as he said, still lived. The funeral of Caesar dispersed the conspirators, in a short time they left the neighbourhood of Rome, and the consul Antonius was temporary master. Caesar was dead, but about the end of April the new Caesar appeared at Rome, a youth who possessed ability, prudence, and boldness above his years. Caesar's death, as he himself predicted, was the beginning of fresh troubles for Rome, and civil war soon broke out again. All the conspirators came to a violent death; and in the next year Cicero perished by the hands of base assassins as Caesar had died, over whose death Cicero ignobly exulted. The triumvirate of Caesar Octavianus, Antonius, and Lepidus, after removing by murder and by civil war all their enemies and all whom they feared, divided among themselves the Roman empire. But their union was soon dissolved: the two weaker men Lepidus and Antonius were compelled to give way to the more prudent and unscrupulous Caesar. After the defeat of Antonius at Actium (B. C. 31) Caesar Octavianus again united the Roman empire. He died after a long and wise administration of his extensive dominions, and left to his successors a power which continued for many centuries. The first Caesar destroyed the Republic, which had been converted into a tyranny by a greedy aristocracy. The second Caesar converted the Republic into a Monarchy, not in name, but in fact.

The medal of Brutus, which has the cap of liberty on the reverse (p. 449), is mentioned by Eckhel under the head *Plactoria*, and described more fully under *M. Brutus* at the beginning of the series of Roman Emperors, vol. vi. p. 24, as Professor Lewis of Cork informs me. The full reading on the obverse is *BRVT IMP. . . L. PLAET CEST*. A young friend, H. W. Henfrey, also informs me that this medal is described in H. Cohen's work, tom i. Paris, 1859. One from the Duke of Northumberland's cabinet is described by Admiral Smyth. There are also three silver specimens of this medal in the British Museum, and one in gold, which is supposed to be a forgery. Mr. S. Addington of London has a fine silver specimen, for which he gave 27*l*.

CHAPTER XXXV.

CAESAR.

I do not propose to write a character of C. Julius Caesar. The drawing of characters is a kind of work which I do not greatly value; and it is unnecessary when we know the acts of a man's life from his early years to the day of his death. If sketches of character are made with great skill and strict regard to truth, they are pleasant to read; but the writer will mislead us, if he has not thought much and long about his subject, and has not well weighed the meaning of every word that he uses.¹ But I do propose to collect in a brief summary the principal facts which show us what Caesar was, and as he appears in this history, in which I have told the truth as far as we know it, and have told it with perfect impartiality.²

¹ One of the best delineations of character that I know is President Jefferson's character of George Washington, which I heard from the old man himself when he was past eighty. The character, as he wrote it, appears in Professor Tucker's *Life of Thomas Jefferson*, vol. ii. p. 384. Tucker, a man of ability and integrity, says of this sketch of Washington's character: "It has every appearance of candour, as it praises without extravagance, qualifies its commendations with caution and moderation, and does not blame at all." Washington, who established and administered honestly a new government, was far inferior as a general to Caesar, who only lived long enough to destroy an old constitution. As a man, the American was immeasurably superior to the Roman, whose career may be better compared with that of the first Napoleon, not Caesar's superior in military ability, and greatly below him in nobleness of character. Americans have however in the late unfortunate Civil War shown their military talent, and proved that they are equal to any of the nations of Europe, ancient or modern. See on characters, vol. i. 229.

² The story of Caesar begins in this work at vol. ii., chapter xxvi., and is

I shall add a few things to show more clearly the man's great and varied talents. His biographer Suetonius, and other writers will be the authority for these facts.

Caesar belonged to an ancient patrician family, and he himself traced his descent on the female side from king Ancus Marcius, and on the male side from the goddess Venus (vol. iii. p. 218). The family was not rich, and this may have been the reason why he was married or betrothed when he was very young to Cossutia the daughter of a rich Eques; but the husband and wife soon separated, and Caesar married Cornelia, the daughter of L. Cinna, consul B.C. 87, by whom he had a daughter Julia, his only child.

Caesar's features are known from busts, medals, and from gems, but all of them belong to the later part of his life. He was tall, of fair complexion, with well-formed limbs, and full lips: his eyes were black and lively.³ The likeness of Caesar from a bust in the Royal Museum of Berlin, prefixed to Rüstow's work,⁴ is most expressive and striking. Cicero says that his style of speaking was brilliant and frank; his voice, his gesture, and his person, dignified and noble.⁵ He managed a horse well, was skilful in the use of arms, a good swimmer, and capable of enduring great fatigue and privations in a campaign. His abstemious habits and his early training made him healthy and strong, though there seems to be no doubt that he sometimes suffered from epileptic fits, and that his health was impaired at the time of his death.

He was always very careful about his appearance, and when a young man was considered to be a kind of fop.⁶ His tunic reached down to his hands where it terminated in a fringe; and he wore his dress in a loose and flowing style, which made the dictator Sulla tell the Roman nobles that they must take care of this ill-girt boy. He kept his hair carefully cut and he shaved close. It was his fashion when he was young to

continued to his death B.C. 44. As to the time of his birth see vol. ii. p. 377, note.

³ Sueton. Caesar, c. 45.

⁴ Heerwesen und Kriegführung C. Julius Cäsars. There is a bust in the British Museum. There exists also a gem of Caesar by Dioscorides.

⁵ Brutus, c. 75.

⁶ Sueton. Caesar, 45. See vol. i. p. 63, and Virgil. Aen. ix. 616.

play with one finger in his hair, which was always well arranged. As he advanced in life, he became bald, which he attempted to disguise by combing his hair over the bald part, and he was much pleased when permission was given him by the Senate to conceal the want of hair by wearing a wreath of bay.

He loved neatness and cleanliness in all the arrangements of his household, though he appears to have lived in a plain way until his elevation to power, when he spent largely on gems, statues, and ancient pictures, for he was a man of taste. He was extravagant in expence for the purpose of buying his way to power when he was still a poor man, and still more extravagant, when he became rich, in expenditure on women, in gratifying the Roman populace, and in satisfying the demands of the greedy men who had helped him. He had in his house slaves of good manners and appearance, and he gave so much for them, that he was ashamed of entering the price in his books, though he was a very methodical man and kept his accounts well.'

Caesar lived at a time when morals were corrupted, and the foulest personal abuse and calumny were common, of which we have an example in Cicero's orations, though Cicero's habits in other respects were much better than those of most of his contemporaries. In those days men charged one another with the most abominable practices, and such charges were considered only a matter of joke. We never read of personal insults and abuse leading Romans to fight duels: they only showed their courage in war, and against their enemies. The residence of Caesar at the court of Nicomedes king of Bithynia, when he was a young man, was the foundation of imputations to the end of his life, and his enemies never ceased to charge him with vices, which seem to us quite inconsistent with his character, and we cannot believe them. If Suetonius tells the truth, Cicero in some of his letters recorded the foul charges against Caesar, of which he could know nothing except by common report, and even in the Senate he alluded to them, when Caesar was speaking in favour of Nysa, the daughter of Nicomedes. We cannot

⁷ Sueton. Caesar, 47.

wonder if M. Bibulus, Caesar's colleague in the consulship, attacked in the same way a man whom he could attack in no other.

There is better evidence and so much of it as to Caesar's licentious habits with women that we cannot refuse to receive it. Caesar was the general lover of all women, and committed adultery with some of the highest ladies in Rome, even with Mucia the wife of Cn. Pompeius when the husband was absent in the east; and yet he was afterwards closely united with Pompeius, and for political reasons gave him his daughter Julia to wife. But Caesar would not allow any imputations on his own wife, and he divorced his third wife Pompeia, because she was suspected in the matter of P. Clodius and the rites of the Bona Dea. During his campaigns he intrigued with women in the provinces, and with Cleopatra in Egypt. In the African war he is said to have committed adultery with the wife of his ally king Bogud, whom Suetonius calls a Mauritanian woman, though her name Eunoe is Greek, and she may have been of Greek origin. But Caesar never allowed pleasure to interfere with business; and if he was ever near being enslaved by a woman, it was by the voluptuous and fascinating young queen of Egypt. Caesar had always a wife: it was the fashion for the great Roman nobles to have one; and if a Roman wife was not satisfied with her husband's behaviour, she had the power of putting an end to the marriage. I have not been able to discover on what terms Caesar lived with his last wife, Calpurnia, but she did live with him to the day of his death, and if Plutarch (Caesar, c. 63) tells the truth, she may have been quite contented with her husband. She must have been well acquainted with Caesar's matrimonial infidelity; but perhaps she did not trouble herself about it, and perhaps she loved the successful soldier, who was too generous to behave unkindly to a woman, and, as we know with certainty, was a mild good-tempered man.

Writers do not agree about the time when Caesar formed the design of making himself master of Rome. It is certain however that he was ambitious to be the first man in the State, and that from an early age he sought the honours of Rome by intrigues, by bribery, and by a lavish expenditure of

money, which led to borrowing and to debt. Any man at Rome was welcome to money-lenders, if there was a prospect that he would be able to pay when he reached the highest places. Caesar attained in B.C. 63 the great office of Pontifex Maximus, or chief of religion in a State, where religion had long been used as a political instrument. Among the Romans the high officers of religion did not form a separate class: they were chosen from laymen, and it was enough for them to discharge religious functions in the usual way. The creed of the functionary was supposed to be that of the State, but it might be anything or nothing. Caesar in his public acts conformed to the ceremonies of religion, but he was certainly not superstitious, and, as I suppose, he had no religion. He sometimes speaks of the immortal gods as if he believed in their existence, but his God, if he had any, was Fortune: he speaks also in the third book of the Civil War of portents and wonders before the battle of Pharsalia, but he wrote in the sense of the common sort and not as Caesar. However let every man think of him in this matter as he chooses.

Spain was the first country in which Caesar exercised his great military talents as a general; and the consulship B.C. 59 was the first opportunity that he had of displaying his great capacity for intrigue and the management of civil affairs. His administration was bold and unscrupulous. He reduced his colleague Bibulus to insignificance and showed what his designs and his power were. When he obtained the proconsulship of Gallia Transalpina with Gallia Cisalpina and Illyricum he began his career of conquest over foreign enemies and his own country. He had before him a wide field and great opportunities for the exercise of his talents as a soldier and a general. In less than nine years he reduced the warlike Gauls, the old and formidable enemies of Rome, to absolute obedience, from the banks of the Lower Rhine to the Alps and the Pyrenees. By taking advantage of the divisions among the Gauls and by his unequalled military ability he subdued a country which comprehends more than modern France, and he plundered it without mercy. He, who was poor at Rome and a borrower, became rich enough to lend, to give, and to bribe those who kept him acquainted with the state of affairs in the

city and were his political agents. Among others he made use of M. Cicero as far as he could, and he employed in his army Cicero's brother Quintus. Those who would know what Gallia suffered from Caesar must read his Commentaries, where he has told us without any disguise how he treated a people whom he was resolved to subdue. In the midst of danger and great hazards he conducted his campaigns with a boldness, which sometimes appeared rashness, but he knew his own abilities and he could rely on the soldiers who loved him, for though his discipline was strict, he was liberal to his men, and he spared their lives whenever it was prudent. In fact these hardy soldiers were too valuable to be exposed to danger when there was not a reasonable certainty of defeating the Gauls. In cold and in heat, in summer and in winter when it was necessary, Caesar followed the enemy. He wasted their fields, he burnt their houses, he left them to perish without shelter and without food. He massacred all the chief men of the Veneti on a slight pretext, but he wished to strike terror into the people. He spared neither sex nor age: he sold his prisoners as slaves; and in one instance he cut off the hands of men who resisted, when he thought that Gallia was conquered and ought to acknowledge the defeat. He once wrote to Cicero, at the commencement of the Civil War, that he was not cruel; but he was cruel to foreign enemies and never spared them until he had compelled them to submission; and then he had the prudence to show them that they would gain more by obedience than by obstinate resistance.

In the Civil War B.C. 49 Caesar's conduct was generous: his great good sense and his natural mildness of character elevated him far above his mean, rapacious, and bloodthirsty opponents. His treatment of those whom he took in the Civil War was certainly guided by calculation and prudence, for he wished to convince the Romans that he would be a better master than Pompeius or any of his followers; but still his temper, at least to his countrymen, was most merciful and forbearing. He had one great quality which commands success. I do not remember any instance in his life after his elevation to the consulship in which he allowed anger and passion to prevail over judgment. He could overlook faults and crimes

when it was not prudent to punish, but he did not forget, and when the time came, he could inflict the penalty which was just.

It is little to say that he was a great general, that he was always vigilant, bold and even rash sometimes, for there are occasions when a general must run great risks, and this was so in the Civil War. But we must add that Caesar took great care of his men, that he looked well after his supplies, that he preferred conquering his enemy by cutting off their food, and he tried to save his soldiers and defeat the enemy with the least loss to himself, as a good general ought to do. He endured as much as he required endurance from his men, and he ran risks of personal danger whenever he thought that it was useful. The seventh campaign in Gallia is a lasting monument of his great talents for war and of his presence of mind and courage in the midst of danger. It is no great praise to speak of Caesar's courage; and yet there is a rare courage which never fails, and Caesar possessed it. There is no sign that he ever knew fear: the best proof of this is his dealing with his own soldiers when they mutinied. He who does not fear death can feel no other fear, unless he should fear pain and disgrace, which are worse than death.

Caesar, like some other Roman generals, was a man of letters, an excellent orator, and well versed in the writings of the Greeks: as a Roman he had a competent knowledge of law, and he discharged the functions of a judge with ease and ability: he had a turn for mechanics, astronomy, and for grammar, and a universal capacity, except perhaps for what we call philosophy, of which I find no exact notice. His literary occupations were continued during his campaigns and employed his leisure hours. He was the most diligent of men, always busy with something. Cicero gave the lawyer Trebatius a letter of introduction to Caesar during the Gallic campaign and asked him to find some employment for the man. Caesar replied kindly, and said that he was not yet very well acquainted with Trebatius, for he was too busy, but he expected to have the opportunity of knowing him better. Caesar had men of letters about him during his campaigns, and we suppose that he relieved the dulness of winter quarters

with their society and conversation. He kept two tables, at one of which he entertained his principal officers, and his Greek friends; at the other, distinguished Romans who might be visiting him or travelling, and the provincials of high rank. He must have had plenty to do in looking after his commissariat, raising money and troops among his Gallic allies, forming his plans and corresponding with his friends in Rome. But he found leisure to write also the history of his campaigns, to which he gave the modest title of *Commentarii*.^a

Caesar's Commentaries are a manual for a general, the best that was ever written. Many commanders have had their favourite books. Scipio Africanus the Younger was always reading Xenophon. Napoleon in his captivity at St. Helena dictated to Marchand his remarks on Caesar's Commentaries. "The late marshal Strozzi," says Montaigne,^b "who took Caesar for his model, without doubt made the best choice, for in truth Caesar's book ought to be the manual of every general, as it is the true and sovereign example of the military art: and God knows besides with what grace and with what beauty he has set off this rich material, with a manner of expression so pure, so delicate and so perfect that to my taste there are no writings in the world which can be compared with his in this respect."

Cicero^c says that Caesar spoke Latin perhaps best of all the Roman orators. He characterizes his *Commentarii* by comparing the style to a beautiful figure, naked, erect, graceful, and divested of all ornament. This description is perfectly true. He also says, "but while Caesar's design was that others might have something to their hand, if they had a mind to write history, perhaps he has accommodated the triflers who shall attempt to ornament his matter after the fashion of those who use the curling irons for the hair: he has certainly deterred all men of sound judgment from writing, for in history there

^a So they are named by Cicero, also in the Preface to the eighth book of the Gallic War, and by Suetonius. They are named by Strabo *ἱστορίαι*, and by the Greek translator of the Gallic War *ἱστορηματώματα*. Plutarch (Caesar, c. 22) names them *ἱστορηματῶδες*, and he clearly means the Commentaries. Compare the Gallic War, iv. 2.

^b Montaigne, *Essais*, livre ii. chap. 34, ed. C. Louandre.

^c Brutus, c. 72, 75.

is nothing more agreeable than brevity accompanied with simplicity and clearness." Fortunately Caesar's writings have escaped the bad luck of being converted into a history by an ancient historian. It would be equally unlucky if the plain simple narratives of the Gallic War and the Civil War should be presented by a modern historian in a modern dress, decorated with red and white, and with a touch from the curling irons.

Montaigne in his chapter on books (ii. 10) says, "The only good histories are those which have been written by men who directed the affairs of which they write, or who took a part in them, or at least have had the good luck to direct other affairs of the same kind." He speaks of a class of historians who spoil everything, who would chew the morsels for us, who assume to judge and consequently to bend the history to their own will. But at the same time he allows that there are good historians who are able to select what is worth being known, who can judge of two reports which is the more probable; who from the condition of princes and their humours deduce their counsels and assign to them appropriate words: they have a right to assume authority to regulate our belief, but certainly this belongs only to a few.—When Cicero (*Ad Fam.* v. 12) asked Lucceius to write the history of his consulship, he promised to supply him with all the matter (*commentarii rerum omnium*). We know what he wanted, a Roman history as he conceived the thing, a rhetorical work. Of all the men in the world Cicero would have written the worst history, though he could write a simple narrative wonderfully well when he chose. In the Preface to the first volume of this book I have stated Thomas Hobbes' notion of historical writing as he explains it in the Preface to his translation of Thucydides.²

² We have in modern times many specimens of historical writing, and some of them very good. Others are very bad. We have also many historical dissertations or essays on various historical matters, which in their nature are different from what we may name simply History; and many of these writings are excellent and most instructive.

Lingard's remarks (*History of England, Preliminary Notice*, ed. 1854) "on that which has been called the philosophy of history, but might with more propriety be termed the philosophy of romance" are strongly expressed; but they are just.

Caesar's business was the narrative of his campaigns, and he has omitted nearly everything which did not belong to his purpose. Yet even Caesar has added something to his work, which is of the character of a dissertation or episode, as in his chapters on Britannia, and on the customs and character of the Galli, and on the German nations. He might have told us a great deal more that we should have been glad to know about Gallia and the people, but this would not have been consistent with the purpose of his book or the man's severe taste. There is no doubt that both in the Gallic War and particularly in the Civil War Caesar has omitted many things which he did not choose to tell the world. In the Gallic War he has not mentioned the conference at Luca (vol. iv. p. 183). It was indeed no part of his Gallic campaign, but it was an important fact in the history of his designs upon his own country. In the Civil War (B. C. i. 33) he has not told us that he seized the money in the Roman treasury, which Pompeius had left there when he fled from Rome. He has however informed us of a mode of raising money during the Gallic war, which he perhaps often used. When he massacred the Senate of the Veneti, he sold the people; and in another case (B. C. ii. 33) he sold in one day 53,000 prisoners to the dealers who followed the army. We could not expect that he would tell us of all the ways of getting money which he employed, as Suetonius does, who charges him with plundering the Gallic temples of their wealth and offerings, and sacking the towns of Gallia. He collected immense sums of money in Gallia, which he used for his wars, and for the purpose of building at Rome, buying the support of partisans, rewarding his soldiers and furthering his ambitious designs. He did not admit the maxim that money makes the nerves of war, nor men either: men helped to get money, and money helped to maintain men. It is clear from all his life after he became proconsul of Gallia that he was the most unscrupulous money-collector that was ever at the head of an army; and after the defeat of Pompeius he enriched himself and his friends by confiscating the property of those who had been his greatest enemies.³

³ Sueton. Caesar, c. 54.

Asinius Pollio "thinks that the *Commentarii* of Caesar were written with little care and no exact regard to truth, since Caesar for the most part inconsiderately gave credit to what was done by others, and as to his own acts either purposely or from defect of memory stated them inaccurately; and he thinks that Caesar would have written them over again and corrected them;" if he had lived, I suppose. The best answer to Pollio is a study of Caesar's books. Caesar must have received the report of what was done by others, Galba for instance, P. Crassus, and Labienus, from these commanders. Now the account of what these generals did is particularly clear as to circumstance, time, and place. Caesar's narrative of Curio's defeat in Africa, whoever furnished the report, is told well, with great impartiality, and with a generous regard to the unfortunate young commander whose rashness cost him his life, and caused Caesar great trouble. Caesar's own acts are told in the simplest form without any exaggeration. He reports his own losses and defeats, and he who has followed him over any part of the ground which he describes, knows that he has marked the places so clearly that you know them as soon as you see them. Caesar instead of being careless was most diligent and exact, and his own work is an evidence of his veracity. How could Caesar have corrected his campaigns, if either purposely or from defect of memory he had stated them inaccurately? If he purposely had stated them inaccurately, what should have induced him to correct that which he had purposely stated falsely; and how would defect of memory be improved by the lapse of time? Pollio in this attack on Caesar's accuracy and veracity has been followed by some modern critics, but they have had their answer; and the *Commentarii* on the Gallic war still remain a monument of Caesar's ability, veracity, and good taste; a book dull enough to boys, if masters will not sufficiently explain it by making their pupils well acquainted with the geography of the country,⁴ and tiresome to all readers who will not take the labour necessary to understand it. Among the great number of illustrious

⁴ I say nothing here of the books on the Civil War. I have spoken of them already (pp. 1, 2, and in many other places). They are not a fit subject for boys to work at.

scholars whose names are known, I have found few who have carefully studied the first of Roman writers.

The two roads to distinction at Rome were oratory and military ability; and Caesar was both a soldier and an orator. Quintilian⁵ says "that if Caesar had devoted himself to the Forum only, no other Roman orator could have been named as a rival to Cicero: he possessed so much force, such acuteness, and liveliness, that it appears that he spoke with the same energy with which he fought, and his oratory was adorned with a wonderful elegance of language to which he gave particular attention." His first oration, which was against Cn. Dolabella, who was charged with the offence of *Repetundae* in Macedonia, was spoken when Caesar was still a very young man (vol. ii. p. 444). Dolabella was acquitted, but Caesar's prosecution was the foundation of his reputation as an orator. Caesar's orations were not collected by himself, and though they were extant, or some of them at least, long after his death, we have only a few fragments. The speech, which Sallustius (*Catil. c. 51*) attributes to Caesar when he spoke of the punishment of the conspirators in B.C. 63, is generally supposed to be the historian's own composition (vol. iii. p. 333). There seem to have been orations attributed to Caesar which were not genuine; and this was the opinion of Octavianus Augustus as to the speeches to his soldiers in the second Spanish war, of which there were two extant. If this were true, falsification began early. There are a few short addresses of Caesar to his men in the *Commentaries*. The titles of his orations and the few fragments of them have been collected by H. Meyer (*Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta*, 1842).

During his campaigns Caesar kept up a constant correspondence with his friends in Rome; and in the time of Suetonius and even as late as the time of Appian, there were extant letters of Caesar to Cicero, and to others about his private affairs. All the letters are lost except the few which are preserved in the collection of Cicero's letters. Some of these letters are good examples of Caesar's brief, rapid, and

⁵ 10, 1, 114.

forcible style. Plinius the elder reports⁶ that he was accustomed, as he expresses it, "to write and read at the same time, to dictate and to listen; to dictate four letters at a time to his copyists, or, if he was not employed about other things, even seven." This seems rather extravagant. There were also extant in the time of Suetonius, Caesar's reports or letters to the Senate, which it is said that he was the first who wrote on pages and in the form of a memorandum book (*memorialis libelli*), though it had been the practice of consuls and generals to write only on one side of the writing material.

Caesar's work entitled *Anticato* or *Anticatones*, the attack on Cato, who killed himself in Utica, has been already mentioned (p. 410).

Caesar wrote also two books, entitled *De Analogia ad M. Ciceronem*, or as Cicero terms it "*de ratione Latine loquendi*," a treatise on Latin grammar. His taste in writing was pure and simple, and the loss of this work is a matter for regret. He wrote this work, as Suetonius says, during the Gallic war, when he used to cross the Alps northwards after holding his courts in Gallia Cisalpina.

Caesar, who was *Pontifex Maximus* and used to make himself master of all subjects that he was employed about, wrote *Libri Auspiciozum*, of which the sixteenth book is mentioned. Perhaps the *Auguralia* is only another name for the same work. Suetonius also speaks of a treatise entitled *Divinatio* (Caesar, c. 55).

A treatise on Astronomy is mentioned by Macrobius (*Saturn.* i. 16), to which the elder Plinius (18. c. 25 &c.) also refers. Caesar had paid some attention to astronomy, which his reformation of the Calendar proves.

Caesar also wrote some poems, when he was young, of which are mentioned "*Laudes Herculis*," and a tragedy named "*Oedipus*." He also wrote a poem named "*Iter*" or the Journey, when he was going from Rome into Hispania Ulterior in the last Spanish war.

Cicero (*Ad Fam.* ix. 16) speaks of Caesar's collection of

⁶ Plinius, H. N. 17. c. 25.

good sayings under the name of *Ἀποφθέγματα*, which appears to be the same work which Suetonius names *Dicta Collectanea*, though he seems to suppose that it was a youthful work ; and he adds that Augustus in the very short and simple letter, which he wrote to Pompeius Macer, to whom he had entrusted the arrangement of the libraries in Rome, would not allow the *Laudes Herculis*, the *Oedipus*, and the *Dicta Collectanea* to be published. But Cicero's letter proves that Caesar was still adding to his collection in B. C. 46.

The fragments of Caesar's works are collected in Oudendorp's edition of Caesar (vol. ii. 989).

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